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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates four interrelated research issues in the context of takeover 
likelihood modelling. These include: (1) the determinants of target firms’ takeover 
likelihood, (2) the extent to which targets can be predicted using publicly available 
information, (3) whether target prediction can form the basis of a profitable investment 
strategy, and – if not – (4) why investing in predicted targets is a suboptimal investment 
strategy. The research employs a UK sample of 32,363 firm-year observations (consisting 
of 1,635 target and 31,737 non-target firm-year observations) between 1988 and 2010.  
 
Prior literature relies on eight (old) hypotheses for modelling takeover likelihood – 
determinants of takeover likelihood. Consistent with prior studies, I find that takeover 
likelihood increases with the availability of free cash flow (Powell (1997, 2001, 2004)), the 
level of tangible assets (Ambrose and Megginson (1992)) and management inefficiency 
(Palepu (1986)), but decreases with firm age (Brar et al. (2009)). The empirical evidence 
lends no support to the firm undervaluation, industry disturbance, growth-resource 
mismatch or firm size hypotheses (Palepu (1986)). I extend prior research by developing 
eleven (new) hypotheses for target prediction. Consistent with the new hypotheses, I find 
evidence that takeover likelihood is an inverse U-shaped function of firm size, leverage 
and payroll burden. Takeover likelihood also increases with share repurchase activity, 
market liquidity and stock market performance and decreases with industry concentration. 
As anticipated, the new hypotheses improve the within-sample classification and out-of-
sample predictive abilities of prior takeover prediction models.  
 
This study also contributes to the literature by exploring the effects of different 
methodological choices on the performance of takeover prediction models. The analyses 
reveal that the performance of prediction models is moderated by different modelling 
choices. For example, I find evidence that the use of longer estimation windows (e.g., a 
recursive model), as well as, portfolio selection techniques which yield larger holdout 
samples (deciles and quintiles) generally result in more optimal model performance. 
Importantly, I show that some of the methodological choices of prior researchers (e.g., a 
one-year holdout period and a matched-sampling methodology) either directly biases 
research findings or results in suboptimal model performance. Additionally, there is no 
evidence that model parameters go stale, at least not over a ten-year out-of-sample test 
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period. Hence, the parameters developed in this study can be employed by researchers and 
practitioners to ascribe takeover probabilities to UK firms. 
 
Despite the new model’s success in predicting targets, I find that, consistent with the 
market efficiency hypothesis, predicted target portfolios do not consistently earn 
significant positive abnormal returns in the long run. That is, despite the high target 
concentrations achieved, the portfolios generate long run abnormal returns which are not 
statistically different from zero. I extend prior literature by showing that these portfolios 
are likely to achieve lower than expected returns for five reasons. First, a substantial 
proportion of each predicted target portfolio constitutes type II errors (i.e., non-targets) 
which, on average, do not earn significant positive abnormal returns. Second, the portfolios 
tend to hold a high number of firms that go bankrupt leading to a substantial decline in 
portfolio returns. Third, the presence of poorly-performing small firms within the 
portfolios further dilutes its returns. Fourth, targets perform poorly prior to takeover bids 
and this period of poor performance coincides with the portfolio holding period. Fifth, 
targets that can be successfully predicted tend to earn lower-than-expected holding period 
returns, perhaps, due to market-wide anticipation. 
 
Overall, this study contributes to the literature by developing new hypotheses for takeover 
prediction, by advancing a more robust methodological framework for developing and 
testing prediction models and by empirically explaining why takeover prediction as an 
investment strategy is, perhaps, a suboptimal strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Typically, organisations undergo some form of restructuring during their life time. Merger 
and acquisition activity (M&A, henceforth) substantially impacts on participating firms 
and their stakeholders (including investors, competitors, management, employees, 
communities and regulators) over several years. It is generally thought that M&A is 
pursued by firms in search of synergies or by entrenched managers seeking to serve their 
own interests. Nonetheless, ‘synergy’ and ‘managerial self-interest’ are illusive or, at best, 
multidimensional constructs. Beneath these constructs, little can be said about what drives 
the phenomenon or whether some firms are more likely to be involved in M&A activity 
than others.  
 
Indeed, there are several reasons why understanding this phenomenon is important for 
different stakeholders. Some of these reasons are highlighted here but discussed in more 
detail in section 2.3. Policy makers are responsible for enacting a regulatory framework to 
guide M&A activity and for assessing the desirability of proposed mergers. Understanding 
why this activity occurs and the motivations of the parties involved is critical to making an 
informed decision. ‘Is my firm a takeover target?’ is possibly a key question that resonates 
with many managers, given the recurrent finding that executives of acquired firms are 
typically ousted. While target executives might shun takeovers, target investors typically 
benefit – earn substantial abnormal returns – from M&A activity (see, for example, Franks 
and Harris (1989) and Georgen and Renneboog (2003)). This established finding motivates 
the next question. ‘Is identifying and investing in potential targets the recipe of a winning 
investment strategy for the investment community?’  
 
These are clearly important questions for both researchers and practitioners. Indeed, a 
number of attempts have been made to address these questions. Nonetheless, the literature 
is riddled with several gaps and a general lack of consensus – something this research aims 
to address. This thesis investigates four interrelated research issues: (1) the determinants of 
target firms’ takeover likelihood, (2) the extent to which targets can be predicted using 
publicly available information, (3) whether target prediction can form the basis of a 
2 
 
profitable investment strategy, and – if not – (4) why investing in predicted targets is, 
perhaps, a suboptimal investment strategy.  
 
The first question aims to shed light on the different motives of takeovers by focusing on 
the profile of takeover targets. The objective is to understand what factors differentiate 
potential targets from non-targets. As will be discussed further in section 1.2, the fact that 
little is known about the characteristics of takeover target has been highlighted by prior 
studies (e.g., Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell (1997)). As will be discussed in 
section 1.4.2, this thesis extends prior literature by proposing and testing new hypotheses 
on the characteristics of targets. The second question is empirical in nature. It assesses 
whether improved knowledge of the characteristics of targets (obtained from the first 
research question) can support the development of a model which can predict future 
targets. As will be discussed in section 1.4.3, this thesis directly contributes to the area by 
introducing methodological improvements for developing and testing target prediction 
models.  
 
The third research question focuses on takeover prediction from an investor’s perspective. 
The objective is to evaluate whether investors can earn abnormal returns by investing in 
predicted targets. The efficient market hypothesis (further discussed in section 2.4) 
suggests that investing in a portfolio of predicted targets is unlikely to yield abnormal 
returns for investors as share prices reflect takeover probability. Therefore, the third 
research question also serves as a test of the efficient market hypothesis. Assuming that the 
market is efficient (as per the third research question), the fourth research question focuses 
on understanding how the efficient market hypothesis unfolds in this setting. That is, it 
seeks to explain why portfolios of predicted targets earn normal returns even though 
targets within such portfolios earn substantial abnormal returns. 
 
Section 1.2 contextualises the study by briefly summarising the body of research on 
takeover prediction modelling in order to highlight the main gaps in the literature and 
illustrate how the current research fits within and contributes to the research area. A 
majority of related research has been conducted using samples of US firms. The thesis 
employs a UK sample of 32,363 firm-year observations (consisting of 1,638 target firm-
year observations and 30,725 non-target firm-year observations) between 1988 and 2010. 
The development of the sample is fully discussed in section 4.2. The goal of section 1.3 is 
to discuss why the UK institutional context is an equally valid (or even a better) setting for 
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takeover prediction modelling when compared with the US. Section 1.3 also reviews the 
UK takeover market and its underlying regulatory context. 
 
1.2 Background of current research 
Several studies use the takeover market as a context to explore different hypotheses and 
theories in finance. Prior studies have explored the drivers of the takeover decision such as 
role of firm asset structure (Ambrose and Megginson (1992)), cash management policy 
(Powell (1997)) and management performance (Hasbrouck (1985)), amongst others. These 
studies improve our understanding of the characteristics of takeover targets and the factors 
that make certain firms attractive to bidders. Attempts to empirically quantify the 
vulnerability of different firms to takeovers can be seen as a natural extension to this 
literature. Studies such as Vance (1969) and Palepu (1986) pool together the cross section 
of characteristics of takeover targets to develop takeover vulnerability assessment models. 
These risk assessment models have increasingly become popular – perhaps, a spill-over 
effect of the success of bankruptcy prediction models such as Altman’s Zeta (Altman 
(1968)).  
 
The major theoretical developments in the area of takeover prediction modelling have been 
in terms of advancing (and testing) theory-based hypotheses on the factors that 
differentiate takeover targets from non-targets. These hypotheses are generally referred to 
as ‘prediction hypotheses’. Palepu (1986) advanced five key prediction hypotheses 
(including: the inefficient management hypothesis, growth-resource mismatch hypothesis, 
firm undervaluation hypothesis, industry disturbance hypothesis and the firm size 
hypothesis) which have been adopted across the literature. Ambrose and Megginson 
(1992), Powell (1997) and Brar et al. (2009) augment this list of hypotheses by advancing 
the tangible assets hypotheses, the free cash flow hypotheses and firm age hypotheses, 
respectively. These hypotheses are fully discussed in chapter 3. The set of eight hypotheses 
forms the framework used by a majority of prior studies for the development of takeover 
prediction models.  
 
Despite its growing popularity, the target prediction literature is fraught with 
inconsistencies and several apparent gaps. These inconsistencies and gaps in the literature 
are discussed in chapter 2. Nonetheless, three of these gaps which initially motivated this 
study, are worth mentioning at this stage. First, the characteristics of targets are not fully 
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known or understood. As will be discussed in chapter 2, the characteristics appear to vary 
both across samples (countries, settings and industries) and over time. This dynamism 
coupled with the fragmented nature of the literature has made the development of a reliable 
takeover target profile an onerous task. Second, the prediction framework used in prior 
studies, perhaps, tends to over-simplify the strategic motives surrounding the takeover 
decision. Prior studies have used different combinations of the eight prediction hypotheses 
(noted above) to develop target prediction models which aim to capture the thought 
process and motivations of managers engaged in acquisitions. It is clearly unlikely that 
these eight hypotheses comprehensively reflect the complexities in the M&A decision
1
. 
Third, the methodologies used by prior researchers to develop and test prediction models 
are not robust and can be substantially improved. Some of these methodological 
weaknesses are discussed in section 2.6 and explored in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The lack of 
robustness and consistency in prior research frustrates efforts to explore any of the 
pertinent research issues (discussed in section 1.1) using results from prior research.  
 
This study seeks to develop a model that uses publicly available information to predict 
firms that will attract takeover bids in the future. Its underlying assumption is that targets 
are not arbitrarily selected by bidders i.e., bidders choose their targets strategically to meet 
certain objectives. If the choice of targets is arbitrary then, it is unlikely that targets can be 
predicted. It can also be reasonably assumed that bidders’ strategic objectives might 
change from one point in time to another, shaped by industry dynamics and external 
macroeconomic conditions. If this is the case, a key part of this modelling exercise is to 
understand the objectives of bidding firms so as to identify those general conditions (firm 
characteristics, industry dynamics and macroeconomic environments) that make some 
firms suitable targets to an average bidder in certain periods. The natural starting point for 
such analyses is the theory on why takeovers occur, why firms are acquired and what 
factors potential moderate the decision to engage in takeover activity (explored in chapter 
3). If these characteristics, their dynamics and interrelationships can be identified, the 
profile of a typical target can be developed. Predicting potential targets therefore will be 
consistent with identifying firms which share the profile of a typical target.  
 
                                                 
1 This contention is supported by evidence from the general corporate restructuring literature. For 
example, Powell and Yawson (2007) show that these hypotheses are also useful in modelling other 
restructuring events including bankruptcies, divestitures, and layoffs. The implication of this 
finding is that this framework is generalist and hence unlikely to be an optimal framework for 
takeover likelihood modelling. 
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As cited above and discussed further in section 2.3, takeover likelihood modelling is of 
relevance to different stakeholders. Given the consensus that takeover targets gain 
enormously from takeover activity, prior studies focus on the relevance of takeover 
likelihood modelling to investors. Studies (such as Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), Powell 
(2001, 2004) and Brar et al. (2009)) investigate the extent to which prediction models can 
identify suitable investment opportunities for investors. A majority of prior studies have 
been conducted using US firms. A UK sample is selected for the current study. The next 
section explains the underlying rationale for this choice and discusses some of the relevant 
and unique characteristics of the UK institutional context which makes it an optimal setting 
for investigating firm-specific factors that drive the takeover decision. 
 
1.3 The UK institutional context 
1.3.1 Overview 
The differences between the shareholder (Anglo-American) and stakeholder (Continental 
Europe and Japan) corporate governance systems have been used to explain the cross-
sectional differences between countries, in terms of firm financing (capital structure), firm 
ownership (banks versus shareholder model), and the role of the market for corporate 
control, amongst others (Aguilera et al. (2006)). Prior research, generally, assumes 
homogeneity under each of these categories. In the case of the shareholder institutional 
systems (which predominates in the UK and US), this homogeneity argument is not 
unfounded as the UK and the US, for example, share more similarities than differences 
from a corporate governance perspective (Miller (2000) and Renneboog et al. (2007)). The 
tendency has been for empirical results and conclusions obtained in the US to be 
extrapolated and used for making inferences in the UK.  
 
In terms of takeover prediction and target characteristics modelling, a majority of studies 
(see, for example, Palepu (1986), Bartley and Boardman (1986, 1990), Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992), Walter (1994), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), Cremers et al. (2009) 
and De and Jindra (2012), amongst others) have focused on a US context for obvious 
reasons – primarily, a large sample size, data availability, a well-developed capital market, 
an active takeover market and the potential for research impact. Only a handful of studies 
have investigated these issues in the UK context. In fact, with the exception of studies by 
Barnes (1990, 1998, 1999, 2000), Powell (1997, 2001, 2004)) and Powell and Yawson 
(2007) which employ the UK context, most studies in the area focus on the US context.  
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This study focuses on the UK for two main reasons. First, the UK (like the US) has an 
active takeover market (further discussed in section 1.3.4). Evidence provided by 
Sudasanam (2003) confirms that the US and UK have historically been the largest and 
most active takeover markets. This large sample allows for empirical validity of analysis 
and relevance (or generalisability) of research results. Second, the UK, perhaps, presents a 
unique institutional context for understanding the factors (firm observable characteristics) 
that drive takeovers. Despite the many similarities between the UK and US, the two 
contexts differ substantially in terms of takeover regulatory regimes (see Miller (2000), 
Toms and Wright (2005), Williams and Conley (2005), and Armour et al. (2007)). In 
section 1.2.2, I discuss the divergence of US and UK takeover regulations. In section 1.2.3, 
I explain why, of the two countries, the UK provides a cleaner context for modelling 
takeover likelihood and understanding the characteristics of takeover targets. In section 
1.2.4, I discuss the historical M&A trends in the UK. 
1.3.2 The divergence of US and UK regulations 
The differences between the US and UK takeover regulation, as well as, the origins of 
these differences, have been discussed in contemporary legal literature (see, for example, 
Johnston (2007) and Armour et al. (2007, 2011)). The implications of such differences on 
the modelling of takeovers and the generalisation of empirical conclusions have been 
ignored in the accounting and finance literature. The legal literature generally suggests that 
the two contexts (UK and US) are startlingly different in their regulation of unsolicited 
tender offers, both in mode and substance.  
 
As discussed in Armour et al. (2011), the 1968 Williams Act is the key US takeover 
regulation. It imposes important disclosure and procedural requirements for tender offers 
for US firms but (deliberately) fails to regulate the conduct of target boards in responding 
to and resisting takeover bids (Armour et al. (2011), p. 241).  Different US states have 
tended to regulate takeovers differently, with two key dichotomies arising. While some 
states (such as California and Texas) have no formal antitakeover laws, other states (such 
as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Delaware) are noted for their 
protectionist-type policies (Karpoff and Malatesta (1990), Armour et al. (2007, 2011)). 
Karpoff and Malatesta (1990) find that over 35 US states use a combination of control-
share acquisition, fair-price and freeze-out laws, which deter bidders from attempting 
hostile acquisitions. In addition, some states explicitly allow target management to mount 
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appropriate takeover defences. In reference to the Delaware
2
 law, Armour et al. (2011) 
note that ‘where a target board has reason to regard a hostile bid as a threat to legitimate 
corporate policy and shareholder interests, the board has both the power and the duty to 
interpose itself between the offeror and the shareholders and, where necessary, take 
defensive measures that are not disproportionate to the threat’ (p. 243). This regulatory 
approach (which appears to be shared by other states) gives the board the power to set up 
pre-bid and post-bid defensive strategies to fend-off unsolicited tender offers. Here, the 
regulation gives management and not the shareholders, the responsibility of deciding 
whether a takeover should proceed. 
 
The approach to M&A regulation in the UK is much different. M&A in the UK is 
regulated by the City Code, issued by the Takeover Panel. A key distinguishing feature of 
the City Code is that it ‘mandates strict neutrality of target boards, prohibits directors from 
installing defensive measures without shareholder approval, and imposes a mandatory rule 
requiring bidders that acquire over thirty percent of the target company’s voting rights to 
extend the offer to all shares of all classes subject to the offer’ (Armour et al. (2011), p. 
243). Some of these distinguishing features are specified in General Principle 3
3
 and Rule 
21
4
 of the City Code. 
 
There is thus a clear regulatory divergence between the UK and US, with the US (or UK) 
system placing the ultimate responsibility for deciding on the merits of a takeover on 
management (or shareholders). This has implications on the role of the market for 
corporate control in monitoring management performance. Possibly, the US system of 
regulation entrenches inefficient management teams by protecting management from 
outside corrective forces or an active takeover market (Karpoff and Malatesta (1990)). 
                                                 
2 The antitakeover regulation in the state of Delaware is particularly important as a large 
proportion of US firms are incorporated in Delaware (Amour et al. (2011)). 
3 General Principle 3 states that, ‘The board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the 
company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the 
merits of the bid.’ 
4 Rule 21 states that, ‘During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if the board 
of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board 
must not, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting: (a) take any action which 
may result in any offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied 
the opportunity to decide on its merits; or (b) (i) issue any shares or transfer or sell, or agree to 
transfer or sell, any shares out of treasury; (ii) issue or grant options in respect of any unissued 
shares; (iii) create or issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares; (iv) sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of 
or acquire, assets of a material amount; or (v) enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary 
course of business.’ 
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These differences are also likely to have substantial implications on takeover prediction 
modelling. In section 1.3.3, I discuss how these regulatory differences, potentially, makes 
the UK an optimal sample for studying the effect of observable firm characteristics on firm 
takeover likelihood. 
1.3.3 The effect of antitakeover provisions on prediction modelling  
Takeover target modelling involves identifying firm (observable) characteristics and the 
enabling environments (such as the level of economic growth) which spur bidders to make 
bids for these firms at certain periods. In this section, I argue that the UK (as compared to 
the US) provides a cleaner context for takeover likelihood modelling. As will be discussed 
in section 2.5, firm financial characteristics and market/macroeconomic variables, which 
are both readily observable, can be used to capture time-varying firm and environmental 
characteristics. Under the general assumption that takeovers are non-random events
5
, the 
likelihood of a firm (i) becoming a target (or receiving a takeover bid) in a period (T) can 
be modelled as a function of its characteristics (  ) in the most recent period (T–1) in 
which these are observable.  
        (     )            ( ) 
 
Even though the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) posits that target managers 
are inclined to shun takeovers and protect their interest, empirical research on target 
prediction has ignored the implication of this tendency on takeover likelihood modelling. 
When the ability of management to shun takeovers is restricted (e.g., by regulation such as 
in the UK as discussed in section 1.3.2), this empirical assumption is, perhaps, valid. When 
this is not the case (e.g., when state laws allow for the protection of incumbents such as in 
the US as discussed in section 1.3.2), there is unlikely to be a clear relationship between 
firm characteristics and takeover likelihood. Here, takeover likelihood will be partly 
influenced by firm observable characteristics ( ), the applicable antitakeover laws6 ( ), the 
target’s existing (pre-bid) takeover defences ( ) and the target’s likely response to a 
takeover approach ( ). 
 
        (                      )            ( ) 
 
                                                 
5 That is, the identification of targets is a systematic process and bidders select targets that will 
allow them to achieve a certain objective. 
6These laws could include control share acquisition laws, fair price laws and freeze-out laws 
(Karpoff and Malatesta (1990)) 
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This relationship is enforced by the fact that bidders incur substantial search and 
negotiation costs (e.g., fees to advisers, investment bankers, consultants, and due diligence 
checks required to identify and bid for suitable targets) and face negative repercussions 
from unsuccessful takeover bids
7
. In an environment where bidders have the option of 
selecting between alternative equally-suitable potential takeover targets, protected firms 
(i.e., firms in states with antitakeover amendments) as well as defensive firms (i.e., firms 
with pre-bid defence strategies and likelihood of staging a post-bid defence) are likely to 
face a lower takeover threat, all things being equal. In such a context therefore, a firm’s 
takeover likelihood will not only depend on its observable financial (and related 
environmental) characteristics, but also on both the level of legal protection it enjoys ( ), 
its defences against takeovers ( ) and its perceived management-response to takeover bids 
( ).  
 
Some US studies (such as Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Cremers et al. (2009)) 
have attempted to capture these extra dimensions by including proxies for board behaviour 
when modelling the incidence of takeovers. For example, Cremers et al. (2009) include the 
governance index (G-index) developed by of Gompers et al. (2003) to capture the likely 
behaviour of firms faced with takeover threats
8
. The G-index has also been used in other 
US studies (see, for example, Cremers and Nair (2005), Masulis et al. (2007) and Ferreira 
and Laux (2007)) as a proxy for the level of antitakeover provisions (or takeover 
protection) within firms.  Nonetheless, the index only captures two of three unknowns in 
equation 1.3.3(2) – the level of legal protection it enjoys ( ) and pre-bid defence strategies 
( ). Post-bid defence strategies (such as ligation, solicitation of white knights, greenmail, 
standstill agreements, Pac-Man defence, employee stock ownership plans, share 
repurchases, recapitalisations, corporate restructuring, amongst others) are likely to have a 
greater impact as they constitute a tailored response by a target. Nonetheless, these post-
bid responses cannot be reasonably modelled a priori with any level of accuracy, and are 
frequently assumed to be a stochastic error (albeit without justification).  
 
Equation 1.2.3(1) clearly presents a simpler modelling framework if the research objective 
is to understand     – the characteristics of firms that make them susceptible to takeover 
                                                 
7 Bradley et al. (1983), for example, finds that bidders in failed bids generate negative abnormal 
returns, particularly when the target is acquired by a rival bidder. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) also 
find evidence consist with an argument that managers are punished for poor acquisitions. 
8 Consistent with the argument in this section, Cremers et al. (2009) finds that a firm’s takeover 
probability decreases when it has antitakeover provisions in its corporate governance framework. 
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bids. In this framework the relationship between     and     is free from the confounding 
effects of       . I therefore argue that the UK potentially provides a cleaner context to 
understand this relationship. In section 1.3.4, I discuss some of the takeover trends in the 
UK. The objective of this discussion is to highlight both the level and the dynamism of 
takeover activity in the UK. 
1.3.4 Takeover trends in the UK 
The UK is one the world’s most active takeover markets, only second to the US, both in 
terms of the number and the value of deals (Sudarsanam (2003)). Prior research reveals 
that an estimated 40% (or 33%) of UK listed firms between 1948 and 1970 (or between 
1975 and 1990) were involved (as targets) in takeover activity (Dickerson et al. (2003)). 
This level of takeover activity is also corroborated by evidence provided by Sudarsanam 
(2003). This evidence shows that the second half of the 1960’s saw an acceleration of 
merger activity which led to a first peak in 1968 (value of mergers; £1.95bn), a second 
peak in 1972 (value of mergers; £2.50bn) and a third peak in 1989 (value of mergers; 
£27bn). This indicates a substantial increase both in terms of number and value of mergers 
between 1968 and 1989. Merger activity in the UK continued to grow in the 1990s despite 
an initial slump in the early 1990’s, with the growth in value outstripping the growth in 
number. The number and value of mergers grew by 28.75% (from 2,078 to 2,675) and 
378.8% (from £47.2bn to £226.0bn), respectively, between 1989 and 2000 (Sudarsanam 
(2003)). Data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS, UK) shows that the growth in 
UK merger activity persisted between 2001 and 2007. Figure 1.3.4 shows trends in number 
and value of UK M&A between 1986 and 2011. 
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Figure 1.3.4: M&A trends in the UK between 1986 and 2011 
 
Notes: Data on expenditure represents the sum of inward and domestic expenditure on M&A 
activity within the UK. All M&A activity (private and public) involving firms with value of £1 
million or greater are considered. The data for this analysis is obtained from the UK Office of 
National Statistics online database (ONS (2012)). The left hand scale is the expenditure on UK 
M&A (in billions of pounds) and the right hand scale is the number of UK acquisitions. The 
expenditure on UK M&A is not adjusted for inflation.  
 
The figure shows that the value of M&A has substantially grown over time despite a slight 
slump in the number of transactions. This can, perhaps, be attributed to the emergence of 
several mega-deals especially during the 1997–2000 dotcom boom. UK M&A slowed 
post-2000 but resurged after 2003 to another peak in 2007. The post-2007 decline in 
merger activity is generally attributed to the 2007 credit crunch and global financial crisis. 
This historical evidence highlights the active nature of the UK M&A market justifying 
why it presents a good case for M&A research. The sheer value of investment in UK M&A 
activity also highlights its importance to the investment community and to the economy as 
a whole.  
1.3.5 Summary 
This study employs a UK institutional context to pursue the research objectives. In this 
section (section 1.3), I discuss two main motivations for this choice. First, the UK has an 
active takeover market which (based on prior empirical evidence) is only second to the US. 
Second, unlike the US, the UK institutional and regulatory context allows for a better 
understanding (and modelling) of the relationship between a firm’s characteristics and it 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
M&A Trends in the UK 
Number of Acquisitions Expenditure on UK M&A (£bn)
12 
 
takeover vulnerability. Overall, the UK provides a rich and clean context for understanding 
and modelling the firm-related factors that drive the takeover decision. 
 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
1.4.1 Overview 
As noted in section 1.1, this thesis investigates four interrelated research issues including: 
(1) the determinants of target firms’ takeover likelihood, (2) the extent to which targets can 
be predicted using publicly available information, (3) whether target prediction can form 
the basis of a profitable investment strategy, and – if not – (4) why investing in predicted 
targets is a suboptimal investment strategy. The Palepu (1986) model (together with the 
eight prediction hypotheses, noted in section 1.2) is used as a starting point. I build on this 
model by improving the underlying empirical methods and by increasing the set of 
predictive hypotheses to more fully capture the characteristics of takeover targets and 
enabling environments. The outcome is the development of an improved yet simple model 
which better explains the underlying reasons for target selection and which better allows 
users to predict what firms will be subject to takeover bids in the future. Overall, the thesis 
contributes in four main areas including: (1) characteristics of targets, (2) the takeover 
prediction modelling methodology, (3) investing in predicted targets, and (4) issues with 
predicted targets portfolios. These contributions are discussed below. 
 
1.4.2 Characteristics of takeover targets 
One of the objectives of this study is to expand our understanding of the characteristics of 
takeover targets by developing and testing new prediction hypotheses. I advance eleven 
new theoretically-grounded hypotheses for takeover prediction, which combine with the 
current (eight) hypothesis to provide a more comprehensive takeover target profile. These 
hypotheses are referred as ‘new’ because, to my knowledge, this is the first time the 
hypotheses are used in takeover prediction research. These new hypotheses are the: (1) 
firm size hypothesis, (2) firm capital structure hypothesis, (3) financial distress hypothesis, 
(4) firm lifecycle hypothesis, (5) M&A rumours hypothesis, (6) payroll synergies 
hypothesis, (7) share repurchase hypothesis, (8) asymmetric valuation hypothesis, (9) 
industry concentration hypothesis, (10) market liquidity hypothesis, and (11) market 
economics hypothesis.  
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Several of the new hypotheses borrow largely from existing hypotheses and theories in 
other areas of finance research.  For example the new firm lifecycle, firm capital structure 
and firm size hypotheses are a simple extension of existing takeover prediction hypotheses. 
These hypotheses build on prior research (which employs firm size, leverage and firm age 
as predictors of takeover probability) but propose an alternative explanation for their 
relationship with takeover probability. Some of the hypotheses employ variables and 
proxies that have been extensively used in prior research (outside the area of takeover 
prediction). For example, HHI, residual volatility and a share repurchase dummy (proxies 
of industry concentration, asymmetric valuation and share repurchase activity) have been 
used extensively outside the takeover prediction literature. While the use of the spread 
between LIBOR and the Bank of England base rate as a measure of market liquidity is 
uncommon in the literature, it borrows from Harford (2005) – a US based study – which 
uses the spread between the commercial and industrial loan rates and the US Federal 
Reserve Funds rate as a measure of market liquidity.  
 
These hypotheses are developed and fully discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.3) and are 
empirically tested in chapter 5. I find empirical evidence consistent with the newly 
proposed firm size, firm capital structure, payroll synergies, share repurchases, asymmetric 
valuation, industry concentration, market liquidity and market economics hypotheses. 
Overall, my results show that the new hypotheses, when added to the old hypotheses under 
a prediction framework, substantially improve the prediction model’s classification and 
predictive ability. 
1.4.3 Takeover prediction modelling 
Besides the use of a limited set of hypotheses, there are several gaps, inconsistencies and 
biases in the methodologies employed in prior studies. These issues are highlighted here 
but are fully discussed in chapter 2. Prior studies have mainly employed matched-samples 
(i.e., equal number of targets and non-targets) in the development of the parameters of 
prediction models. This leads to significant survivorship bias as firms that are delisted, 
liquidated or go bankrupt are typically excluded from these samples. Further, prior studies 
employ arbitrarily selected test and holdout periods, with several studies employing a very 
short (usually one-year) holdout period. The results from such tests lack any 
generalisability.  
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Again, many studies focus on computing returns to predicted target portfolios but fail to 
test whether their models are able to predict actual targets. The latter is, perhaps, a more 
appropriate test of a prediction model’s performance. The few studies that evaluate 
whether their model predicts actual targets compare model performance against poor 
benchmarks (such as a random selection prediction approach). Perhaps, a better benchmark 
for comparison is the performance of a control model. Most studies incorporate substantial 
look-ahead bias in their analysis by not recognising the time lapse between financial year-
ends and the publication of financial results. The June approach (see Fama and French 
(1993) and Soares and Stark (2009)) is used in this study to substantially reduce this bias
9
. 
Last, prior studies typically use an arbitrarily-selected single method for identifying the 
optimal target portfolio from the holdout sample (e.g., the use of cut-off probabilities as 
opposed to deciles or quintiles).  
 
In critique of these prior studies, I show that the results achieved by prediction models are 
a function of several of these methodological choices. The true predictive ability of these 
models can, perhaps, be observed only by averaging out the effect of methodological 
choices. I therefore employ a more robust framework for predicting takeover targets and 
testing prediction models by taking into consideration the issues raised above. In the 
empirical part of this study, I explore different portfolio identification techniques including 
deciles, quintiles, percentiles, cut-off probabilities (developed ex-ante) and fixed portfolios 
(of 100 firms, 50 firms, 30 firms and 10 firms). Further, I compare the performance of the 
new model against a control model (described as ‘the old model’) equivalent to the model 
used in prior studies. The choice of the control model allows any differences in 
performance between the two models to be directly attributed to one or more of the eleven 
new hypotheses. 
 
The new takeover target prediction model developed in this study has a superior 
classification and predictive ability when compared with the control model (and when 
directly compared with results of prior researchers). These results are robust to the choices 
discussed above. The model’s coefficients are reasonably stable and are, hence, useful for 
ascribing takeover probabilities to UK firms several years after coefficient development
10
. 
                                                 
9 This approach allows a time lapse of six months between firm financial year end (assumed to be 
December for most UK firms) and the publication of firm financial data. This approach is fully 
discussed in section 4.2.5. 
10 I find that the performance of the model in out-of-sample testing does not systematically decline 
over a ten-year hold period. 
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The importance of such a model is the finding that, increasingly, studies use takeover 
probability as an independent variable in empirical research but the models used in these 
studies are, arguably naïve. The new model (together with its coefficient) can, perhaps, be 
useful to future researchers seeking to compute takeover likelihood for UK firms. 
1.4.4 Investing in predicted targets 
There is no consensus amongst prior researchers on whether investors can ‘beat the 
market’ by investing in portfolios of predicted targets. The results reported in several prior 
studies are also biased and lack generalisability due to some of the methodological issues 
highlighted in section 1.3.4. More importantly, to my knowledge, no prior study 
investigating this aspect, factors in the large losses that arise when predicted targets exit 
the market through bankruptcy and liquidation.  
 
As one potential application of the new target prediction model, I evaluate the model’s 
usefulness for investors seeking abnormal returns. I evaluate the model’s performance 
across different estimation windows, portfolio holding periods, portfolio identification 
techniques and market cycles while taking into consideration the negative impact of firm 
exit through bankruptcy. I compare this performance against a control model (described as 
‘the old model’) equivalent to the model used in prior studies. I find significant variation in 
the returns generated by the new model. The model generates high abnormal returns in 
some periods but also generates substantial abnormal losses in other periods. Consistent 
with the efficient market hypothesis, the long run return generated by the portfolios derived 
from the new model is not statistically different from zero.  
 
In fact, the new model underperforms the old model in several cases. These results remain 
robust when periods of significant market decline (such as the dotcom crisis and the global 
financial crisis) are excluded from the analysis. This finding suggests a more fundamental 
problem with the strategy which is not explained by external market trends. The fourth 
contribution of this study is to investigate why takeover prediction using the new model is 
a suboptimal strategy despite the model’s ability to correctly predict a high number of taker 
targets. 
1.4.5 Why takeover prediction is a suboptimal investment strategy 
Prior studies which find that target portfolios do not generate abnormal returns (e.g., 
Palepu (1986) and Powell (2001)) attribute this to market efficiency but fail to explain how 
market efficiency unfolds in this setting. For the first time, I empirically show that the 
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suboptimal performance of predicted target portfolios can be explained by: (1) the presence 
of small poorly performing firms in the portfolios, (2) the tendency for predicted target 
portfolios to hold a number of firms which are declared bankrupt and earn –100% returns, 
(3) the mediocre performance of the large number of non-targets within the predicted 
target portfolios and its diluting effect on portfolio returns, (4) market anticipation of 
impending bids and its erosion of announcement period gains, and (5) the dynamics of 
target gains, annual portfolio rebalancing and the use of fixed portfolio holding periods. 
These five categories of issues combine to neutralise the abnormal returns to predicted 
target portfolios. This is discussed in greater detail in section 7.3. 
1.4.6  Summary 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating the unique characteristics of 
targets, the extent to which such characteristics can reliably predict future takeover targets, 
whether takeover target prediction can form the basis of a profitable investment strategy 
and (if not) why takeover prediction is a suboptimal investment strategy. The thesis also 
seeks to contribute to the literature by highlighting several sources of methodological 
biases in prior research and by proposing an improved framework for developing and 
testing target prediction models. Overall, I show that target prediction models can be 
improved through the introduction of relevant prediction hypotheses and improved 
empirical methods for prediction. A key output of the thesis is a relatively stable model 
which can better ascribe takeover probabilities to UK firms. This model is useful for key 
stakeholders such as regulators and management who may want to more fully understand 
the motivations underlying target selection or the likelihood that some firms will be subject 
to takeover bids in the future. Nonetheless, consistent with the market efficiency 
hypothesis, I find that if all known sources of bias are eliminated, there is no evidence that 
even an improved target prediction model can help investors to consistently ‘beat the 
market’ in the long run.  
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 is a literature review. The first 
section of the chapter highlights the relevance and underlying motivation for the research 
as well as its implications to theory development. The second part of the chapter looks at 
prior empirical research on takeover prediction, reviewing its development from early 
studies through to contemporary studies. A critique of these prior studies is carried out 
alongside, highlighting discrepancies, areas of weaknesses, unanswered questions and gaps 
in the literature. Chapter 3 starts with the development of takeover prediction hypotheses 
grounded in M&A theory. A theoretical literature review is used as the basis for the 
development of the prediction hypotheses proposed in the current study and developed in 
chapter 3.  
 
The empirical part of the study starts with chapter 4, wherein the methodology for the 
study is developed and the data used in the study is discussed. The sample is analysed, 
preliminary descriptive statistics are presented and the method for outlier elimination is 
discussed. The hypotheses developed in this study are tested through univariate and 
multivariate analysis in chapter 5. Chapter 5 ends with the development of the new 
takeover prediction model. The model’s classification and predictive ability are evaluated 
in chapter 6. In chapter 7, the ability of the model to be used as the basis of an investment 
strategy is evaluated. Further analysis is conducted in chapter 7 with a view to explaining 
some of the results obtained. The empirical findings from the study are summarised and 
the limitations of the study as well as its implications are set out in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the underlying framework for takeover prediction modelling, as 
well as, the prior literature on the subject. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the relevance of 
predicting corporate events and the motivations for predicting takeover targets. Section 2.4 
discusses the market anticipation and efficient market hypotheses and their implications on 
takeover prediction. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 critically review the empirical literature on 
takeover prediction modelling by looking at its development over the last 60–70 years. The 
next section is an overview of the literature on predicting corporate events. It sets the stage 
for discussing the motivation of this study. 
 
2.2 The prediction of corporate events: An overview 
Mueller (1972) presents a framework to describe the typical lifecycle of a firm. Mueller’s 
postulation highlights the tendency for firms to experience several key events over their 
life time. These defining events (such as initial public offerings, acquisitions, bankruptcies 
and liquidations, amongst others) are generally of interest to stakeholders. Understanding 
why these events occur and even predicting whether these events will occur at some point 
in the future has, therefore, been of interest to both researchers and practitioners. The basis 
for the prediction of corporate events is the assumption that certain events that occur 
during the lifetime of an organisation do not occur randomly but are driven by observable 
factors. The task of predicting these events starts with understanding the factors that drive 
them, as well as, their underlying dynamics.  
 
Prediction of corporate events as a research area in finance is, perhaps, pioneered by 
Altman (1968) which develops a model to predict firms that are likely to go bankrupt.  
Altman (1968) uses key accounting variables such as retained earnings (RE), total assets 
(TA), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), working capital (WC), market value of 
equity (MV), book value of total debt (BV) and sales (S), to identify firms with a high 
likelihood of becoming insolvent. The dynamics between these variables is explored in his 
study, through the use of five financial ratios including WC/TA, RE/TA, EBIT/TA, 
MV/BV and S/TA. The area of bankruptcy prediction has been advanced through the 
development of more advanced bankruptcy prediction models. Key contributions in the 
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bankruptcy prediction literature have been made by Altman et al. (1977), Ohlson (1980), 
Taffler (1984), Shumway (2001), and Agarwal and Taffler (2008), amongst others. The 
growth of this literature is backed by the increasing need for policy makers, management 
and investors to understand the factors that drive firms towards insolvency and to 
quantitatively measure the risk that a firm might go bankrupt in the future. 
 
Like bankruptcy, the occurrence of takeovers, the characteristics of firms engaged in 
takeovers and the measuring of takeover exposure of firms, are issues of interest to 
corporate stakeholders, notably, policy makers, management and investors
11
. In line with 
the bankruptcy prediction studies, takeover prediction studies use accounting variables and 
financial ratios such as return on assets, total assets, market capitalisation, leverage ratio, 
market to book value and price to earnings ratio to develop models for the prediction of 
future merger candidates (targets and bidders). Prior studies such as Hayes and Taussig 
(1968), Vance (1969), Monroe and Simkowitz (1971), Belkaoui (1978), Palepu (1986), 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (2001), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), Brar et 
al. (2009) and Cornett et al. (2011) have advanced the literature through the development 
of indicator variables and the refinement of initial prediction models. An overwhelming 
majority of the studies have focused on the prediction of merger targets with just a few 
studies (such as Cornett et al. (2011)) attempting to predict bidders. This is, perhaps, due to 
the fact that the motivations for predicting targets (discussed in section 2.3) are more 
compelling.  
 
Other events and issues which have also attracted some interest in the prediction literature 
include: share repurchases (e.g., Dittmar (2000)), credit ratings and credit rating changes 
(e.g., Pinches and Mingo (1973) and Laitinen (1999)) and loan decisions by loan officers 
(e.g., Libby (1975)) and Dietrich and Kaplan (1982)). The event of interest in this study is 
takeovers. More specifically, the current study develops a model to predict future takeover 
targets. While such a model is useful in its own rights (as will be discussed in section 2.3), 
the study goes further to explore whether the model can be used as a tool for investment 
decision-making. The next section (section 2.3) discusses the usefulness of takeover 
prediction modelling to different stakeholders – the motivation for the study. 
                                                 
11 The relevance of these issues to the different stakeholders is discussed in section 2.3. 
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2.3 The relevance of takeover prediction modelling 
2.3.1 Overview 
The decision to focus this study on developing takeover target prediction models is  driven 
by the continuing relevance of the issue to different stakeholder groups and the apparent 
inconsistencies and gaps in the current literature (further discussed in section 2.6). The key 
stakeholders with an interest in takeover activities include: corporate management, 
investors, and policy makers. The relevance of takeover prediction modelling to these key 
stakeholders is discussed in sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.4. Besides its direct relevance to these key 
stakeholders, merger and acquisition activity provides a useful research context for 
standard setters and business researchers. These issues are discussed in sections 2.3.5 and 
2.3.6 respectively. 
2.3.2 Relevance to management 
The employment effects of M&A on target managers, as well as, the tendency for target 
managers to, typically, be ousted during the integration phase of M&A, is well documented 
in the literature (Cannella and Hambrick (1993) and Hartzell et al. (2004)). In many 
circles, a takeover is viewed as a sign of target management inefficiency (further discussed 
in chapter 3). Being able to anticipate future takeover bids is therefore important to the 
management of potential target firms who may want to take action to safeguard the 
interests of their shareholders (the neoclassical perspective – Ruback (1987)) or extract 
excess managerial rent (the managerial perspective – Willcox (1988)).  
 
In contexts wherein the use of some takeover defence strategies is legally appropriate, 
knowledge of takeover risk can allow managers to set up applicable pre-bid or post-bid 
takeover defence strategies. These defensive strategies can either make the firm 
unattractive as a potential target, or may even allow target management to generate a 
higher takeover premium for their shareholders (Ruback (1987), Holl and Kyriazis (1997), 
Schwert (2000) and Klock et al. (2005))
12
. Further, knowledge of the likelihood that a 
firm’s competitors and supply chain partners will engage in M&A activity is, perhaps, 
important for the firm’s long term strategy development.  
 
                                                 
12 Klock et al. (2005), for example, note that managers in threat of takeovers react by distributing 
excess cash, increasing their pay-outs to shareholders, typically recapitalize their firms, and may 
focus firms through spinoffs and divestitures. Ruback (1987) contends that managers resist 
takeovers for three main reasons; ‘(1) they believe the firm has hidden values, (2) they believe 
resistance will increase the offer price and (3) they want to retain their positions’ (p. 50). 
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2.3.3 Relevance to investors 
Corporate events such as takeover and bankruptcy announcements usually result in 
significant price movements. The motivation of several target prediction studies is that the 
ability to identify potential takeover targets in advance of the bid announcement can be a 
basis for a successful investment strategy (Palepu (1986), Powell (2001) and Brar et al. 
(2009)). There is consensus within the events studies literature that takeover targets gain 
substantially from takeover activities. Research has consistently documented substantial 
excess return accruing to targets (e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983), Frank and Harris (1989), 
and Georgen and Renneboog (2003)) and insignificant returns or significant losses to 
bidders (e.g., Franks and Harris (1989), Stulz et al. (1990) and Danbolt (1995)). 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), summarising results from previous short run event studies on 
target gains (including Dodd and Ruback (1977), Bradley et al. (1983) and Ruback 
(1983)), show that targets in the US gain between 16.9% and 34.1% abnormal returns, with 
the weighted average gain amounting to 29.1%, in the months surrounding merger 
announcements. Using a large sample of 1,898 targets, Franks and Harris (1989) show that 
UK targets gain over 25.0% abnormal returns in the five-month period starting four months 
prior to the takeover announcement (month –5) and ending one month after the 
announcement (month +1). This evidence of significant gains to UK targets is corroborated 
by Georgen and Renneboog (2003) and Danbolt (2004)
13
. These results are robust to 
moderating factors including the bid characteristics. 
 
Investors can, perhaps, generate substantial abnormal returns if they are able to 
successfully predict future target firms. Jensen and Ruback (1983) contend that there are 
always a series of occurrences or cues that increase or decrease the probability that a firm 
will become a target of a takeover. These cues are likely to be picked-up by other market 
participants and hence reflected in share prices. Consistent with this argument, Keown and 
Pinkerton (1981) find that over half of the abnormal returns that accrue to targets of 
takeovers are earned prior to the actual announcement day. This suggests that the challenge 
faced by an investor (relying on takeover prediction) is not only to identify future targets a 
few months before they become the subject of an announced takeover bid but also to do so 
                                                 
13 Georgen and Renneboog (2003) find that UK targets gain cumulative abnormal returns of 29.0% 
between month –2 and +2 relative to the bid. Similarly, Danbolt (2004) shows that UK targets of 
domestic bidders earned cumulative average abnormal returns of 24.37% over month –2 to month 
+1 relative to the bid, while UK targets of foreign bidders earned cumulative average abnormal 
returns of up to 31.35% in the same period. 
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before other market participants. Aside from errors in prediction, buying-in too early is 
another potential risk which such an investor might face.  As several studies (e.g., Morck et 
al. (1988) and Asquith (1983)) have shown, on average, targets underperform in the period 
before they are acquired.   
 
Overall, prior empirical evidence suggests that investors can, potentially, generate 
substantial abnormal returns from takeover prediction modelling. This is however, not a 
straight forward process as a lack of precision in prediction (such as getting the timing 
wrong and predicting firms which do not eventually receive takeover bids) might erode 
any potential gains to be made. As will be shown in section 7.4, there are other significant 
risks involved, particularly the risk of predicting and investing in firms that eventually file 
for bankruptcy. 
2.3.4 The policy and legal perspective 
The UK Financial Service Authority (FSA) has continuously sought to discourage and 
eliminate insider trading or market abuse in the UK financial market. This is the objective 
of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSA (2000)). The preservation of an 
orderly market in the shares of bidders and targets through effective disclosure is also a 
prime ethos of the takeover code
14
 administered by the UK Takeover Panel. This is 
covered in Rule 2 of the code (Takeover Code (2011)).  
 
Keown and Pinkerton (1981) note that takeovers are poorly held secrets as the takeover 
process generally involves several groups and individuals (e.g., investment bankers, 
advisers, management) all of whom generally hold material price-sensitive information not 
in the public domain. Events studies on takeovers (including Keown and Pinkerton (1981), 
Franks and Harris (1989), and Danbolt (1995), amongst others) show that target share 
prices start rising up to four months before the bid announcement. Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981) attribute this growth in prices and the corresponding increase in trading volume to 
information leakage and insider trading activity. In contrast, Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
attribute the price run-up to the market’s anticipation of imminent bids.  
 
Market regulators have a general duty to investigate, on a case by case basis, whether such 
price run-ups are due to insider trading activity or market anticipation. To date, the 
literature focuses on testing the insider trading hypothesis, perhaps, because market 
                                                 
14 The code was last amended in September 2011. 
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anticipation is non-observable. Prediction modelling provides regulators with a tool to 
investigate the extent to which some takeover targets could have been anticipated by 
market participants using only publicly available information. The results from such 
analyses could inform decisions on whether (or not) to investigate potential cases of 
market abuse. An example of this analysis is conducted in section 7.3.4. 
 
Further, M&A activity impacts on economic prosperity as it underlies economic growth, 
industry competition, employment and general welfare. The regulation of M&A activities 
is, therefore, an important duty of regulators and policy makers. Takeover activity in the 
UK is regulated by the takeover code which is periodically amended. Policy changes might 
directly have one of two effects on potential target firms – it can either increase or decrease 
the likelihood of firms to be acquired. A protectionist policy, for example, can, ceteris 
paribus, reduce the likelihood of firms being acquired over time and vice versa. Measuring 
the impact of changes to the code is, possibly, of interest to policy makers. The case of the 
impact of the 2011 change to the takeover code, for example, has been discussed in both 
academic and policy circles. The ensuing debate and the potential role of takeover 
prediction modelling in this debate are briefly discussed below. 
 
The amendments to the UK takeover code introduced by the Takeover Panel in September 
2011 have been viewed as a response to the widely criticised takeover of Cadbury by 
Kraft
15
. The UK takeover code has traditionally sought to facilitate takeover activity and 
protect target shareholders by preventing target management from adopting frustrating 
tactics (such as takeover defences). The current UK takeover code, perhaps, empowers 
management, by giving management more control of the deal process. To date, it appears 
the effects of this change of focus from a shareholder perspective to, perhaps, a stakeholder 
perspective are not fully understood. Given that the UK has traditionally been viewed as 
the largest M&A market outside the US, the takeover panel is, possibly, keen on ensuring 
that new changes to the code do not inhibit merger activity. Takeover prediction modelling 
                                                 
15 The Takeover Panel argues that these changes to the Code are designed to increase transparency 
in the offer process, improve the quality of disclosures, recognise the interests of target employees, 
emphasise the power of the target’s board in communicating deal merits, and protect targets by 
prohibiting deal protection and inducement fees. Amongst others, notable changes in the code 
include: the prohibition of break fees and deal protection measures, a requirement for all known 
potential bidders to be publicly identified, a ‘put-up or shut-up’ rule requiring bidders to make a 
firm offer or withdraw within 28 days of being publicly identified and a requirement to disclose 
details of how the proposed takeover will be financed (see Takeover Code (2011)). 
 24 
 
provides an empirical way of testing whether policy changes have an impact on takeover 
likelihood and hence, overall activity
16
.  
2.3.5 Investigating the value-relevance of accounting information 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986, 1990) argue that the role of positive accounting 
research is to develop theory that can explain observed phenomena or occurrences
17
. The 
decision model paradigm (Belkaoui (1996)) and the events approach (Sorter (1969)) of 
accounting theory are both centred on the provision of information about relevant 
economic events and the development of appropriate models that may be useful in 
explaining and predicting such events. The decision model paradigm prescribes that the 
appropriate choice of an accounting method and the quality of accounting measurements 
should be judged based on the predictive ability of the information generated (Beaver et al. 
(1968, 1996))
18
.  This is also consistent with Bartley and Boardman’s (1990) contention 
that the usefulness of accounting information can be directly evaluated by their ability to 
help investors predict future events.  
 
As noted in section 2.2, several research papers focus on using financial statement 
information to predict corporate events and outcomes. Some key studies (such as Walter 
(1994) and Bartley and Boardman (1986, 1990)) have explicitly used takeover prediction 
models as a framework to test the usefulness of accounting data. Bartley and Boardman 
(1986) test whether the ratio of market value to inflation-adjusted book value is better able 
to classify targets than the ratio of market value to historical book value. The study finds 
that prediction models with inflation-adjusted financial ratios are better able to classify 
targets and non-targets when compared to prediction models that employ only historical 
cost ratios. They conclude that inflation adjusted accounting data is more value-relevant to 
users when compared to historical cost accounting data
19
. Walter (1994) also investigates 
                                                 
16 This can, potentially, be achieved by evaluating the change in UK firms’ probability of being 
acquired across two different time periods – pre and post policy change (i.e., whether policy 
change constitutes a breakpoint in the model. This can also be investigated by testing whether 
policy change (proxied by a dummy variable) can explain takeover likelihood. 
17 In fact, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) stated that, ‘…the objective of accounting theory is to 
explain and predict accounting practice’ (p. 2). Deegan and Unerman (2006) contend that the 
prediction of events and explanation of phenomena are at the core of positive accounting research. 
18 As Beaver (1966) reiterates, the premise here is that, ‘accounting data can be evaluated in terms 
of their utility and that utility can be defined in terms of predictive ability’ (p. 99). 
19 Bartley and Boardman (1990) build on their earlier study by testing whether inflation-adjusted 
accounting information is more useful than historical cost accounting information. The researchers 
achieve this by developing and comparing the performance of two different models – one with 
inflation adjusted data and the other with historical cost information. In line with earlier studies, 
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the usefulness of current costs accounting data (replacement costs) by testing whether 
target prediction models developed with such accounting data can be useful to investors
20
.  
 
The UK, like other countries, has been subject to several changes in accounting regulations 
(i.e., International Financial Reporting Standards) issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (between 1973 and 2001) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (after 2001). The IFRS has generally promoted the use of several cost 
measurement methods including historical costs, net realisable value (residual value), 
current cost, present value (entity-specific value) and fair value, depending on the asset in 
question and how it was acquired (Alexander et al. (2007))
21
. Alexander et al. (2007) note 
that the IFRS (as opposed to the US GAAP) is still predominantly principle-based (as 
opposed to rule-based), allowing UK managers some flexibility in choosing an appropriate 
cost measurement method for different assets. In line with the works of Beaver (1966), 
Sorter (1969), Bartley and Boardman (1986, 1990) and Walter (1994), takeover prediction 
modelling can, perhaps, provide a useful framework for the investigation of value-
relevance of different accounting choices and accounting information for investors.  
 
2.3.6 Takeover probability – An explanatory variable in empirical 
research 
Another interesting area of development and usefulness of takeover prediction and 
modelling of takeover probability is its use as an explanatory variable in empirical 
research. Recent studies such as Cornett et al. (2011), Bhanot et al. (2010) and Cremers et 
al. (2009) investigate new research questions by employing firm takeover risk as a main 
explanatory variable in their research design. These studies are fully discussed in section 
2.5.6
22
. The underlying assumption across the three studies is that their models for 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bartley and Boardman (1990) confirm that inflation adjusted data is value-relevant as it improves 
the classification ability of prediction models. 
20 Walter (1994) shows that current cost models improve the explanatory power of prediction 
models.  
21 As will be discussed in chapter 4, the current study does not use inflation adjusted data or 
current cost information as this information is not available for all firms over the sample period.  
22 Cornett et al. (2011) investigate investors’ anticipation of bidder and target candidacy in 
takeovers and whether this anticipation moderates the wealth distribution between bidders and 
targets in takeovers. In the research design, the likelihood of a firm becoming a target or a bidder 
are used to develop a surprise instrument (a measure of market anticipation). Bhanot et al. (2010) 
study the effect of a firm’s takeover risk on the relationship between its stock returns and bond 
prices. They show that highly rated firms with a high takeover likelihood have a more positive 
correlation between their stock returns and bond spreads, and vice versa. Cremers et al. (2009) 
develop a model to determine firm takeover likelihood. They show that a takeover factor (derived 
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measuring takeover risk is adequate, correctly specified and fully capture the concept of 
takeover risk. As will be discussed further, these studies, potentially, employ suboptimal 
models for computing and ascribing takeover probability
23
. This is, perhaps, because 
modelling takeover likelihood is not the primary objective of these studies. This thesis 
seeks to address this issue through the development of a new takeover prediction model 
(together with model parameters) which can, perhaps, be adopted by future researchers.  
2.3.7  Summary 
This section has discussed the importance of takeover prediction modelling by reviewing 
current research and practice in different areas. It is shown that takeover prediction 
modelling can provide a useful tool for managers evaluating their risk of being acquired, 
investors seeking above market returns, regulators unearthing the reasons for pre-bid price 
run-ups, policy makers evaluating the impact of their policies on M&A activities, and 
researchers exploring new research questions. The current study aims to provide a more 
efficient yet simple to use takeover prediction model which can potentially assist these 
different stakeholders. The next section discusses two key theoretical concepts with 
implication to takeover prediction modelling. 
 
2.4 Market anticipation and efficient market hypotheses: 
Implications for prediction 
 
Takeover prediction modelling has direct implications for the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) as prediction models rely on publicly available accounting information. The semi-
strong form EMH posits that such information cannot be used by investors to identify 
assets (e.g., future targets) from which abnormal returns can be consistently earned (Fama 
(1970)). This suggests that takeover likelihood, for example, is continuously factored into 
share prices upon receipt of new information. Hence, investing in a portfolio of predicted 
targets (irrespective of whether these predicted targets eventually receive a bid) should not 
generate excess returns.  
                                                                                                                                                    
from takeover spread portfolios) is able to predict the level of takeover activity in the economy and 
explained the abnormal returns to governance-based (G-index) spread portfolios proposed by 
Gompers et al. (2003). 
23 The impact of these suboptimal models on the results and conclusions of these studies is not 
easily discernible.  
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Nonetheless, prior evidence suggests that investors are unable to accurately predict future 
targets (Jensen and Ruback (1983))
24
. Hence, share prices are unlikely to fully reflect 
takeover likelihood. Prior studies attribute the inability to generate abnormal returns from 
predicted target portfolios to the difficulty of predicting takeover targets (see Palepu 
(1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (2001)). These studies argue that this 
finding – the inability to generate abnormal returns from predicted target portfolios – lends 
support to the EMH. Given some of the weakness of these prior prediction models, it is 
unclear whether the poor performance of the portfolios is a due to the inadequacy of the 
prediction models or the market’s ability to anticipate impending bids. This is further 
discussed in section 7.3. 
Event studies in M&A mainly use the price reaction to takeover announcements as a test of 
market efficiency (see Asquith (1983)). These studies consider the significant price 
reaction at the time of bid announcement as a signal of market efficiency.  As will be 
shown in section 7.3.4, a non-significant price reaction at the time of announcement is 
consistent with market efficiency if the market is able to fully anticipate the event. Other 
studies use pre-bid price run-ups as evidence of insider trading (e.g., Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981)). As will also be shown in section 7.3.4, a pre-bid price run-up will not reflect 
insider trading if the market is able to partly anticipate the event. In the two cases, share 
prices will adjust continuously to incorporate the likelihood of an event occurring in the 
future. This suggests that tests of market efficiency focusing on M&A, perhaps, need to 
control for the level of market anticipation.  
 
Further, short run event studies examining the returns to takeover targets and bidders, 
frequently, undermine the importance of market anticipation of these events. The level of 
market anticipation for each target can be gauged by computing the target’s pre-bid 
takeover probability. This study extends prior literature by testing the EMH in the context 
of takeover prediction. This context allows for the effect of market anticipation to be 
controlled (e.g., by comparing the returns to targets with a high takeover likelihood to 
targets with a low takeover likelihood). This context also permits further investigation of 
how the EMH unfolds. This is further discussed in section 7.3. The next section reviews 
prior research on takeover likelihood modelling. 
 
                                                 
24 Jensen and Ruback (1983) note that, ‘…it is difficult, if not impossible, for the market to identify 
future target firms’ (p. 29). The recurrent finding that targets earn significant abnormal returns on 
the announcement day further suggests that the market only poorly anticipates impending bids. 
 28 
 
2.5 Empirical literature on takeover likelihood modelling 
2.5.1 Overview 
The previous sections (2.3 and 2.4) have highlighted the relevance of takeover prediction 
modelling to stakeholders (such as management, investors, regulators and policy makers) 
and to the development of finance theory. The goal of this section is to present a summary 
of key studies on takeover prediction modelling. Hayes and Taussig (1968) and Vance 
(1969) are amongst the earliest studies in takeover likelihood modelling. These studies use 
discriminant analysis to identify the unique financial characteristics of takeover targets. A 
major shift in the literature is introduced by Palepu (1986). This paper introduced several 
methodological advancements which have been  adopted in the literature. As will be 
discussed, this paper has remained a key source of reference with more contemporary 
studies adopting the methods introduced in Palepu (1986).  
 
With increased technological developments, a new stream of studies has emerged over the 
last decade. These studies explore different modelling techniques such as Artificial Neural 
Networks, Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines, Fuzzy sets, Multi-Criteria 
Classification Techniques and other Machine Learning models.  Other studies have simply 
tailored ‘the Palepu approach’ to different datasets while adjusting for other sample 
specific characteristics.  
 
As will be discussed in section 2.5.5, investment firms and practitioners (such as Morgan 
Stanley and Deutsche Bank, amongst others) have also been engaged in takeover 
prediction as an investment strategy. To support this review, the prediction of takeovers in 
practice is also summarised albeit from a limited set of published material. Another 
interesting development in the literature is the emergence of new studies post-2009 using 
takeover probability as an explanatory variable in empirical research. Some of these 
studies will also be reviewed in section 2.5.6.  
 
Three major research streams have emerged over time. The first looks at improving our 
understanding of the characteristics or profile of takeover targets and the factors that make 
certain firms attractive to bidders
25
. The second stream of studies focuses on developing 
predictive models and employing different empirical techniques to improve the accuracy of 
                                                 
25 Hasbrouck (1985), for example, looks at how firm characteristics such as size, leverage, liquidity 
and Tobin’s Q differ between targets and non-targets. Other examples of studies under this stream 
are included in table 2.5.1. 
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target prediction
26
. The third stream focuses on assessing whether takeover prediction 
models can be used to generate abnormal returns for investors. Table 2.5.1 summarises the 
key papers in the areas, highlighting their period under study, the context or sample choice 
and the stream or focus of the research. 
 
Table 2.5.1: Prior studies on takeover prediction 
Study Period Context stream 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) 1968 USA M 
Stevens (1973) 1966 USA C 
Belkaoui (1978) 1960-1968 CAN C, M 
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) 1969-1973 USA C 
Hasbrouck (1985) 1977-1982 USA C 
Bartley and Boardman (1986) 1978 USA C, M 
Palepu (1986) 1971-1979 USA C, M, I 
Barnes (1990) 1986-1987 UK C, M 
Bartley and Boardman (1990) 1975-1981 USA C 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) 1981-1986 USA C 
Walter (1994) 1981-1984 USA M, I 
Powell (1997) 1984-1991 UK C, M 
Barnes (1999) 1991-1993 UK M 
Barnes (2000) 1991-1993 UK M 
Powell (2001) 1986-1995 UK M, I 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) 1993-1997 US M 
Powell (2004) 1986-1985 UK M, I 
Powell and Yawson (2005) 1986-2000 UK C 
Powell and Yawson (2007) 1992-2002 UK C, M 
Brar et al. (2009) 1992-2008 EU C, M, I 
Cremers et al. (2009) 1981-2004 USA M 
Bhanot et al. (2010) 1980-2000 USA M 
Cornett et al. (2010) 1979-2004 USA M 
De and Jindra (2012) 1980-2006 USA C 
Notes: Context: CAN- Canada, USA- United States, UK- united Kingdom, Stream: C- 
characteristic, M- prediction modelling, I-Investment opportunity. The studies are listed based on 
the date of publication with the earliest studies at the top of the table. 
 
Given the broad nature and long history of the research area, a historical perspective is 
adopted in this review. Here, the studies are discussed based on the era during which they 
are published. While not clearly distinct from each other, three key eras are identified for 
discussion purposes. These eras span 1968–1985 (first era), 1986–2002 (second era) and 
2003–2013 (third era). The basis for this classification is the realisation that studies 
                                                 
26 For example, Palepu (1986) highlights the importance of methodology and proposes 
improvements on the methodologies employed in earlier studies. Other researchers such as Barnes 
(1998) and Powell (2001) have also raised related methodological issues. Advances in computer 
technology have allowed some researchers such as Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) to explore the 
usefulness of other models such as artificial neural networks in the prediction of takeover targets. 
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published during each of these three eras share significant similarities in their approach and 
their methodologies. These similarities will be further discussed in sections 2.5.2 to 2.5.4. 
Within these eras, the studies are further sub-classified based on the context or country 
employed. These will allow the results of this thesis (which focuses on the UK context) to 
be effectively reconciled with previous empirical research bearing in mind any contextual 
differences. Section 2.5 provides a historical and contextual overview of related prior 
studies. Section 2.6 integrates the studies from the different eras and contexts and provides 
a critical evaluation of the methodologies and conclusions of these studies. Section 2.6 also 
discusses the ways in which the current study improves upon the weaknesses of prior 
studies.  
2.5.2 Empirical studies in takeover prediction 1968–1985 
2.5.2.1 Overview 
Most of the empirical work during the 1968–1985 era focuses on the US context. Few 
studies during this era focused on other markets such as the UK, Canada and the rest of 
Europe. This section discusses the contributions of the key US and UK studies during this 
era.  
2.5.2.2 US studies 
As noted above, Hayes and Taussig (1968) is, perhaps, the earliest study on takeover 
prediction modelling. The objective of Hayes and Taussig (1968) is to investigate whether 
firms which failed to provide sufficient information to investors are more likely to be 
acquired. The researchers investigate whether the choice of accounting policy used by 
firms can affect their probability of being acquired. On a US sample of 50 targets and 50 
non-targets between 1956 and 1967, Hayes and Taussig employ univariate analysis on a set 
of accounting variables
27
 to show that accounting policies employed – specifically over-
conservative accounting policies – do not increase a firm’s likelihood of being acquired. 
They note that, instead, poor investment policies
28
, a low return on net worth, and a 
declining (or unpredictable) dividend pay-out, are features of takeover targets.  
 
Following on from Hayes and Taussig (1968), Vance (1969) develops a raider’s index29 
based on financial statement variables. Vance asserts that, ‘…management should realise; 
                                                 
27These accounting variables included inventories to total assets, net fixed assets to total assets and 
book value to market value. 
28 In this study investment policies are proxied by excess liquid assets. 
29 The raider’s index is a list of potential target firms. 
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many (if not all) of the takeovers or tenders can be foreseen by looking at the victim’s 
(target’s) published financial data’ (p. 93). The objective of this index was, therefore, to 
provide guidance to management on the likelihood of being the subject of a takeover. 
Vance (1969) identifies four variables
30
 that are ‘principal indicators of the degree of 
corporate vulnerability to a takeover attempt’ (p. 94). In a holdout sample of 21 actual 
target firms (and no non-target firms), Vance’s index is able to correctly highlight 17 as 
potential targets.  
 
Monroe and Simkowitz (1971) seek to improve upon the methodology of earlier studies 
through their use of stepwise discriminant analysis and a broader set of financial variables. 
They employ discriminant analysis based on 24 firm financial characteristics on a sample 
of listed US firms in 1968 with the objective of discriminating between future targets and 
non-targets. They observe that future targets and non-targets can be distinguished on the 
basis of both their financial and non-financial characteristics. They conclude that acquired 
firms have a lower PE ratio, paid out lower dividends, experienced low growth in equity 
and are generally smaller in size.  
 
The use of stepwise discriminant analysis in Monroe and Simkowitz (1971) appears to 
have paved way for methodological criticisms and development in the area. An example is 
the application of factor analysis (by Stevens (1973)) – a variable reduction technique 
which is, perhaps, more theoretically robust when compared to stepwise analysis. Stevens 
(1973), using factor analysis and multiple discriminant analyses, finds that future targets 
and non-target firms can be distinguished from each other based on their financial 
characteristics. Stevens employs an equal sample of 40 targets and 40 non-targets from US 
publicly listed firms in 1966 to show that targets have lower leverage, lower profitability 
and higher liquidity. Stevens (1973) concludes that, ‘…financial characteristics either are 
explicit decision variables or directly reflect non-financial reasons for acquisitions’ (p. 
157).  
 
Wansley et al. (1983) do not set out to predict future targets per se, but to investigate 
whether firms with a high degree of resemblance to acquired firms earn abnormal risk-
adjusted returns
31
. They employ discriminant analysis and a broad set of firm accounting 
                                                 
30 These variables include liquidity, debt position, price earnings ratio and stability of earnings. 
31 The motivation for this study is a periodic publication of a list of potential ‘Acquisition 
Candidates’ by the brokerage firm, E.F Hutton, coupled with the knowledge that merger targets 
earned significant abnormal returns. 
 32 
 
and market variables
32
 to derive models that discriminate between acquired and non-
acquired firms. By holding a portfolio of 25 firms with target characteristics, Wansley et 
al. (1983) show that cumulative abnormal returns of up to 17.1% can be generated over a 
21 month holding period
33
. Aside from significantly expanding the set of potential 
discriminatory variables in target prediction studies, this study was one of the first to 
highlight the possibility that a portfolio of firms with semblance to merger targets might 
generate abnormal returns for investors.  
2.5.2.3 UK Studies 
Singh (1971) is, perhaps, the earliest study investigating the unique financial 
characteristics of UK targets. Singh (1971) employs univariate and discriminant analysis 
on a sample of 847 UK firms which operated between 1954 and 1960
34
. Singh finds that, 
when compared with non-targets, UK targets have lower profitability, lower growth and 
lower valuation ratios. 
 
Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) build on the work of Singh (1971) by investigating the 
differences between the characteristics of UK targets and UK bidding firms. Tzoannos and 
Samuels (1972) use a sample of 36 mergers (targets and bidders) and a control sample of 
32 non-merging firms between 1967 and 1968
35
. Their analysis reveals that UK targets 
have high levels of capital, experienced a growth in gearing and a decline in profits, have 
low P/E ratios, have low dividend growth rates and were inconsistent in their dividend pay-
outs. Bidders on the other hand, have low levels of capital and reported falling gearing 
ratios, growing dividends and growing profitability. 
 
Keuhn (1975) extends Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) by employing a longer sample period 
from 1957 to 1959 and linear probability and probit models to investigate the 
                                                 
32The variables used in the study represented 10 dimensions of a firm’s financial profile and its 
market characteristics including: profitability, size, leverage, age, liquidity, price-earnings, stock 
activity, market valuation, growth, turnover, and dividend policy. 
33 The CAR to the top 50 firms is indifferent from zero and none of the top 50 firms is involved in 
M&A activity in 1977 – the year of study. Nonetheless, 12 of the top 50 firms are involved in M&A 
activities within the next 3 years (1979-1980). 
34 The study employs financial variables such as return on capital employed, return on equity and 
return on assets (as measures of profitability), dividends to equity ratio (as a measure of dividend 
return), net profit to financial capital employed (as a measure of productivity return), current 
assets to total assets (as a measure of liquidity), long term liability to total capital (as a measure of 
gearing), net assets ( as a proxy for firm size), percentage change in net assets (as a proxy for 
growth), and market to book value of equity ( as a measure of firm valuation).   
35 The study uses discriminant analysis to distinguish targets from non-merging firms and bidders 
from non-merging firms across five main dimensions. These dimensions include: capital structure, 
profitability, liquidity, investment and dividend policy. 
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characteristics of UK targets and bidders. Keuhn (1975) finds that UK targets are 
characterised by low valuation ratios, profitability ratios, liquidity levels and growth. UK 
bidders on the other hand, have high valuation ratios and growth levels but low 
profitability ratios when compared to their industry average (Keuhn (1975)).  
2.5.2.3  Summary 
The review above has summarised some of the key US and UK studies in the 1968–1985 
era of takeover prediction. Other studies in this era looking at characteristics of takeover 
targets include Rege (1984) and Belkaoui (1978) – employing a Canadian sample – and 
Dietrich and Sorenson (1984) and Hasbrouck (1985) – employing a US sample – amongst 
others. Overall, the studies in this era establish that a profile for targets can potentially be 
built as targets  share some common characteristics. Irrespective of context (US or UK), 
most of the studies seem to agree that targets are characterised by low valuation ratios (i.e., 
targets are potentially undervalued firms), unstable or falling dividends and low 
profitability ratios (i.e., targets are, on average, poorly performing firms). The studies also 
establish that financial and market variables can act as reasonable proxies for the motives 
of takeovers. Aside from their methodological weaknesses (as critiqued by Palepu (1986) 
and discussed in section 2.5.3.2), these studies fail to provide a theoretical framework 
underlying the selection of variables in the models. The studies neither discuss the choice 
of discriminatory variables nor hypothesise on the relationship between variables and 
takeover likelihood. 
2.5.3 Empirical studies in takeover prediction 1986–2002 
2.5.3.1  Overview 
There appear to have been a decline in the number of studies looking at takeover prediction 
during the 1986–2002 era when compared with the first era. Fewer USA studies, in 
particular, focused on takeover prediction. This decline can, perhaps, be attributed to 
Palepu’s (1986) seminal study which concluded that, when the analysis is done 
appropriately, takeover prediction, especially for investment purposes, is an unattainable 
goal. The Palepu (1986) study presents a detailed critique of studies in the first era. This 
critique is summarised in this section. During this era (1986–2002), other key contributions 
to the literature have been made by UK studies such as Barnes (1990, 1999, 2000) and 
Powell (1997, 2001). To the best of my knowledge, much less has been published for other 
regions such as Canada, Australia and the rest of Europe. This section discusses some of 
the contributions of the key US and UK studies during this era. 
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2.5.3.2 US studies 
Palepu (1986) is considered a seminal study in the area and has been recurrently cited in 
contemporary studies. The main contribution of this paper is that it brings to light some 
methodological biases in earlier (1968–1985) takeover and bankruptcy prediction studies 
and proposes an improved method for modelling takeover risk. Palepu (1986) raises three 
key weaknesses in prior research methodologies, including (1) the use of non-random 
equal-share samples in model estimation, (2) the use of arbitrary cut-off points in target 
prediction, and (3) the use of equal-share samples in prediction tests. These issues are 
discussed below. 
 
i.) Non-random equal-share samples or state-based sampling methodology 
 
The fact that M&A are rare events (within the population of firms) is generally perceived 
as an obstacle to prediction modelling. For example, as will be discussed in section 4.2, 
only 5.28% of all UK listed firms, on average, receive takeover bids each year during the 
sample period of this study (July 1989 to June 2010). Palepu (1986) posits that earlier 
studies (such as Simkowitz and Monroe (1971), Belkaoui (1978), Stevens (1973) and 
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984)) recognise the need to improve the efficiency of models by 
using non-random equal-share samples which employ an equal number of targets and non-
targets
36
. However, these studies fail to control for the inherent sample selection bias by 
using econometric estimators that implicitly assume random sampling (Palepu (1986)). 
This, Palepu (1986) argues, ‘…leads to inconsistent and asymptotically biased estimates of 
the model parameters and hence biased estimates of the acquisition probability’ (p. 7).  
 
Palepu (1986) proposes that the ‘rare event’ problem can be alleviated by using the state-
based sampling methodology alongside appropriately modified estimators such as the 
conditional maximum likelihood estimator (CMLE) and the weighted maximum likelihood 
estimator (WMLE). Other researchers (including Manski and McFadden (1981) and 
Barnes (2000)) have supported the use of state-based sampling when random sampling or 
the use of equal samples is deemed inefficient. As will be discussed subsequently, most 
post-Palepu (1986) studies (such as Powell (1997), Barnes (1999), Powell (2004), Brar et 
al. (2009) and Cahan et al. (2011)) have employed the state-based sampling methodology 
without recognising its limitations with regards to out-of-sample analysis. This is further 
discussed in section 2.6.3. 
                                                 
36 The alternative is to employ a random sample which, on average, will be made up of 5.28% 
targets and 94.72% non-targets, in the case of the UK. 
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ii.) Use of arbitrary cut-off probabilities 
 
Prior research places emphasis on identifying the factors that increase takeover likelihood 
and/or on developing models that can identify future targets. In the former case, the focus 
is on the explanatory power of the whole model and the statistical significance of the 
independent variables in the model. In the latter case, researchers also evaluate the model’s 
ability to predict targets in a holdout sample based on acquisition probabilities. Given that 
logit models report their predictions in terms of probabilities that are bounded between 0 to 
1, researchers (pre-Palepu (1986)) generally used 0.5 as a cut-off probability for 
identifying prospective targets
37
. Palepu asserts that using a cut-off probability of 0.5 is 
arbitrary. He contends that the optimal cut-off probability should be dependent on ‘the 
decision context of interest, an appropriate payoff function and the prior state probabilities’ 
(p. 12). Notwithstanding, Palepu’s methodology for arriving at an optimal cut-off 
probability has also been criticised by Barnes (1999) and Powell (2001). The two studies 
provide alternative methodologies for identifying the optimal cut-off probability for target 
prediction. This issue is further discussed in section 2.6.4.  
 
iii.) Use of equal-share samples in prediction tests 
The relevance of models derived is based on their forecasting ability, i.e., their ability to 
generate correct ‘out-of-sample’ predictions of targets and non-targets. This is done by 
testing the models’ predictive ability on a holdout sample. In prior studies which employ 
‘optimal cut-off probabilities’, the key statistic used to measure a model’s performance is 
the prediction error rate
38
. Palepu (1986) notes that predicting a target is like ‘searching for 
a needle in a haystack’ – the rare event problem (p. 10). Pre-Palepu studies obscure this 
difficulty by using a ‘contrived sample with a large proportion of targets’ in their 
prediction tests (Palepu (1986), p. 10). The result is that the error rate inferences obtained 
from such non-random or state-based holdout samples are biased and cannot be generalised 
to the population. He further argues that there is no econometric justification for employing 
non-random samples in prediction tests. The unbiased approach is to use a random sample 
or even the whole population as at a given time, as the prediction sample.  
 
                                                 
37That is, any firm with a takeover probability of 0.5 and above is considered a target while any 
firm with a takeover probability below 0.5 is considered a non-target. 
38 The error rate computes the number of targets the model predicts as non-targets (type I error) 
and the number of non-targets the model classifies as targets (type II error). 
 36 
 
Aside from the three proposed methodological corrections discussed above, Palepu (1986) 
lays a theoretical foundation for the selection of variables for inclusion in prediction 
models. Early studies such as Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) simply employ a ‘kitchen-
sink’ approach to variable selection augmented by a stepwise procedure to identify 
unimportant variables for exclusion
39
. Palepu (1986) proposes six acquisition likelihood 
hypotheses which have been recurrently used in the literature. These include: inefficient 
management hypothesis, firm undervaluation hypothesis, firm size hypothesis, growth-
resource mismatch hypothesis, industry disturbance hypothesis and price-earnings 
hypothesis. In brief, these hypotheses, respectively, argue that inefficiently managed firms, 
undervalued firms, small firms, firms which have a mismatch between their growth 
potential and their resource levels, firms within merger-active industries, and firms with a 
low P/E ratio are more likely to receive takeover bids. These hypotheses are fully 
discussed in section 3.3. 
 
In the empirical part of his study, Palepu employs a sample consisting of 163 firms 
acquired between 1971 and 1979 and a sample of 256 US firms not acquired by 1979. To 
validate the model, Palepu selects a holdout sample made of 30 targets and 1,087 non-
targets
40
. The holdout sample consists of the set of all listed firms (targets and non-targets) 
in 1980. Using an arguably very low cut-off probability of 0.112 (as noted in Barnes 
(1999), Powell, (2001) and Powell (2004)), Palepu’s model classifies 492 firms as non-
targets and 625 firms as targets from the sample of 1,117 firms of which 24 of the 
predicted targets are actual targets and 601 firms which are not involved in M&A activity 
are misclassified as targets. The overall accuracy rate is estimated at 45.60% and the 
concentration of targets in the portfolio is 3.80%. Although the model is statistically 
significant, its predictive power is very low. As can be expected, investing in the 625 
predicted targets over a 250 day holding period generates insignificant cumulative 
abnormal returns of –1.62%41. Palepu concludes that his model does not have a superior 
predictive ability when compared with the stock market – evidence of market efficiency.  
 
Palepu (1986) presents a systematic and detailed critique of the studies in the first era 
(1968–1985). Hence, the methodologies applied in these studies are not critiqued further. 
                                                 
39 Simkowitz and Monroe (1979) started with a set of 24 accounting and market variables and 
employed step wise regression to reduce this set of variables to seven. 
40 The sample employed in the study is restricted to firms in the mining and manufacturing 
industry only. This is a likely to limit the generalisability of the results obtained. 
41 Insignificant at the 5% level of significance 
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As will be discussed, several studies in the second and third era have adopted Palepu’s 
propositions. The starting point of this thesis is the recognition of the limitations of 
Palepu’s propositions (i.e., methodology and hypotheses). Other researchers (such as 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Barnes (1999) and Powell (2001)) have acknowledged 
some of these weaknesses. Nonetheless, to my knowledge, no study has attempted to 
address these issues in a comprehensive manner. Besides the Palepu study, other US 
studies in the second era include: Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Bartley and Boardman 
(1986, 1990) and Walter (1994).  
 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), for example, extend the Palepu (1986) study by looking 
at the effect of asset structure, institutional shareholdings and takeover defences on 
takeover likelihood. The researchers use a sample of 169 targets and 267 non-targets pulled 
from the period 1979–1986. The main finding of this study is the fact that US targets are 
characterised by a high proportion of fixed or tangible assets (tangible assets) within the 
asset structure. Ambrose and Megginson (1992) explain the result by asserting that 
tangible assets proxied for operational synergies between targets and bidders, its 
availability improves the ease of valuation of potential targets, and proxies for asset rich 
firms in declining industries. Additionally, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) find that the 
Palepu (1986) model has very little explanatory power when re-estimated using their 
sample and data. Indeed, none of the Palepu hypotheses are validated using their data (see 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), pp. 584–585). Based on this finding, they conclude that 
little is known about the characteristics of targets. Bartley and Boardman (1986, 1990) and 
Walter (1994) focus on using prediction models (similar to the Palepu (1986) model) to 
evaluate the value-relevance of accounting information. These studies have been discussed 
in section 2.3.5. 
2.5.3.3  UK studies 
Powell (1997) adopts the hypotheses proposed by Palepu (1986) alongside a multinomial 
framework for takeover prediction based on his contention that hostile and friendly targets 
have different characteristics. Powell (1997) employs a UK sample made up of 97 hostile 
targets, 314 friendly targets and 532 non-targets selected from the period 1984–1991. From 
his empirical results, Powell (1997) argues that the use of a binomial modelling framework 
is suboptimal and might lead to incorrect conclusions about the factors driving takeovers. 
The researcher also finds that the characteristics of targets are time dependent. All the 
models developed in the study, nonetheless, have a very low explanatory power. Powell 
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(1997) attributes this poor performance to the reliance on theories (the Palepu hypotheses) 
which potentially lacked validity or the use of proxies which poorly measured the 
theoretical constructs.  
 
Barnes (1999) also extends the work of Palepu (1986) by reviewing other relevant 
statistical and methodological weaknesses of prior research in takeover prediction. First, 
Barnes (1999) raises the issue of researcher ignorance of the strict statistical assumptions 
that underlie estimating procedures such as ‘multivariate normality’ and ‘equal-group 
dispersion matrices across all groups’. Barnes argues that these assumptions are rarely met 
(as financial ratios are less likely to be normal and more likely to be skewed) and proposes 
the use of industry-relative ratios
42
. Again, Barnes argues that, to be of use to investors, 
prediction models need to be stable over time and across industries
43
. Building on Barnes 
(1999), Barnes (2000) uses a UK sample to test the extent to which targets can be 
predicted, comparing different models and different variable specifications
44
. Even after 
including anticipatory share price changes as a new independent variable, Barnes (2000) 
finds that none of his models (the industry-specific model or the general model) is able to 
correctly predict any target. In line with this finding, Barnes concludes that his results are 
consistent with predictions of the semi-strong form of the EMH
45
.  
 
Like Powell (1997), Powell (2001) also adopts Palepu’s prediction hypotheses, and equal-
share samples to estimate the likelihood of a firm being acquired. Powell (2001) extends 
Powell (1997) by also testing whether abnormal returns can be generated by holding a 
portfolio of firms predicted as potential targets by the model. The main contribution of this 
study is to develop a procedure for determining optimal cut-off probabilities which takes 
into account the investment objective of prediction modelling. The new classification rule, 
when applied to the holdout samples, results in smaller predicted samples with higher 
takeover probabilities compared to the Palepu (1986) method (Powell (2001)).  
 
                                                 
42 As will be discussed in section 4.3 the use of logit model as opposed to discriminant analysis 
circumvents the need to assume multivariate normality. 
43The difficulty with having a stable model is that a firm’s environment changes over time due to 
changes in inflation, technology, accounting policies, attitudes of acquisition managers, investment 
officers or merger advisers etc. (Barnes (1990)). 
44 The different specifications included industry-adjusted versus unadjusted variables. 
45 As argued in section 2.4.3, the fact that targets can be predicted does not imply that the market is 
inefficient. The market is, perhaps, inefficient if investing in predicted targets can consistently 
generate significant above-market returns for investors. 
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In the empirical part of the analysis, Powell employs an equal-share UK sample of 471 
targets and 471 non-targets to develop his model. The model is tested out-of-sample by 
using fresh data from 1996. The model predicts that 216 firms will receive a bid in the next 
period, of which only 7 (or 3.24%) of these firms actually received such a bid. The next 
stage in the study involves holding a portfolio of all predicted targets over the one year 
period. Powell (2001) finds that, despite the methodological improvements introduced in 
the study, the model generated significantly negative abnormal returns during the holding 
period. Powell (2001) concludes that the results are consistent with the EMH. 
2.5.3.4  Summary 
Palepu (1986) has remained a seminal paper in this research area, perhaps, for two key 
reasons; (1) the introduction of theoretically justified takeover prediction hypotheses, and 
(2) the introduction of an improved methodology for takeover prediction. Some of the 
studies during this era contribute by further developing new hypotheses (e.g., Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992) and Powell (1997)) and by critiquing/proposing alternatives to some 
aspects of the Palepu (1986) methodology (e.g., Barnes (1999) and Powell (2001)). The 
results from tests on the possibility of generating abnormal returns from prediction models 
are mostly negative. While Walter (1994) argues that above-average returns can be earned 
by including current cost information in prediction models, other studies (such as Barnes 
(2000), Powell (1997) and Powell (2001)), argue (consistent with Palepu (1986)) it is 
unlikely that using target prediction models can lead to the generation of abnormal returns.  
 
Furthermore, these studies (including Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Barnes (2000), 
Powell (1997) and Powell (2001)) highlight some of the potential weaknesses in the Palepu 
(1986) study, particularly his method of computing optimal cut-off probabilities, and the 
lack of comprehensiveness, sufficiency and validity of his hypotheses and selected proxies. 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), for example, do not find evidence to support any of 
Palepu’s hypotheses. The general contention is that little is known about the characteristics 
of targets. While some of these gaps in research have been highlighted by prior studies, 
little has been done (in any of the studies during this era) to address issues of theoretical 
grounding, validity and comprehensiveness of the hypotheses. Further, no study (to the 
best of my knowledge) highlights the potential limitations of the methods employed by 
Palepu (1986).  
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2.5.4 Empirical studies in Takeover prediction 2003–2013 
2.5.4.1  Overview 
The second era (1986–2002) is marked by a general contention that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for takeover prediction to form the basis of a successful investment strategy. 
The primary reason advanced for this is that target prediction models are inefficient as high 
levels of prediction errors are recorded. This, perhaps, explains why many studies post-
2002, focus on the use of new computational techniques to improve prior takeover 
prediction models. As will be discussed in this section, several studies in the 2003–2013 
era, focus on testing the discriminatory potential of different sophisticated computational 
techniques rather than actually predicting future takeover targets for investment purposes. 
Like the studies in the first and second eras, the main studies in this era span different 
contexts including: the US, the UK and the rest of Europe. 
2.5.4.2  US studies 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) is one of the main US studies focusing on the 
development and testing of takeover prediction models during this era. The study employs 
both non-parametric (recursive partitioning) and parametric tests (discriminant, logit and 
probit models) along-side Palepu’s (1986) state-based sampling methodology, to develop 
takeover prediction models for US targets. Aside from using financial variables similar to 
those in Palepu (1986), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) investigate the relevance of 
several non-financial variables such as a dummy for anti-takeover regulation
46
, a dummy 
for the presence of poison pills defensive strategies, a dummy for the presence of golden 
parachutes, and the percentage of directors’ ownership within the company. As discussed 
in section 1.3, the use of these non-financial variables (which broadly capture antitakeover 
amendments and takeover defences) is particularly important when modelling takeovers in 
a US institutional setting. These variables are, perhaps, of less importance or even non-
applicable (e.g., the Delaware dummy) in the UK setting. 
 
After highlighting the potential relevance of several financial and non-financial prediction 
variables, Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), nonetheless, fail to employ the variables in 
their analysis as the set of variables are reduced to four main variables (including free cash 
flow to total assets, golden parachute dummy, Delaware dummy and equity market value 
to total firm-value) using stepwise regression analysis. Further, Espahbodi and Espahbodi 
                                                 
46 Firms incorporated in the state of Delaware are subject to more stringent takeover regulations 
(Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003) 
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(2003) validate their results by testing it on a non-randomly selected sample of 30 targets 
and 200 selected non-targets. In spite of the biases in the study, Espahbodi and Espahbodi 
(2003) reported poor predictive ability of all models
47
.  
2.5.4.3  UK studies 
The main UK studies during this era include: Powell (2004), Powell and Yawson (2007), 
Pasiouras et al. (2007), Ouzounis et al. (2009) and Pasiouras et al. (2010). To a large 
extent, the focus of Ouzounis et al. (2009), Pasiouras et al. (2007) and Pasiouras et al. 
(2010) is on the comparison of different parametric and non-parametric modelling 
approaches using a prediction modelling framework.  
 
Powell (2004) builds on Powell (1997) which proposes a multinomial framework for 
predicting takeover targets – a framework which differentiates between friendly and hostile 
targets. Powell (2004) argues that the characteristics of hostile takeover targets are 
markedly different from those of friendly takeover targets given the fact that the motive for 
hostile takeovers is to enforce discipline while that of friendly takeovers is to achieve 
synergies. Powell (2004) contends that a multinomial framework (as opposed to a simple 
binomial framework) that takes into account the characteristics of the event (hostile or 
friendly) will produce models with more explanatory power and this will invariably lead to 
better predictive abilities. Powell (2004) hypothesises that friendly targets are more likely 
to be small firms in financial distress, having low levels of liquidity and high leverage 
while hostile targets are more likely to be profitable firms.  
 
Powell employs a UK sample consisting of an estimation sample of 9,891
48
 firm-years 
drawn from 1986 to 1995 and a holdout sample of 1,000
49
 firm-years drawn from 1996. 
The study reports poor model predictive ability as all models (multinomial and binomial) 
misclassified a large number of non-targets as targets and no model achieves a better than 
chance predictive ability
50
. Aside from a significant difference in the size of friendly and 
                                                 
47 Although the recursive partitioning model reported better in-sample classification levels, its 
superiority can possibly be due to the fact that many more financial and non-financial variables are 
used in the model while only four variables are used in the discriminant, logit and probit models.  
48 The estimation sample of 9,891 firm-years is made up of 81 hostile targets firm-years, 390 
friendly targets firm-years and 9,420 non-targets firm-years. 
49 The holdout sample of 1,000 firm-years is made up of 4 hostile targets firm-years, 25 friendly 
targets firm-years and 971 non-targets firm-years. 
50 The model is developed using data from 1986 to 1995 and the model is tested using data from 
1996. The 1996 test sample of 1,000 firms had 29 targets (a target concentration ratio of 2.9%). 
Powell (2004) predicted that 268 firms will be targets of which 8 firms are actual targets (a target 
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hostile targets, the results from the model do not lend support to his contention that 
friendly and hostile targets have substantial differences. The theorised benefits of a 
multinomial modelling framework are not, therefore, empirically confirmed in this study. 
Further, the number of hostile targets in the sample is, perhaps, too few (zero in some 
years) for a multinomial model to be of any substantial benefit. 
 
Powell and Yawson (2007) focus on factors driving restructuring events. The study 
investigates whether the variables frequently used in takeover prediction (Palepu’s 
hypotheses plus the tangible assets and free cash flow hypotheses) also explain other 
restructuring events such as layoffs, bankruptcies and divestitures. Powell and Yawson 
(2007) employ a sample of 482 takeovers, 82 bankruptcies, 360 divestitures and 631 
layoffs between 1992 and 2002. During this period there were no restructuring events in 
8,048 firm-year observations. Using a multinomial model, Powell and Yawson (2007) find 
evidence that takeover targets, firms involved in divestitures and bankrupt firms are all 
characterised by declining stock returns. The results from the analysis reveals that the 
variables frequently used in takeover prediction might be more appropriate in modelling 
divestitures and layoffs than takeovers or bankruptcies
51
. The result of this study further 
suggests that the set of prediction hypotheses (and variables) used in prior studies does not 
comprehensively encapsulate the strategic motives of takeovers. 
 
Ouzounis et al. (2009) employ a UK sample of 416 takeover targets and 1,160 non-targets 
between 2001 and 2005. The study finds that targets are significantly larger in size, 
potentially undervalued and less profitable when compared to non-targets
52
. The finding on 
firm size is consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007) but in contrast to prior evidence 
which suggests that targets are, on average, smaller than non-targets (see, for example, 
Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), Powell (2001, 2004) and Brar et al. (2009)).  The finding 
that targets have more inefficient management teams and are generally undervalued 
corroborates earlier research findings (e.g., Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), Powell (2001) 
                                                                                                                                                    
concentration ratio of 2.9%). The implication is that the model developed by Powell (2004) does not 
predict targets better than a chance or random selection. 
51 For example, the results reveal that the likelihood of divestitures is negatively related to a firm’s 
growth, liquidity, stock returns and industry shocks, and positively related to leverage, size, 
industry growth and industry liquidity, at the 10% level. Similarly, the probability of layoffs is 
negatively related to growth, size, tangible assets, industry shocks and industry concentration. 
Nonetheless, the study shows that the probability of takeover is only explained by stock returns, 
size, industry growth and industry concentration (significant at 10% level), with the relevance of 
stock returns and size disappearing in some sub periods. 
52 The study measured size by using the log of total assets in the previous year. The size variable is 
significant at a 1% level of significance. 
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and Brar et al. (2009)). Ouzounis et al. (2009) explore the performance of other non-
parametric methods such as UTADIS (Utilités Additives Discriminantes), ANN (Artificial 
Neural Networks) and SVM (Support Vector Machines). There is no evidence that the 
more sophisticated non-parametric methodologies consistently outperform a simple 
discriminant analysis model. 
 
In line with Ouzounis et al. (2009), other UK studies such as Pasiouras et al. (2007) and 
Pasiouras et al. (2010) have also explored the use of non-parametric models including 
MHDIS (Multi-group Hierarchical Discrimination Method) and UTADIS (Utilités 
Additives Discriminantes) in the prediction of UK targets. The objective of these studies is 
generally to compare the discriminatory ability of these new techniques and not to predict 
future targets per se. As will be further discussed in section 2.6.2.3, the results obtained to 
date are mixed with no non-parametric method consistently achieving superior predictive 
ability over other parametric and non-parametric methods. 
2.5.4.4  European (outside the UK) studies 
A few studies have considered takeover prediction in a European context. While some 
researchers have employed a European Union-wide approach (e.g., Brar et al. (2009)), 
others have focused on a single European country (e.g., Tsagkanos et al. (2007)). In a 
cross-country European study, Brar et al. (2009) posit that takeover prediction models 
which incorporate share price momentum and trading volume in their model can be used to 
generate abnormal returns. Brar et al. (2009) employ the Palepu (1986) hypotheses 
together with the state-based sampling methodology advocated by Palepu (1986). In terms 
of target characteristics, the study reports that, ‘…European targets are smaller in size, 
undervalued, less liquid, have low sales growth, exhibit strong short-term price momentum 
and their shares are actively traded prior to the deal announcement’ (p. 449). In terms of 
investment potential, the study ends on a positive note, emphasising that it is possible to 
generate significant abnormal returns by investing in predicted targets
53
. As will be 
discussed in section 2.6, the methodology employed in Brar et al. (2009) introduces 
substantial look-ahead bias into the findings. Primarily, Brar et al. (2009) test their model 
on the same sample used to develop model parameters. 
 
Tsagkanos et al. (2007) on the other hand, focus on a single EU country by developing a 
target prediction model for Greece. The study employs a set of variables which presumably 
                                                 
53 Brar et al. (2009) report that their model generates 17.4% unadjusted returns (equivalent to 8.5% 
market-adjusted returns and 10.4% size-adjusted returns), over the holding period. 
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have unique influences in the Greek economy and a strategic bearing on the decision to 
acquire Greek firms
54
. The results from the study suggest that Greek acquirers are more 
interested in large targets, high productivity, accumulated experience and good financial 
performance. While the study only focuses on a small economy, it highlights the 
importance of country or context on the choice of prediction variables. It also shows that 
the relationship between takeover probability and firm variables (e.g., firm size) is likely to 
be context dependent.  
2.5.4.5  Summary 
There appears to have been a shift in research focus from developing predictive 
variables/hypotheses (i.e., understanding the factors that drive takeovers) towards an 
agenda of testing the ability of different empirical and computational techniques 
(parametric and non-parametric discriminatory models) to predict future targets. The 
studies in this era assume (implicitly but not explicitly) that the Palepu (1986) hypotheses 
fully explain the underlying rationales for takeover. This, perhaps, explains why most of 
the studies adopt the Palepu (1986) hypotheses but try to improve upon his computational 
model – the logit model – by employing multinomial models and non-parametric models. 
The results derived from the different parametric and non-parametric models employed in 
many of the studies, indicate that these new computational techniques do not, in many 
cases, improve the accuracy of takeover prediction models
55
. Generally, the models 
correctly predict very few targets and in so doing misclassify very many non-targets as 
targets. The effect is that the promised returns to takeover prediction have not been 
achieved, unless when substantial bias is incorporated in the study
56
.   
 
Perhaps, the shift towards the application of ‘more advanced’ or non-parametric models is 
pre-mature as a solid foundation for prediction modelling is yet to be laid. For example, 
evidence from Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell and Yawson (2007) suggest 
that Palepu’s hypotheses do not really explain the strategic rationale for takeovers. A 
potential way forward is for researchers in the area to revisit the development of predictive 
hypotheses as knowledge about what motivations/factors drive takeovers is still 
incomplete. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the current study advances the 
                                                 
54The accounting variables used include; return on equity, net profit margin, leverage, liquidity, 
debtors’ collection period, creditors’ payment period, goods’ holding period, growth  and growth 
to resource. The non-accounting variables employed include; size, export orientation, relative 
labour productivity, age and capital to labour. 
55 As will be discussed in section 2.6.2 and 4.3, non-parametric models are not, therefore, adopted 
in this study. 
56 Such as the Brar et al. (2009) study discussed above. 
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literature by redeveloping the old hypotheses and introducing new takeover prediction 
hypotheses prior to the development of prediction models. The result obtained from this 
study affirms the importance of robust hypotheses development for takeover prediction 
success. 
2.5.5 Takeover prediction by investment practitioners 
2.5.5.1 Overview 
The goal of this section is to align the research literature with practice and to establish the 
usefulness and relevance of the methods employed in the area to investment practitioners. 
Wansley et al. (1983) highlight two early cases of investment firms (E.H Hutton and 
Dreyfus Company) with investment strategies centred on investing in potential takeover 
targets. Wansley et al. (1983) notes that E.H Hutton regularly published its ‘Acquisition 
Candidates’ brochure devoted to identifying stocks with a high probability of being 
acquired (p. 149). The Dreyfus Company also managed a Merger and Acquisition Fund 
with the goal of investing in firms which are likely acquisition targets (Wansley et al. 
(1983), pp. 149-150). At present, several investors on the internet claim to employ target 
prediction models as the basis of their investment strategies. Nonetheless, the models 
employed by these investors are considered to be proprietary and therefore not disclosed. 
Interestingly, Morgan Stanley IQ and strategists at Deutsche Bank have published the 
takeover prediction models these firms employ as part of their investment strategies.  This 
published material can therefore provide some useful insights into the practitioners’ 
approach to takeover prediction modelling as an investment strategy. The approaches used 
by these institutions are discussed below. 
 
2.5.5.2 Target Equity Index Family (2003-2010) – Morgan Stanley IQ 
Morgan Stanley runs a Target Equity Index Family (TEIF) as part of its Intelligent 
Investing programme (Morgan Stanley IQ). This family is a group of five funds made up 
of a World Target Equity Index, a Europe Target Equity Index, a US Target Equity Index, 
a UK Target Equity Index and a Japan Target Equity Index. The rationale behind the 
investing style is embedded in the ‘Target Equity’ philosophy statement which states: 
‘Why do some stocks outshine others? While many stocks are perceived as undervalued, 
not all realise their true value. But sometimes there is a catalyst that brings an undervalued 
stock to the surface – an event or potential event that may drive a resurgence in the stock 
price. Some of the largest moves in stock prices can occur when the firms are takeover 
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targets or associated with rumours or potential takeovers. The Target Equity Index Family 
aims to select undervalued stocks that may be potential takeover targets’ (Morgan Stanley 
IQ (2008), p. 2). 
 
What is intriguing about the prediction of potential targets by Morgan Stanley is the 
simplicity of the model/methodology employed. The firm indicates that the TEIF, ‘…uses 
a screening process that is quantitative, rules-based and transparent. It ranks and selects 
stocks using inputs from publicly available firm data to create a series of global, regional 
and country indices’ (Morgan Stanley IQ (2008), p. 4). 
 
For potential inclusion in the investible index, Morgan Stanley IQ requires that the stock 
should be listed on a regulated exchange, must not be in the financial sector and must meet 
a minimum liquidity criterion
57
. The next step in the selection process employed by 
Morgan Stanley IQ is to apply its ‘Target Equity’ screen to the population of firms. This is 
done by ranking stocks based on five variables: the ratio of free cash flow to enterprise 
value (FCF/EV), interest cover (EBIT/I), dividend yield (D/P), the ratio of enterprise value 
to fixed assets (EV/FA) and the ratio of share price to book value (MV/BV)
58
. The final 
step in the selection process is to pick the 50 stocks with the best ranking across all 
variables, i.e., stocks with a high FCF/EV, high EBIT/I, high D/P, low EV/FA and low 
MV/BV. The 50 stocks are used to form an index with equal weighting and the index is 
rebalanced quarterly (Morgan Stanley IQ (2008)). 
 
Based on self-reported performance in back-tests between April 2001 and July 2007 
(Morgan Stanley IQ (2013)), the UK (or world) Target Equity Index generated a total 
annualised return of 14.40% (or 17.10%) while a broad based index such as the Morgan 
Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) UK (or world) generated an annualised return of 6.40% (or 
0.5%). This leads to an excess return of 8.10% (UK) or 16.60% (world). This period (2001 
to 2007) can, perhaps, be viewed as an in-sample period used in the development of the 
model or the selection of appropriate indication variables. It is therefore expected that the 
model should perform well during this period. The true test of the model is, perhaps, its 
performance post-2007.  
 
                                                 
57 Sufficient liquidity allows for the formation of a tradable index. 
58 The brochure argues that enterprise value is more suitable when compared to market 
capitalisation because it captures both the value of equity and the cost of taking over the firm’s 
debt. 
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Morgan Stanley IQ (2013) reports that the target equity index has not out-performed the 
MSCI when the methodology is tested ‘live’ between July 2007 and April 2013. The 
Morgan Stanley World Target Equity earned an annualised return of –1.5% as against the –
0.9% annualised return earned by the MSCI world index. The results show that on a risk-
adjusted basis, the model does not generate returns higher than those of the market. In fact, 
the strategy underperforms the market. 
2.5.5.3 Deutsche Bank quantitative strategy – Cahan et al. (2011) 
The Cahan et al. (2011)
59
 paper is developed by five quantitative strategists working at 
Deutsche Bank. The paper is published as part of a series of publications on quantitative 
trading strategies at Deutsche Bank and described as a ‘quant approach to takeover 
prediction’ (p. 4). To develop their prediction models, the strategists employ the variables 
used in Brar et al. (2009) together with informed trading variables, high-frequency trading 
variables and technical trading variables
60
. These variables attempt to capture the 
sentiments of other market participants (such as option traders, technical traders and high-
frequency traders) by examining the minute-to-minute movements in stock prices.  
 
The Weibull Shape Parameter, for example, measures the time between trades on a 
particular stock. If the time between trades suddenly drops (i.e., higher frequency trading), 
then it is probable that informed traders are predicting an event (such as a bid) to occur. 
Similarly, the Residual PIN uses data from individual trades (tick by tick data) to infer the 
likelihood of informed trading or information leakage (i.e., the likelihood that traders are 
expecting an event to occur). The rationale for using these different variables is fully 
discussed in Cahan et al. (2011). 
 
By employing a logit regression model on the sample of Russell 3000 stocks, the 
strategists find that targets have a higher price to earnings, lower price to book, higher 
gearing, good gross margins, are within active M&A sectors, have lower trading volume, 
lower market capitalisation, higher total assets, lower price volatility, fat tails in daily 
returns, higher option trading volume and positive intraday return skewness. Some of the 
                                                 
59 At the time of writing (2011), the lead researcher, Rochester Cahan, is the Director at Deutsche 
Bank, heading the US quantitative strategy team. 
60 Informed trading variables include the ratio of dollar value of options traded to stocks traded 
(O/S ratio), Weibull Shape parameter, Intraday Order Imbalance, Residual PIN, and Intraday 
abnormal turnover. High-frequency trading variables include; high-frequency standard deviation, 
high-frequency skewness, and high-frequency kurtosis. Technical trading variables include; daily 
volatility, daily skewness, daily kurtosis, and abnormal volume. The data for some of these 
variables (e.g., high-frequency trading) is only available in a limited number of years. 
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results presented by Cahan et al. (2011) are counter intuitive or even contradictory. For 
example, the finding that targets have small market capitalisation and large total assets is, 
possibly, contradictory as total asset and market capitalisation are both used as proxies for 
firm size
61
. Perhaps, this is because some of the variables included in the model (e.g., price 
to earnings and price to book, market capitalisation and total assets, and stock trading 
volume and options trading volume) are likely to be highly correlated. Cahan et al. (2011), 
on average, achieve a target concentration of just 0.8% using their high-frequency model 
which predicts targets on a monthly basis
62
. When its abnormal returns are considered, the 
model substantially underperforms the market in all periods between June 2001 and June 
2011.  
 
Cahan et al. (2011) contend that the poor results are attributed to a ‘loser drag’ as ‘false 
positives’ are on average ‘loser stocks’ and the benefits from a few predicted targets do not 
outweigh the cost of holding these ‘loser stocks’ (p. 18). The strategists argue that 
underperformance within the target portfolio can be mitigated by applying an in-house 
proprietary screening procedure (Deutsche Bank QCD model) on all predicted targets to 
further screen the list of predicted targets for loser stocks. The results show that the high-
frequency model employed in this study neither has a superior predictive ability nor 
provides a superior investment tool.  
2.5.5.4 Summary 
This section highlights the relevance of target prediction modelling to the investment 
community by drawing examples from two key investment banks – Morgan Stanley and 
Deutsche Bank. There is a substantial difference in the approach employed by the two 
institutions, with Morgan Stanley employing a simple ‘rank-based’ model (which ranks 
firms across five variables) and Deutsche Bank employing a sophisticated high-frequency 
‘quant-based’ model. While Morgan Stanley describes its model as one which ‘aims to 
select undervalued stocks that may be potential takeover targets’ (Morgan Stanley (2008), 
p. 2), there is no empirical evidence that the model can actually predict any actual targets. 
Cahan et al. (2011) present empirical evidence which shows that their model only slightly 
                                                 
61 The study also employed the non-random equal-share or matched sampling procedure used in 
studies such as Brar et al. (2009) and Palepu (1986). 
62 The strategists employ deciles rather than any cut-off probability. The use of deciles on the 
Russell 3000 leads to a prediction that 300 stocks should receive bids each month. Of these 300, 
only 2.4 stocks (0.8%) on average received a bid each month.  
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improves on a strategy of holding all the stocks in the Russell 3000 index
63
. Overall, the 
results suggest that the two practitioner models neither have a superior predictive ability 
nor a superior ability of generating above normal returns for investors. 
2.5.6 Takeover probability as an input variable in empirical research 
As discussed in section 2.3.6, a range of studies including Cremers et al. (2009), Bhanot et 
al. (2010) and Cornett et al. (2011), amongst others, have employed takeover probabilities 
as a key input variable to investigate different research questions. Cremers et al. (2009), for 
example, develop a model to predict takeover targets, with the objective of testing the 
impact of takeover likelihood on firm valuation. They employ a US sample of firms 
between 1981 and 2004. In the study, the takeover likelihood is defined as a probit 
function of a firm’s Q ratio, tangible assets, cash resources, blockholders’ dummy, size, 
industry leverage and return on assets. Cremers et al. (2009) report that between 1991 and 
2004, the prediction model generates annualised mean abnormal returns of 7.95%. 
Nonetheless, these returns are not explained by the targets in the sample as the returns 
persist (at a similar magnitude) when actual targets are excluded from the sample. The 
study concludes that a takeover factor (derived from firm takeover likelihood) partly 
explains the cross section of firm returns and the returns to governance-based (G-index; 
Gompers et al. (2003)) portfolios. 
 
Bhanot et al. (2010) investigate the effect of a firm’s takeover risk on the relationship 
between its stock returns and bond prices. Takeover risk in this study is defined as a 
function of firm size, market to book ratio, excess returns, EBITDA, R&D, level of 
tangible property, leverage, percentage of institutional ownership and one-year price 
volatility. Only completed takeovers are considered and a probit regression model is used 
to obtain the takeover probability. No validation tests are conducted to ascertain the 
validity of the model in computing firm takeover probability.   
 
Further, Cornett et al. (2011) investigate investors’ anticipation of bidder and target 
candidacy in takeovers and whether this anticipation moderates the wealth distribution 
between bidders and targets in takeovers. In the research design, bid probability or risk of 
takeover for targets (probability of making a bid for bidders) is used to develop a surprise 
instrument (a measure of market anticipation). Cornett et al. (2011) model bid probability 
                                                 
63 Cahan et al. (2011) indicate that about 180 Russell 3000 stocks receive a bid each year (15 bids 
each month). Their model is able to predict an average of 2.4 targets each month (from a pool of 
300 firms) or 24 targets each year (from a pool of 3000 stocks).  
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as a logit function of sales shock, size, change in size, industry concentration, growth-
resource mismatch, return on assets, cash ratio, price run-up, information asymmetry and 
participation in previous mergers. Like in the previous two studies, the validity of the 
model in measuring the likelihood of being a bidder or target is not further tested in the 
study.  
 
The validity of these three studies (Cremers et al. (2009), Bhanot et al. (2010) and Cornett 
et al. (2011)) is, perhaps, reliant on the models efficiency in measuring takeover risk. 
These three studies do not, however, test whether the models can predict future targets. 
Further, the variables used in the definition of takeover risk in these three studies are a mix 
of the variables that have recurrently been used and criticised (for lacking explanatory 
power) in prior empirical research. Perhaps, the true test of a prediction model or one that 
measures takeover risk is not whether it generates abnormal returns (like in Cremers et al. 
(2009)) but whether it is able to predict the event in question (future targets or bidders). It 
is unclear whether a more optimal takeover risk model will alter the conclusions of these 
studies.  
2.5.7 Conclusion 
The review has shown that takeover prediction and takeover probability modelling is truly 
a broad field with a strong historical background. The review has also shown that the 
literature has resorted to the propositions made by Palepu (1986) with marginal 
improvements in modelling techniques. Takeover prediction is of interest to investors, with 
investor models seeming to mirror the models used in academic empirical research. As 
discussed in section 2.5.6, several contemporary studies are employing takeover 
probability (however defined) as an input in different areas of empirical research. These 
studies do not, however, evaluate the empirical validity of the takeover likelihood models 
developed. The next section (2.6) critiques the methodologies that have been used in post-
Palepu (1986) studies. The aim is to put in place a more robust methodological framework 
for developing and testing takeover prediction models. A key part of this framework is the 
development of a new set of predictive hypotheses derived from theory. The development 
of these hypotheses is the subject of chapter 3. 
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2.6 An evaluation of methodological choices of prior studies 
2.6.1 Overview 
The Palepu (1986) study provides a comprehensive critique of the studies in the pre-Palepu 
era which are discussed in section 2.5.2. This critique is summarised in section 2.5.3.2. The 
focus of this section is to critically evaluate the methodology recommended by Palepu (and 
adopted by several of the studies discussed in section 2.5.3 and 2.5.4), as well as some of 
the empirical methods, choices and techniques used in more contemporary studies. 
Different aspects of the prediction methodology (including: (1) the choice of 
discriminatory models, (2) sampling strategies, (3) the choice of cut-offs for identifying 
targets out-of-sample, and (4) the choice of prediction hypotheses) are evaluated.  
2.6.2 Choice of discriminatory models 
2.6.2.1 Overview 
Several discriminatory models have been used by researchers in the various attempts to 
predict takeover targets. The methods employed include: univariate analysis such as 
difference of means testing, linear discriminant models, logistic regression models,  neural 
network models, recursive partitioning models, multinomial logit models, support vector 
machines, rough set models, quadratic discriminant analysis, multi-criteria decision aids 
and probit regressions, amongst others (see, for example, Palepu (1986), Powell (2001, 
2004), Barnes (2000), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), Pasiouras et al. (2007), Brar et al. 
(2009), Ouzounis et al. (2009), Bhanot et al. (2010)). A summary is presented in table 
2.6.2.  For the purposes of this study, these techniques are broadly classified into 
parametric and non-parametric techniques. 
2.6.2.2 Parametric techniques 
Parametric analysis generally assumes knowledge of the nature or functional form of the 
distribution from which data is drawn. Most popular statistical models (some of which are 
discussed below) are parametric in nature. Knowledge of the nature of the distribution 
allows inferences about the model parameters to be made. Regression analysis (linear, 
logistic and probit) is a key parametric technique which has been widely used in prediction 
modelling. Prior researchers such as Steven (1973), Wansley et al. (1983) and Rege (1984) 
employed linear discriminant analysis (LDA) to predict future targets. The popularity of 
this model amongst early researchers can, perhaps, be attributed to the success of the early 
bankruptcy prediction models such as Beaver (1966), Altman (1968) and Taffler (1983) 
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which also employed linear discriminant models. Some more recent studies such as 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) have also applied linear discriminant models
64
.  
 
Researchers such as Zavgren (1983), Palepu (1986) and Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) have 
criticised the use of LDA in takeover and bankruptcy prediction, noting that the model is 
based on assumptions which are highly violated in prior research. For example, LDA 
assumes that the independent variables follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution. Palepu 
(1986) and Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) contend that this particular assumption is very often 
violated. Barnes (1990) contends that financial variables are less likely to be normally 
distributed and more likely to be skewed. The consequence of using such financial 
variables in the model is that standard errors and significance tests become unreliable. The 
requirement for multivariate normality also limits the use of qualitative predictor variables 
(such as dummy variables) in LDA. Hence, controlling for industry effects, for example, 
through the use of industry dummies, becomes inappropriate.  
 
When distinguishing between targets and non-targets, the LDA assumes that the target and 
non-target subgroups have equal variance-covariance matrices. This implies that dispersion 
matrices for targets and non-targets should be the same, which is often not the case. 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) argue that in instances where this assumption cannot be met, 
quadratic LDA (though more complex) will provide a more appropriate solution. The third 
assumption of linear discriminant modelling requires that, prior probabilities of group 
membership are known together with misclassification costs (costs of type I and type II 
errors). The likelihood that firms will be subjects of takeovers is contingent on several 
factors which may include environmental factors which are unstable over time. It is 
therefore difficult to determine a priori with certainty, the probability of group 
membership and hence the misclassification cost. 
 
Finally, the LDA model requires that independent variables should be free from 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity leads to unstable parameter estimates (Brookes (2008)) 
and therefore inaccurate models with low predictive abilities. Multicollinearity occurs 
when the independent variables are interrelated or correlated i.e., when one independent 
variable is a function of another. The main effect of multicollinearity is that it leads to 
broader confidence intervals and smaller t-statistics (see Brookes (2008) and Gujarati 
                                                 
64 Linear discriminant models (LDA) employ linear regression analysis to obtain a score which is a 
function of several firm characteristics. The model stipulates that the probability that a firm will 
receive a bid is a linear function of a vector of firm variables.  
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(2007) for a fuller discussion on the source and consequences of multicollinearity). Critics 
of bankruptcy and takeover prediction studies (e.g., Palepu (1986), Balcaen and Ooghe 
(2006)) note that few researchers using discriminant analysis test if their data actually meet 
the assumptions of the models. The consequence is that some of these models are 
potentially mis-specified, and are likely to lack explanatory and predictive ability.  
 
The logit model has been proposed and employed in takeover prediction as it circumvents 
some of the problems inherent in LDA. The model stipulates that the probability that a firm 
will receive a takeover bid is a logit function of a set of firm characteristics. Several 
researchers (including Barnes (1999)) argue that logit models are theoretically and 
empirically superior to LDA in the context of takeover prediction. The suitability of logit 
models over LDA is based on its less restrictive assumptions. Logit models do not assume 
a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables. This implies that logit 
models can handle nonlinear effects (such as U-shaped relationships), without mis-
specifying the model parameters. Again, the dependent variables that go into a logit model 
need not necessarily be interval scaled, unbounded or normally distributed. This implies 
that dummy variables can be used as proxies and explicit interaction, as well as power 
terms can be added to a model without mis-specifying the model’s parameters. Unlike 
LDA where the output is unbounded, the output from logit regression is bounded between 
0 and 1 (corresponding to a probability scale), allowing for meaningful and direct 
interpretation. The assumptions of logit models are fully discussed in Allison (2012). 
 
The rare event problem poses a threat to the validity of using logit regression models in 
takeover likelihood modelling. King and Zeng (2001) contend that logit regression models 
can sharply underestimate the likelihood of rare events. They suggest that the effects of 
this rare event problem can be eliminated by using a large sample. Some researchers such 
as Bhanot et al. (2010) have employed probit models (as opposed to logit models) as the 
base model for takeover likelihood modelling. The key difference between these models is 
their assumption of the shape of the underlying probability distribution (further discussed 
in Brookes (2008)). Brookes (2008) contends that in large sample analysis, where the split 
of the dependent variable between 0 and 1 is balanced, the difference between the probit 
model and the logit model is insignificant. The case of takeovers represents an unbalanced 
case as the number of targets is usually significantly less than 10% of the total population 
(further discussed in section 4.2). Using a large sample, nonetheless, minimises any bias 
originating from choice of model as the difference in the results obtained from either link 
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(logit or probit) functions approaches zero as the sample size increases (Greene (2003)). 
Table 2.6.2 shows the parametric and non-parametric techniques that have been employed 
across the takeover prediction literature to date. 
 
Table 2.6.2: Modelling techniques employed in prior research 
 
Study Period Country Model(s)  
Belkaoui (1987) 1960-1968 Canada Linear Model 
Rege (1984) 1962-1973 Canada Linear Model 
Brar et al. (2009) 1992-2008 EU Logit Model 
Pasiouras et al. (2006) 1998-2002 EU  Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 
Zanakis and Zopounidis 
(1997) 
1983-1990 Greece Linear Model 
Tsagkanos et al. (2007) 1995-2001 Greece Logit Model 
Slowinski et al. (1997) 1983-1990 Greece RSM 
Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) 1967-1968 UK Linear Model 
Barnes (1990) 1986-1987 UK Linear Model 
Ouzounis et al. (2009) 2001-2005 UK Linear Model, ANN, UTADIS, SVM,  
Barnes (1998) 1991-1993 UK Logit Model 
Barnes (1999) 1991-1993 UK Logit Model 
Powell (1997) 1984-1991 UK Logit Model 
Powell (2001) 1986-1995 UK Logit Model 
Powell (2004) 1986-1985 UK Logit Model, Multinomial Logit Model 
Tartari et al. (2003) 1998-2000 UK SG, Linear Model, UTADIS, PNN, RSM 
Doumpos et al. (2004) 2000-2002 UK UTADIS 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi 
(2003) 
1993-1997 USA Logit Model, Linear Model, RP, Probit 
Model, QDA 
Wansley et al. (1983)  1975-1976 USA Linear Model 
Bartley and Boardman (1986) 1978 USA Linear Model 
Bartley and Boardman (1990) 1975-1981 USA Linear Model 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971)  1986 USA Linear Model 
Stevens (1973) 1966 USA Linear Model 
Wansley and Lane (1983) 1975-1977 USA Linear Model 
Ambrose and Megginson 
(1992) 
1981-1986 USA Logit Model 
Cornett et al. (2010) 1979-2004 USA Logit Model 
Cremers et al. (2009) 1981-2004 USA Logit Model 
Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) 1969-1973 USA Logit Model 
Palepu (1986) 1971-1979 USA Logit Model 
Walter (1994) 1981-1984 USA Logit Model 
De and Jindra (2012) 1980-2006 USA Multinomial Logit Model 
Bhanot et al. (2010) 1980-2000 USA Probit Model 
Notes: The table summarises sample period, sample country and modelling techniques used 
across different prior studies in takeover prediction. The table is ordered by sample country. The 
techniques used are as follows: UTADIS (UTilites Additives DIScriminante), PNN (Probabilistic 
Neural Network), ANN (Artificial Neural Networks), RP (Recursive Partitioning), QDA 
(Quadratic Discriminant Analysis), SVM (Support Vector Machine), RSM (Rough Sets Model). 
The most conventional techniques employed are the logit and linear models. 
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The table shows that the logit model is the model of choice for many researchers. While 
the use of linear models (linear regression analysis or multiple discriminant analysis) was 
quite popular pre-1986, their use in modelling takeover likelihood has declined 
substantially over time.  The table also reveals that the last decade has seen the 
introduction of several other ‘non-parametric’ models into the prediction literature. This is 
further discussed in the next section.  
2.6.2.3 Non-parametric techniques 
As shown in table 2.6.2, several non-parametric (and semi-parametric) predictive 
modelling techniques have been introduced over the last decade. The recent upsurge in the 
use of non-parametric techniques has been in line with recent developments in 
computational technology. Examples of these models include recursive partitioning, neural 
networks, support vector machines, rough set models and decision trees, amongst others. 
 
Unlike parametric models, non-parametric models do not generally assume a priori 
knowledge of the underlying distribution from which data is drawn. The attractiveness of 
these models stems from the fact that the researcher does not need to hypothesise on the 
underlying relationship between the dependent and independent variables prior to 
modelling. Pasiouras et al. (2007) note that non-parametric models are advantageous when 
compared to parametric models since they do not require any assumptions to be made 
(such as the need for multivariate normality) and therefore allow for the incorporation of 
non-quantitative variables into the model. It is worth reiterating that logit models also have 
less restrictive assumptions similar to those of non-parametric models. As evidenced by 
prior research (Pasiouras et al. (2007), Ouzounis et al. (2009)), non-parametric models are 
likely to be better fitted to the training data
65
 given their flexibility in accommodating 
nonlinear patterns and other data dynamics. Nonetheless, they are less likely to have a 
superior predictive ability when applied to a holdout sample, as the models are sample-
specific. A major limitation of these models (for empirical research) is their inability to 
explain the underlying relationships between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) directly compared the performance of parametric and 
non-parametric models in takeover prediction. Their results show that recursive 
partitioning has a higher in-sample classification ability compared to the parametric 
methods used in the study, but underperformed out-of-sample. They further contend that, 
                                                 
65 Training samples constitute the data employed in the development of the model. This is 
discussed further in section 2.6.4.2 
 56 
 
unlike the parametric methods, recursive partitioning does not allow for firms to be ranked 
or compared based on their takeover probability. That is, the algorithm simply classifies 
firms as ‘targets’ or ‘non-targets’ without information on the degree of semblance to 
targets and non-targets. Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) also argue that non-parametric 
models are bound to perform poorly out-of-sample as the models are specific to the 
variables, sequence of variables used and other user-specific choices such as splitting 
values and number of splits.  
 
Other researchers (such as Pasiouras et al. (2007), Zopounidis and Doumpos (2002) and 
Doumpos et al. (2004)) have employed non-parametric models such as MHDIS, SVM and 
UTADIS. Pasiouras et al. (2007) show that, when compared against each other, these 
models have different merits, with MHDIS having the highest out-of-sample predictive 
ability and UTADIS having the least out-of-sample predictive ability
66
. The issue of 
interest in this area of research is whether the more sophisticated models perform 
significantly better than the traditional models. Several researchers argue against the 
purported benefits of these ‘more sophisticated’ models. Summarising the evidence across 
different research areas, Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) conclude that the benefits to be gained 
from using more sophisticated models are questionable as much of the evidence shows that 
they don’t perform substantially better than the standard parametric models.  
2.6.2.4 Summary 
This section has looked at the different models (parametric and non-parametric) applied 
across research in takeover prediction. It has been shown that linear discriminant models 
are limited due to several assumptions which govern their use. Many researchers have 
substituted linear discriminant models for logit models due to its less restrictive 
assumptions and the ease of interpreting its results. As discussed in section 2.6.2.3, non-
parametric techniques are similar to ‘black box’ models which do not allow for the 
interaction between the independent variables and their relationship with the dependent 
variable to be understood. Non-parametric techniques are, therefore, less likely to be useful 
to stakeholders interested in understanding the dynamics of the takeover process.   
                                                 
66 No tests are however done to show that the difference in performance across models is 
statistically significant.  
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2.6.3 Strategies employed in Sample construction 
2.6.4.1 Overview 
Sampling has remained a challenge in takeover prediction modelling due to the rare event 
problem. As will be shown in section 5.2, just over 5.28% of UK firms, on average, receive 
a takeover bid each year (between 1989 and 2010). Given the problems that such a data 
distribution can generate in regression analysis (discussed by King and Zeng (2001)), 
many researchers resort to use contrived (rather than random) sampling methods in model 
development and/or out-of-sample model testing. The problem (i.e., using contrived or 
non-random samples) is exacerbated when researchers rely on statistical tests that assume 
random sampling (Palepu (1986)). This sampling limitation and other biases arising from 
the way in which training and holdout samples are selected are discussed in this section. 
2.6.4.2 Training samples: matched-samples versus panel data approach 
Training or estimation samples constitute the data employed in the development of the 
model and the computation of its parameters. Prior research argues that reliance on random 
sampling methods in the construction of training samples is simply inefficient as the 
number of non-targets significantly dwarfs the number of targets. Palepu (1986), for 
example, argues that the use of a purely random sample (with a small proportion of targets) 
will result in the obtainment of a sample with low information content and lead to 
‘imprecise parameter estimates’ (p. 6). Building on Palepu (1986), researchers such as 
Hasbrouck (1985), Bartley and Boardman (1990), Barnes (1990, 1998, 1999, 2000), 
Powell (1997, 2001) and Brar et al. (2009), amongst others, have employed state-based 
samples (or a matched-sampling approach) in order to circumvent the rare event problem.  
 
Palepu (1986) describes his sampling approach as follows. ‘A total of 277 targets are 
initially identified. Of these, 163 are included in the estimation sample after screening for 
data requirements. The population of 2,054 firms, which are not acquired as of 1979 and 
satisfied the criteria for inclusion in the sample as non-targets, is first arranged in 
alphabetical order. Every sixth firm is selected from this list to generate a random group of 
343 non-targets. Of these, 256 firms met the data requirements and are included in the 
sample’ (p. 20). Palepu (1986) employs a match-sampling technique that results in a 
reduction of the number of non-targets in his sample from 2,054 to 256. This allows him to 
increase the proportion of targets to non-targets from 7.3% to 38.9%. This contrived 
sample, perhaps, significantly obscures the difficulty of finding a target in the sample.   
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A similar procedure is used in Brar et al. (2009), who describe the procedure as follows. 
‘For every year in our study we generate a random sample of firms from the non-target 
population. We call this sample a ‘control’ group. The size of each control group matches 
the percentage of M&A activity in the reference year to the total activity over the entire 
period. If for example, 10% of M&A activity takes place in 1998, we randomly assign 10% 
of the non-target firms to 1998’ (p. 435). Brar et al. (2009) have a sample of 894 European 
targets (successful and unsuccessful bids between 1991 and 2003) and 2,906 European 
non-targets (firms that did not receive a bid in any year between 1991 and 2003).  Brar et 
al. (2009) choose not to adopt a panel data framework (which would have increased the 
number of non-targets to 34,872 non-target firm-years) but to adopt a matching procedure 
that matches non-target ‘firms’ to target ‘firm-years’. 
 
While the selective sampling methodology for non-target selection described above is 
problematic in itself (as will be discussed below), a major concern (and potential source of 
bias) is the non-systematic way in which specific non-target cases are selected for 
inclusion in the sample across different studies. The approach used, generally referred to as 
the ‘matching criterion’, is quite varied across prior research. Prior researchers have 
adopted various matching criteria including matching by size, matching by year-end, 
matching by industry, and random matching, amongst others. Bartley and Boardman 
(1986, 1990) argue that any form of matching is arbitrary due to the lack of a theoretical 
explanation to justify the matching criterion but suggest that when the ‘objective is simply 
to examine the statistical significance of predictive variables’ then matching by size, 
industry and time might be sufficient (Bartley and Boardman (1990), p. 55). While state-
based sampling, potentially, gives an indication of the relevance of prediction variables (as 
suggested by Bartley and Boardman (1990)), it also, perhaps, leads to misspecification of 
model coefficients (and particularly the magnitude of coefficients). Coefficients do not 
capture the true difficulty of identifying a ‘needle in a haystack’67 and therefore leads to 
high out-of-sample misclassification when the model is used in prediction.  
 
State-based sampling methods, typically, consider only live firms (see, for example, Palepu 
(1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000), Powell (1997, 2001) 
and Brar et al. (2009)). The procedure recommended by Palepu (1986) and employed in 
the above studies is to identify all targets over the study period and to match these targets 
                                                 
67 Palepu (1986) describes the difficulty of finding a target in the population of firms as finding a 
‘needle in a haystack’. 
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to the set of non-targets (i.e., surviving firms) at the end of the study period. By 
considering only surviving firms, the sampling process employed by several researchers 
(such as Palepu (1986) and Brar et al. (2009), amongst others) incorporates substantial 
survivorship bias. The implication is that, the models developed are not trained to 
distinguish between potential targets and potential dead (bankrupt, liquidated, receivership) 
firms, which is an important consideration from an investment perspective. This 
survivorship bias can, perhaps, partly explain why the models developed in previous 
research have reported significant error rates in out-of-sample prediction. For models to be 
useful in out-of-sample (equivalent to ‘real-world’) prediction, their coefficients need to be 
developed using representative training samples. This is further discussed in chapter 4. 
 
Overall, the use of a state-based sampling methodology for model development cannot be 
justified from a ‘prediction for investment’ perspective. The state-based sampling method 
undermines the reality that M&A is a rare and difficult-to-predict event. The parameters of 
models developed using state-base samples do not capture the true nature of the data. Such 
models are likely to lack any generalisability or out-of-sample explanatory power
68
.  
2.6.4.3 Holdout samples 
Prediction models are developed using a training sample but need to be validated out-of-
sample. If validation is done using the training sample, the predictive accuracies are likely 
to be biased upwards. For a holdout sample to be relevant for prediction testing, it is 
important for such a sample to reflect the challenges faced in real life usage of the model. 
Brar et al. (2009) can be criticised on this basis as they employ the same period to develop 
and to validate their model
69
.  
 
The method of using a holdout sample to test predictive ability of a model proposed by 
Palepu (1986) and widely used in the takeover and bankruptcy prediction literature (see 
studies by Powell (2001, 2004), Barnes (1999, 2000)), leads to results that are, potentially, 
negatively biased. Palepu (1986) correctly argues that, out-of-sample tests are required to 
                                                 
68 In section 6.5, for example, I discuss two studies by Powell (2001 and 2004) which apply the same 
data set and variables but different sampling methods. The results from this comparison suggest 
that a state-based sampling methodology underperforms a random-sampling method in out-of-
sample analysis. 
69 Brar et al. (2009) use data from 1992 to 2003 to develop their model, then fit the model on data 
from 1995 to 2003 (p. 447). Several biases are apparent. First, their sample has very few targets (16 
targets) between 1992 and 1994 (see table 1, p. 443, Brar et al. (2009)). This potentially explains why 
1995 (with 31 targets) is used as a start year to fit the model. Second, while they argue that their 
model is tested out-of-sample, no apparent tests or results are presented. It is unlikely that any 
such tests are conducted as the model is fitted using data from 1995. 
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investigate the predictive ability of models. Palepu (1986) uses a static sample of firms 
from 1970–1979 to construct his model and a sample of firms from 1980 to test the 
predictive power of the model.  The sample is described as ‘static’ as no consideration is 
given to the exact year (time) from which the data is drawn. The use of static-type models 
is not consistent with the cause-and-effect assumption underlying the modelling process – 
firm characteristics (e.g., management inefficiency) lead to takeovers. For example, when 
matched samples are employed, no attempt is made to capture ‘causation’ by using time-
lagged data to explain the event. For each firm in Palepu’s prediction sample, his model is 
validated only if a firm is a target between January 1980 and December 1980.  Firms 
subject to a takeover in January 1981, for example, are not considered as targets. The 
implication is that the holdout sample test might show that the model performs poorly even 
if several of the predicted targets are acquired in January 1981. This introduces a time 
dependency in hold-sample tests which is not captured during the model development 
process
70
. This time-dependency in prediction tests, potentially, leads to negatively biased 
model performance results.  
 
As will be discussed further, this problem cannot simply be alleviated by extending the test 
window beyond a 12-month period (as there is no theoretical or empirical justification for 
applying any test window in the context of static-type models). Static-type models only 
help to classify firms into different groups on the basis of their similarity to either targets 
or non-targets. These models are unlikely to offer any guidance on the time line within 
which firms with semblance to target firms should receive a takeover bid. Several studies 
adopting the Palepu (1986) methodology fail to recognise this time independency and 
therefore have introduced bias to their model tests. This issue can, perhaps, be resolved by 
developing more dynamic models using time varying covariates, incorporating appropriate 
lags and adding timing factors into prediction models.  
 
Timing and causation can, perhaps, be factored-in implicitly through the use of more 
dynamic models which employ time-varying covariates and a suitable lagging framework 
(i.e., a framework that supports the cause-and-effect assumption). In bankruptcy prediction 
research, Shumway (2001), for example, proposes a hazard-type model employing up to 
three years of historical data for each target in the sample. This hazard-type model is more 
                                                 
70 That is, the out-of-sample test is evaluating the model’s ability to predict firms that will be the 
subject of a bid between specific dates (January 1980 and December 1980) while the model was 
developed using a static framework with no regard for time or year in which a bid was made in the 
estimation sample. 
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efficiently able to model the ‘time to death’ (Shumway (2001)) or the probability that a 
firm will receive a bid during its next financial year. In addition, timing can also be 
incorporated explicitly, perhaps, through the incorporation of ‘timing factors’ (such as 
market variables), which serve to provide additional clues as to how soon a firm can be 
expected to receive a bid. These factors are likely to improve timing by incorporating both 
market and economic environmental factors which may act as a catalyst or an inhibitor to 
takeover activity.  
 
The use of a 12-month out-of-sample test period can be empirically justified when time-
varying covariates are employed in the model. Equation 1.2.3(1) is restated as below, 
where the likelihood of a firm (i) becoming a target (or receiving a takeover bid) in a 
period (T), denoted by       , is modelled as a function of a vector of its 
characteristics(  ) in the most recent period (T–1) in which these characteristics are 
observable, denoted by  (     ). 
        (     )            ( ) 
This framework allows for T to be more clearly empirically specified. For example, a T of 
12 months will allow for the computation of the probability that firm (i) will become a 
target in the next 12 months based on its observable characteristics in the last 12 months. 
The coefficients of the model will be trained to recognise this time dependability and hence 
will be optimal in out of sample prediction. 
2.6.4.4 Time lapse between firm year-end and date of data availability 
Fama and French (1993) raise the issue of a time lag between firm financial year-end and 
the actual date of data publication. Many US and UK firms have a financial year-end of 
December which coincides with the Calendar year-end (see Fama and French (1993) for 
US evidence and Soares and Stark (2009) for UK evidence). Fama and French (1993) 
apply a lapse of six months by assuming that June X2 represents a realistic date by which 
firm financial data for year-ending December X1 is publicly available. Building on Fama 
and French (1993), Soares and Stark (2009) note that a significant proportion of UK firms 
have a December year-end and the regulation allows public firms to publish their financial 
results within six months of their financial year-end. In fact, prior to 6
th
 April 2008, the UK 
Companies Act allowed firms to file in their reports up to seven months after year-end. 
This is further discussed in section 4.2.5.  
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Prior target prediction studies do not account for the likelihood that firm financial data will 
only be publicly available several months after firm year-end. This, perhaps, leads to look-
ahead bias in prediction tests as takeover probabilities are computed using data which is 
not in the public domain. In section 4.2.5, the ‘June approach’ (discussed in Soares and 
Stark (2009)) is adopted and used to mitigate such look-ahead bias. 
2.6.4.5 Coverage of training and holdout samples 
There is no clear empirical guidance on how much data (how many years of observations) 
should be used to develop or test prediction models. Barnes (2000) contends that the 
significance of prediction models and hypothesis changes over time. In line with this, 
Powell (1997) argues that takeover likelihood models are not robust over time due to 
frequent changes in the macroeconomic environment that impose changes in the firm’s 
operating conditions. Powell (1997) advocates the use of training samples covering short 
time periods as a way of circumventing the lack of robustness inherent in long time 
periods. In support of this, Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), for example, construct their 
sample by employing US data from 133 takeover bids announced in the last six months 
(July to December) of 1997
71
.  
 
Traditionally, the preference has been to employ time periods which maximise data usage. 
The use of longer periods of analysis can allow the researcher to document important 
changes in the relevance of takeover prediction hypotheses and theories over time. It is 
shown in this study that the length of the time period used in model development impacts 
on the model performance (further discussed in chapter 6). Given that there are no 
theoretical prescriptions on how samples should be constructed, the potential bias arising 
from the choice of sample time period can, perhaps, be mitigated by showing that results 
are consistent when different alternatives are employed. 
 
Several researchers (including Palepu (1986), Walter (1994) and Powell (2001, 2004)) 
have tested the potential for prediction models to generate abnormal returns for investors 
by computing the abnormal returns generated by the models over a period of one year. 
                                                 
71 On the contrary, Brar et al. (2009) employ a 12-year time span from 1992 to 2003, obtaining a 
sample of 896 bid announcements. They note that more than 50% of the bids considered in their 
sample are made between 1999 and 2000, with UK targets making up over 40% of the sample. The 
implication is that the likelihood of firms receiving a bid in their static sample is time dependent, 
with firms more likely to receive a bid between 1999 and 2000 than during the rest of the period. 
As discussed in 2.6.4.3, this problem of lack of robustness over time (and hence the preference for 
short time period sampling) can, perhaps, be mitigated through the use of dynamic models, 
incorporating timing factors as well as time varying covariates. 
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Powell (2004), for example, tests his multinomial model by holding a portfolio of 
predicted targets through the period from January 1996 to December 1996. From the 
model’s performance during this one-year period, he contends that his multinomial model 
is better than the binomial model and can lead to the generation of abnormal returns.  
 
From an investment standpoint, it is necessary to test a model’s ability to generate 
abnormal return over several years. This will allow the modeller to ascertain if the model 
performs consistently enough to be a useful investment tool. In line with the discussions on 
the EMH in section 2.4.3, a valid test of EMH is not whether the model can generate 
abnormal returns in one single year (which could be an outlier), but whether it can do so 
consistently over several time periods. A misleading picture of the model’s potential to 
generate positive returns can be painted, if, for example, that single year corresponds to a 
year when the entire stock market experienced high growth levels (such as 1996, employed 
in Powell (2001, 2004)). A more robust performance test can evaluate how the model 
performs under different market conditions, across different years and whether the model’s 
long run average performance (when adjusted for the level of risk) is different from that of 
the entire market. Such an approach is adopted in the current study as will be further 
discussed in chapter 4.  
2.6.4.6 Summary 
This section highlights some weaknesses and biases in the sampling methodology 
employed in prior studies. These include the use of matched-samples in estimating model 
parameters, the evaluation of model performance on inappropriately designed holdout 
samples, the failure to recognise the time lapse between firm year-end and financial data 
availability and the coverage of training and holdout samples. The exact impact of these 
biases on the conclusions of different prior studies is difficult to discern. These study 
advances the literature by proposing and adopting a more robust sampling framework 
(discussed in chapter 4). This framework is applied to re-evaluate some of the conclusions 
of prior studies. 
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2.6.4 Cut-offs and other methods for selecting the optimal target 
portfolio 
2.6.4.1 Overview 
Logit takeover prediction models are probabilistic models as they model the probability 
(between 0 and 1) that a firm will receive a bid during the specified period. Determining 
whether the computed takeover probability is high enough for a firm to be considered a 
potential target has remained a major challenge to researchers. This section examines and 
critiques the methods that have been used by different researchers. It also highlights the 
potential sources of bias in the different methods and proposes ways in which the bias can 
be mitigated. 
2.6.4.2 Cut-off probabilities for identifying future targets 
Three main empirical techniques for identifying the optimal cut-off have been proposed by 
Palepu (1986), Barnes (1990) and Powell (2001). Palepu (1986) contends that the optimum 
cut-off probability to be employed should depend on ‘prior probabilities of takeover, the 
decision context of interest and the appropriate pay-off function’ (p. 12). Palepu (1986) 
derived his optimal takeover probability as the point at which the probability density 
function of targets is equal to the probability density function of non-targets. This 
methodology aims to minimise the overall sample error rate as it assumes that the cost of 
type I and type II errors are equal. This technique has been used by other studies including 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003).  
 
Palepu’s (1986) estimation sample consists of an average of 18 targets a year over a period 
of nine years.  The population of non-target firms at the end of the nine-year period is 
2,054, meaning that only about 7.3% of firms in the period actually received a bid. 
Palepu’s cut-off methodology nonetheless led him to predict that 625 firms of 1,117 firms 
in the holdout sample (i.e. over 56% of the holdout sample) will receive a bid in 1980. This 
immediately highlights the inefficiency in this methodology given the discrepancy between 
past experience of 18 targets a year (between 1971 and 1979) and the prediction of 625 
targets in one year (1980). 
 
Barnes (1998) and Powell (2001) discuss the limitations of Palepu’s ‘equal cost of type I 
and type II errors’ assumption and propose the use of an alternative cut-off point which 
maximises the return for investors. This coincides with the cut-off probability that 
maximises the concentration of targets within the predicted target portfolio. This 
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assumption leads to the selection of a higher cut-off probability compared to the one 
arrived at using Palepu’s method. Barnes (1999) show that the Barnes (1998) methodology 
when applied to Palepu’s results increased Palepu’s cut-off probability from 0.112 to 0.30. 
This will lead to the prediction of a smaller number of firms than the 625 potential targets 
predicted by Palepu. Although it is not certain if such an increase in the cut-off point will 
lead to better target concentrations, this methodology (employed in Barnes (1998, 1999) 
and Powell (2001) to identify a suitable cut-off), appears to be more efficient from an 
investment stance point when compared to Palepu’s method. The methodology will 
therefore be employed in the current study. The method (and its underlying rationale) is 
fully discussed in chapter 4. 
2.6.4.3  Percentiles, Deciles and Quintiles (fixed portfolios) for portfolio 
selection 
Some recent studies such as Brar et al. (2009) and Cremers et al. (2009) have used deciles 
and quintiles in preference to cut-off probabilities in the identification of potential targets. 
These studies simply consider the top 10% (Brar et al. (2009) and Cremers et al. (2009)) or 
20% (Cremers et al. (2009)) of firms with highest probabilities as their sample of predicted 
targets. While this appears to be a conventional methodology in other areas of finance, it is, 
potentially, problematic as it implicitly assumes that 10.00% or 20.00% (respectively) of 
the firms in the sample are expected to receive a bid in the period, on average
72
. The long 
run average number of UK listed firms within the FTSE All-Share receiving a bid each 
year is about 5.28% as will be shown in chapter 5. Under the decile and quintile schemes, a 
perfect model will, on average, achieve type II errors of 47.20% (when deciles are used) or 
73.60% (when quintiles are used)
73
. Given a posteriori knowledge of a 5.28% rate of 
takeover activity, it seems more reasonable to forecast that in each year the 5.28% of firms 
with highest takeover probability are the most likely targets. That is, all firms with 
takeover probability above the 95
th
 percentile are potential targets. This only partly 
resolves the issue. 
 
Perhaps, the limitation of using quintiles, deciles and percentiles for predicting future 
targets is the fact that to decide whether or not a firm is a potential target requires the 
modeller to compute the takeover probability for every firm in the population. This poses a 
                                                 
72 Palepu (1986) argues that, on average, less than 3% of US listed firms receive a bid every year.  
73 When deciles are employed (for example) a perfect model will correctly predict all targets (5.28% 
of the population) but also predict non-targets as targets (type II errors), in order to attain the 10% 
decile cut-off. Hence, 4.72% of the 10% of firms predicted as targets will constitute a 
misclassification, leading to a type II error of 47.20%. 
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problem in a setting where data for different firms become available at different time 
periods
74
. This is not the case when cut-offs are employed. Here, each firm’s takeover 
probability can be computed as soon as its data is available and its probability directly 
compared against the cut-off to determine whether or not the firm is likely to receive a bid. 
Another problem with the use of deciles and quintiles is that they do not allow for 
flexibility from one year to another. Studies in the merger wave literature (see, for 
example, Harford (2005)) show that the level of takeover activity significantly changes 
from one period to another. The use of deciles or quintiles do not account for the changes 
in the level of takeover activity from one year to the next. 
2.6.4.4 Summary 
This section has shown that several techniques for identifying future targets out-of-sample 
have been used in the literature. The different techniques appear to have different merits 
and demerits. To my knowledge, no study has examined the impact of using these different 
techniques on the results of prediction tests. This issue is partly addressed in this study. As 
will be shown in chapter 6, these techniques lead to different results. Hence, the reported 
performance of a model can be biased by the techniques used to identify the optimal 
portfolio. Therefore, an unbiased approach to testing, perhaps, employs a cross section of 
methodologies. The use of a cross section of methodologies (e.g., cut-offs, deciles, 
quintiles and percentiles) will allow for the impact of methodological choice to be 
averaged-out and the unbiased predictive ability of the model ascertained. This approach is 
adopted in this study. This is further discussed in chapter 4.  
2.6.5 Prediction hypotheses and variable selection methods 
2.6.5.1 Overview 
The ‘Garbage in, Garbage out’ principle, a popular aphorism in the field of information 
and communication technology, specifies that a model is only as good as the quality of its 
input data. This highlights the importance of selecting appropriate explanatory variables 
for prediction modelling. This section discusses the approaches to selecting explanatory 
variables in prior research, as well as, the variables and hypotheses that have been 
employed in the literature. 
                                                 
74 For example, different firms have different financial year ends, implying that firm data will be 
made public at different points in time. In the context of deciles (for example), the top-10 highest 
takeover likelihood firms can only be identified once the financial data for all firms are made 
public. 
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2.6.5.2 Prediction hypotheses 
The selection of appropriate explanatory variables for inclusion in prediction models 
remains a challenge in prediction modelling research. The problem in predicting targets 
lies with identifying the best explanatory/predictive variables (Barnes (2000)). The studies 
in the first era (1968–1985) and some of the studies in the second era do not generally 
discuss the theoretical motivation for their choice of prediction variables. The general 
approach employed by these studies involves the use of univariate analysis (difference of 
means tests between targets and non-targets) to identify significant variables from a set of 
all available variables. Prior studies such as Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) and Cahan et 
al. (2011) have employed a ‘kitchen-sink’ approach to variable selection. Some studies use 
other variable reduction methods such as stepwise regression analysis (as in Simkowitz and 
Monroe (1971) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003)) and factor analysis
75
 (as in Barnes 
(1990)) to identify the important explanatory variables or reduce the variables to 
meaningful constructs. 
 
Palepu (1986) proposes a theoretical framework for the selection of hypotheses for 
takeover prediction. In his study, Palepu (1986) argued that a set of six hypotheses
76
 can 
sufficiently explain the motivations for and choice of target selection. These hypotheses 
include: management inefficiency, growth-resource mismatch, undervaluation, price 
earnings magic, industry disturbance and firm size hypotheses (fully discussed in chapter 
3). As discussed in section 2.5.3 and 2.5.4, these hypotheses have been replicated across 
many post-Palepu studies. Two more hypotheses, including tangible property hypothesis 
(proposed by Ambrose and Megginson (1992)) and the free cash flow hypothesis 
(proposed by Powell (1997) and based on Jensen’s (1986) agency cost of free cash flow 
theory), have been proposed and used extensively in the prediction of takeover targets. 
Brar et al. (2009) include firm age as a variable for prediction. The researchers neither 
discuss the rationale for using firm age nor empirically test its validity as an explanatory 
variable. 
 
Despite the advancement of these hypotheses, there is a near consensus amongst 
researchers that little is known about the characteristics of targets – suitable explanatory 
variables for takeover likelihood modelling. As discussed in section 2.5.3, Ambrose and 
                                                 
75 By grouping the variables into factors, factor analysis helps curb the problem of multicollinearity 
which arises when variables are indiscriminately included in the prediction model. 
76 Management inefficiency, growth-resource mismatch, undervaluation, price earnings magic, 
industry disturbance and firm size hypotheses. 
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Megginson (1992), for example, finds no support for any of Palepu’s hypotheses. This 
finding is more disconcerting given that the two studies employ a US sample with data 
drawn from around the same period. One possible reason for this finding is the fact that 
Palepu (1986) ignores the institutional context (the effect of takeover defences and 
antitakeover amendments) which Ambrose and Megginson attempt to capture. 
Nonetheless, this does not explain the full story as Palepu’s variables remain insignificant 
when institutional variables are excluded from the Ambrose and Megginson (1992) model. 
Other non-US studies (such as Powell (1997, 2001, 2004), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000), 
Powell and Yawson (2007) and Brar et al. (2009)) have failed to find evidence consistent 
with some of Palepu’s hypotheses. 
 
It appears the set of eight hypotheses used in prior research is limited and do not fully 
capture the complexity of the M&A target selection decision. For example, Powell and 
Yawson (2007) show that these same (six to eight) hypotheses could be used to model 
other restructuring activities including bankruptcies, divestitures and layoffs. Their results 
show that the old hypotheses better explain divestitures and layoffs, than takeovers. This 
evidence suggests that a timely redevelopment of takeover prediction hypotheses is 
warranted. This is a gap which this research aims to address. A contribution of this thesis is 
to develop a broader set of prediction hypotheses based on a more expansive theoretical 
foundation. As will be shown in chapter 5, this expansion leads to the development of a 
more powerful model.  
2.6.5.3 Proxies for prediction hypotheses 
The selection of suitable proxies for hypotheses is also a key issue for researchers. 
Concepts such as management inefficiency (or firm performance) and firm size can be 
measured in different ways as there is no theoretical guidance on the selection of proxies 
for hypotheses. Different researchers have employed different proxies for management 
inefficiency including return on assets (Palepu (1986)), return on equity (Palepu (1986), 
Brar et al. (2009)), stock abnormal return (Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson 
(1992)), operating profit margin (Powell (1997), Brar et al. (2009)), sales growth (Brar et 
al. (2009)) and earnings growth (Brar et al. (2009)). Different proxies such as market 
capitalisation (Brar et al. (2009)), net book value of assets (Palepu (1986), Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi (2003)), total sales (Brar et al. (2009)), total assets (Powell (1997)) and number 
of employees (Brar et al. (2009)) have also been used to measure firm size. It is popular to 
see researchers combining different proxies to test a single hypothesis. 
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Given the likely high correlation between some of these proxies (which results in the 
problem of multicollinearity), and the need to manage the degrees of freedom in the model, 
researchers turn to select only a few proxies for each hypothesis. It is, therefore, unlikely 
that all the dimensions of a hypothesis will be captured by selected proxies. The choice of 
proxy is therefore critical as different proxies are likely to yield different results in some 
cases. Powell (1997), for example, argues that some of the proxies used in his study might 
have poorly operationalised the underlying concepts or hypotheses. Without the use of data 
mining techniques such as stepwise regressions, the issue of selecting the most efficient 
proxies remains a challenge to address. The selection of suitable proxies in this study is 
further discussed in chapter 3. 
2.6.5.4 Raw versus industry-adjusted financial ratios  
There is no consensus on the choice between raw versus industry-relative financial ratios 
in selecting appropriate proxies for hypotheses.  Barnes (1990) notes that financial ratios 
are more likely to be skewed than normally distributed and are therefore not suited for use 
in models such as LDA which assume that independent variables are normally distributed. 
This is, perhaps, not a major problem when using logit regression models. Barnes (1990) 
proposes the use of industry-relative variables as a way of normalising firm financial 
variables and meeting the assumptions of the LDA technique. From an empirical stance, 
Pasiouras (2007) contends that industry-relative financial ratios have more explanatory 
power when compared to non-industry-adjusted firm variables. Cudd and Duggal (2000) 
also argue that different industries have specific distributional characteristics of their 
financial ratios. They advocate that financial ratios used in prediction modelling should, 
therefore, be adjusted for industry specific characteristics. Nonetheless, the argument for 
industry-adjustment advanced in Cudd and Duggal (2000) is not empirically supported, as 
they find that the unadjusted model has a slightly higher explanatory power when 
compared to the industry-adjusted model.  
 
Few studies (such as Brar et al. (2009)) have used industry-adjusted ratios in developing 
takeover prediction models. Some studies (such as Palepu (1986)) focus on a few 
industries (mining and manufacturing) thus eliminating a need to employ industry-adjusted 
financial ratios. The use of industry-adjusted ratios is well suited for model development as 
the model is developed using past data which is available for all firms and all industries. 
Nonetheless, the use of industry ratios is, perhaps, ill-suited for out-of-sample testing and 
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real life model application and is likely to introduce some look-ahead bias in prediction 
model testing. This can be explained as follows. 
 
In a practical setting, an investor relying on target prediction models will determine 
whether a firm is a suitable target or not as soon as its financial results are released. This 
will be accomplished by comparing the firm’s takeover probability (based on its published 
financial results) against a set criterion (cut-off or a benchmark probability). Different 
firms within the same industry have different financial year-ends. This implies that the 
industry ratio cannot be computed unless all firms within the industry have published their 
financial results. Employing industry-adjusted ratios in out-of-sample prediction implicitly 
assumes that all firms within the industry release their financial statements at about the 
same time or portfolios of predicted targets are formed only after the financial results of all 
firms in all industries are publicly available. One way of overcoming the problem is to use 
the previous year’s industry average in computing the firm’s industry-adjusted ratio in the 
current year. This, nonetheless, assumes that industry ratios are stable from one year to 
another.  
 
Given the potential importance of controlling for industry differences and the need to avoid 
look-ahead bias in prediction, the approach employed in the current study is to use industry 
dummy variables as opposed to industry-adjusted variables as control variables in the 
model
77
. Using industry dummies, eliminates the need to distort financial data, mitigates 
the problem of look-ahead bias in out-of-sample prediction and ensures that industry 
differences in the distribution of financial variables are controlled for. 
2.6.5.5  Summary  
Section 2.6.5 has highlighted the 8 key hypotheses used across the takeover prediction 
literature as well as the limitations inherent in this set of hypotheses. These discussions are 
continued in chapter 3. This section has also noted the diversity in approaches for selecting 
prediction hypotheses and the challenges researchers face when selecting suitable proxies 
for these hypotheses. The issue of using industry-adjusted ratios as opposed to unadjusted 
firm ratios is discussed and a potential source of look-ahead bias is identified. The use of 
industry dummies (as opposed to industry-adjusted firm ratios) is advanced as a potentially 
                                                 
77 Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Brar et al. (2009)), the objective of contrecursive for industry 
effects is not to explain industry differences in takeover likelihood but to manage the distributional 
differences in the financial characteristics of firms across different industries. As will be discussed 
in chapter 5, the use of industry dummies does not affect the results and therefore to allow for 
simplicity industry dummies are subsequently excluded from the model. 
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more analytically tractable alternative for controlling for industry distributional 
characteristics of financial ratios. 
2.7 Chapter summary and conclusion 
This literature review chapter discusses the relevance of takeover prediction modelling to 
different stakeholders (including managers, investors, policy makers and researchers) as 
well as its implications to theory (such as the efficient market hypothesis and the market 
anticipation versus insider trading debate). The chapter reviews the historical development 
of the takeover prediction literature across time and across different contexts or countries – 
mainly the UK and the US. The literature is broken down into three eras, with studies 
published during each era sharing several similarities in approach and methodology.  
 
The studies in the first era (1968–1985) mainly focus on defining the characteristics of 
targets and bidders. These studies adopt simple methods (such as difference of means 
testing and linear discriminant analysis) to identify some of the defining the characteristics 
of targets. A key limitation of these studies is the lack of a theoretical rationale to underlie 
the variable selection process. As such, these studies are only able to identify (but not 
explain) the differences between in financial characteristics between targets and non-
targets. Led by Palepu (1986), the studies in the second era (1986–2002) focus on 
hypotheses (or theory) development as well as the application of more robust methods in 
testing the power of prediction models
78
. Studies during this era build upon the Palepu 
(1986) framework by proposing other methodological amendments such as new 
hypotheses (e.g., Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell (1997)) and new ways of 
computing cut-off probabilities (e.g., Barnes (1999) and Powell (2001)). The studies in the 
third era (2003–2013) mainly focus on evaluating the discriminatory ability of different 
types of models (e.g., parametric and non-parametric), with very few of these studies 
attempting to actually predict future targets. Building on the studies in the second era, 
Powell (2004) and Powell and Yawson (2007) introduce two different multinomial 
frameworks for takeover prediction. Their empirical evidence, however, undermines their 
arguments as there is no evidence that the multinomial model substantially improves upon 
the binomial model.  
 
                                                 
78 These tests involved both out-of-sample prediction ability and the ability to generate abnormal 
returns. 
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Not surprisingly, investment practitioners have also been involved in the development and 
use of prediction models. Models used by two major investment professionals – Morgan 
Stanley and Deutsche Bank – are discussed in this review. The models advanced by the 
two institutions are markedly different. On the one hand, Morgan Stanley employs a 
simple rank-based methodology which sorts stocks based on how they perform across five 
financial ratios. In contrast, strategists at Deutsche Bank employ a sophisticated high-
frequency ‘quant-based’ model which predicts targets on a monthly basis. The results from 
these publications reveal that neither method consistently outperforms the market. In fact, 
the two models substantially underperform the market in out-of-sample tests. The results 
from the Deutsche Bank report questions the use of high-frequency data, particularly, as 
there is no underlying reason why such data should drive the takeover decision. Further, 
the research applies a monthly rebalancing framework but provides no evidence that more 
frequent rebalancing improves the chances of generating abnormal returns from target 
prediction. 
 
With the exception of a few US studies incorporating corporate governance measures in 
their models (e.g., Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Cremers et al. (2009)), there is 
very little emphasis or consideration of the potential uniqueness of context (including the 
USA, the UK, Canada and the European Union) across different studies. As discussed in 
section 1.3, the regulation of takeovers varies across countries. Presumably, this has an 
impact on what factors drive the strategic takeover decision in these countries. 
Nonetheless, little has been said about the influence of context on the process and 
framework for takeover prediction modelling. This issue is partly addressed in this study 
through the development of new hypotheses (which reflect the UK context) and the 
reassessment of prior prediction hypotheses (further discussed in chapter 3). 
 
The final part of the chapter is a critique of the methodological choices of prior empirical 
studies. Four key choices (including, the choice of discriminatory model (parametric or 
non-parametric), the choice of sample construction technique, the choice of cut-off 
probability (or technique for identifying targets out-of-sample) and the choice of prediction 
hypotheses and proxies), are discussed. A review suggests that the logit model (parametric 
model) is, perhaps, an optimal choice when the goal of a researcher is both to explain and 
to predict. Its attractiveness lies in the fact that its assumptions are less restrictive than 
those of other models and it is theoretically suited for takeover prediction modelling. The 
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probit model bears the same qualities but is slightly less popular amongst researchers in 
takeover likelihood modelling.  
 
Sampling remains a major challenge due to the rare event problem. Several researchers in 
all three eras rely on non-random sampling techniques which aim to improve the 
information content of the sample. Nonetheless, it is probable that the use of these non-
random sampling techniques introduces bias in model testing and results in poor out-of-
sample model performance. There is little consensus on the appropriate technique for 
identifying a suitable cut-off probability. I examine the merits of different methods and 
highlight the possibility that the use of any one technique can constitute a source of bias in 
model testing given that results are likely to vary with the technique for selecting cut-off 
probabilities. The use of a cross section of techniques (as opposed to any single technique) 
is likely to be a more optimal (or robust) approach. 
 
With little exception, prior studies have adopted the hypotheses put forward by Palepu 
(1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell (1997). Notwithstanding, several post-
Palepu (1986) studies find no evidence to support some of the Palepu hypotheses. In fact, 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell (2001) directly question the validity of the 
hypotheses proposed by Palepu (1986). These studies have reiterated the need to fully 
understand the strategic rationale for target selection. This area constitutes a major gap in 
the research area which this thesis partly addresses. The next chapter (chapter 3) is the 
hypotheses development chapter. This study advances the literature by redeveloping the 
Palepu (1986) hypotheses and by introducing new hypotheses for takeover prediction 
modelling. The chapter starts by reviewing key theories explaining why mergers and 
acquisitions occur and why certain targets are selected by bidders. This theoretical review 
constitutes the basis for redeveloping the old hypotheses and introducing the new 
hypotheses. The hypotheses presented in chapter 3 are tested in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3  PREDICTION HYPOTHESES  
 
3.1 Overview 
The previous chapter reviewed the empirical literature on takeover target prediction. It 
discussed the motivations for takeover prediction modelling and reviewed the historical 
development of the literature. The chapter critiqued the Palepu (1986) approach, which has 
been widely adopted by prior researchers, by highlighting potential sources of bias inherent 
in his methodology for takeover prediction. One key limitation of prior research, as was 
noted in chapter 2, is the use of a limited set of six to eight hypotheses for takeover 
prediction in many studies. I argue that prior studies rely on a limited set of prediction 
hypotheses which, perhaps, do not fully explain why many firms receive takeover bids. 
This particular limitation – the irrelevance and lack of comprehensiveness of takeover 
prediction hypotheses – is also highlighted in studies such as Powell (1997), Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992) and Powell and Yawson (2007), amongst others. Nonetheless, little has 
been done to improve the hypothesis development framework for takeover prediction.  
 
This study contributes to the literature by reviewing (and redeveloping) some of the key 
hypotheses proposed by Palepu (1986) as well as proposing some new theory-grounded 
takeover prediction hypotheses. The hypotheses developed in this study are described as 
‘new’ because they have not been used by prior studies to predict takeover targets. The 
hypotheses build on established research in other areas of accounting and finance. This 
chapter reviews the theoretical framework underlying takeover prediction hypotheses, both 
newly developed (‘new’) hypotheses and the (‘old’) hypotheses used in prior studies. Some 
of the hypotheses introduced by prior research are also redeveloped
79
 in this chapter to 
provide new insights and new predictions for firm takeover likelihood modelling. The rest 
of the hypotheses introduced by Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and 
Powell (1997) are restated in line with their original predictions.  
 
The old hypotheses for takeover prediction are discussed in section 3.2. The new 
hypotheses introduced in this study as well as the old hypotheses which are redeveloped in 
this study are discussed in section 3.3. The key proxies and the constituent variables that 
                                                 
79 One of such hypotheses is the firm size hypothesis. Prior research has presumed that takeover 
likelihood is declining in firm size. It is proposed here that the relationship between takeover 
likelihood and firm size is nonlinear – an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
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are used to operationalise the old and new hypotheses are also discussed in this chapter. As 
will be further discussed in chapter 4, financial data for all firms in the sample is obtained 
from Thomson DataStream while data on takeover activity is obtained from Thomson 
OneBanker. The DataStream codes for the proxy variables are noted (in this chapter) in 
box brackets, i.e., ‘[DataStream code]’. The exact time period over which the data is 
collected, the matching and realignment of the data from the two databases, the 
development of a unique database to meet the objective of this study and other 
methodological considerations (e.g., industry definitions) are discussed in chapter 4. 
 
3.2 Old hypotheses for takeover target prediction  
3.2.1 Overview 
The focus of takeover prediction hypotheses development is to identify some of the 
characteristics of firms which increase their likelihood of receiving takeover bids. 
Researchers (including Barnes (2000) and Palepu (1986)) emphasise the importance of the 
choice of prediction variables in the development of effective prediction models. Palepu 
(1986) proposes six hypotheses for the prediction of future takeover targets. These include: 
inefficient management, firm undervaluation, industry disturbance, growth-resource 
mismatch, firm size, and price-earnings
80
. The use of these hypotheses has been consistent 
amongst researchers. Powell (1997) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) propose two 
additional hypotheses for takeover prediction, including the free cash flow hypothesis 
(Powell (1997)) and the tangible assets hypothesis (Ambrose and Megginson (1992)). With 
the exception of firm size and firm age these old hypotheses are adopted in the current 
study. The firm size and firm age hypotheses (used in prior studies such as Palepu (1986) 
and Brar et al. (2009), respectively) are redeveloped (in section 3.3) to yield new insights 
on their relationship with takeover likelihood. The discussion of the hypotheses is 
organised as follows: inefficient management (section 3.2.2), firm undervaluation (section 
3.2.3), industry disturbance (section 3.2.4), free cash flow (section 3.2.5), growth-resource 
mismatch (section 3.2.6), tangible assets (section 3.2.7), firm size (section 3.2.8) and firm 
age (section 3.2.2).  
                                                 
80 P/E and undervaluation hypotheses have a similar theoretical underpinning and are therefore 
combined in later discussions. Prior studies have treated the two hypotheses as independent. 
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3.2.2 Management inefficiency hypothesis 
Target management inefficiency has been frequently cited as a main rationale for 
takeovers
81
. Palepu (1986) advances the inefficient management hypothesis as a key 
hypothesis for takeover prediction. The hypothesis stipulates that an underperforming 
management team is likely to face a control contest from a more efficient management 
team, which seeks to generate value for shareholders through improved management of 
shareholder resources. As noted above, the hypothesis has been widely adopted across the 
takeover prediction literature. It builds on the agency theory and the market for corporate 
control concept. 
 
Agency theory posits that the separation between the principal and the agent and the 
inherent information asymmetry between the two parties, potentially, gives rise to conflicts 
of interest. Conflicts arise as the agent has an incentive to expropriate the wealth of the 
principal in order to maximise his utility (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). In the face of this 
conflict of interest, the principal puts in place several mechanisms (such as pay-for-
performance contracts, board oversight, internal controls and independent audits, amongst 
others), which focus on safeguarding his interest or realigning the agent’s interest with the 
principal’s. Based on Manne (1965), Jensen and Ruback (1983) introduce the concept of 
‘the market for corporate control’ (MCC) as an external monitoring mechanism for 
monitoring management action. This market (also referred to as the takeover market) is 
one in which various management teams compete for the rights to manage a firm’s 
resources (Manne (1965) and Jensen and Ruback (1983)). Manne (1965) contends that the 
takeover market makes the corporate world a more efficient one by ensuring that managers 
who deviate from the best interest of their shareholders are replaced by more efficient 
management teams
82
.  
 
The role of the takeover market in enforcing managerial discipline is, possibly, weakened 
by the existence of other disciplinary mechanisms such as industry competition (product-
market competition), corporate governance mechanisms, competition within the 
                                                 
81 See, for example, Manne (1965), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Grossman and Hart (1980), Jensen 
(1988) and Morck et al. (1989), amongst others. 
82 This theory is also consistent with the undervaluation theory. The market value of the firm 
reflects the management’s capacity to generate future cash flows using the firm’s assets. A firm 
with poor management is therefore likely to have a lower value than it would have, if it had a good 
management team. In line with the firm undervaluation theory of takeovers, a new management 
team perceives such a firm as being undervalued and therefore a suitable target. This is further 
discussed in section 3.2.3. 
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managerial labour market and threat of bankruptcies and liquidation (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)). The role of the takeover market as a disciplinary mechanism is further questioned 
given investors ability to easily transfer their investments from poorly performing to well 
performing firms. The management inefficiency hypothesis will be irrelevant if takeovers 
do not serve a disciplinary role as posited by the market for corporate control (MCC) 
theory. 
 
It can be argued that the evidence, with regards to the existence of the market for corporate 
control, is mixed and inconclusive. The MCC theory has been tested in the event study 
literature by researchers looking at the performance of merger targets prior to merger bids. 
Studies in the event study literature either find no support for or evidence against the 
inefficient management hypothesis. See, for example, Dodd and Ruback (1977), 
Mandelker (1974), Langetieg (1978), Malatesta (1983), Asquith and Kim (1982), Franks 
and Mayer (1996), Agrawal and Walkling (1994) and Agrawal and Jaffe (2003). 
Researchers generally find that targets earn negative but insignificant abnormal returns 
(Mandelker (1974)), zero returns (Langetieg (1978)) and positive abnormal returns (Dodd 
and Ruback (1977)) in the period prior to acquisitions. This position (no support for the 
MCC theory) has been corroborated by studies looking at accounting performance. Berger 
and Ofek (1996), for example, find that a firm’s return on equity ratio does not affect its 
probability of being acquired. From an extensive literature review and an empirical study 
looking at both target accounting and stock market performance, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) 
concludes that there is little evidence to support the assertion that underperforming firms 
are more likely to become takeover targets.  
 
Notwithstanding, some contradictory empirical evidence supports the existence of a 
thriving MCC (see, for example, Shrieves and Stevens (1979), Asquith (1983) Hasbrouck 
(1985), Morck et al. (1988) and Lang et al. (1989)). Asquith (1983), for example, finds that 
targets underperform prior to takeover bids. The cumulative abnormal returns of targets 
between ‘day –480’ to ‘day –60’ prior to the takeover announcement is –14.8% on average 
(Asquith (1983)). Again, Shrieves and Stevens (1979) find that 15.2% of 112 takeover 
targets in their sample can be classified as ‘bankrupt’ at the time of acquisition. In support, 
Hasbrouck (1985), Morck et al. (1988) and Lang et al. (1989) report that targets have 
significantly lower Tobin’s Qs which declines year-on-year – with the probability of 
hostile takeover generally decreasing with a firm’s Q ratio. Using empirical evidence from 
the takeover market, Grossman and Hart (1980), Jensen (1988) and Morck et al. (1989) 
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conclude that shareholders benefit from takeovers due to the replacement of inefficient 
management. These studies provide contradictory evidence which supports the view that 
an efficient MCC exists and acts to replace inefficient management teams. 
 
The management inefficiency hypothesis has been directly tested in the takeover prediction 
literature. The evidence from this literature is also inconclusive. In support of the MCC and 
the management inefficiency hypothesis, some researchers find that targets have lower 
accounting performance (see, for example, Barnes (1999), Pasiouras (2007), Ouzounis et 
al. (2009)) and lower stock market performance (Powell and Yawson  (2007)). Others find 
no significant difference between targets and non-targets in terms of accounting 
profitability and stock market performance (e.g., Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and 
Powell (1997)). Some researchers report mixed results from the same sample. Palepu 
(1986), for example, finds that takeover likelihood decreases with a firm’s stock market 
returns but increases with its accounting return. Brar et al. (2009) show that takeover 
likelihood increases with accounting profitability but declines with sales growth. These 
findings (Palepu (1986) and Brar et al. (2009)) neither support nor contradict the 
predictions of the MCC hypothesis. 
 
While it is generally hypothesised that poor management performance can lead to 
takeovers, there is no consensus on what constitutes ‘poor management performance’. The 
mixed findings appear to be a result of the use of different performance proxies (both 
accounting and market-based) across different studies, without clarity on what these 
proxies measure. Several measures of performance, including accounting profitability 
(return on assets, return on sales, operating profit margins) and market performance (stock 
return) have been employed across the literature. While market performance measures are 
thought to measure the present value of all future cash flows that will accrue to a particular 
stock as a result of the manager’s actions (Lambert and Larcker (1987)), accounting 
measures have been criticised for being unable to reflect the future consequences of current 
managerial actions (Rappaport (1986)). In line with Rappaport (1986), Lambert and 
Larcker (1987) argue that accounting regulations (such as the US GAAP and IFRS) may 
limit the ability of accounting performance to reflect future cash flows that a firm may 
generate as a result of current management actions. The two measures of management 
performance can, perhaps, be considered as complements (not substitutes), as accounting 
measures mainly gauge management’s historical performance while market measures, 
perhaps, assess management’s future prospects.  
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Much of the evidence points to the possibility that bidders show a preference for targets 
with potential for profitability. There is overwhelming evidence that, on average, targets 
are profitable firms – as shown by their accounting performance (Palepu (1986), Brar et al. 
(2009) and De and Jindra (2012)). The evidence also suggests that, despite current 
profitability, targets have a lower prospect for future growth or a limited ability to generate 
future cash flows. This is corroborated by findings that targets face declining sales growth 
and declining stock returns prior to receiving a bid (Brar et al. (2009), Powell and Yawson 
(2007), Palepu (1986)). In this sense, the management inefficiency hypothesis in takeover 
prediction is, perhaps, too general to be meaningful in building the profile of a takeover 
target. Perhaps, the management inefficiency hypothesis can better be understood as 
management’s inability to sustain positive growth in future cash flows for shareholders, 
despite current profitability. This qualification of the hypothesis is tested in the current 
study by investigating both the accounting and stock market performance of targets in 
comparison to non-targets. In line with Palepu (1986), the hypothesis, as adopted in the 
current study, is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the probability that a firm will become the subject 
of a takeover bid decreases as its performance increases. 
 
As in prior studies, accounting and market measures of performance are used to capture the 
two dimensions of management performance – historical (accounting) and future (market). 
In line with prior studies (such as Palepu (1986), Brar et al. (2009), amongst others), the 
return on capital employed (ROCE) and the average daily abnormal return (ADAR) over 
the last year is used to measure market performance. Return on capital employed is 
computed as the ratio of net operating income before tax and depreciation or EBITDA 
[wc01250] to total capital employed [wc03998]. This ratio measures management’s ability 
to utilise resources efficiently in the generation of profits through regular business 
operations.  
 
Additionally, I add a new proxy – a loss-making dummy variable (denoted LMDummy) – 
to directly test whether poor accounting performance (i.e., reporting a loss) increases a 
firm’s takeover likelihood. The LMDummy takes a value of 1 when a firm reports negative 
net earnings [wc017151] in a specific year and a value of 0, otherwise.  
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The market measure of management performance is the average daily abnormal return 
(ADAR) – a measure of stock performance. ADAR represents the average of the 260 
observations of daily abnormal returns (DAR) of the stock. DAR is computed from daily 
price index data [RI] using the OLS market model (discussed in Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985)). The model for the computation of the DAR is given as follows; 
          ( ̂   ̂    )………Eqn 3.2.2 (1) 
Here, DAR for a firm i at time t is given by the difference between the firm’s actual stock 
return at time t (   ) and its expected stock returns at time t ( ̂   ̂    ). The returns for 
each firm i on day t (denoted    ) and the market m on day t (denoted    ) are first 
computed from adjusted price [RI] as follows.  
     (           ) (      ⁄ )             ( ) 
    (           ) (      ⁄ )             ( ) 
The daily return of the FTSE All-Share (   ) is used as a proxy for the daily market 
returns. Next,  ̂  and  ̂  are estimated by using data in the previous period (260 trading 
days). Each firm’s daily stock returns in period T-1 (previous period)83 is regressed on its 
daily market returns in period T-1 and the coefficients of the regression model are used as 
estimates of  ̂  and  ̂   The regression coefficients ( ̂  and  ̂  estimates) from period T-1 
are used to compute ADAR in the next period (period T). 
       
 
   
∑                    ( ) 
As will be fully discussed in chapter 4, the June approach to portfolio development is 
adopted in this study. This implies that portfolios are formed from 1
st
 July each year and 
held to 30
th
 June in the next year. To compute a firm’s ADAR on 1st July 2010, for 
example, I use its daily return data from 1
st
 July 2008 to 30
th
 June 2009 to generate its   ̂  
and  ̂  estimates. I then use these estimates together with its daily return data from 1
st
 July 
2009 to 30
th
 June 2010 to compute its DAR (as per equation 3.2.2(1)). The 260 DAR 
observations are then averaged to obtain its ADAR for the period from 1
st
 July 2009 to 30
th
 
June 2010. As per the hypothesis, I expect takeover probability to decline with ADAR. 
                                                 
83 As will be fully discussed in chapter 5, each period is considered to run from 1st July year 1 to 
30th June year 2. 
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3.2.3 Firm undervaluation hypothesis 
The valuation theory of mergers contends that mergers are perpetrated by bidders who 
either (1) hold private information about the true value of the target or (2) hold private 
information on how a higher value can be realised for the target (Trautwein (1990)).  The 
misvaluation hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Dong et al. (2006)), which builds 
on this theory, suggests that the stock market’s inefficiency in the valuation of firms has 
important effects on takeover activity. As suggested by Dong et al. (2006), the effects arise 
from the bidders’ deliberate efforts to ‘profit by buying undervalued targets for cash at a 
price below fundamental value, or by paying equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are 
less overvalued than the bidder’ (p. 726). Studies such as Ang and Cheng (2006), Dong et 
al. (2006) and Bi and Gregory (2011) have investigated how misvaluation (either 
overvaluation or undervaluation) of both targets and bidders moderates takeover decisions.  
 
In the prediction of takeover targets, no assumptions are made about the characteristics of 
the respective bidders. If this is the case, on average, an overvalued firm is unlikely to be 
an attractive target to the average bidder – a bidder who is not highly overvalued. Studies 
in takeover prediction therefore focus on undervaluation of firms as a driver of takeovers – 
the undervaluation hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that firms perceived as relatively 
undervalued will be attractive takeover targets to the average bidder (Belkaoui (1978)). 
The idea is supported by the valuation theory of mergers (Trautwein (1990)). The theory 
holds that mergers are perpetrated by bidders who have superior (private) information 
about the target not available to the market. Such private information could include future 
cash flow forecasts and methods for improving such cash flows. A management team 
(prospective bidder) with private information about another firm (a prospective target) will 
have a higher valuation for this firm compared to the firm’s current market value. The 
prospective target thus appears undervalued and, therefore, a ‘cheap buy’ for a rational 
wealth maximising bidder (Palepu (1986)).  
 
Several studies have evaluated whether firm undervaluation explains takeover propensity
84
. 
Hasbrouck (1985) finds that the MTB of a firm is inversely related to the firm’s takeover 
likelihood. Hasbrouck (1985) also argues that low MTB is indicative of managerial 
                                                 
84 While Tobin’s Q has been proposed as a measure of firm undervaluation, it is usually proxied by 
the market to book ratio due to the unavailability of asset replace costs (e.g., Hasbrouck (1985)). 
Hasbrouck (1985) notes that low MTB indicates that a firm is under-priced as its assets are worth 
more than its market value. 
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inefficiency and therefore an opportunity for value to be derived through better 
management. Other empirical studies (including, Palepu (1986), Morck et al. (1989), 
Martin and McConnell (1991), Walter (1994) and Powell (1997)) have shown that 
takeover likelihood declines with a firm’s MTB. Walter (1994) finds that MTB is the most 
important ratio when differentiating between targets and non-targets. In line with the 
literature, the hypothesis is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability increases with the level of 
firm undervaluation. 
 
Prior literature uses the price to book value of equity (MTB) ratio as a measure of firm 
undervaluation, misvaluation or overvaluation (see for example, Palepu (1986), Ambrose 
and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997, 2001), Powell and Yawson (2007), Dong et al. 
(2006) and Brar et al. (2009)). As argued by Dong et al. (2006), to the extent that the book 
values of equity measure the value of a firm, any discrepancies between book and market 
values of equity will capture the market’s efficiency in valuing the firm. This suggests that 
MTB ratios of 1 indicate correct valuation and any deviation from this value will suggest 
misevaluation. Consistent with prior studies, the MTB (ratio of market value of equity to 
book value of equity) is used to proxy for firm undervaluation in this study. To improve 
analytical tractability, the inverse of MTB (i.e., the book to market value of equity ratio – 
BTM) is used in preference to the traditional MTB ratios
85
. As per Dong et al. (2006), high 
(low) BTM ratio indicates that the firm is relatively undervalued (overvalued). 
 
Powell and Yawson (2007) compute book value of equity as the equity capital and reserves 
(305 or WC03501) minus total intangibles (344 or WC02649) and market value of equity 
as the number of shares outstanding [NOSH] multiplied by share price [UP]. This 
definition is adopted in this study as the BTM ratio is defined as; 
 
         
                   
                     
             ( ) 
Where: 
          [       ]  [       ]             ( ) 
            [    ]  [  ]             ( ) 
 
                                                 
85 Negative book values can potentially distort the inference drawn from MTB but not from BTM 
ratios. 
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As will be discussed in chapter 4, the June approach is adopted in matching firm financial 
data (e.g., book value) to market data (e.g., market value). Here, book values for any 
financial year-end between January and December year t are matched to market values on 
30 June year t+1.  
 
Brown et al. (2008) contend that several stocks report negative book values of equity and 
the general approach in the Accounting and Finance literature is for such stocks to be 
considered as outliers and excluded from empirical samples
86
. These stocks are generally 
extreme value or extreme growth stocks and their exclusion might introduce bias in the 
analysis where MTB is an important variable (Brown et al. (2008)). Again, negative book 
value of equity might also arise when a stock has substantially underperformed in the past 
or when a stock has a very high level of leverage
87
. The exclusion of negative book value 
firms could introduce bias in the study as these factors (i.e., performance and leverage) 
underlie key hypotheses for target prediction. Given the importance of controlling for 
negative book values (as in prior research) and the possibility of generating new insights 
(e.g., by examining the relationship between negative book values and takeover 
likelihood), a negative book value dummy variable (NBVDummy) is added as a control 
variable to the model. This variable takes a value of one when book value of equity is 
negative and a value of 0, otherwise. Further, sensitivity analysis are conducted (by 
excluding negative BTM observations) to ensure that the results are not biased. 
 
 
Although BTM is used as the primary measure of undervaluation in keeping with prior 
takeover prediction literature, it is worth reiterating that BTM is, perhaps, not the most 
suitable proxy for undervaluation. Other more suitable and advanced measures of 
undervaluation are discussed below. Nonetheless, these measures are not explored further 
in this study as testing the undervaluation hypothesis is not a main contribution of this 
                                                 
86 Alternatively, such outliers are winsorised by replacing them with a new value. 
87 Shareholder equity generally measures how much shareholders will receive in the event that the 
firm is liquidated. The variable is easily obtained from the accounting equation as the difference 
between total assets and total liabilities (i.e., Total equity = total assets – total liabilities). As shown 
in equation 3.2.3 (2), studies (e.g., Powell (2001)) typically exclude intangibles from the 
computation of the variable, as the carrying value of intangibles (such as goodwill) is not, typically, 
realised when a firm is liquidated. Hence, total equity = total assets – total liabilities – total 
intangibles. Total equity can be negative when (other things remaining equal) the value of total 
assets declines (e.g., through a revaluation and write-off) or the proportion of total liabilities in the 
capital structure increases (e.g., through accumulated losses over several periods). 
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study. I therefore adopt the use of BTM as a measure of undervaluation in line with prior 
studies. 
 
Indeed, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) show that a firm’s market to book (M/B) ratio in itself 
could be decomposed into a misvaluation component (M/V) and a growth component 
(V/B). That is, 
  ⁄         ⁄⁄                ( ) 
where M is the firm’s market value, V is the firm’s true value and B is the firm’s book 
value. In log form, Eqn 3.2.3 (4) can be written as, 
    (   )  (   )               ( ) 
where lower case letters indicate logarithms of the different variables. (   ) represents 
misvaluation and should be zero if market participants have full knowledge of the firm’s 
future cash flows, discount rates and growth opportunities. As suggested by Rhodes-Kropf 
et al. (2005) a deviation from zero can occur due to behavioural biases and/or information 
asymmetry between market participants and firms. In the current study, information 
asymmetry and the valuation problems it causes is treated as a main factor driving 
acquisitions (discussed in section 3.3.9). The challenge with using the Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) MTB decomposition model is determining the true value (V) of a firm. The 
researchers suggest various methods, perhaps, the most popular of which involves the use 
of book value, net income, the market leverage ratio and a vector of accounting 
information variables. 
 
Ang and Chen (2006), Dong et al. (2006) and Bi and Gregory (2011) have also used the 
price to (residual income) value ratio as an alternative and, perhaps, a better measure of 
firm undervaluation (misvaluation or overvaluation). The model nonetheless requires the 
use of analyst forecast for firm earnings and dividends for a period of up to three years. As 
noted in Bi and Gregory (2011), UK analysts generally forecast up to two years ahead with 
data only really available for one-year forecasts. The researchers propose the estimation of 
two-year and three-year earnings and dividends forecasts by assuming that earnings and 
dividends grow at the rate of inflation plus 1.6% (representing the UK average real 
earnings growth rate). While this appears to be a more robust method for estimating the 
level of undervaluation, it is not adopted in this study. This is therefore a limitation of this 
study and an area in which it could be further improved. 
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Further, other measures of undervaluation including the earnings to price and dividends to 
price ratios have been used in some takeover prediction studies. For example, Palepu 
(1986) argues that a low PE ratio makes a firm an attractive takeover target as a bidder 
with a high PE ratio can scoop an ‘instantaneous capital gain’ by taking over such a target 
(p. 18). The underlying economic logic of this argument is questionable (also noted in 
Palepu (1986), p. 18). The attractiveness of low PE firms has been discussed in early 
studies such as Vance (1969), Mead (1969) and Tzoannos and Samuels (1972)). Vance 
(1969) contends that conglomerate predators are interested in firms with a low PE since a 
combination of a low PE ratio (of the target) and the high PE ratio (of the acquirer) 
significantly increase the acquirer’s earnings per share. In line with Mead’s (1969) merger 
profit hypothesis, this is thought to happen because the market tends to value the earnings 
of the combined firm at the higher PE of the bidder.  
 
An alternative view is that a low PE proxies for growth opportunities – with low PE firms 
more likely to be undervalued. This view is consistent with the argument advanced by 
Mead (1969) and Vance (1969) as a bidder can increase its PE by unearthing the potential 
of the combined firm to grow future net cash flows due to the contributions of the 
‘cheaply’ acquired target. There is, nonetheless, little empirical support for the 
discriminatory ability of PE in takeover prediction. Studies such as Powell (1997) and 
Powell (2001)) do not employ PE in their prediction models. Other studies (such as Palepu 
(1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Barnes (1998), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) 
and Ouzounis et al. (2009)) include PE as a discriminatory variable but find no empirical 
support for the hypothesis.  
 
The lack of use of dividends (as a measure of performance, cash flow management or firm 
valuation) in many US based studies can be attributed to the finding that the number of 
firms paying dividends (especially in the US) has decline over time with a substantial 
proportion of listed firms paying no dividends (Fama and French (2002)). Studies 
employing a UK sample (e.g., Trajanowski and Renneboog (2005)) provide evidence that a 
majority of UK firms still pay dividends. Research on the role of dividends has shown that 
dividend plays a significant role in signalling. Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock 
(1985), for example, argue that dividend policy signals firm growth opportunities, financial 
viability and potential agency costs/problems when the level of information asymmetry 
between firms and their stakeholders is high. 
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The effect of dividend pay-out on takeover likelihood is, potentially, mixed. On the one 
hand, a high dividend pay-out (hence high dividend yield) signals management’s desire to 
reduce free cash flow and hence, agency costs (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen 
(1986)). In line with Lintner (1956) and Kalay (1980), a high pay-out may signal that 
management envisages a growth in future earnings while a low pay-out may indicate low 
growth in future earnings. Conversely, the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984)) 
contends that a firm with low growth opportunities has no need to retain current earnings 
and is therefore more likely to increase its dividend pay-out.  
 
There is little empirical evidence to support the use of dividend pay-out as a potential 
discriminatory variable for takeover prediction. Powell and Yawson (2007) and Espahbodi 
and Espahbodi (2003) find that targets, on average, have lower pay-out ratios and therefore 
lower yields. Contrary to the above findings, Brar et al. (2009) show that dividend yield 
and probability of takeover are positively correlated. The findings of Brar et al. (2009) 
provide some evidence that firms which are, potentially, undervalued – as measured by 
their dividend yield – are more likely to be takeover targets. 
 
Besides the limited evidence to support their usefulness, the two variables (dividend yield 
and PE) tend to be highly correlated with the book to market ratio. I also find that several 
firms in my sample do not pay dividends in several periods. Given their high correlation 
with the BTM ratio, the empirical evidence supporting the use of BTM as a measure of 
misevaluation and the presence of non-dividend paying firms, neither dividend yield nor 
earnings to price is used as proxies for undervaluation in this study. 
 
3.2.4 Industry disturbance hypothesis 
This hypothesis stems from Gort’s (1969) economic disturbance theory in which Gort 
explains how merger patterns vary across time and across industries. Gort (1969), Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005) contend that merger waves result from shocks 
(including, economic, structural, technological and regulatory) to an industry’s 
environment. The consolidation of a merger within an industry changes the competitive 
structure of that industry. Merging firms within an industry generally benefit from 
increased efficiency generated from internalised competition (Qiu and Zhou (2006)). This 
increased efficiency allows the merged firms to develop a competitive edge over rivals. 
Qiu and Zhou (2006) argue that mergers tend to cluster at industry level because a firm’s 
 87 
 
incentive to merge (as a strategy to improve its capacity to compete) increases when other 
firms within the industry merge. The industry disturbance hypothesis therefore models the 
propensity for mergers to occur in certain industries based on past merger activity within 
the industry. 
 
Palepu (1986) finds no support for the industry disturbance hypothesis. His results show 
that the occurrence of a takeover within an industry reduces the probability of future 
mergers occurring in that industry. Palepu (1986) does not advance any reasons for this 
observation. Antitrust avoidance and regulation can, perhaps, partly explain why a merger 
within an industry decreases the probability of further mergers occurring within that 
industry. Again, a takeover, potentially, reduces the number of ‘suitable targets’ in the 
industry, making it less likely for further takeovers to occur. If this is the case, then 
hypothesised relationship between takeover probability and industry disturbance will be 
reversed
88
. As specified in Palepu (1986), the industry disturbance hypothesis predicts that 
a merger within an industry stimulates further consolidation between firms in that industry. 
The hypothesis is stated as below. 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of takeovers within an industry will 
increase with the announcement of a merger bid in that industry. 
 
In line with Palepu (1986) and Walter (1994), the industry disturbance dummy variable 
(IDummy) is used to model for industry disturbances. The variable takes a value of 1 if any 
merger is completed within a firm’s industry (over the previous year) and a value of 0, 
otherwise. An industry is said to be ‘disturbed’ in year X1 (calendar year-end) if any 
merger is completed in this industry between 1 July X1 to 30 June X2. For example, an 
industry is considered disturbed in (calendar year-end) 2009 if a merger is completed in 
this industry between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010. This timing choice (i.e., 1 July X1 to 
30 June X2) which is based on the June approach for portfolio formation is further 
discussed in chapter 4
89
. In many studies, industry is defined using the 4-digit SIC code 
system (Palepu (1986), Barnes, (1999), Brar et al. (2009), Ouzounis et al. (2009) and 
                                                 
88 Some takeover prediction studies (including Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997), 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), Brar et al. (2009)) do not use the industry disturbance hypothesis 
in their prediction models. The studies (including Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997), 
Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), Brar et al. (2009)) which do not adopt the hypothesis do not 
discuss why the hypothesis is left out of their models. The hypothesis is adopted in the current 
study to ensure consistency with the Palepu (1986) study. 
89 As will be fully discussed in section 4.2.5, M&A data for a period 1 July X2 to 30 June X3 is 
matched to accounting data for the year-ending X1 – the June approach. 
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Powell and Yawson (2011)). Some studies such as Walter (1994) have employed the 2 
digit SIC code classification method. The definition and categorisation of industry groups 
in the thesis, which is based on the 4-digit SIC code classification, is fully discussed in 
chapter 4.  
3.2.5 Free cash flow hypothesis 
Free cash flow as defined by Jensen (1986) is ‘Cash flow in excess of that required to fund 
all projects that have positive net present values (NPV) when discounted at the relevant 
cost of capital’ (p. 323). Jensen (1988) advocates that all free cash flow must be returned to 
shareholders if the firm is to remain efficient. Nonetheless, returning this cash flow to 
shareholders reduces the resources available to managers (hence their power) and therefore 
subjects them to increased monitoring by capital markets when they seek new funds as the 
need arises (p. 12).  
 
Excess free cash flow in a firm is likely to substantially increase the agency problem. As 
suggested by the agency theory, when in control of excess free cash flows, management is 
likely to engage in projects that do not enhance the wealth of shareholders. Jensen (1988), 
for example, contends that managers have incentives to use free cash flow to grow their 
firms beyond the threshold size for shareholder wealth maximisation. One reason for this is 
to create opportunities to reward middle management through promotion. In an active 
market for corporate control – one in which management teams compete for the rights to 
control shareholder resources and maximise shareholder wealth – management which 
hoards or misappropriates excess free cash flows are likely to face a challenge for 
corporate control (Manne (1965), Jensen (1986) and Powell (1997)). Besides the 
opportunity to correct management inefficiency, the bidding firm, in this case, is further 
attracted by the excess free cash flow in the target firm as this free cash flow can be used 
(by the bidder) to reduce the net cost of acquisition. The implication is that the availability 
of free cash flow is likely to increase a firm’s takeover likelihood. 
 
There is mixed empirical support for the hypothesis that excess free cash flow drives 
takeover activity. In support of the free cash flow hypothesis, studies (including, Powell 
(1997) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003)) find that targets have comparatively higher 
levels of free cash flow when compared to bidders. Nonetheless, some studies (including, 
Powell and Yawson (2007), Brar et al. (2009)) do not find a significant difference between 
the levels of free cash flows in targets and non-targets. The latter studies find no strong 
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support for the free cash flow hypothesis within their sample as their results show that free 
cash flow neither increases nor decreases takeover probability. To my knowledge, no study 
shows takeover probability to decrease with free cash flow. 
 
As adopted in this study, the free cash flow hypothesis predicts that firms that have 
performed well enough to accumulate substantial free cash flows but have not returned 
such cash flows to investors are likely to become takeover targets (Jensen (1986) and 
Powell (2004)). The hypothesis can be stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, takeover likelihood increases with a firm’s level of 
free cash flow. 
 
Consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007), free cash flow is defined as the ratio of net 
cash flow from operating activities [wc04860]
90
 less capital expenditures [wc04601] scaled 
by total asset [wc02999]
91
. As in Powell and Yawson (2007), all three variables are drawn 
from year-end financial statements within the same period. The net cash flow from 
operating activities represents operating income before depreciation, adjusted for interest 
expense, taxes and dividends. Hence, this proxy considers free cash flow as the residual 
cash flow after all major required expenditures (operating expenses, finance interest and 
taxes) and investments. The limitation of the measure is that it does not consider whether 
the investments (capital expenditures) are directed towards shareholder wealth maximising 
projects.  
3.2.6 Growth-resource mismatch hypothesis 
The neo-classical view of mergers holds that mergers are perpetrated to create value 
through synergies (see, Manne (1965) and Trautwein (1990)). Merging firms can also 
create synergies in operations through economies of scale and scope, the elimination of 
redundancies and the optimisation in the use of equipment, facilities and resources. 
Managerial synergies, for example, can be achieved when the bidder has superior 
management capability (in, for example, planning, controlling, or monitoring) which can 
improve the target’s operations. Managerial synergies can also be achieved if the target 
management is underperforming such that new management (bidder) can better utilise the 
                                                 
90 DataStream defines net cash flow from operations as the difference between cash inflow and 
outflow due to a firm’s operations. 
91 The net cash flow from operating activities represents operating income before depreciation, 
adjusted for interest expense, taxes and dividends. 
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resources and opportunities available to the target to provide increased benefits to the 
shareholders (Trautwein (1990)).  
 
Devos et al. (2009), for example, investigate the sources of gains in mergers in relation to 
three key aspects: financial synergies, operational synergies and market power. They find 
that the average value of synergies created is equivalent to 10.03% of the combined pre-
merger equity value of the two firms
92
. Interestingly, Devos et al. (2009) show that over 
81% of all synergies created from mergers are in terms of operational synergies, with 
financial synergies making up just about 17% of total synergies.  
 
The growth-resource mismatch hypothesis builds on the neoclassical motive of takeovers – 
to generate synergies through complementarities (Manne (1965), Palepu (1986) and 
Trautwein (1990)).  It asserts that M&A is pursued by resource-rich or resource-poor 
bidders looking for strategic partners (resource-poor or resource-rich targets, respectively) 
to complement. For example, resource-rich bidders with low growth opportunities generate 
growth opportunities by acquiring resource-poor targets with high growth opportunities. 
Such an alliance creates synergies as the bidder’s excess resources are used to pursue the 
target’s growth opportunities.  
 
The growth-resource mismatch hypothesis contends that two variables – the level of firm 
growth and the amount of resources available to the firm – can combine to moderate the 
attractiveness of the firm as an acquisition target. Palepu (1986) proposes that low-growth-
resource-rich firms as well as high-growth-resource-poor firms will make attractive targets. 
Palepu (1986) defines a low-growth-resource-rich firm as one which has sustained low 
levels of growth in sales, yet is rich in liquid resources and has a low gearing ratio. He 
defines a high-growth-resource-poor firm as a firm which has maintained high growth in 
sales despite its low liquidity and high leverage position. A firm with high liquidity and 
low leverage (i.e., resource-rich firm) should intuitively be matched with growth in sales 
(i.e., growth opportunities). If this is not the case (i.e., a mismatch exists), then an 
opportunity arises for a bidder to create synergies by correcting this mismatch.  
 
                                                 
92 Other studies (including Houston et al. (2001) and Bhagat et al. (2005)) have reported the creation 
of synergies of about 13% (on average) of the pre-merger value of the two firms. Evidence from the 
event study literature (e.g., Bradley et al. (1988) and Becher (2000)) confirms that the combined firm 
earns positive abnormal returns around the merger period. 
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While this hypothesis is, perhaps, theoretically sound, there is little empirical evidence to 
support its validity and usefulness in takeover target prediction. In support, Palepu (1986) 
finds evidence that takeover likelihood increases with a mismatch between growth 
opportunities and firm resources. Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) find that targets have a 
higher mismatch between growth and resources when compared to non-targets
93
. In line 
with Palepu (1986), the hypothesis is stated below. 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, low-growth-resource-rich firms as well as high-
growth-resource-poor firms are more likely to become takeover targets. 
 
Palepu (1986) employs a growth-resource mismatch dummy variable (GRDummy) to 
proxy this hypothesis. The Palepu (1986) approach is replicated in this study. The 
GRDummy is computed from three variables: sales growth (percentage increase in net 
sales [wc01001]), liquidity (cash and short term investments [wc02001] to total assets ratio 
[wc02999]) and leverage (debt [wc03255] to equity [wc03995] ratio). A mismatch between 
growth opportunities and resources is said to occur when (1) a firm has high sales growth 
accompanies by low liquidity and high leverage, or when (2) a firm has low sales growth 
accompanied by high liquidity and low leverage
94
. As in Palepu (1986), these variables are 
characterised as low or high by comparing them with the industry average
95
. High indicates 
that the value is higher than the industry mean, and vice versa. The GRDummy takes a 
value of 1 in these two cases ((1) and (2) above) and a value of 0 in all other combinations 
of growth, liquidity and leverage.  
 
Ideally, a forecast of the firm’s future growth level should be used in measuring growth 
opportunities, but since this information is not readily available (or might be unreliable), 
future growth potential is estimated from past growth levels. Palepu (1986) uses the three-
year average historical sales growth as a proxy for the firm’s future growth levels. This 
method assumes that a firm’s current growth level is the best indicator of its future growth 
potential. This approach is standard in the literature (Barnes (1999), Brar et al. (2009), 
Ouzounis et al. (2009)). Nonetheless, the current study employs a panel type data structure 
                                                 
93 Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) later dropped the growth-resource mismatch hypothesis from 
their model as the difference between targets and non-targets (in terms of the level of mismatch) 
was not statistically significant. 
94 Leverage models for the firm’s interest obligations. High leverage implies that the firm will have 
lower available cash resources after it meets its yearly debt obligations. A combination of high 
liquidity and low leverage indicates overall high resource availability while a combination of low 
liquidity and high leverage indicates overall low resource availability. 
95 Industry classifications are discussed in chapter 4. 
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with different firm-years being considered as independent events (this is further discussed 
in section 4.2). Growth opportunities are therefore measured by using the sales growth 
level in the previous year. A firm’s sales growth in year t is computed from annual sales or 
revenues [wc01001] as follows: 
             
               
        
             ( ) 
 
Resource availability is measured as a function of both a firm’s level of liquidity and its 
level of leverage (Palepu, 1986). Liquidity measures the level or proportion of liquid assets 
(cash and near cash items) within a firm’s asset structure. This measure of liquidity has 
been applied by Palepu (1986) and Loderer et al. (2011). Consistent with these studies, 
liquidity is defined as the ratio of cash, short-term investments and near cash items 
[wc02001] to the firm’s total assets [wc02999]. In line with Palepu (1986), leverage is 
measured as the ratio of total debt [wc03255] to total equity [wc03995]. The rationale of 
using leverage to determine resource availability is due to the fact that highly levered firms 
have higher interest and repayment commitments which act as a constraint on the firm’s 
liquid resources.  Therefore, a high level of liquid assets and a low leverage (implying high 
resource availability), will allow a firm to engage in new projects while low liquidity and 
high leverage (implying low resource availability) will constrain a firm from investing in 
new projects
96
.  
3.2.7 Tangible assets hypothesis 
The importance of asset structure on financial decision making and policy within the firm 
have long been studied in the literature (see, for example, Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Ambrose and Megginson (1992)). Assets are said to provide financial slack for a 
firm, enabling it to raise debt capital rather than turn to the stock market in times of need 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)). Stulz and Johnson (1985) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) 
contend that the level of tangible fixed assets (property, plant and equipment) within a firm 
can proxy its debt capacity. All things being equal, a firm with tangible assets – a high 
proportion of tangible fixed assets in its asset portfolio (i.e., high debt capacity) – is likely 
to be a more attractive takeover target. This is because the tangible assets can be used as 
collateral security by a prospective bidder to raise some of the funds needed to finance the 
proposed takeover. The presence of tangible assets or tangible fixed assets within a firm’s 
                                                 
96 This is also based on the potential restrictions that debt holders place on firms through debt 
covenants coupled with the fact that interest to debt must be paid before the firm can engage in 
any new investment opportunities. 
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portfolio makes it an attractive target by reducing its implicit takeover cost to the bidder
97
. 
Further, asset tangibility is, perhaps, important for firm valuation, especially when the level 
of information asymmetry between the target and the bidder is high. Non-tangible assets 
such as brands, patents, R&D and goodwill are, arguably, difficult to value. In line with the 
asymmetric valuation hypothesis (section 3.3.9), the ease of valuing firms with tangible 
assets can improve their attractiveness as takeover targets. The ‘ease of valuation’ 
perspective of tangible assets hypothesis is not fully consistent with the undervaluation 
hypothesis. This is because a firm with more tangible assets is less likely to be undervalued 
by the market. Hence, as suggested by the undervaluation hypothesis, such a firm should 
have a low takeover probability. 
 
There has been some empirical evidence to support the tangible assets hypothesis, with 
researchers (including Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997), and Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi (2003)) finding that takeover probability increases with the proportion of 
tangible assets in a firm’s total asset portfolio. The hypothesis – first employed in takeover 
prediction by Ambrose and Megginson (1992) – predicts that firms with substantial 
tangible assets (such as plant and machinery) in their total asset portfolio are more 
attractive targets to bidders. The hypothesis can be stated as below. 
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability increases with the proportion 
of tangible assets in a firm’s total asset portfolio. 
 
The reported value for property, plant and equipment net of reserves is used as a measure 
of the firm’s level of tangible fixed assets98. In line with prior studies (such as Powell 
(1997) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992)), tangible assets is proxied by the ratio of 
tangible fixed assets or property, plant and equipment [wc02501] to total assets [wc02999].  
3.2.8 Firm size hypothesis 
Palepu (1986) argues that takeover probability is decreasing in firm size, with small firms 
highly susceptible to takeover bids. Palepu (1986) contends that several size-related 
transaction costs
99
 are associated with acquiring a target and, therefore, the number of 
                                                 
97 In line with this, Eddey (1991) proposes the raider theory of takeovers – that bidders (or ‘raiders’)  
interested in ‘buying and striping’ firms will be attracted to firms with a high proportion of 
tangible fixed assets in their asset structure. 
98Net property plant and equipment (PPE) represents the gross value of PPE less accumulated 
reserves for depreciation, depletion and amortization (DataStream definition). 
99 These costs can include the market price plus premium for the target, M&A negotiation fees 
(adviser, consultants and investment banks, amongst others), the cost of fighting any target 
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viable bidders for a target decreases as its size increases. This perspective is supported by 
Gorton et al. (2009) who contend that bidding firms can only, generally, acquire 
comparatively smaller target firms. Palepu (1986) and Gorton et al. (2009) discuss the 
effect of target firm size with reference and comparison to the characteristics of the bidder 
by positing that ‘comparatively smaller’ firms are suitable targets as they are likely to be 
more affordable for a ‘comparatively larger’ bidder. In general, such a reference to the 
bidder’s characteristics introduces a look-ahead bias as the characteristics of the bidder are 
unknown a priori and hence cannot be added to the model. The norm is to compare a target 
against the population of non-targets. Palepu’s ‘affordability’ argument (proxied by firm 
size) is, perhaps, justified only if takeover probably of a firm (e.g., firm i) increases with 
the number of firms, γ, which are larger than firm i. If this is the case, a better (or 
unbiased) proxy for affordability might be γ rather than the size of firm i100.  
 
Some studies (including Hasbrouck (1985), Bartley and Boardman (1990) and Walter 
(1994)) employing the contentious non-random (matched or unmatched) sampling 
methodology similar to that employed in the Palepu (1986) study, concur with Palepu’s 
finding that targets are generally smaller in size. This finding is not, however, supported 
across the literature (see, for example, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell 
(1997)). Powell (1997), for example, finds that the purported negative relationship between 
size and takeover probability is not robust across time. Using a multinomial model 
(distinguishing between hostile targets, friendly targets and non-targets), Powell (1997) 
also shows that the relationship between size and takeover probability is negative for 
friendly targets but consistently positive for hostile targets. The hypothesised negative 
relationship between firm size and takeover probability is further disputed by studies from 
the merger wave literature which argue that some waves (such as the 1980s wave) are 
characterised by the acquisition of larger targets as bidders view growth, capacity 
development and economies of scale as a key merger motive (Hughes (1989), Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005)).  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
resistance and the cost of absorbing the target into the bidder’s operating framework (see Palepu 
(1986) and Powell (2001) for a discussion). 
100 The number of firms of size larger than the size of firm i, is a better proxy for affordability of 
firm i, as the proxy generates a linear pattern across the population with the smallest firm having 
the largest γ, and vice versa. γ can be made more analytically tractable by taking its inverse or 
natural log. 
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Again, the ‘matching criteria and state-based sampling methodology’101 employed by 
Palepu (1986), Hasbrouck (1985), Powell (1997), Barnes (1990), Barnes (1998), Powell 
(2001), and Brar et al. (2009), potentially, explains why the relationship between size and 
takeover probability might have been mis-specified (although supported) in some prior 
empirical studies (Shumway (2001)). Further, some researchers (e.g., Brar et al. (2009)) 
constrain their samples through the imposition of a minimum size criterion for firm 
inclusion in the sample. This constraint masks the relationship between firm size and 
takeover probability through the elimination of small firms. The current study contributes 
to the literature by redeveloping the firm size hypothesis as discussed in section 3.3.2. As 
in Palepu (1986), the (old) firm size hypothesis is stated as below. 
Hypothesis 7: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability decreases with firm size. 
 
Several measures of firm size have been employed in the literature. These include: net 
book assets, market capitalisation, sales, capital stock and total assets, amongst others (see 
Palepu (1986), Brar et al. (2009) and Barnes (2000)). The natural log of these variables is 
used as it improves the analytical tractability of the variable. In the current study, firm size 
is proxied by the log of total assets (consistent with Powell (1997), Powell and Yawson 
(2007), Cornett et al. (2011) and De and Jindra (2012))
102
. The total asset proxy captures 
all the different size related transaction costs noted above. Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992) use the net book value (i.e., total assets less total liabilities) as a 
measure of target firm size. While the net book value can, perhaps, proxy for the direct 
cost of acquisition (or purchase price), it is unlikely to proxy for other related transaction 
costs such as the cost of absorbing the target into the bidder’s operating framework103.  
3.2.9 Firm age hypothesis 
Substantial research has been done in the firm life cycle literature which focuses on 
understanding the different stages in the life cycle of a typical firm (including industry 
entry, growth, decline and exit). This literature frequently attributes firm survival (age) to 
the ability of firms to learn actively or passively over time (Hopenhayn (1992), Pakes and 
Ericson (1998) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009)). In line with the learning perspective, 
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009) contend that exit rates (due to the hazard of takeovers or 
                                                 
101 This methodology is further discussed in section 2.6.3. 
102 The natural log is used in order to improve scaling and hence analytical tractability. 
103 This is because a firm can have substantial total assets but a low net book value due to high long 
term debt in its capital structure. The net book value of this firm will be equivalent to that of a 
small firm with low debt. While both firms will have the same net book values, it is unlikely that 
both firms will have the same probability of receiving a bid, other things being equal. 
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bankruptcies) should decrease with age. Firm age is highlighted in Brar et al. (2009) as a 
potential discriminatory variable between targets and non-targets. Nonetheless, Brar et al. 
(2009) neither present any theoretical justification to support the hypothesis, nor conduct 
any related empirical tests
104
. Bhattacharjee et al. (2009) also employ firm age as a 
predictor of business exit due to the hazard of takeovers or bankruptcy. Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2009) find evidence of a negative relationship between age and firm exit. For consistency, 
the hypothesis is included in this section (section 3.3) given that it was highlighted in a 
prior takeover prediction study. Brar et al. (2009) indicate that takeover probability is 
expected to have a negative relationship with firm age. This hypothesis is redeveloped in 
the current study and a theoretical justification of the expected relationship between age 
and takeover probability is further discussed in section 3.3.5. The (old) firm age hypothesis 
(as implied in Brar et al. (2009)) is stated below. 
Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability decreases with firm age. 
 
Two measures of age have been used in the finance literature: number of years since listing 
(IPO) and number of years since firm incorporation (see, for example, Loderer et al. (2011) 
and Shumway (2001)). Loderer et al. (2011) find that incorporation age and listing age for 
a sample of US firms are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.668 and can 
therefore be used interchangeably. Studies on business exit (such as Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2009) and Loderer and Waelchli (2010)) generally use listing age (i.e., the difference 
between the current year and the year in which the firm was listed). However, these studies 
focus the life cycle concept with a firm’s IPO considered to be the starting point. In the 
current study, the focus is on how a firm’s characteristics (such as productivity of its assets 
and ability to innovate) changes with age hence affecting its likelihood of takeover. In this 
study, firm age is measured as the number of years since firm incorporation [wc18273] – 
the incorporation age – i.e., the time span (in years) from incorporation to the current year.  
3.2.10 Summary 
Eight old takeover prediction hypotheses have been discussed in this section. Two of these 
old hypotheses (firm size and firm age) are redeveloped in this study to generate new 
insights as discussed in section 3.3.2 (firm size) and 3.3.5 (firm age) below. As discussed 
in chapter 2 (see section 2.6.5), these eight hypotheses (hypothesis 1 – hypothesis 8) have 
been recurrently used in the takeover target prediction modelling literature. The empirical 
                                                 
104 The firm age variable is dropped from their analysis at an early stage (prior to their univariate 
analysis).  
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evidence on their validity is mixed. This study makes a contribution to the literature by 
introducing eleven new takeover prediction hypotheses (hypothesis 9 – hypothesis 19), 
which when combined with the six old hypotheses (hypothesis 1 – hypothesis 6), improves 
the theoretical and empirical framework for predicting future takeover targets. The eleven 
new hypotheses are discussed in section 3.3. 
 
3.3 New hypotheses for takeover target prediction  
3.3.1 Overview 
The phrase ‘new hypotheses’ is used in this study because, to my knowledge, this is the 
first time that these hypotheses are applied in the prediction of takeover targets. As will be 
discussed, some of the hypotheses are developed from empirical research in other areas of 
finance and most of the hypotheses build on established theories. Some new hypotheses, 
such as firm size, capital structure and firm lifecycle, constitute an expansion of old 
takeover prediction hypotheses.  
 
This section discusses the new hypotheses for takeover prediction developed in this study. 
One key hypothesis used in prior studies is the firm size hypothesis, which argues that 
takeover probability is decreasing in firm size. An alternative view is adopted in this study 
(i.e., the hypothesis is redeveloped in this study). Also, firm age is briefly highlighted as a 
potential moderator of firm takeover probability in Brar et al. (2009). Nonetheless, Brar et 
al. (2009) do not use firm age when developing their model. This hypothesis is included 
under new hypotheses as it is also redeveloped in this study. The eleven new hypotheses 
discussed in sections 3.3.2 to 3.3.13 include: firm size, firm age, capital structure, M&A 
rumour, payroll synergies, share repurchases, financial distress, asymmetric valuation, 
barriers to entry, market liquidity and market economics hypotheses.  
3.3.2 Firm size (new) hypothesis 
The relationship between firm size and takeover probability is, perhaps, not linear 
previously considered. As discussed in section 3.3.8, the use of firm size as a proxy for the 
ease of affordability might introduce look-ahead bias in prediction studies given that the 
characteristics of the bidder are not known a priori. Even if firm size measures 
affordability (as in Palepu (1986)), the use of net book value of assets as a measure of firm 
size (in studies such as Palepu (1985), Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi (2003)) as opposed to market value (for example) fails to fully capture the 
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concept of affordability as discussed in section 3.3.8. Arguably, the ‘old’ firm size 
hypothesis (Palepu (1986)) is mainly consistent with an antitrust avoidance rationale and a 
variable cost minimisation motive for target selection
105
.   
 
As will be discussed here, when other theories/motives of takeovers (such as economies of 
scale, managerial hubris, managerial utility maximisation, empire-building, information 
asymmetry, and transaction costs) are taken into consideration, this view is not supported. 
In fact, it is likely that ‘mid-sized’ firms will face a higher takeover threat in comparison to 
their small and large counterparts. While the smallest firms are the easiest to acquire (due 
to low capital requirement), their acquisition is unlikely to allow managers to attain most 
of the aforementioned acquisition motives. If ‘bigger is better’ to bidding management106, 
and it is assumed that Gibrat’s Law107 (on firm size distribution) holds, then a firm’s 
takeover likelihood should generally increase with size – at least for firms below the mean 
(or median) firm size. Notwithstanding, high transaction costs and the limited number of 
larger firms (γ) can play an important role in shielding the largest firms in the industry 
from takeover threats
108
.  
 
The ‘new’ firm size hypothesis argues that the relationship between firm size and takeover 
probability is essentially nonlinear, with the smallest and largest firms facing the least 
takeover threat. Other theories of takeovers e.g., the managerial (utility) theory and the 
empire building hypothesis, support this hypothesised relationship.  
 
Managerial (utility) theory of mergers stipulates that managers engage in merger activity to 
attain increased managerial utility (see Mueller (1969) and Marris (1963)). Clearly, 
managers are unlikely to consistently pursue mergers only with the aim of maximising 
their own utility without any regard for (or at the detriment of) their shareholders. Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) argument – that managers are more likely to adopt shareholder 
                                                 
105 That is, bidding firms show preference for smaller targets because such mergers are likely to 
face little scrutiny from antitrust regulators (antitrust avoidance) and because the cash outlay to 
target shareholders is low (variable cost minimisation). 
106 As predicted by theories such as economies of scale and scope, managerial hubris, managerial 
utility maximisation, empire-building, information asymmetry, and transaction costs. This will be 
discussed further. 
107 Gibrat’s Law proposes that firm size is log normally distributed (see Angelini and Generale 
(2008) for evidence on firm size distribution). That is, the log of firm size of all firms in the 
population follows a normal distribution. 
108 As in section 3.3.8, γ is used to denote the number of firms of size larger than a potential target. 
It is assumed that a firm (potential target) mainly faces a takeover threat from the γ (viable bidders) 
population. In line with Gibrat’s Law, γ declines as (log) firm size increases. 
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wealth satisficing objectives than shareholder wealth maximising objectives – provides a 
more plausible justification of the managerial utility theory. Managers adopting a 
shareholder wealth satisficing objective will, perhaps, engage in mergers that do not 
adversely impact on the wealth of their shareholders but allows them to increase their own 
utility. Consistent with the managerial theory, prior empirical evidence suggests that 
bidders do not gain from takeovers and may even earn negative abnormal returns from 
takeover activity
109
. This suggests that, on average, bidders pursue their self-interests 
through mergers (Malatesta (1983)). The empire-building hypothesis (Marris (1963)) 
proposes that managers engage in mergers to increase firm size, and with it, salary, power 
and social status. The finding that managers systematically overpay for targets – the hubris 
hypothesis (see Roll (1986) and Hayward and Hambrick (1997)) – further supports a 
managerial self-interest motive of mergers. A related argument for the consummation of 
mergers is advanced by the monopoly theory. This theory argues that mergers are 
consummated by firms aiming to gain market power (e.g., Eckbo (1992)). The theory 
suggests that gains in mergers arise from the reduction in industry competition, permitting 
an increase in prices and thus a general increase in industry profits.  
 
To facilitate further discussion, the (new) firm size hypothesis can be broken down into 
two segments – A and B. Segment A predicts that takeover probability will increase with 
firm size for firms in the population with firm size below a threshold
110
. Segment B of the 
hypothesis predicts that takeover probability will decline with firm size for firms in the 
population with firm size above a threshold.  
 
The main argument for the relationship in segment A (takeover probability increases with 
firm size) is that the acquisition of smaller targets is less likely to allow prospective bidders 
to attain either neoclassical or managerial utility motives of takeovers. While bidding firms 
are likely to pursue targets that are comparatively smaller in size for transaction costs 
reasons (Palepu (1996), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997) and Gorton et al. 
(2009)), the creation of value by the bidder (through increased synergies and economies of 
scale) is, potentially, dependent on the size of the target. Gorton et al. (2009), for example, 
contend that mergers with larger targets are more attractive because of the potential to 
                                                 
109 See, for example, Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Franks and Harris (1989), Holl and 
Kyriazis (1997), Higson and Elliot (1998), Gregory (1997), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Limmack 
(1991) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). 
110 If the distribution of firm size is log normal (Gibrat’s law), then this threshold can be 
approximated by the median or mean firm size. 
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generate higher value due to larger economies of scale. Similarly, bidders seeking to 
generate monopoly power or benefit from the acquisition of undervalued firms are more 
likely to achieve such motives through the acquisition of the largest of their potential 
targets. Likewise, bidders with an empire-building motive or bidders whose decision to 
acquire is driven by hubris, are, perhaps, more fulfilled by acquiring the largest firm in 
their list of potential targets. 
 
In segment A (i.e., below a size threshold), there are, perhaps, transaction cost savings to 
be made by acquiring larger rather than smaller firms. Prior studies (such as Palepu (1986) 
and Gorton et al. (2009)) implicitly assume that the fixed costs of takeovers (costs which 
are unrelated to target size) are insignificant and only variable costs of takeovers (e.g., 
offer price) really matter. There is evidence that these fixed costs are quite substantial, 
particularly when the value of acquisition is low. This is because the fees paid to advisors 
in M&A transactions – which are usually a proportion of the value of the transaction – 
decline with the transaction value (Kosnik and Shapiro (1997)). Using a US sample of 
5,337 deals between 1995 and 2000, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), for example, provide 
some empirical evidence to show that the fee paid by targets decreases as the value of the 
transaction increases. This is in line with popular fee structuring formulae such as the 
Lehman and Double Lehman fee structure used by many investment banks (Kosnik and 
Shapiro (1997)). This stepped fee structure (which generates a higher fee to value ratio for 
small takeovers) imposes significant fixed costs in the acquisition of smaller firms. Bidders 
might thus benefit from economies of scale in transaction costs by acquiring the largest of 
their potential targets. Further, the evidence suggests that M&A advisors are likely to 
recommend larger rather than smaller firms as potential targets for both reputational and 
financial purposes. The empirical evidence suggests that the reputation of M&A advisors 
(e.g., their position on M&A league tables), as well as, their revenues is generally tied to 
the value of deals in their portfolio (see, for example, Plaksen (2011) and Walter et al. 
(2008)). 
 
The problem of information asymmetry and its effect on the market mechanism – the 
market for lemons – has been discussed in prior research (Akerlof (1970)). The market for 
firms is, perhaps, not an exception to this problem. Some researchers (e.g., Pettit and 
Singer (1985)) argue that, due to a lack of economies of scale in information production 
and distribution, smaller firms are inclined to produce and distribute less information about 
themselves, thus leading to a higher level of asymmetry between them and their 
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stakeholders. This problem of comparatively higher information asymmetry in smaller 
firms is further exacerbated by the lack of significant analyst following. Eleswarapu et al. 
(2004), for example, show that a group of small US firms (with an average market 
capitalisation of $106 million) had no (0) analyst coverage.  Eleswarapu et al. (2004) also 
find that analyst following increases with firm size, with up to 35 analysts following large 
firms (with an average market capitalisation of $62.6 billion). This suggests that, if bidders 
are cautious of purchasing ‘lemons’, they are likely to bid for low information asymmetry 
firms – which produce and distribute large volumes of information about themselves and 
are followed by several analysts. The implication is that bidders will be, perhaps, more 
inclined to acquire larger than smaller targets on average. 
 
Segment B of the hypothesis argues that takeover likelihood declines with firm size 
beyond a size threshold. This part of the hypothesis is consistent with the old firm size 
hypothesis discussed in prior studies (see, for example, Palepu (1986), Hasbrouck (1985), 
Bartley and Boardman (1990), Walter (1994), Powell (2001), amongst others). These prior 
studies argue that there is a linear relationship between firm size and takeover likelihood 
with large firms being least susceptible to takeovers. As noted by Gorton et al. (2009), this 
might be the case because a larger acquisition is more difficult to finance or because it is 
more difficult (and more risky) to raise new debt capital to fund larger acquisitions. 
Further, use of equity to finance acquisitions will lead to dilution of ownership (with the 
effect increasing in target size) and a loss of control for incumbent management (Gorton et 
al. (2009)).  
 
The arguments put forward by Gorton et al. (2009) and Palepu (1986) combines with 
Gibrat’s law on the distribution of firm sizes in the population to, possibly, explain why the 
resource requirements (transaction costs and cost of reorganisation) involved in the 
acquisition of larger targets limits the number of viable bidders. If Gibrat’s law holds, the 
number of viable bidders (γ) in the population will decrease with (the log of) firm size for 
all firms larger than the median firm
111
. The implication is that the takeover risk faced by 
comparatively larger firms (firms with size above the median) will continuously decline as 
size increases. All things being equal, the largest firms in the population will, perhaps, face 
little or no risk of takeover. Overall, Segment A and segment B generate an inverse U-
shaped relationship between firm size and takeover probability.  
                                                 
111 This assumes that a viable bidder is any firm with (log) size greater than the (log) size of the 
target. 
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As discussed above, the old firm size hypothesis is, perhaps, mainly consistent with an 
antitrust avoidance motive and a variable cost minimisation motive of takeovers. These 
two motives do not appear to be strong enough to fully explain the relationship between 
firm size and takeover likelihood. Further, there is lack of robust empirical evidence to 
support the old firm size hypothesis. The new firm size hypothesis is more consistent with 
both the neoclassical and managerial motives of takeovers. It is also consistent with other 
factors (such as transaction costs, role of advisers, and information asymmetry 
considerations) which, arguably, play a role in moderating the choice of takeover targets. 
This hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm size and takeover 
likelihood has not been tested in the literature to the best of my knowledge. The hypothesis 
is stated below. 
Hypothesis 9: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability is an inverted U-shaped 
function of firm size.  Takeover likelihood initially increases with size then 
declines as firm size exceeds a threshold. 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.8, firm size is proxied by the natural log of total assets 
[wc02999]. The nonlinear relationship is captured by adding a squared term (the natural 
log of total assets squared) to the model. It is expected that if the hypothesis holds, then 
takeover probability will be positively related to firm size (log total assets) and negatively 
related to firm size squared (log total assets squared). 
3.3.3 Firm capital structure hypothesis 
Although leverage has been used as a control variable in almost every takeover prediction 
model, its hypothesised relationship with takeover probability is hardly discussed. Palepu 
(1986) uses firm leverage together with growth and liquidity to develop a proxy for the 
growth-resource mismatch hypothesis. Palepu (1986) also includes leverage as an 
independent variable in the model noting that the relationship between leverage and 
takeover probability cannot be hypothesised a priori. In his empirical analysis, Palepu 
(1986) finds a negative relationship between leverage and takeover probability.  
 
The role of target financial slack (as discussed in Myers and Majluf (1984), Smith and Kim 
(1994) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008)) and deterrent effects of high leverage (as 
discussed in Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Safieddine and Titman (1999), Garvey 
and Hanka (1999) and Billet and Xue (2007)) can, perhaps, explain why leverage and 
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takeover probability can be negatively related. Firms with low debt in their capital 
structure offer a bidder more financial slack (i.e., the ability to borrow capital, if needed). 
The total available financial slack decreases as the target’s level of leverage increases. 
Acquiring a highly levered target imposes new risk on the bidder as the bidder inherits the 
target’s debt interest commitments. Both factors (financial slack and risk of high leverage) 
result in a negative relationship between leverage and takeover probability. 
 
This theoretical argument is, however, not fully supported by the empirical evidence. 
Several studies adopting Palepu’s prediction model (hypothesis and variables) find mixed 
results. Some studies (such as Hasbrouck (1985), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and 
Bhanot et al. (2010)) find that, on average, targets have higher (but statistically indifferent) 
leverage level when compared to non-targets. Other studies (such as Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992), Powell (1997), Powell (2004), Barnes (1998) and Barnes (1999)) show 
that there is a significant positive relationship between leverage and takeover probability. 
The aforementioned studies neither corroborate Palepu’s finding nor the theoretical 
arguments (i.e., financial slack and risk of high leverage) for a negative relationship 
between leverage and takeover probability. These mixed results motivate a closer look at 
the relationship between firm leverage and takeover probability.  
 
The firm capital structure hypothesis introduced in this study predicts that, below a certain 
threshold, the relationship between takeover probability and firm leverage is direct but the 
direct relationship reverts as leverage increases further.  This implies an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between leverage and takeover probability. For discussion purposes, this 
hypothesis is broken down into 2 segments – segments A and B. Segment A predicts that 
takeover probability will increase with leverage up until a leverage threshold. Segment B 
of the hypothesis predicts that takeover probability will decline with leverage beyond the 
leverage threshold.  The rationale for this prediction is discussed further below. 
 
Classic capital structure theory (Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Modigliani and Miller 
(1963)) as well as the trade-off theory of firm financing behaviour (Myers (1984)) fail to 
explain why a significant proportion of firms (even successful firms with presumably low 
bankruptcy risk) have very little debt in their capital structure (see, for example, Fama and 
French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and Roberts (2010) and Halov and Heider 
(2004), amongst others). The pecking order theory (Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984)) suggests that, due to agency conflicts and tax reasons, managers will only take on 
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additional external financing (debt and new equity issues) when they are unable to generate 
funds internally. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), for example, provide some empirical 
evidence to support the pecking order theory of corporate financing behaviour. The theory 
has, however, been criticised for not fully explaining a majority of corporate financing 
decisions, particularly the finding that many firms turn to issue equity in preference to debt 
(Helwege and Liang (1996), Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and 
Roberts (2010), Halov and Heider (2004) and Fama and French (2005)). Several studies 
which find no support for the pecking order theory (including Fama and French (2002), 
Halov and Heider (2004), Frank and Goyal (2003)) find that the preference for equity over 
debt as a source of external financing, is especially common in well-performing high-
growth firms. This exception in high growth firms is also noted in studies (such as 
Lemmon and Zender (2010)) which find support for the pecking order theory. 
 
Based on this evidence, it appears that well-performing high-growth firms are likely to 
follow a unique pecking order with a preference for internal financing (retained earnings), 
then equity (when internally generated funds are depleted) and finally debt (when all other 
sources of funds are exhausted). The reasons for this unique pecking order include issues 
of information asymmetry (Frank and Goyal (2003)), adverse selection (Halov and Heider 
(2004)) and debt capacity restrictions (Lemmon and Zender (2010)). This unique pecking 
order followed by ‘well-performing high-growth’ firms corroborates much of the empirical 
evidence on firm financing choices (see Helwege and Liang (1996), Fama and French 
(2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and Roberts (2010), Halov and Heider (2004), 
Fama and French (2005), and Lemmon and Zender (2010)). For the purpose of takeover 
prediction, leveraging can therefore be considered as a characteristic of firms which are 
less able to generate and retain sufficient funds to meet reinvestment needs. In line with the 
empirical findings discussed above, leveraging can also be considered a characteristic of 
firms which are unlikely to be ‘well-performing high-growth’ firms. These firms therefore 
tend to issue debt to fund their financing deficit. As the problem becomes more severe, the 
financing deficit increases and more debt is issued. The implication is that, all things being 
equal, leveraging is a sign that firms are either facing financing difficulties or lack 
sufficient financial slack to meet investment needs. 
 
 This argument is directly supported by theoretical and empirical evidence (e.g., Israel 
(1992)) which predicts that more efficient firms are likely to issue less debt. Further, 
evidence from the bankruptcy prediction literature (see, for example, Altman et al. (1977), 
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Taffler (1983, 1984), Shumway (2001) and Agarwal and Taffler (2007), amongst others) 
overwhelmingly shows that high leverage is synonymous to financial distress, insolvency 
and corporate bankruptcy – key indicators of managerial inefficiency. It can be expected, 
consistent with the management inefficiency hypothesis, that firms with high leverage 
might constitute attractive targets, especially to resource rich firms. Contrary to Palepu’s 
(1986) finding, but consistent with much of the empirical evidence (Hasbrouck (1985), 
Bhanot et al. (2010), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997), Barnes (1998, 
1999), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Powell (2004)), this implies a direct 
relationship between leverage and takeover probability.  For discussion purposes, this is 
referred to as segment A of the relationship between takeover likelihood and firm leverage. 
 
I argue that there is a discontinuity in this relationship when leverage becomes ‘too’ high 
(segment B). At high debt levels (above a threshold), the firm, possibly, no longer becomes 
an attractive target. There are two main reasons for this postulation. First, firms with high 
levels of debt (presumably above the threshold) face increased monitoring from debt 
holders. Jensen (1986) argues that high debt levels result in low free cash flows and hence 
low agency problems. A high debt level also proxies for high managerial commitment to 
shareholders and therefore low opportunity for improvements by a prospective bidding 
firm (Jensen (1986)). Supporting evidence provided by Safieddine and Titman (1999) 
suggests that higher leverage helps firms remain independent, not because it entrenches 
managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be 
made by potential raiders. This implies the attractiveness of a firm as a target, potentially, 
declines as leverage goes beyond a certain threshold.  
 
The second reason for an inverse relationship between leverage and takeover probability is 
the role of leverage as a takeover defence mechanism. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz 
(1988) argue the leveraging is an effective takeover defence strategy as it concentrates 
ownership and increases the percentage ownership of the target’s management thus making 
the firm more costly for a prospective bidder. Garvey and Hanka (1999) find that firms 
protected by state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, while 
unprotected firms increase their leverage levels. They argue that threat of hostile takeover 
motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. Leveraging can, 
potentially, be a useful defence tactic in the UK context, where several standard takeover 
resistance strategies are prohibited. Further empirical support of the use of leverage as a 
resistance strategy is provided by Billet and Xue (2007) who report that managers 
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threatened by prospective takeovers engage in open market share repurchases funded by 
new debt issues.  
 
Based on segments A and B, it is hypothesised that there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between takeover probability and leverage. A linear relationship fails to 
reconcile the pecking order theory and inefficient management hypothesis. This is because 
a direct linear relationship implies that efficiently managed (well-performing high-growth) 
firms with the ability of reinvesting earnings to generate future growth are more likely to 
face the threat of takeovers. The nonlinear relationship reconciles key theories including 
the pecking order theory, management inefficiency hypothesis and the role of debt as a 
takeover deterrent. The potential existence of a threshold also reconciles seemingly 
conflicting empirical evidence asserting that targets generally have higher leverage levels 
than non-targets (Hasbrouck (1985), Bhanot et al. (2010), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), 
Powell (1997, 2004), Barnes (1998, 1999) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003)) as well as 
evidence that bidders shun highly levered firms (Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988) and 
Safieddine and Titman (1999)). The firm capital structure hypothesis is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 10: Ceteris paribus, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between a firm’s leverage and the probability that it will receive a takeover bid. 
 
As in Palepu (1986) and Brar et al. (2009), leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt 
[wc03255] to total equity [wc03995].  This definition of leverage is similar to that used in 
several prior studies including Palepu (1986), Powell (1997) and Powell and Yawson 
(2007). The inverted U-shape relationship is captured by adding a (leverage) squared term 
into the model. A significant positive coefficient for leverage and a significant negative 
coefficient for leverage squared in the takeover probability model will provide support for 
the hypothesis. 
3.3.4 Financial distress hypothesis 
As discussed in section 3.3.3, it is important to consider the implications of an increased 
likelihood of financial distress (arising from additional debt) in evaluating a firm’s 
takeover probability. It was argued that firms may take on excess debt levels as a way of 
shielding themselves from future takeovers. This increased debt, nonetheless, engenders a 
new risk – the risk of bankruptcy or financial distress – when the firm is unable to generate 
sufficient cash flows to meet its interest commitment. This risk of bankruptcy is likely to 
be faced mainly by poorly performing firms with high levels of leverage (see, for example, 
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Taffler (1983) and Shumway (2001)). This suggests a potential interaction between 
leverage, financial distress risk and performance in moderating a firm’s takeover risk. 
 
The relationship between a firm’s takeover likelihood and its probability of financial 
distress appears to be unclear. On the one hand, firms with a high likelihood of facing 
financial distress can be regarded as having inefficient management teams and therefore 
being suitable takeover targets. These firms are also likely to be more open to takeovers, 
which, perhaps, is a better alternative to bankruptcy. On the other hand, financial distress 
caused by excessive leverage might make a firm an unattractive takeover target as the 
bidder is bound to inherit the debt and debt conditions of the target. More recent 
bankruptcy studies (e.g., Jones and Hensher (2007)) argue against the use of a binary 
framework in bankruptcy prediction. The underlying rationale (as discussed in Jones and 
Hensher (2007)) is that there are different states of financial distress ranging from financial 
insolvency (in which firms are ‘temporarily’ unable to meet their financial obligations) to 
failure or bankruptcy (in which administrators are called-in to begin liquidation 
proceedings). Jones and Hensher (2007) find that distressed firms that exit the industry 
through acquisitions have comparatively lower leverage when compared to distressed firms 
that go into administration, receivership and/or liquidation. The hypothesis is stated as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 11a: Ceteris paribus, takeover likelihood increases with the degree of 
financial distress.  
 
The level of financial distress is measured using the Taffler Z score model (Taffler (1983) 
and Agarwal and Taffler (2007)). The Taffler Z score model is specifically tailored to 
model the likelihood of financial distress in UK firms. It is worth acknowledging that 
several limitations of this model have been discussed in prior studies (e.g., Shumway 
(2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Agarwal and Taffler (2007), Christidis and Gregory 
(2010) and Tinoco and Wilson (2013)). For example, Agarwal and Taffler (2007) find that 
number of UK firms with low Z scores have dramatically increased post 1997 – suggesting 
a need to update the model. Chava and Jarrow (2004) find that the use of industry controls 
substantially improves the model (or model coefficients). Shumway (2001) shows that a 
‘hazard-type’ financial distress model has better predictive power. Notwithstanding, the 
Taffler model has been widely adopted across several studies as popular alternatives are 
yet to emerge. Most studies apply the model across different industries. For example 
Agarwal and Taffler (2007) test the model on a sample of all UK non-financial firms listed 
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on the London Stock Exchange for at least 2 years between 1979 and 2003. The evidence 
presented by Agarwal and Taffler (2007) asserts the model’s applicability to firm’s today. 
The model is shown below (based on Agarwal and Taffler (2007) and Taffler (1983)). 
 
                                                   ( ) 
Where, 
                     [       ]                     [      ]            ( )⁄  
                  [       ]                   [       ]⁄            ( ) 
                       [       ]              [       ]⁄            ( ) 
   
(            [               ]                      [       ])
      [       ]     [       ]              [       ]
 
            ( ) 
 
Per the model, the risk of financial distress decreases with a firm’s Z score, with Z scores 
below 0 indicating insolvency and the likelihood of failure due to financial distress 
(Agarwal and Taffler (2007)). If the hypothesis (11a) holds, then takeover likelihood 
should decrease with a firm’s Z score. If this is the case, the coefficient of the Z score 
variable in the takeover probability model, should be positive and significant. To account 
for the argument that bidders are likely to find highly distressed firms (firm’s with Z scores 
below zero) unattractive, the following hypothesis is tested. 
Hypothesis 11b: Ceteris paribus, firms with a high probability of going bankrupt 
(i.e., firms with Z scores below 0) will have a low takeover probability. 
 
A Z score dummy variable (ZSDummy) is used to proxy for highly distressed firms. This 
ZSDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm’s Z score is less than 0 and a value of 0, otherwise. 
If hypothesis (11b) holds, the coefficient of the ZSDummy variable should be negative and 
statistically significant. The difference between the two hypotheses, 11a and 11b, is that 
11a considers Z score as a continuous variable while 11b considers Z score as a binary 
variable modelling two states of financial distress – solvent and failure.  
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3.3.5 Firm lifecycle hypothesis 
Firm age has been advanced as a factor that affects firm survival
112
 within an industry.  
Agarwal and Gort (1996) discuss several empirical studies (including Jovanovic (1982), 
Dunne et al. (1989) and Audretsch (1991)) which find a positive relationship between firm 
age and survival. Jovanic (1982) contends that this relationship is attributable to the fact 
that, over time, a firm learns about its true costs and relative efficiency and so is less likely 
to fail. Agarwal and Gort (2002) advanced the literature on firm age and survival by 
proposing that two key factors (learning-by-doing and firm endowments) define its 
probability of survival (and hence likelihood of industry exit). Agarwal and Gort (2002) 
contend that, over time, a firm gains knowledge about itself and its industry, which allows 
it to achieve cost reductions, product improvements, and develop new market techniques – 
learning-by-doing. In terms of endowments, Agarwal and Gort (2002) argue that firm 
endowments
113
 are generally low when firms are born, but increase over time as firms 
invest in research and development. Older firms are therefore more endowed and more 
knowledgeable about themselves. The implication is that the probability of firm survival 
within an industry increases as firms grow older, learn about themselves and improve their 
endowments. 
 
Based on the lifecycle theory, Loderer and Waelchli (2010) argue that when firms grow 
old (after maturity) they are forced to turn to other firms for help. This is because they 
become increasingly rigid, less dynamic
114
, profitable and innovative (Leonard- Barton 
(1992)). They also become technologically obsolete in terms of products and services and 
are forced to initiate or accept takeovers (Davis and Stout (1992) and Loderer and Waelchli 
(2010)). Their takeover likelihood therefore increases with age after a threshold. Jensen 
(2000) adds that, old firms can also constitute attractive targets as they house resources 
trapped within outdated structures which can be freed by a successful bidder through 
takeovers. In line with Loderer and Waelchli (2010), Agarwal and Gort (2002) contend 
that obsolescence rises with firm age, leading to a net negative investment in endowment 
in very old firms. At this point, the probability of survival starts to decline. The outcome of 
                                                 
112 Theories on the effects of firm age on firm outcomes have mostly been discussed in the literature 
on firm survival. Takeovers are the main survival hazard faced by firms (Loderer and Waelchli 
(2010)). That is, many firms exit the industry (or fail to survive) due to takeovers. 
113 Endowment is defined as a firm’s inherent or natural suitability for profitability. 
114 Leonard-Barton (1992) argues that as firms grow older, there is the tendency for them to 
concentrate on their core capabilities. This limits their ability to adapt to shocks in the business 
environment. 
 110 
 
both contentions is an inverted U-shaped relationship between firm age and probability of 
survival.  
 
There is substantial empirical evidence showing that younger firms face a higher risk of 
acquisition (see, for example, Zingales (1995) and Loderer and Waelchli (2010)). This 
relationship is explained by the observation that many entrepreneurs use initial public 
offerings as an exit strategy. Further, young firms are, perhaps, more attractive takeover 
targets as they have fresh resources, new business models, new technologies, innovative 
products and are founded on more contemporary business ideas. They may thus constitute 
an attractive investment option for mature firms seeking to pursue new business 
opportunities and expand their product portfolios. Agarwal and Gort’s (2002) theory of 
firm survival does not, however, consider the unique drivers of different survival hazards 
(including bankruptcy, takeovers and delisting) faced by firms. While Agarwal and Gort’s 
(2002) empirical results support the hypothesis, the coefficient of the independent age 
variable (age square) which proxies for ‘old firms’ is low, indicating that the relationship 
might not be as strong as suggested. Further, Shumway (2001) finds no evidence relating 
firm age to probability of bankruptcy. In line with Loderer and Waelchli (2010), both 
findings suggest that the main survival hazard faced by firms is the threat of takeovers. If 
this is the case, then the takeover likelihood should, perhaps, be a U-shaped function of 
firm age. The hypothesis is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 12: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability is a U-shaped function of 
firm age i.e., takeover likelihood initially decreases with age then increases as 
firm age exceeds a threshold. 
 
The choice of a suitable proxy for firm age (listing age or incorporation age) has been 
discussed in 3.2.9. The incorporation age (computed from the year of firm incorporation 
[wc18273]) has been chosen in this study. The hypothesised U-shaped relationship is 
tested by adding a squared term for firm age. It is expected that if the hypothesis holds, 
takeover probability should have a negative relationship to firm age and a positive 
relationship with firm age squared.  
3.3.6 M&A rumours hypothesis 
Despite the perceived obvious relationship between rumours on takeovers and takeover 
probability of rumoured targets, there has been, to my knowledge, no empirical research 
looking at the ability of takeover rumours to predict future takeovers. The prediction 
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potential of takeover rumours will be investigated here for the first time. Oberlechner and 
Hocking (2004) define rumours as ‘allegations which are passed along accompanied by 
doubt rather than by evidence’ (p. 420). They argue that rumours bear the characteristics of 
news since rumours may be positive or negative and rumours explain important events. In 
their interviews with trading experts, they find that trading experts have to evaluate the 
validity of every piece of information (rumour) they received in order to outperform the 
majority of market participants who ‘just assume the news (rumour) is correct’ (p. 421). 
Inferring from this claim, one can argue that a robust takeover prediction model which 
incorporates but does not entirely depend on takeover rumour information, might provide a 
way of making ‘sense’ out of rumours. 
 
Bommel (2003) examines an informed investor’s motivation for spreading stock tips or 
rumours. He notes that since rumours are imprecise in nature, there is a likelihood that 
prices will be positively biased allowing the rumourmonger the opportunity to carry out 
two profitable trades – first when the rumourmonger has private information and next 
when the market overreacts. Bommel (2003) finds that rumours are informative at 
equilibrium, thus allowing rumourmongers (as well as their followers) to outperform 
uninformed investors. The main problem is, perhaps, the fact that rumours might carry 
honest information, no information or contrary information. Bommel (2003) shows that 
rumourmongers are more likely to spread honest rumours due to the moral hazard 
associated with bluffing or cheating. A rumourmonger who bluffs or cheats will benefit 
from ‘deceiving’ the market in the first instance, but will be unable to ‘sell’ rumours in the 
future. 
 
Pound (1990) investigates the effects of takeover rumours from the ‘Heard on the street’ 
column of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on stock prices. Pound concludes that the market 
is efficient in responding to this information as no significant returns can be made from 
investing in rumoured targets once the rumours are published. Pound finds that more than 
40% (18 out of 42 firms) of the rumoured targets in their sample actually received a bid 
within one year of the publication. In their study of 362 tender offers between 1981 and 
1995, Jindra and Walking (2004) find that 7% of the takeovers are preceded by rumours. In 
line with the contention that rumours are informative at equilibrium (Bommel (2003)) and 
the finding that several tender offers are preceded by rumours (e.g., Pound (1990) and 
Jindra and Walking (2004)), it is hypothesised that: 
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Hypothesis 13: Ceteris paribus, a firm’s takeover probability increases with the 
presence of rumours about the firm becoming a prospective takeover target. 
 
I propose the use of a merger rumour dummy variable (MRDummy) which takes a value of 
1 when there are rumours about the potential takeover of a firm in the past year and a value 
of 0, otherwise. As will be discussed in chapter 4, Thomson OneBanker is used to collect 
data on M&A rumours over the period. 
3.3.7 Payroll synergies hypothesis 
The potential for mergers to create synergies is generally advanced by managers as the 
main rationale for engaging in mergers. These synergies appear to mainly be generated 
through cutting operating costs (Devos et al. (2009)), which mostly constitute personnel 
costs (see, for example, Haynes and Thomson (1999) and Shleifer and Summers (1988)). 
Haynes and Thomson (1999), reviewing the case of UK mutual funds, find that takeovers 
are followed by three years of negative effects on the demand for labour. This finding – a 
decline in demand for labour post acquisitions – has been replicated across different 
studies employing different samples (see, for example, Conyon et al. (2002), Kubo and 
Saito (2012) and Lehto and Bockerman (2008)). Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that 
much of the benefits to merging firms come from the termination of long term contracts 
with employees. After investigating nine bank mergers in the US, Rhoades (1998) finds 
that staff reduction constituted the largest element of cost reduction and synergy creation in 
bank mergers. In his sample, on average, over 50% of total cost savings post-merger are in 
payroll reductions (Rhoades (1998)). The evidence therefore suggests that payroll savings 
constitutes one of the main forms through which synergy can be achieved through mergers. 
To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated how the payroll costs, given its 
role in the generation of synergies, affects a firm’s takeover propensity.  
 
Capron (1999) argues that two types of synergies (cost synergies and revenue-enhancing 
synergies) are created through mergers. Cost synergies are generally achieved through 
asset divestitures (including personnel cutbacks) while revenue-enhancing synergies are 
achieved through the efficient redeployment of resources (physical assets and personnel) to 
improve corporate earnings (see Capron (1999)). Other studies (see, for example, 
Comment and Jarrell (1995), Walker (2000) and Houston et al. (2001)) corroborate this 
framework. In line with the cost synergies and revenue-enhancing synergies perspective, it 
is hypothesised here that takeover likelihood will increase with the availability of payroll 
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synergies (such as the redeployment of resources) until such a point where creating 
synergies is unlikely (perhaps due to the need for very large layoffs). In essence, payroll 
synergies can be achieved through a combination of human resource (HR) asset 
redeployment (efficient utilisation of the target’s HR resources) and HR asset divestiture 
(employee layoffs). The bidder’s propensity to generate synergies will, perhaps, increase 
with the presence of excess human resources in the target. Nonetheless, at high levels 
(excess human resources) negative synergies are created as the costs and reputational 
effects of asset divestitures become too high. The hypothesis therefore argues that takeover 
likelihood has an inverse U –shaped relationship with HR costs. 
 
Firms with a high payroll cost (or payroll burden) relative to other firms are likely to have 
a high takeover likelihood due to the potential cost synergies to be created by a bidder. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) find that the UK (and Europe as a whole) has a high labour-
adjustment cost
115
 when compared to the US. This is mainly because the European 
employment regulations provide stricter employment protection making it comparatively 
more difficult to lay-off staff, particularly through collective dismissals (Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2004)). This suggests that some firms carry excess labour due to the challenges 
(e.g., litigation) and costs (e.g., compensation and corporate reputation) of firing 
employees. Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) note that 
corporate reorganisation through M&A is an effective way of achieving the desired 
restructuring (at least, in Europe) as a new management team is less likely to uphold 
existing employee contracts. The transfer of corporate ownership, perhaps, also provides a 
strong argument for engaging in restructuring initiatives such as layoffs. Their evidence 
(Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004)) suggests that firms can 
deliberately engage (as a target) in M&A to create shareholder value by shedding their 
excess human resources. Such a transaction also presents bidders with an opportunity to 
generate operational synergies through increased target efficiency. 
 
Further, firms with higher technological knowhow (such as the mechanisation of manual 
processes) are, potentially, able to earn rents from this knowledge and capability by 
acquiring labour intensive firms and shedding the excess human resources
 116
. Given the 
empirical finding that a reduction in payroll costs is one of the main ways of generating 
synergies in mergers (Devos et al. (2009), Haynes and Thomson (1999) and, Shleifer and 
                                                 
115 Labour adjustment cost is the cost of maintaining an optimal work force by firing excess staff. 
116 These rents could be in terms of cost savings and synergies generated by employing advanced 
technologies to mechanize manual processes thus eliminating the need to hold staff. 
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Summers (1988)), one can predict that, other things being equal, a firm’s takeover 
likelihood is likely to increase with its payroll costs. 
 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that this relationship will persist in a linear fashion. While the 
redeployment and divestment (layoffs) of human resources can be a way to create 
synergies, the associated costs (e.g., compensation and reputational effects) might result in 
the creation of negative synergies at very high levels (Krishnan et al. 2007). Besides 
increasing the complexity of the restructuring process, very large layoffs are likely to lead 
to significant or costly compensation schemes. Such layoffs are also likely to be met with 
stiff resistance from managers and employees with further effects on retained employee 
motivation and performance. Further, protracted litigations and court battles with 
damaging effects on corporate reputation cannot be ruled out. These arguments suggest 
that despite the potential for synergies, takeover likelihood will, perhaps, decline with 
payroll costs when the target has very high levels of payroll costs. This suggestion is 
consistent with Pagano and Volpin (2005) who argue that managers can use high employee 
wages and long-term contracts as a strategy to defend against unwanted takeovers. The 
implication is an expectation of an inverse U-shaped relationship between corporate 
payroll and takeover probability. The hypothesis can be stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 14: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability is an inverse U-shaped 
function of a firm’s payroll burden.  
 
To my knowledge, neither this hypothesis nor any hypothesis relating a company’s payroll 
burden to its takeover probability has been tested in prior research. Payroll burden is 
proxied by the ratio of payroll expenses (i.e., salaries and benefits expenses – wc01084) to 
total sales (wc01001). This ratio indicates the percentage of revenue that is allocated to 
employees in wages. A high percentage indicates a greater or more significant payroll 
burden to the company. If this hypothesis holds, takeover probability should have a 
negative relationship with payroll cost and a positive relationship with the square of 
payroll cost. 
3.3.8 Share repurchases hypothesis 
Firms sometimes engage in share repurchase programmes during which they buy back 
their shares from current shareholders. As the literature asserts, the use of share 
repurchases has increased significantly over the past two decades (Billett and Xue (2007) 
and Grullon and Michaely (2002)) and fewer firms are paying dividends over time (Fama 
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and French (2001)). The contention therefore is that share repurchase programmes are 
being used as a preferred means of distribution of excess cash to shareholders over 
dividends (Grullon and Michaely (2002)). A large body of literature asserts that share 
repurchases play several roles including the distribution of free cash flows, signalling of 
firm undervaluation, firm capital structure readjustment and takeover defence strategy (see, 
for example, Harris and Raviv (1988), Persons (1994), Jagannathan et al. (2000), Dittmar 
(2000), Grullon and Michaely (2002, 2004), Brav et al. (2005) and Billett and Xue (2007)). 
 
In Harris and Raviv’s (1998) model, firms defend against takeovers by issuing debt and 
using its proceeds to engage in share repurchases activity. Bagwell (1991) shows that share 
repurchases deters takeovers by reducing heterogeneous valuations amongst shareholders. 
Once a repurchase offer is made, those shareholders who perceive the value of their shares 
to be low will tender their shares for repurchase while those shareholders who perceive 
their shares to be of higher value will hold on to their shares (Bagwell (1991)). This deters 
takeovers by eliminating shareholders with a low perceived value, thus increasing the cost 
to be incurred by any potential bidder. Further, share repurchases effectively reduces the 
number of shares in free float. Harris and Raviv (1988) and Persons (1994) add that shares 
become concentrated amongst institutional shareholders and other major shareholders 
(friendly shareholders) who are less likely to succumb to a takeover by tendering their 
shares. 
 
The finding that firms are substituting dividends for share repurchases (Fama and French 
(2001)) indicates that share repurchases are also used to distribute excess free cash flows. 
This should reduce the agency problem (Jensen (1986)) and hence the firm’s takeover 
likelihood. Grullon and Michealy (2004), for example, find that the market reacts 
positively to share repurchase announcements due to its role in reducing free cash flow. 
Given the finding that share repurchases serves as a deterrent to takeovers and reduces 
agency problems, it is hypothesised that takeover probability should decline with the 
presence of share repurchase activity. The hypothesis is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 15a: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability will decline when a firm 
engages in share repurchase activity.  
 
Another perspective on share repurchases – the information-revealing hypothesis – is that, 
share repurchases signal a manager’s private information about the favourable future 
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prospects of the firm, and hence, firm undervaluation
117
. A survey conducted by Brav et al. 
(2005) reveals that firm undervaluation is the key factor driving the decision to repurchase 
shares. While some studies (Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry et 
al. (1995), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005)) have shown 
that the market reacts positively to share repurchase announcements thus leading to an 
instantaneous increase in firm value, there is overwhelming evidence that the market, on 
average, underreacts to share repurchase announcements (see, for example, Ikenberry et al. 
(1995, 2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Chan et al. (2004), McNally and Smith (2007), 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) and Yook (2010))
118
.  
 
Given the magnitude of the gains generated in the years following the repurchase 
announcement, it is probable that some of these gains can be explained by takeover activity 
involving repurchasing firms. In line with the undervaluation hypothesis (section 3.4.3), a 
firm which is potentially undervalued by the market constitutes an attractive target to a 
prospective bidder. A share repurchase highlights the likelihood that a firm is undervalued, 
thus, potentially, increasing its likelihood of receiving a bid. The evidence shows that the 
market systematically under-reacts to share repurchase announcements, implying that the 
bidder is would still be able to benefit from firm undervaluation post share repurchase 
announcements. It is therefore hypothesised that repurchases announcement reveal 
information on firm undervaluation and thus increases the firm’s takeover likelihood. The 
hypothesis can be stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 15b: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability will increase when a firm 
engages in share repurchase activity. 
 
Hypothesis 15a and 15b are competing hypothesis with contradictory predictions on the 
relationship between takeover probability and the share repurchases. The two hypotheses 
are, nonetheless, justified on different theoretical bases. The results obtained will therefore 
shed some light on the effect of share repurchases on takeovers. A dummy variable is used 
as a proxy to capture the presence or absence of share repurchases announcements in the 
                                                 
117 See, for example, Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981, 
1984), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), Hertzel and Jain (1991), Comment and Jarrell (1991) and 
Dann et al. (1991). 
118 Ikenberry et al. (1995), for example, find that undervalued firms repurchasing shares generate 
average abnormal returns of 45.3% in the four years following the repurchase announcement. This 
long run return far exceeds the reported average share repurchase announcement return of about 
3.0% (see, for example, Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Ikenberry et al. (1995)). 
These systematic substantial long run gains (beyond initial market reaction) have been described as 
an anomaly (see Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)) as its source is still unclear. 
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past year. The share repurchase dummy variable (SRDummy) takes a value of 1 in this 
period (year t) when there has been a share repurchase activity in the prior year (1
st
 July 
year t-1 to 30
th
 June year t) and a value of 0, otherwise. The chosen period (1
st
 July to 30
th
 
June) is explained by the fact that the June approach is used in the formation of portfolios 
in this study (further discussed in chapter 4). Data on Share repurchase announcements, 
including the announcement date and the magnitude of the repurchase activity is available 
from Thomson OneBanker. A significant negative coefficient of the SRDummy will 
indicate empirical support for hypothesis 15a while a significant positive coefficient will 
provide some empirical support for hypothesis 15b. 
3.3.9 Asymmetric valuation hypothesis 
The asymmetric valuation hypothesis (in this study) builds on the popular information 
asymmetry hypothesis. Information asymmetry arises when agents have unequal access to 
information required to make an informed decision such that one party relies on 
probabilities of the true state. The role played by information asymmetry – the information 
asymmetry hypothesis – has been studied in several contexts. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), for example, use the information asymmetry hypothesis to explain 
why corporate spin-offs (and not many other restructuring activities) create value for 
shareholders. They argue that spin-offs create value as the restructuring of a firm into 
smaller more focused units allows investors to understand the position of the firm – by 
reducing the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. Their results show 
that the gains from spin-offs are positively related to the level of information asymmetry 
before the spin-off.  
 
The role of information asymmetry in M&A decision making has been explored by prior 
researchers. Draper and Paudyal (2008), for example, show that bidders engage in 
acquisitions to reduce information asymmetry between themselves and the market. They 
argue that besides the investment implications (e.g., synergies created) of the bid, M&A 
bids spurs investors to reassess or revalue the bidder. Their results show that the returns to 
bidders gradually decrease with successive bids. They associate this decrease with a 
decline of the level of information asymmetry between bidders and investors with 
successive bids. In summary, this study shows that information asymmetry negatively 
impacts on firm value. 
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Hansen (1987) argues that it is optimal for bidders to use stock as acquisition currency 
when the level of information asymmetry between target and bidder is high. This is 
because the use of stock allows the bidder to share the risk of acquiring the target with 
target shareholders (Hansen (1987) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009)). This 
contention is supported by the finding that bidders earn more from acquisitions of opaque 
targets when stock (rather than cash) is used to finance the deal. Consistent with this 
argument, Officer et al. (2009) also contend that bidders gain more from acquisitions when 
they use stock as transaction currency when acquiring difficult-to-value takeover targets. 
Here, the use of stock as a method of payment appears to mitigate some of the problems 
caused by information asymmetry (Officer et al. (2009)). This evidence suggests a link 
between information asymmetry and the value creation from M&A activities.  
 
Despite the substantial research on the causes and consequences of information 
asymmetry, there is little established theory on how information asymmetry moderates a 
firm’s (or prospective target’s) takeover likelihood. To my knowledge, no prior study has 
directly considered how information asymmetry moderates a firm’s acquisition likelihood. 
I anticipate that, on average, bidders will prefer to acquire targets which they understand – 
low information asymmetry between target and bidder. This is, perhaps, the case as 
information asymmetry will lead to difficulties in the valuation of targets by the bidder. 
Here, I present a framework to illustrate that information asymmetry between the target 
and bidder (pre-merger), potentially, leads to a reduction in the post-merger value of the 
combined firm. My argument is consistent with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
who suggest that information asymmetry between a firm’s insiders and its investors leads 
to a depletion in firm value. If this is the case, then from a neoclassical stance, information 
asymmetry should reduce a firm’s likelihood of receiving a bid (from a value maximising 
bidder), all things being equal. I also anticipate that the size of the reduction of post-merger 
value is, perhaps, directly related to the level of information asymmetry. That is, the size of 
the post-merger value of the combined firm is inversely related to the information 
asymmetry between the target and the bidder. This therefore yields an inverse relationship 
between takeover likelihood and target information asymmetry. This is illustrated below. 
 
By definition, synergies (  ) are created when the value of the combined firm or the value 
of the bidder post-merger (  ) exceeds the sum of the value of the target (  ) and bidder 
(  ) pre-merger. This sum is given by (     ).     and    are the intrinsic values of the 
bidder and the target (respectively) known to their managers. The bidder evaluates the 
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target as part of the merger process and assigns the target a value, (  )  It can be assumed 
that       when there is no information asymmetry between the bidder and target 
management. That is, the bidder’s valuation of the target is equal to the target’s intrinsic 
value (i.e., its true value excluding any potential synergies created through a merger). 
However, when there is information asymmetry between bidder and target management, 
         . That is, bidder’s valuation of the target will be higher than the target’s 
intrinsic value. With information asymmetry, the bidder systematically over-values (but 
never undervalues) the target.            is not observed (on average) as the target’s 
management is unlikely to accept any bids below the intrinsic value of the target.  
 
A proportion of the value created through the merger is shared with the target shareholders 
through the payment of a merger premium (  )   The value of the combined firm, 
irrespective of the method of payment (cash, equity or mixed), is (  ), where 
                              ( ) 
 
That is, the post-merger value of the combined firm is equal to the sum of the value of the 
bidder (  ), the value of synergies created (  ) and the value of the target (  ) less the 
bidder’s valuation of the target (  ) and the acquisition premium paid by the bidder 
(  )
119
. Eqn 3.3.9 (1) could be rearranged as follows. 
         (     )                 ( ) 
 
 (     ), which is the difference between the target management’s valuation and the 
bidder’s valuation, is an overpayment due to information asymmetry. This difference, 
perhaps, increases with the level of information asymmetry. That is, the bidder is likely to 
highly overvalue a more opaque target than a less opaque target
120
. When there is no 
information asymmetry, i.e., where(     )   , the value of the combined firm ( 
 
 
) is 
simply the sum of the value of the bidder (  ) and the value of synergies created (  ) 
minus the merger premium(  ). 
                         ( ) 
When information asymmetry causes asymmetric valuation, i.e.,(     )   , the value of 
the combined firm (  
 
) is given by its value when there is no information asymmetry 
                                                 
119 The sum of the bidder’s valuation of the target and the acquisition premium paid by the bidder 
is the offer price.  
120 This assumption is consistent with Officer et al. (2009) who find evidence that more opaque 
firms are more difficult to value. 
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(  
 
   as shown in equation 3.3.9(3)) less the overpayment due to information asymmetry 
(     )   
     
 
  (     )             ( ) 
 
The illustration shows that information asymmetry between the bidder and target 
potentially leads to a reduction in the bidder’s post takeover value (or value of combined 
firm), with the value-reduction increasing with target opaqueness or the level of 
information asymmetry. Based on this illustration, it is hypothesised that bidders are likely 
to be attracted to targets where the level of information asymmetry between bidder and 
target management is likely to be low as this results in a higher post-merger value. The 
hypothesis is stated below. 
Hypothesis 16: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability will decrease as the level of 
target information asymmetry increases. 
 
Measuring opacity is a major challenge as information asymmetry can be considered as a 
multidimensional construct. For example, information asymmetry can arise from the 
target’s accounting quality, asset structure and operational strategy and might also depend 
on the bidder’s knowledge of the target’s industry. Arguably, there is currently no 
comprehensive proxy for information asymmetry. Some prior studies (such as Aboodi and 
Lev (2000), Officer et al. (2009) and Ciftci et al. (2011)) proxy the degree of a firm’s 
opacity – the level of information asymmetry between the firm and a prospective bidder – 
 using its research and development (R&D) intensity. Firms with high levels of R&D are, 
perhaps, difficult to value as their future cash flows are a function of the success of their 
R&D programmes – which is uncertain at best. I explore the use of this measure but find 
that several firms in the UK sample do not report R&D values in the early periods of the 
study. Many firms do not also generally engage in R&D activities. Consistent with Shah et 
al. (2013) the data for R&D is also likely to be inconsistent over time due to changes in 
accounting regulation particularly the adoption of IFRS by UK listed firms after 2005. 
 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) suggests five different measures of information 
asymmetry including forecast error in earnings, the standard deviation in analysts’ 
forecasts, a normalised forecast error, volatility in abnormal returns around earnings 
forecast and residual volatility. The data on analysts’ earnings forecasts over my sample 
period is patchy and a large proportion of some firms in the sample have no analyst 
coverage during the period. Consistent with other studies such as Bhagat et al. (1985), 
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Blackwell et al. (1990), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Krishnaswami et al. 
(1999), I adopt residual volatility as the preferred measure of information asymmetry – the 
level of asymmetry in target valuation – in this study. As suggested by Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), residual volatility is measured as ‘the dispersion in the market-
adjusted daily stock returns’ in the year to June 30th (prior to the takeover). 
 
The level of asymmetry in the valuation of targets is high when target managers hold 
significant value-relevant firm-specific private information. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) suggests that if all stakeholders are equally well-informed about all 
factors that moderate firm value then residual standard deviation or volatility in excess 
returns should capture the level of information asymmetry between stakeholders. This 
variable captures any firm-specific uncertainty that persists after excluding the total 
uncertainty shared by all stakeholders. Firms with higher information asymmetry about 
their value are likely to have a higher residual volatility in stock returns (Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999). 
 
The procedure for computing residual volatility is similar to that used to compute ADAR 
in section 3.2.1. First, daily abnormal returns (DAR) are computed from daily price index 
data [RI] using the OLS market model (discussed in Brown and Warner (1980, 1985)). The 
model for the computation of the DAR is given as follows; 
          ( ̂   ̂    )………Eqn 3.3.9 (1) 
 
Here, DAR for a firm i at time t is given by the difference between the firm’s actual stock 
return at time t and its expected stock returns at time t (given by ( ̂   ̂    )). The 
returns for each firm i on day t (denoted    ) and the market m on day t (denoted    ) are 
first computed from adjusted price [RI] as follows.  
     (           ) (      ⁄ )             ( ) 
    (           ) (      ⁄ )             ( ) 
 
The daily return of the FTSE All-Share (   ) is used as a proxy for the daily market 
returns. Next,  ̂  and  ̂  are estimated by using data in the previous period (260 trading 
days). Each firm’s daily stock returns in period T-1 (previous period)121 is regressed on its 
daily market returns in period T-1 and the coefficients of the regression model are used as 
                                                 
121 As will be fully discussed in chapter 5, each period is considered to run from 1st July year 1 to 
30th June year 2. 
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estimates of  ̂  and  ̂   The regression coefficients ( ̂  and  ̂  estimates) from period T-1 
are used to compute DAR in the next period (period T). The residual volatility of firm i in 
period T is given by the standard deviation of      . 
 
3.3.10 Industry concentration hypothesis 
A concentrated industry is one which consists of a few dominant firms or an oligopolistic 
industry structure. These few firms generally control a large proportion of the market share 
and hence enjoy a high market power. High concentration industries generally have high 
barriers to entry for newcomers. Barriers to entry can come as a result of high advertising 
from incumbents, the need for high start-up capital, cost advantages to incumbents (in the 
form of proprietary technology, experience, distribution networks), high degree of 
customer loyalty (or high switching barriers for customers in the form of contracts), 
government policy (protected industries), intellectual property rights (patents and 
trademarks) and inelastic demand, amongst others. Further, mergers in high concentration 
industries are generally contentious and the subject of antitrust regulations in Europe, the 
US, Canada and Australia, amongst others. These antitrust regulations reduce the 
likelihood that incumbent firms within such high concentration industries will be subject to 
takeover activity.  
 
Given the limited number of market players, the level of competition between firms in high 
concentration industries is comparatively lower than that in low concentration industries. 
The effect of industry concentration on the market for corporate control, the incidence of 
takeovers and the agency problem has been discussed by several researchers
122
. Prior 
research argues that strong competition in the product markets (i.e., low industry 
concentration) is especially costly for inefficiently managed firms (see, for example, Fama 
and Jensen (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). This is mainly because competition 
between firms in a low concentration industry leads to the elimination of inefficiently 
managed and under-performing firms.  
 
As opposed to firms in high concentration industries, firms in low concentration industries 
have limited control of the market, restricted market share, and a low market power. 
Powell and Yawson (2005) suggest that low concentration industries are more likely to see 
                                                 
122 See, for example, Alchian (1950), Stigler (1958), Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Holmstrom (1999), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Hart (1983) and Cremers et al. (2008), amongst 
others. 
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higher takeover activity as incumbents (prospective bidders) compete to gain a greater 
share of the market. Again, struggling firms can solicit takeovers either as an alternative to 
impending bankruptcy (financial distress) or as a way of improving their market power and 
ability to compete more efficiently. Further, antitrust regulators are less likely to oppose 
mergers within low concentration industries. It can therefore be hypothesised that, all 
things being equal, a firm’s takeover likelihood will increase as the concentration of its 
industry decreases (or the competitiveness of its industry increases). The hypothesis is 
stated below. 
Hypothesis 17: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability will decrease as the 
concentration of a firm’s industry increases. 
 
In the current study, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is used as a proxy for industry 
concentration. This measure of industry concentration is popular and has been used in 
studies such as Hou and Robinson (2006), Giroud and Mueller (2010) and Loderer et al. 
(2011). The identification of industries in this study is discussed in section 4.2.2. Unlike 
other measures of concentration (e.g., the four firm concentration ratio), the HHI considers 
the entire distribution of industry market share information thus leading to a more 
comprehensive measure of industry concentration (Hou and Robinson (2006)). Consistent 
with these prior studies (Hou and Robinson (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2010)), the 
index is computed as the sum of the squared market shares of all publicly listed firms in 
the industry. Market share is computed as the proportion of a firm’s revenue [wc01001] to 
the industry’s revenue (sum of [wc01001] for all publicly listed firms (n) in the industry (j) 
during a specific period, t). The index is computed using the formula below. 
      ∑(
     
∑      
 
   
)
  
   
              ( ) 
Low values of HHI indicate a low industry concentration, i.e., an industry in which the 
market is shared by several competing firms, and vice versa (Hou and Robinson (2006)). 
Hou and Robinson (2006) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) have shown that measures of 
market shares which employ total assets or total equity are highly correlated to measures 
which employ firm revenue.   
 
Arguably the measurement of HHI in this study is biased as it ignores the contributions of 
privately listed firms which are likely to play a significant role or control a substantial 
market share in certain industries. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the study relies on 
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data obtained from DataStream which only holds data for publicly listed companies. Some 
data for private companies is available on FAME but the period of coverage is limited (10 
years) and does not cover the full period of this study. While the reliance on data for public 
listed companies only, is in line with prior studies (including Hou and Robinson (2006) 
and Giroud and Mueller (2010)), it is worth acknowledging that this constitutes a limitation 
of the current study and an opportunity for further research. 
 
3.3.11 Market liquidity hypothesis 
When the number of deals and the total value of deals are considered, it is generally 
accepted that mergers occur in wavelike patterns (see, for example, Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) document five historical merger waves (including, mergers waves of 
the 1900’s, 1920’s, 1960’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s) and anticipate the beginning of a new 
wave after 2003. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) note that the fifth wave (which was the 
most recent, completed and documented merger wave) covered four main regions 
(including the US, UK, Asia and Europe). Martynova and Renneboog (2008) argue that the 
wave was primarily driven by the communication and information technology industry and 
was precipitated by economic/financial markets boom and globalisation processes (such as 
technological innovation, deregulation and privatisation).  
 
The end of the fifth wave coincides with the stock market crash (Dotcom crises) and the 
‘September 11’ terrorist attack in the US. Compelling empirical evidence (see, for 
example, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade et al. (2001), Andrade and Stafford 
(2004), Martynova and Renneboog (2008), and Gorton et al. (2009)), suggest that 
takeovers are most likely to occur in periods of economic recovery, coinciding with rapid 
credit expansion, burgeoning external capital markets and stock market booms. The 
evidence also suggests that waves are frequently driven by industrial and technological 
shocks with regulatory changes (such as antitrust legislation and deregulation) acting as a 
catalyst and stock market declines acting as inhibitors to takeover activity (see, for 
example, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). 
M&A transactions are generally high capital investments and hence rapid credit 
expansions are likely to stimulate M&A activity (see, for example, Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)). The methods of payment 
employed in mergers include: cash, equity and a mixture of both. Prior empirical evidence 
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suggests that a high proportion of M&A transactions involve the use of cash (see, for 
example, Danbolt (2004) and Danbolt and Maciver (2012)
123
. Even in circumstances where 
equity is used as the preferred method of payment, bidders will, perhaps, still require 
substantial cash resources to successfully absorb the target and complete post-merger 
reorganisation activities. Perhaps, the majority of firms are unlikely to have sufficient 
internally generated cash resources to complete takeovers without relying on external 
funding either from equity markets or from debt markets.  
 
The success of M&A activities is therefore likely to be contingent on the availability of 
capital and the ease at which capital can be obtained. This suggests that takeovers are more 
likely to occur in periods of high capital availability and market liquidity. Historical 
evidence affirms that more mergers are completed in periods of economic expansion than 
in periods of economic gloom (Harford (2005) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)). Prior 
research suggests that merger waves result from economic, technological and regulatory 
shocks (Gort (1969) and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)) with high capital availability and 
high macro level liquidity acting as important catalysts (Harford (2005)). Macro level 
liquidity – the availability or ease of obtaining investment capital – appears to play a major 
role in moderating takeover activity. It is hypothesised that, all things being equal, more 
mergers will be observed in periods of high macro level liquidity or high investment 
capital availability. The hypothesis is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 18: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability will increase with market 
liquidity. 
 
Market liquidity attempts to measure the flow of funds, the ease of raising capital and the 
cost of capital within the UK market – availability of M&A investment capital. Market 
liquidity is computed as the difference between the 12-month London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR) and the Bank of England Base Rate (BOEBR). 
                                       ( ) 
 
                                                 
123 In a UK study, Danbolt (2004), for example, finds that over 95% (of 116) foreign bidders and 30% 
(of 510) domestic bidders use cash as the preferred method of payment. For the domestic bidders 
not using solely cash as a method of payment, over 9% use cash alongside other forms (equity and 
alternatives) as the method of payment. Danbolt and Maciver (2012) also show that UK bidders 
have a high preference for cash over other methods of payment, with 44.6% of bidders paying in 
cash and 45.4% using a mixed method. Danbolt and Maciver (2012) find that only 10% of UK 
bidders use equity exchange as the method of payment.  
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Rate changes from one month to the other are fairly slight. I therefore consider the average 
of the reported monthly rates over each year-ending June 30
th
 (i.e., 1 July year t to 30 June 
year t+1) as the annual LIBOR and BOEBR. The choice of period 1 July year t to 30 June 
year t+1 is explained by the portfolio formation strategy – the June approach – further 
discussed in chapter 4. A smaller spread indicates high capital availability over the period 
and thus a, potentially, higher acquisition propensity in the subsequent period. A similar 
measure of market liquidity has been used by Harford (2005). Harford’s measure of market 
liquidity is the spread between the commercial and industrial loan rate and the US Federal 
Reserve Funds rate.  
3.3.12 Market economics hypothesis 
Investment decisions are sometimes driven by factors beyond firm and economic 
fundamentals. Helwege and Liang (1996), for example, argue that investor reaction to 
corporate announcements are driven by investor sentiments, with  more positive reactions 
observed in periods of high investor sentiments and vice versa. Also, more merger deals 
are completed during periods of high stock market valuation (Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
and Dong et al. (2006)). Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Harford (2005) show that 
merger activity generally increases in periods of economic growth (booms) and declines in 
periods of recession (downturns). This trend could be interpreted as an attempt by bidders 
to take advantage of their overvalued stocks, in the case of stock deals (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) and Dong et al. (2006)) or the observation that economic growth 
increases the likelihood of mergers being successful (Harford (2005)). This trend is also 
consistent with merger wave theories (see, for example, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) 
and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)) discussed in section 3.3.11 above. 
 
There is, therefore, likely to be a positive correlation between economic performance and 
stock market activity, which I attribute to market sentiment about success of investment 
projects. Again, economic growth opens up new market opportunities. Such market 
opportunities are likely to be short-lived due to the cyclical nature of economic 
performance – with periods of growth interspersed by periods of decline. The evidence, 
however, suggests that managers are not deterred by the knowledge of impeding market 
declines, as M&A activities systematically increase in periods of market growth 
(Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Harford (2005)). Managers can, perhaps, benefit 
from transitory growth periods in economic cycles by acquiring (or investing in) already 
established firms. The alternative is to start-up new ventures through extensive (and time-
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consuming) R&D activities. It is hypothesised here that economic growth generates 
positive market sentiment about future economic states and the success of investment 
programmes, thus increasing the likelihood of observing M&A activity. The hypothesis is 
stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 19: Ceteris paribus, takeover probability will increase with the overall 
market performance. 
 
The hypothesis argues that the propensity for takeovers to occur is likely to increase with 
general stock market performance due to the positive effect market performance has on 
market sentiment. The performance of the FTSE All Share index in the preceding year is 
used to proxy for market-economics. Consistent with Bi and Gregory (2011) market 
performance in each year is computed as the 12-month (ending June 30
th
) return on the 
FTSE all share index. A year is defined as the period between 1 July year t and 30 June 
year t+1. This definition is informed by the portfolio formation strategy – the June 
approach – further discussed in chapter 4. A positive change in the performance of the 
FTSE All share from one year to another is expected to drive positive market sentiment 
and hence increase the propensity for takeovers to occur, and vice versa. 
3.3.13 Summary 
This study attempts to contribute to the takeover likelihood modelling literature by 
proposing, developing and incorporating several new hypotheses into the modelling 
framework. Eleven new takeover prediction hypotheses (including firm size, firm capital 
structure, financial distress, firm age, M&A rumours, payroll synergies, share repurchases, 
asymmetric valuation, industry concentration, market liquidity and market sentiment), have 
been proposed and discussed in this section (3.3). The hypotheses have been developed 
based on three different literatures: the neoclassical theory of mergers, the managerial 
(utility) theory of mergers and theories on merger waves. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first time these hypotheses will be used in the development of target prediction 
models.  
 
3.4 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
Takeovers are complex investment decisions, arguably making them difficult to model. 
Some researchers have suggested that it is possible takeovers occur for a multitude of 
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motives and therefore no single theory might fully explain the motives for takeovers. Roll 
(1986), for example, argues that his evidence on why takeovers are perpetrated ‘supports 
the hubris hypothesis as much as it supports other explanations such as taxes, synergy and 
inefficient target management’ (p. 197). This highlights the necessity to investigate a wide 
range of takeover motives in every prediction model.  
 
This study builds on the contentions of Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Powell 
(1997), who argue that the prediction hypotheses put forward by Palepu (1986) and 
recurrently used in the literature are, perhaps, insufficient to model takeovers. It 
contributes to the literature by proposing (and employing) eleven new prediction 
hypotheses in an attempt to improve takeover likelihood modelling. This new hypotheses 
also provokes new thinking on why firms engage in merger activity. The eleven new and 
six old hypotheses discussed in this chapter, as well as their predictions, are summarised in 
table 3.4.1 below. The evidence suggests that the motivations of mergers are dynamic in 
nature and are, perhaps, shaped by a multitude of factors (including firm specific and 
environmental), which may change over time and across different transactions. The set of 
19 hypotheses is expected to more fully capture the dynamics on how firm characteristics 
moderates takeover likelihood.  
 
Notwithstanding, this expansion of the set of predictive hypotheses presents new 
challenges in modelling. For example, an increase in the set of predictive variables reduces 
the degrees of freedom and increases the likelihood of encountering the problem of 
multicollinearity in regression analysis. These issues are discussed in the next chapter (4). 
Further, some of the hypotheses are likely to overlap – at least empirically. For example, 
other things remaining equal, higher leverage (capital structure hypothesis) generates lower 
free cash flow (free cash flow hypothesis) and a higher payroll cost (payroll synergies 
hypothesis) implies lower profitability (management inefficiency hypothesis). I review 
collinearity diagnostics (bivariate correlations and variance inflation factors) to ensure that 
these problems are not so severe so as to invalidate the findings. In chapter 5, I develop 
alternative models with different input variables in an attempt to assess the impact of the 
problem. In chapter 6, I also evaluate models without these variables and show that their 
inclusion in the model improves its predictive power. Chapter 4 focuses on the empirical 
methods used in testing the hypotheses and developing the takeover target prediction 
model. It also discusses the sample used in the study, the sources employed for data 
collection, the data collection process and the methodology used in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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Table 3.4.1 Summary of new and old hypotheses for takeover prediction 
Hypothesis Hypothesis statement (Ceteris paribus) Expected sign 
Panel A: Old hypotheses 
 
 
1 
Inefficient 
management  
The probability that a firm will become the subject of a 
takeover bid decreases as its performance increases Performance: – 
2 Undervaluation 
Takeover probability increases with the level of firm 
undervaluation Undervaluation: + 
3 
Industry 
disturbance  
The likelihood of takeovers within an industry will 
increase with the announcement of a merger bid in that 
industry Disturbance: + 
4 Free cash flow  
Takeover likelihood increases with a firm’s level of free 
cash flow Free cash flow: + 
5 
Growth-resource 
mismatch  
Low-growth-resource-rich firms as well as high-growth-
resource-poor firms have a high takeover likelihood Mismatch: + 
6 Tangible assets  
Takeover probability increases with the proportion of 
tangible assets in a firm’s total asset portfolio Tangible assets: + 
7 Firm size  Takeover probability decreases with firm size Firm size: – 
8 Firm age  Takeover probability decreases with firm age Firm age: – 
Panel B: New hypotheses 
 
 
9 Firm size  
Takeover probability is an inverse U-shaped function of 
firm size i.e., takeover likelihood initially increases with 
size then declines as firm size exceeds a threshold 
Firm Size: + 
Firm Size Squared: 
– 
10 
Firm capital 
structure  
There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between a 
firm’s leverage and the probability that it will receive a 
takeover bid. 
Leverage: + 
Leverage squared: 
– 
11a 
Financial distress  
Takeover likelihood increases with the level of financial 
distress. That is, takeover likelihood decreases with a 
firm’s Z score Zscore: + 
11b 
Firms with a high probability of going bankrupt (i.e., 
firms with Z scores below 0) will have a low takeover 
probability Bankrupt: – 
12 Firm age  
Takeover probability is a U-shaped function of firm age 
i.e., takeover likelihood initially decreases with age then 
increases as firm age exceeds a threshold 
Firm age: – 
Firm age squared: 
+ 
13 M&A rumours 
A firm’s takeover probability increases with the 
presence rumours about the firm becoming a 
prospective takeover target Rumours: + 
14 Payroll synergies  
Takeover probability is an inverse U-shape function of 
payroll burden.  
Payroll: + 
Payroll Squared: – 
15a 
Share repurchases  
Takeover probability will decline when a firm engages in 
share repurchase activity.  Repurchase: – 
15b 
Takeover probability will increase when a firm engages 
in share repurchase activity Repurchase:+ 
16 
Asymmetric 
valuation  
Takeover probability will decrease as the level of target 
information asymmetry increases 
Residual Volatility: 
– 
17 
Industry 
concentration  
Takeover probability will decrease as the concentration 
of a firm’s industry increases. Industry conc: – 
18 Market liquidity  Takeover probability will increase with market liquidity Mkt liquidity: + 
19 Market sentiment  
Takeover probability will increase with market 
performance 
Market 
performance: + 
Notes: All hypotheses are stated on a ‘ceteris paribus’ basis i.e., all other things being equal. The 
expected sign is the hypothesised relationship between takeover probability and the stated 
variable. Hypotheses 1to 8 are the old hypotheses and hypotheses 9-19 are the old hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 4  SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Overview 
The chapter discusses the sample used as well as the methodology employed in the 
empirical analysis. With respect to the sample, it discusses the sample characteristics, the 
data collection process and the development of a database
124
 which is appropriate for the 
modelling methodology. In terms of methodology, it discusses the applicability of the logit 
model (as base model for takeover prediction), methods for validating the old and new 
prediction hypotheses (discussed in chapter 3) and methods for testing the new model’s 
performance (explanatory power and investment potential). This chapter is the basis of 
results presented in the next three chapters (i.e., chapters 5, 6 and 7)
125
. The construction of 
the sample, the collection of data and the development of the database is discussed in 
section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology for hypotheses validation, section 4.4 
discusses the methodology for testing the models’ predictive ability and section 4.5 
discusses the methodology for evaluating the models’ ability to generate abnormal returns 
for investors. 
 
4.2  Sample and data 
4.2.1 Overview 
Takeover target prediction modelling (as per this study) involves the development of 
models to predict firms that are likely to receive takeover bids in the next year based on 
their current characteristics as well as the environmental conditions. This section discusses 
the sample construction, data collection for the dependent and independent variables, data 
collation and database matching (to develop the prediction model database), as well as the 
procedure for identifying and eliminating outliers in the data. 
                                                 
124 The task here is to manage the differences between different firm year ends, as well as, the 
differences between the time at which financial data is observed (annually) and market data is 
observed (continuously) when computing financial ratios. 
125 Chapter 5 focuses on testing the hypotheses developed in chapter 4. Chapter 6 focuses on 
evaluating the performance of this model in terms of distinguishing between targets and non-
targets. Chapter 7 focuses on evaluating the model’s ability to generate abnormal returns for 
investors. 
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4.2.2 Sample construction 
The modelling methodology introduced by Palepu (1986) and widely used across the 
literature
126
 has been criticised outside the takeover target prediction literature (e.g., in 
bankruptcy prediction modelling) for generating bias in regression coefficients (see, for 
example, Platt and Platt (2002) and Shumway (2001)). This is further discussed in section 
2.6.3. Consistent with Cornett et al. (2011), Bhanot et al. (2010) and Cremers et al. (2009), 
a panel data sampling approach is used in this study. I start by identifying the sample of all 
firms (dead and live) that have been (or are) listed on the London Stock Exchange (main 
market) up until January 2011
127
. DataStream codes: FBRIT and DEADUK1–7, are used 
to generate a list of all UK live and dead firms respectively (together with their DataStream 
codes). The initial list of all live and dead UK firms is made up of 8,970 firms of which 
1,929 firms are active, 7,001 firms are dead and 40 firms are suspended.  
 
The ‘inactive dates’ for dead firms are also extracted from DataStream using the TIME 
data type. The dates (death month) provided by DataStream’s TIME data type broadly 
correspond with the Death Month (M3) data type from the London Share Price Data 
(LSPD) database master index file. Observations with death dates prior to 1988 are 
excluded from the sample. This procedure eliminates 1,692 dead firms, reducing the 
number of dead firms to 5,309 and the total number of firms to 7,278. The sample of 7,278 
firms is described as the initial sample on which preliminary financial data is gathered. 
Upon data collection, I find that a further 351 active firms, 2,953 dead firms and 3 
suspended firms do not meet minimum data requirements of financial data on total assets 
and total revenues in at least one year and do not have DataStream industry classification 
or SIC codes
128
. Most of the 351 active firms are not listed as equities. A majority of the 
2,953 dead firms, perhaps, were inactive before 1988
129
.  
 
Next, the sample of 3,971 firms is classified into 12 industry groupings. There is no 
standard method for industry classification in prior research. I employ a simple 
classification system based on the 2007 UK Standard Industry Classification (SIC 2007) 
                                                 
126 See, for example, Barnes (1990, 1999), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Walter (1994), Powell 
(1997), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Brar et al. (2009), amongst others. 
127 The coverage of financial data for this study is from 1988 to 2009 while the coverage of M&A 
data is June 1990 to June 2011. This is further discussed in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.4. 
128 A majority of proxies used in the study employ a denominator of total assets or total revenues in 
the computation of financial ratios. 
129 I attempt to gather data for these firms and find that they have no financial data for the 1988–
2009 period. 
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scheme. This scheme is similar to (but broader than) that employed in Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2007) and consistent with that employed by DataStream. The industry 
groups are summarised in table 4.2.2. 
 
Table 4.2.2: Sample characteristics and industry distribution 
SIC code R Industry groupings Abbrev. Active Dead Susp. Total 
0100 – 0999 
Agriculture, Hunting & 
Forestry 
AHFF 13 9 
0 
22 
1000 –1499 Mining & Quarrying MQ 222 16 3 241 
1500 –3999 Manufacturing MAN 420 799 9 1,228 
4000 – 4499 Electricity, Gas & Water EGW 25 33 0 58 
4500 – 4999 Construction CON 85 159 1 245 
5000 – 5499 Wholesale & Retail WRT 47 179 5 231 
5500 – 5999 Hotels & Restaurants HR 67 156 4 227 
6000 – 6999 Financial Intermediation FI 406 583 12 1,001 
7000 – 7499 
Real Estate & Business 
Services 
RERB 240 378 5 623 
7500 – 7999 Public admin. & Defence PAD 52 112 1 165 
8000 – 8499 Education & Training EDU 15 39 0 54 
8500 – 9999 
Social work, Health & 
Other Services 
SWH 78 127 0 205 
 
Total 
 
1,578 2,356 37 3,971 
Less Financial intermediation FI 406 583 12 1,001 
Final Sample (Master List)   1,172 1,773 25 2,970 
Insufficient data NA 351 2,953 3 3,307 
Initial Sample         7,278 
Notes: This table presents the industry distribution of the sample. The SIC code R. is the range 
adopted to define industries using SIC codes. This classification (Industry groupings) builds on the 
recent UK SIC 2007 classification scheme, the classification scheme employed by Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2007) as well as the industry definitions reported by DataStream. Active firms are 
firms which are listed on the stock exchange in January 2011. Dead firms are firms which were 
listed in January 1988 but not in January 2011. Suspended firms are firms whose stocks are no 
longer traded in the stock exchange but have not been official delisted. Firms in the financial 
intermediation (FI) sector are excluded from further analysis. The final sample used in the study is 
made up of 2,970 firms – 1,172 live, 1,773 dead and 25 suspended firms. 
 
As in prior studies, financial intermediaries (SIC code 6000–6999) are excluded from the 
analysis as they are known to follow unique reporting standards which makes the 
interpretation of their financial ratios different from those of other firms (see, for example, 
Renneboog and (2007), Brar et al. (2009) and Ouzounis et al. (2009) for a discussion). The 
final sample used in this study is made up of 2,970 firms (with 1,172 active firms, 1,773 
dead firms and 25 suspended firms). This sample of 2,970 firms constitutes the ‘master 
list’ on which accounting and market data is gathered. The data on the independent 
variables (i.e., proxies to the hypotheses) collected from DataStream (discussed in section 
4.2.3) as well as the data for the dependent variable (takeover likelihood) collected from 
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OneBanker (discussed in section 4.2.4), are matched with the ‘master list’ using 
DataStream codes. The matching procedure – the June approach – is discussed in section 
4.2.5. 
4.2.3 The independent variable – hypotheses proxies 
The independent (or explanatory) variables in the model include the nineteen hypotheses 
(eight old hypotheses and eleven new hypotheses) discussed in chapter 3. The proxies and 
constituent variables or DataStream data items for these hypotheses are also discussed in 
chapter 3. A summary is shown in table 4.2.3. As shown in the table, four main data types 
are required. These include: (1) firm accounting data (e.g., total assets, revenues, and total 
equity; obtainable from DataStream), (2) firm stock market data (e.g., share price and 
number of shares outstanding; obtainable from DataStream), (3) macroeconomic and 
market data (e.g., LIBOR, BOEBR and FTSE All-Share returns; obtainable from 
DataStream), and (4) M&A data (e.g., merger targets, merger rumours, and share 
repurchase announcements; obtainable from OneBanker). 
 
The DataStream codes (see table 4.2.3) are used to obtain year-end financial data for each 
of the 2,970 firms on the master list (discussed in section 4.2.2) between January 1988 and 
December 2009. Every firm on the list contributes an observation to the dataset in every 
year or up to a point when it is delisted (e.g., due to bankruptcy or acquisition). Stock 
market data for each of the firms on the master list (including number of shares 
outstanding [NOSH] and share price [UP]) are collected from DataStream as at June 30
th
 
of each year between 30
th
 June 1989 and 30
th
 June 2010. The rationale for this choice is 
discussed in section 4.2.5. Daily adjusted share price [RI] data that includes dividend 
payments for each firm is also collected and used to compute daily stock returns (discussed 
in section 3.3.2). Information on share repurchases activity and merger rumours (including 
the announcement date, the firms involved and their DataStream codes) are collected from 
Thomson OneBanker. DataStream codes are used to match the data from OneBanker with 
the data from DataStream. The matching procedure is discussed in section 4.2.5. Monthly 
data for macroeconomic variables (LIBOR and BOEBR) and market variables (FTSE All-
Share return) are collected from DataStream and corroborated with data obtained from the 
British Bankers Association’s (BBA) LIBOR database. These four types of required data 
(model explanatory variables) are collected and used to populate the master list to generate 
an unbalanced panel dataset of all explanatory variables. The unbalanced panel dataset is 
made up of 32,363 firm-year observations generated from 3,433 unique firms. 
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Table 4.2.3: Hypotheses, proxies and constituent DataStream variables 
Hypotheses Proxies (Exp. sign) 
Constituent variables (DataStream 
codes) 
Panel A: Old Hypotheses 
Inefficient  Profitability (–) wc01250, wc03998 
Management ADAR (–) RI (Firm and FTSE ALL Share index) 
 
LMDummy (+/–) wc017151 
Undervaluation BTM (+) wc03501, wc02649, NOSH, UP 
 
NBVDummy (+/–) wc03501, wc02649, NOSH, UP 
Industry Disturbance IDummy (+) SIC codes 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+) wc04860, wc04601, wc02999 
Growth-Resource  Sales Growth (+/–) wc01001 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/–) wc02001, wc02999 
 
Leverage (+/–) wc03255, wc03995 
 
GRDummy (+) 
wc01001, wc02001, wc02999, wc03255, 
wc03995 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+) wc02501, wc02999 
Firm Size Ln Assets (–) wc02999 
Firm Age Age  (–) wc18273 
Panel B: New Hypotheses 
Firm Size (new) Ln Assets (+) wc02999 
 
Ln Assets sq. (–) wc02999 
Firm lifecycle Age  (–) wc18273 
 
Age sq. (+) wc18273 
Capital Structure Leverage (+) wc03255, wc03995 
 
leverage Sq. (–) wc03255, wc03995 
Financial Distress 
Z Score (–) & 
ZSDummy  (–) 
wc01401, wc03101, wc02201, wc03255, 
wc01151, wc02201, wc02101 
M&A Rumours MRDummy (+) OneBanker 
Payroll Synergies HR. Cost to sales (+) wc01084, wc01001 
 
HR. Cost to sales Sq. (–)  wc01084, wc01001 
Share Repurchases SRDummy (+/–) OneBanker 
Asymmetric Valuation Residual Volatility (–) RI (Firm and FTSE ALL Share index) 
Industry Concentration Herfindahl Index (–) wc01001 
Market Liquidity LIBOR-BOEBR (–) LIBOR, BOE Base rate 
Market Sentiment FTSEChange (+) FTSE All Share index 
Notes:  The table presents the constituent DataStream variables used to develop proxies for the 
hypotheses. The old and new hypotheses are presented in panels A and B, respectively. The 
proxies for these hypotheses, together with their expected signs, are shown in the second column. 
The computation of these proxies as well as variable definitions is discussed in chapter 3. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. LMDummy takes a value of 1 when a 
firm makes a loss and a value of 0 otherwise. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to 
market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. NBVDummy takes a 
value of 1 when a firm’s BTM is negative and a value of 0 otherwise. Sales growth is the rate of 
change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term 
investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 
when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 
otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 
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otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to 
total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. 
Age is the number of years since incorporation. Ln Assets is the natural log of a firm’s total assets. 
SRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm announced any share repurchases in the period and a value 
of 0 otherwise. MRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is the target in a merger rumour and a value 
of 0 otherwise. ZScore is a firm’s Taffler Z Score. ZSDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm has a 
negative Z Score and a value of 0 otherwise. HR Cost to sales is the ratio of payroll expenses to 
revenues. Herfindahl index is the concentration of the firm’s industry in a particular year. Residual 
volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s abnormal return in the year to June 30th. FTSEChange 
is the performance of the FTSE All Share index in the year to June 30th. LIBOR-BOEBR is the spread 
between the LIBOR and the Bank of England’s base rate. The hypothesised sign is shown in 
brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Data for all variables with DataStream codes is obtained from the Thomson 
DataStream database, while data for variables designated as ‘OneBanker’ is obtained from the 
Thomson OneBanker database.  
  
4.2.4 The dependent variable – takeover probability 
Several announced bids do not result in completed deals as the bids are successfully 
defended by the target, blocked by regulators or eventually withdrawn by the bidder. Event 
studies focusing on announcement day return show that targets gain substantially when a 
merger bid is announced, irrespective of whether the bid is eventually successful or 
unsuccessful (see, for example, Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986)). Ruback (1988), 
nonetheless, shows that targets of failed bids lose over half of their announcement day 
return (of 31.0%) when the offer is eventually withdrawn.  Even though it appears optimal 
(from an investment perspective) to predict targets of successful bids (as opposed to all 
targets), the evidence suggests that distinguishing between targets of successful bids and 
targets of failed bids without prior knowledge of the terms of the deal is an onerous task.  
Bartley and Boardman (1990), for example, argue that whether a bid is successful or fails 
is dependent on external factors (other than target financial characteristics). Walkling 
(1985) finds that the difference between failure and success in merger bids is explained by 
variables such as managerial resistance, competition in the bidding environment, bid or 
offer premium, solicitation activities by brokers and bidder’s toehold, and not by firm 
financial characteristics. The loss of over 30.0% of the target’s announcement returns upon 
merger termination (as shown in Ruback (1988)) indicates that, on the announcement day, 
even with full  knowledge of the terms of the deal, the market is still only partially able to 
ascertain the likelihood that the deal will be completed.   
 
The goal of this study is to develop a model to predict firms that are likely to receive 
takeover bids, irrespective of the final outcome (success or failure) of the bid. In line with 
prior studies (e.g., Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Cornett et al. (2011)) and the evidence 
discussed above, no distinction is made between targets of failed bids and targets of 
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successful bids. Consistent with prior studies (Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson 
(1992), Walter (1994), Powell (2001), Powell and Yawson (2007), Brar et al. (2009) and 
Cremers et al. (2009)) no distinction is made between hostile and friendly targets
130
. The 
key event date is the date when the initial bid is announced. Not all merger bids are 
considered. In line with prior studies (such as Cornett et al. (2011) and Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992)
131
), only bids that (if completed) will lead to a transfer of control rights 
are considered (i.e., the bidder aims to own more than 50.0% of the target). Data for 8,358 
M&A announcements involving publicly listed UK targets between 1
st
 June 1989 and 30
th
 
June 2011 is collected from OneBanker.  
 
Of the 8,358 announcements, 2,071 announcements do not result in the acquisition of 
control rights (if the bidder is successful). 780 of the bids are described as rumours or 
intentions. Consistent with section 4.2.2, 1,837 announcements involving targets in the 
financial industry are also excluded from further analysis. Of the remaining 
announcements, 871 targets are excluded as no target DataStream codes are available on 
OneBanker. The final sample is made up of 2,799 acquisition bids for UK public targets 
made between 1
st
 July 1989 and 30
th
 June 2011. The sample construction process is 
summarised in table 4.2.4a below. 
 
                                                 
130 Besides the lack of strong evidence in support of the use of multinomial models which 
distinguish between hostile and friendly targets (see Powell (1997, 2004)), the number of hostile 
targets in the population is perhaps too few to allow for any meaningful analysis. 
131 Ambrose and Megginson (1992) defined a takeover bid as ‘an announced attempt to accumulate 
or acquire majority voting power (50.1% or more of the outstanding voting shares) of another firm 
(p. 577). A bid in which a bidder increases its stake in the target from 20% to 51%, for example, is 
considered as a takeover bid. A bid in which a bidder increases his stake from 60% to 90% is not 
considered given that there is no acquisition of control through such a takeover. 
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Table 4.2.4a: M&A data collection and sample construction 
All bids 8,358 
Bids for minority stakes  2,071 
Rumours and intensions 780 
Financial intermediaries  1,837 
No DataStream Code 871 
Number of bid announcements 2,799 
Notes: The table shows the process of streamlining the initial dataset of 8,358 M&A bid 
announcements recorded in Thomson OneBanker (between July 1st 1989 and June 30th 2011) to the 
final sample of 2,799 useful (control) bids. The final sample is obtained by excluding bids which 
do not meet conceptual and data requirements. That is, bids which do not result in an acquisition 
of control rights, bids which are classified as ‘rumours’ or ‘intensions’ and bids involving financial 
intermediaries, are excluded from all bids. Cases without DataStream codes are excluded as these 
codes are needed to match the data from the two databases. Of the 8,358 announcements, 2,071 
announcements do not result in the acquisition of control rights (if the bidder is successful). 780 of 
the bids are described as rumours or intentions. 1,837 announcements involving targets in the 
financial industry are excluded from further analysis. 871 targets are excluded as no target 
DataStream codes are available on OneBanker. The final sample is made up of 2,799 acquisition 
bids for UK public targets made between 1st July 1989 and 30th June 2011. 
 
As shown in table 4.2.4b, a majority (66.92%) of the 2,799 M&A cases are successful and 
lead to a transfer of control rights from the target to the bidder. The average transaction 
value of the 1,873 successful merger bids (or control contests) is over £586.76 million
132
. 
On average, the bidder holds about 95.73% of the target when the acquisition is completed.  
 
Table 4.2.4b: Characteristics of the sample of bid announcements 
Classification 
Number (%) of 
targets 
Average transaction value 
(£millions) 
Bidder post-acquisition 
average holding (%) 
Completed 1,873 66.92% 586.76 95.73 
Part Comp 1 0.04% – – 
Pending 117 4.18% 87.76 – 
Status 
Unknown 102 3.64% 32.14 – 
Unconditional 199 7.11% 143.62 29.45 
Withdrawn 507 18.11% 1,629.75 17.16 
Total (Average) 2,799 100.00% (669.02) (89.87) 
Notes: The table shows the classification of the different bids that make up the sample. A 
substantial proportion of bids in the sample (66.92%) are successful bids which lead to the 
acquisition of control rights by the bidder. 507 withdrawn bids indicate bids that can be considered 
as failed bids. The status of 219 bids (pending and unknown), i.e., whether such bids are eventually 
completed or withdrawn, is not clear. These bids are not excluded in the sample as any risk of 
double counting is averted by the matching methodology employed in section 4.3.5. The average 
transaction value of failed deals is £1,629.75 million, which is substantially higher than the average 
transaction value of successful bids (£586.76 million). The bidder’s post-acquisition holding in 
failed bids is 17.16% on average i.e., below the 50% threshold required for control.   
 
                                                 
132 The transaction value of £586.76m is the average for 1,456 deals. Transaction value for 417 
successful deals is not reported in OneBanker. 
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The results in table 4.2.4b indicate that 18.11% of the bids are eventually withdrawn (or 
fail). The average transaction value of these failed deals is £1,629.75 million, which is 
substantially higher than the average transaction value of successful bids (£586.76 
million). The bidder’s post-acquisition holding in failed bids is 17.16% on average i.e., 
below the 50% threshold, as expected.   
 
OneBanker does not distinguish between initial bid announcements and subsequent bid 
revisions. The implication is that the sample of 2,799 might also contain bid revisions (for 
the same target by the same bidder) and multiple bids (for the same target by different 
bidders) during the same time period. Indeed, I find that the list of 2,799 bids sometimes 
registers different phases of the bid process (e.g., initial announcement, bid revision, bid 
completion or withdrawal) as distinct bids.  It is also possible that a single target receives 
several independent bids at different points within the same year. The algorithm for 
developing the database (discussed in section 4.3.5) prevents double counting by 
restricting each firm to a maximum of one bid within a one year period
133
. Variables such 
as the identity of the bidder(s) and the number of bidders are irrelevant to the analysis. 
 
The dependent variable ),( tiP is a binary variable, defined as the probability that firm i will 
receive a takeover bid in the period t . Each of the 2,799 ‘targets’ are assigned a takeover 
probability of 1 in the year in which they receive a takeover bid. These 2,799 ‘targets’ are 
matched to the firms on the ‘master list’ (discussed in 4.2.5 below). The result is a 
successful match of 1,635 firms
134
. All other firms on the master list (excluding the 1,635 
targets) are assigned a probability of 0 for every year in which no bid is observed.  
4.2.5 The procedure for database development  
As discussed in section 4.4.3, much of the empirical analysis in this study relies on results 
obtained from back-testing. Although this is the standard methodology employed in the 
literature, it frequently leads to look-ahead bias. The algorithm for data mapping aims to 
minimise any look-ahead bias in back-tests by reflecting the data-related challenges faced 
by investors and other users of the model in real life. As will be discussed in section 4.3.3, 
the prediction model postulates that the takeover likelihood of a firm i at time t, denoted by 
 (   )  is a function of a vector of its characteristics at time t-1. The implication is that a 
                                                 
133 The earliest M&A event (i.e., initial bid announcement) is used as the M&A announcement date. 
134 The implication is that the 2,799 recorded bids for control were for 1,635 unique targets. 1,030 
recorded bid activity remain unmatched as they, perhaps, constitute multiple bids, bid revisions 
and bids within the same year. The rest of the bids (134) pertain to firms in the financial industries 
(FI). 
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firm’s characteristics in the current period determine its takeover likelihood in the next 
period. Data therefore needs to be appropriately lagged to make the modelling exercise 
realistic and free from bias.  
 
The dependent variable (1,635 bid announcements obtained from Thomson OneBanker) is 
matched with the independent variables (unbalanced panel dataset of 32,363 firm-year 
observations) on this basis. The matching process is further complicated by two issues: (1) 
the fact that all firms do not generally share a similar financial year-end (or balance sheet 
date), and (2) the observation that firm financial data is not typically publicly available on 
the balance sheet date
135
. This issue is further discussed in section 2.6.3. In the UK, the 
Companies Act allows public firms to file their reports to the Companies House up to six 
months after the reporting year-end
136
.  
 
The ‘June approach’ to lagging UK financial data for forecasting purposes (as discussed in 
Soares and Stark (2009)) is tailored and adopted in this study. This approach builds on 
Fama and French (1993) who apply a portfolio inception date of July 1
st
. In this context, 
the approach assumes that takeover prediction models are developed on June 30
th
 (of each 
year) and used to predict and invest in targets from July 1
st
. This approach is based on the 
observation that a significant proportion of UK firms have a December year-end and the 
fact that the regulation allows public firms to publish their financial results within six 
months of their financial year-end (Soares and Stark (2009)). In support of Soares and 
Stark (2009), I find that over 40.34% of the observations in my sample have a December 
year-end (and about 19.89% of the observations have a March year-end). The distribution 
of firm-year ends for the firm-year observations in my sample is shown in the chart below. 
 
                                                 
135 Although data is available as at balance sheet date in back-tests, the use of such data constitutes 
look-ahead bias, as the data is only made available to the public (sometimes up to six months) post 
balance sheet date. 
136 Before the 6th April 2008, the UK Companies Act allowed firms to file their reports up to 7 
months after year end.  
 140 
 
Figure 4.2.5a: The distribution of firm year-ends for firms in the sample 
 
Note: The chart presents a summary of the financial year-ends of the 35,363 firm-years in the 
sample. Firm-years are used (as opposed to firms) as a balanced sample is not employed in the 
analyses and a number of firms change their financial year-end over the period. The X axis 
represents the calendar month of the financial year-end. The Y axis represents the number of firm-
year observations for each calendar month of the financial year-end. The results show that a 
majority (40.34%) of observations (firm-years) in my sample have a financial year-end which 
coincides with the calendar month of December. About 19.89% of the firms in the sample have a 
March year-end. 
  
The results in figure 4.2.5a suggest that a substantial proportion of firms publish their 
financial results between January and June of each year (i.e., a large proportion of firms 
have a December year-end). This is further discussed below. The June approach simplifies 
the modelling process by assuming that all firms have their data available (to the public) on 
the June 30
th
 of each year (e.g., 30 June 2010) for the financial year-ending sometime 
during the previous calendar year (e.g., 1 January 2009 – 31 December 2009). Clearly, 
some firms will publish their results a few months before this cut-off (June 30
th
). However, 
on average, June 30
th
, perhaps, represents the appropriate cut-off applicable for a large 
proportion of UK firms. If June 30
th
 (of year 2010, for example) is assumed as the 
reference point when data is made available to the public, then, perhaps, all takeover 
activity between July 1
st
 (year 2010) and June 30
th
 (year 2011) can be attributed to June 
30
th
 (year 2010) data release.  
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Figure 4.2.5b: The June approach to database matching and proxy computation 
Year t-1 t t+1 
Month J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J 
Firm financial year-end * * * * * * * * * * * * 
      
                        
Returns period       " " " " " " " " " " " "                         
Bid announcement date                               x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Bid announcement date       X  This is the month in which a bid is announced as indicated by OneBanker 
Firm financial year-end       *  This is the balance sheet date, i.e., the month up until which financial statements are prepared. 
Returns period       " Daily returns and residual volatility are computed using data from July year t-1 to June year t  
Notes: This figure demonstrates the application of the June approach in this study. The letters, JFMAMJJASOND in row 2, represent all calendar months from 
January (J) to December (D) respectively. t-1, t and t+1 in row 1, represent three sequential calendar years. The table shows how a database holding key prediction 
variables, as well as the dependent variable is constructed (by matching data from different sources (DataStream and OneBanker), using the ‘June approach’ 
discussed in Soares and Stark (2009). For each firm on the master list (of dead and live firms), I identify the financial year-end (*). The month of the financial year-
end (*) can be any month from January year t-1 to December year t-1. Most firms have a December year-end so a cut-off of December year t-1 is assumed (see figure 
4.2.5a). To allow for the firm’s financial data to be available to the public, a 6-month gap is given. It is assumed that each firm’s financial data is available by the 30 
June year t (6 months after December year t-1). That is, for any firm with financial year-end between January year t-1 and December year t-1, I assume its data is 
publicly available on the 30 June year t. It is assumed that the prediction model is developed when data is available to the public (i.e., 30th June year t). I therefore 
match market data on June 30th year t to financial data for year-end January year t-1 to December year t-1. I assume that any merger bid (X) tendered by bidders 
between 1 July year t and June year t+1, relies on data available to the bidders on June 30th year t pertaining to the financial year January year t-1 to December year t-
1. I compute 1-year market performance (ADAR – management inefficiency hypothesis) and residual volatility (Asymmetric Valuation hypothesis) using daily data 
between July year t-1 and June year t ("). For the computation of ratios (such as book to market), I use stock price at June 30th year t and match this with financial 
data for year-end January year t-1 to December year t-1. 
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Figure 4.2.5b illustrates the June approach for matching the event with firm characteristics 
and for computing market returns. As shown in the figure, for each firm on the master list, 
I identify the financial year-end. As shown in table 4.2.5a, over 40.34% of firms in my 
sample have a December year-end so a cut-off of December (e.g., December 2009) is 
assumed. As discussed above, the current UK regulation allows firms to publish their 
results up to six months after year-end. To allow for the firm’s financial data to be 
available to the public, a 6-month gap is given. It is assumed that each firm’s financial data 
is available by the 30
th
 of June in the next calendar year (e.g., 30
th
 June 2010, six months 
after December 2009). It is assumed that the prediction model is developed when data is 
available to the public (i.e., 30
th
 June 2010) and the portfolio generated from this model is 
held for one year starting from 1
st
 July 2010. In the example above, I therefore match 
market data on 30
th
 June 2010 to accounting data for financial year-end January 2009 to 
December 2009. I assume that any merger bid tendered between 1
st
 July 2010 and 30
th
 
June 2011 relies on data available to the bidders on 30
th
 June 2010 pertaining to the 
financial year-end 2009. Hence, I match M&A data for period 1
st
 July 2010 and 30
th
 June 
2011 to market data at 30
th
 June 2010 and financial data for year-end 2009. 
 
The computation of ratios which utilise market data (such as book to market ratio) matches 
June 30
th
 market data with accounting statement data, assumed to be available by June 30
th
 
of the following calendar year (2010). For example, for calendar year end 2009, I compute 
1-year market performance (ADAR – management inefficiency hypothesis) and residual 
volatility (Asymmetric valuation hypothesis) using daily data between July 2009 and June 
2010. For the computation of ratios (such as book to market), I use stock price at 30
th
 June 
2010 and match this with data for financial year-end 2009. Each firm’s book to market 
ratio in 2009 is computed as the ratio of its book value (at balance sheet date in 2009) to its 
market value on 30
th
 June 2010.  
 
Aside from eliminating look-ahead bias, the June approach is advantageous (from an 
investment perspective) as its implementation occurs only once each year thus resulting in 
low transaction costs (Soares and Stark (2009)). Soares and Stark (2009), however, note 
that a significant lag can arise implying that the approach will not always reflect data 
employed by the market. This will result in a negative bias and a likely underperformance 
of the empirical model.  
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It is worth noting that other approaches (like the September approach) have been used in 
studies such as Agarwal and Taffler (2008) and Gregory et al. (2013). This follows their 
finding that about 37% of UK firms have a December year-end as compared to 22% with a 
March year-end. These studies adopt an approach (September approach) which assumes 
that most firms have a financial year-end before March. Allowing 6 months for the 
publication of financial results, these studies match market data from September to 
financial data from March. While this approach is justified on the basis that it mitigates 
look-ahead bias, it can, potentially, lead to the over-reliance on stale data for takeover 
prediction in the current study. This is because I find that, in comparison to Gregory et al. 
(2013), a higher (lower) proportion of firms in my sample have a December (March) 
financial year-end. In my sample, 40.34 % (19.89%) of firms have December (March) 
year-end. Nevertheless, adopting the September approach rather than the June approach 
may be a further extension of this study.   
 
The outcome of this data matching process is the expansion of the ‘master list’ into a panel 
database which holds firm information (computed proxies for old and new hypotheses) as 
well as the probability of a firm receiving a bid based on its characteristics at time t 
(modelled as a binary variable, as discussed in section 4.2.4). This unique database is then 
used to test the hypotheses and to develop the new prediction model. Prior to such tests, the 
database is scrutinised in a bid to identify and remove extreme values or outliers. The 
characteristics of the database as well as the outlier management process are further 
discussed in section 4.2.6. 
4.2.6 Sample characteristics and dealing with outliers 
As discussed in section 4.2.4, the final sample is made up of 32,363 firm-year observations 
drawn from a time period of 22 years (1988 to 2009). DataStream codes are used to match 
both databases (OneBanker and DataStream) using the approach discussed in 4.2.5. Some 
of the 3,433 firms (32,363 firm-year observations) do receive a takeover bid within a 
specific year and these firms are described as targets in that year. All firms for which no 
announcements were made are considered as non-targets (further discussed in section 
4.2.4). Out of the 32,363 observations, 1,638 takeover bids (targets) are recorded leaving a 
sample of 30,725 non-targets firm-year observations. In terms of overall sample size, this 
sample compares favourably against the sample employed in prior UK studies (including 
 144 
 
Powell (1997, 2001, 2004), Barnes (1990, 1998, 1999) and Ouzounis et al. (2009)). The 
samples used in these prior studies are discussed in section 2.5 (chapter 2).
137
  
 
Table 4.2.6a shows the distribution of targets from one year to another over the sample 
period (1988–2009). The data shows that out of an average of 1,471 listed firms per year, 
74 firms receive a bid (on average) in each year. The implication is that on average 5.05% 
of listed firms receive a bid each year. This level of takeover activity is similar to the 
5.00% (between 1986 and 1995) reported by Powell (2004). This ratio varies from one 
year to another with a high of 9.80% in 1997 and a low of 2.55% in 1993. The lowest 
number of takeover bids made is recorded in 1993 with just 32 firms out of a population of 
1,254 active firms, receiving a takeover bid. Highs of 160 and 151 bids are, respectively, 
recorded in 1997 and 1998, marking a peak in takeover activity in the UK.  
 
Table 4.2.6a: Constitution of the panel dataset 
FYE Targets Total Obs. Prop. % FYE Targets Total Obs. Prop. % 
1988 42                     1,127  3.73% 1999 81         1,473  5.50% 
1989 39                     1,211  3.22% 2000 65         1,503  4.32% 
1990 43                     1,259  3.42% 2001 84         1,555  5.40% 
1991 42                     1,272  3.30% 2002 69         1,617  4.27% 
1992 35                     1,245  2.81% 2003 78         1,696  4.60% 
1993 32                     1,254  2.55% 2004 101         1,772  5.70% 
1994 44                     1,277  3.45% 2005 106         1,808  5.86% 
1995 53                     1,270  4.17% 2006 106         1,774  5.98% 
1996 101                     1,557  6.49% 2007 71         1,663  4.27% 
1997 160                     1,633  9.80% 2008 79         1,500  5.27% 
1998 151                     1,544  9.78% 2009 53         1,353  3.92% 
Notes: The table shows the constitution of the dataset (in terms of number of unique firms and 
number of targets) and the proportion of targets from one year to another across the 22-year 
period. FYE refers to the financial year-end of the accounting data to which the bids are matched. 
The June approach discussed in section 4.2.5 is used to match the announced bids to the relevant 
financial data. For example, bids pertaining to FYE 1988 occur (i.e., bid announcement date) 
between July 1989 and June 1990. The total number of targets (observation) is 1,638 (32,363). Prop. 
% is the ratio of targets to total firm year observations in each period. Out of an average of 1,471 
listed firms per year, 74 firms receive a bid (on average) in each year. The implication is that on 
average 5.05% of listed firms receive a bid each year.  
 
 
The descriptive statistics relating to the key financial variables for the sample are presented 
in table 4.2.6b. Table 4.2.6b presents descriptive statistics for proxies of management 
                                                 
137 For example, Palepu (1986) employs a US sample consisting of 163 targets and 256 non-targets. 
Powell (1997, 2001) employs a UK sample consisting of 411 targets and 532 non- targets. Powell 
(2004) which, to the best of my knowledge, is the most extensive UK study in takeover prediction 
to date, uses a panel sample consisting of 9,891 firm-year observations. 
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inefficiency, firm undervaluation and growth-resource mismatch hypotheses, economic 
disturbance, firm size, free cash flow, tangible assets, firm age, financial distress 
hypotheses, payroll synergies and asymmetric valuation. Other variables not shown in the 
tables (such as dummies and macroeconomic variables) are not treated for outliers. A full 
discussion and analysis of descriptive statistics of all variables is completed in chapter 5. 
The definitions and derivation of the variables are discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4.  
 
In panel A (table 4.2.6b), the descriptive statistics for the raw data is presented. As will be 
discussed, a key observation from panel A is the presence of extreme and, seemingly, 
implausible values. Some analysis on why such extreme values are observed is conducted 
and the results are presented in table 4.2.6c, 4.2.6d and 4.2.6e. In general, I find that the 
extreme values are not primarily due to database (DataStream) errors as original annual 
reports obtained from Perfect Information database corroborates the data obtained from 
DataStream. This is further discussed below.  
 
In panel B, the raw data used in panel A is winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. That is 
values below the 1
st
 percentile are replaced with the 1
st
 percentile and values above the 99
th
 
percentile are replaced with the 99
th
 percentile. As noted above, the focus is on firm 
specific data. All dummy variables (such as LMDummy, NBVDummy, GRDummy, 
IDummy, SRDummy, MRDummy), industry variables (Herfindahl index) and market 
variables (such as FTSEChange and LIBOR-BORBR) are excluded from the winsorisation 
process
138
. Firm size (natural log of total assets) and firm age (number of years since 
incorporation) are also not winsorised as no apparent extreme values are observed. As will 
be discussed below, the results from panel B shows an improvement from panel A but still 
suggests that more extensive winsorisation (in line with Christidis and Gregory (2010)) 
might be necessary. The effect of adopting a more extensive winsorisation procedure is 
investigated in section 5.4. 
 
In panel C, the data in panel A is now winsorised at the 5
th
 percentile and the 95
th
 
percentile (in line with Christidis and Gregory (2010)). As will be discussed below, this 
procedure leads to an improvement in the variables’ distribution, with no apparent extreme 
values. The data used in panel C – data winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentile – is 
adopted for all further analysis (chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
  
                                                 
138 See table 4.2.3 for full variable definitions. 
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Table 4.2.6b Descriptive statistics and treatment of outliers 
 
Panel A: Raw Data  
    N Mean Median Std. Dev Skew Min Max Percentiles 
Hypothesis Proxies Valid Missing             25 75 
          Inefficient 
Management 
ADAR     25,406      6,959  0.0001 0.0002 0.0021 1.8621 -0.0154 0.0674 -0.0009 0.0011 
Profitability     32,363               2  0.0402 0.1178 1.4949 -5.4792 -36.3200 34.2727 0.0000 0.2309 
Undervaluation Book to Market     27,586      4,779  0.5337 0.3722 2.6101 17.4675 -37.5242 98.5250 0.1231 0.7501 
Growth Resource 
Mismatch 
Sales Growth     28,459      3,906  0.3322 0.0892 1.6086 11.7003 -1.0000 37.2647 -0.0257 0.2600 
Liquidity     32,343            22  0.1572 0.0808 0.2021 2.0621 0.0000 1.0000 0.0230 0.2020 
Leverage     32,348            17  0.5254 0.2690 3.2324 5.2654 -52.9412 73.2500 0.0182 0.6551 
Firm Size Ln Assets     32,354            11  17.7070 17.5259 2.2540 0.2059 6.9078 25.9761 16.2580 19.0033 
Free Cash Flow FCF/TA     25,160      7,205  -0.0755 0.0090 0.7005 24.8093 -14.5310 50.0975 -0.0856 0.0714 
Tangible property PPE/TA     32,105          260  0.3127 0.2659 0.2537 0.7589 0.0000 1.0000 0.0943 0.4620 
Firm Age Age     29,886      2,479  31.8159 17.0000 32.5718 1.0556 0.0000 164.0000 6.0000 54.0000 
Financial Distress ZSCORE     27,336      5,029  53.6836 8.0553 246.9343 8.5348 -992.0700 3,809.6884 2.0281 19.7469 
Payroll Synergies Salaries/Sales     23,572      8,793  0.5734 0.2638 2.1053 11.6487 0.0000 43.0625 0.1650 0.4007 
Asymmetric Val. Res. Volatility     25,406      6,959  0.0250 0.0196 0.0210 11.6445 0.0000 1.2330 0.0129 0.0307 
Notes to panel A: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables in the dataset prior to winsorisation. The first and second columns show the 
hypotheses and associated proxies. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return, profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed, book to market is the 
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period, liquidity is the ratio of cash and 
short term investments to total assets, leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio, Ln Assets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets, FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash 
flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets, PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets, Age is the 
number of years since incorporation, ZSCORE is the firm’s Taffler Z score. Salaries/sales represent the payroll costs to sales ratio. Res. Volatility is residual volatility 
computed from the firm’s one-year daily abnormal returns. The third and fourth columns show the number of observations and the number of missing observations.  
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Table 4.2.6b Descriptive statistics and treatment of outliers 
 
Panel B: The effect of winsorising at 1% and 99% 
    N Mean Median Std. Dev Skew Min Max Percentiles 
Hypothesis Proxies Valid Missing             25 75 
          Inefficient 
Management 
ADAR     25,406      6,959  0.0001 0.0002 0.0019 -0.2837 -0.0060 0.0056 -0.0009 0.0011 
Profitability     32,363               2  0.0592 0.1178 0.6302 -2.2684 -3.6600 2.4445 0.0000 0.2312 
Undervaluation Book to Market     27,586      4,779  0.5023 0.3723 0.9885 1.2762 -3.3748 5.5782 0.1228 0.7513 
Growth Resource 
Mismatch 
Sales Growth     28,459      3,906  0.2988 0.0895 1.0393 5.4045 -0.8761 7.9277 -0.0253 0.2627 
Liquidity     32,343            22  0.1568 0.0808 0.2005 2.0206 0.0000 0.9298 0.0230 0.2020 
Leverage     32,348            17  0.4922 0.2690 1.4571 2.1994 -5.3014 9.1809 0.0180 0.6563 
Firm Size Ln Assets     32,354            11  17.7070 17.5259 2.2540 0.2059 6.9078 25.9761 16.2580 19.0033 
Free Cash Flow FCF/TA     25,160      7,205  -0.0677 0.0089 0.3168 -3.7483 -2.0207 0.3343 -0.0859 0.0714 
Tangible property PPE/TA     32,105          260  0.3125 0.2659 0.2532 0.7513 0.0000 0.9366 0.0943 0.4620 
Firm Age Age     29,886      2,479  31.8159 17.0000 32.5718 1.0556 0.0000 164.0000 6.0000 54.0000 
Financial Distress ZSCORE     27,336      5,029  72.7021 8.1606 319.1029 6.6223 -63.4318 2623.1001 2.0795 20.3357 
Payroll Synergies Salaries/Sales     23,572      8,793  0.5540 0.2644 1.5021 6.8299 0.0311 12.8240 0.1654 0.4032 
Asymmetric Val. Res. Volatility     25,406      6,959  0.0246 0.0196 0.0169 1.7809 0.0000 0.0947 0.0129 0.0307 
Notes to panel B: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables in the dataset when the variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The 
first and second columns show the hypotheses and associated proxies. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return, profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital 
employed, book to market is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period, 
liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets, leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio, Ln Assets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets, 
FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets, PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets, ZSCORE is the firm’s Taffler Z score, Age is the number of years since incorporation. Salaries/sales represent the payroll costs to sales ratio.  
Res. Volatility is residual volatility computed from the firm’s one-year daily abnormal returns. Firm size (natural log of total assets) and firm age (number of years 
since incorporation) are also not winsorised as no apparent extreme values are observed. The third and fourth columns show the number of observations and the 
number of missing observations. 
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Table 4.2.6b Descriptive statistics and treatment of outliers 
 
Panel C: The effect of winsorising at 5% and 95%  
    N Mean Median Std. Dev Skew Min Max Percentiles 
Hypothesis Proxies Valid Missing             25 75 
          Inefficient 
Management 
ADAR     25,406      6,959  0.0000 0.0001 0.0026 0.7370 -0.0348 0.0600 -0.0012 0.0013 
Profitability     32,363               2  0.0852 0.1178 0.2839 -0.8665 -0.6534 0.5979 0.0000 0.2312 
Undervaluation Book to Market     27,586      4,779  0.4918 0.3723 0.5793 0.9027 -0.4400 1.9864 0.1228 0.7513 
 
Book to Market (P)     27,586      4,779  0.5288 0.3722 0.5333 1.2920 0.0000 1.9864 0.1228 0.7513 
Growth Resource 
Mismatch 
Sales Growth     28,459      3,906  0.1826 0.0895 0.3933 1.6020 -0.3859 1.3788 -0.0253 0.2628 
Liquidity     32,343            22  0.1494 0.0808 0.1766 1.5805 0.0003 0.6557 0.0230 0.2020 
Leverage     32,348            17  0.4941 0.2691 0.6560 1.9769 0.0000 2.6894 0.0180 0.6563 
Firm Size Ln Assets     32,354            11  17.7070 17.5260 2.2540 0.2059 6.9078 25.9761 16.2579 19.0035 
Free Cash Flow FCF/TA     25,160      7,205  -0.0396 0.0089 0.1821 -1.4865 -0.5528 0.1868 -0.0860 0.0714 
Tangible property PPP/TA     32,105          260  0.3109 0.2659 0.2492 0.6969 0.0023 0.8632 0.0943 0.4620 
Firm Age Age     29,886      2,479  31.8159 17.0000 32.5723 1.0556 0.0000 164.0000 6.0000 54.0000 
Financial Distress ZSCORE     27,336      5,029  29.6983 8.1606 66.2460 2.8682 -17.5933 273.9258 2.0790 20.3401 
Payroll Synergies Salaries/Sales     23,572      8,793  0.3393 0.2644 0.2687 1.7911 0.0571 1.1658 0.1653 0.4032 
Asymmetric Val. Res. Volatility     25,406      6,959  0.0171 0.0133 0.0169 4.4060 0.0000 0.5638 0.0061 0.0229 
Notes to panel C: This table presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables in the dataset when the variables are winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The 
first and second columns show the hypotheses and associated proxies. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return, profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital 
employed, book to market is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, book to market (p) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
when BTM is winsorised at the 0% and 95%, sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period, liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term 
investments to total assets, leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio, Ln Assets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets, FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow 
(operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets, PPP/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets, ZSCORE is the 
firm’s Taffler Z score, Age is the number of years since incorporation. Salaries/sales represent the payroll costs to sales ratio.  Res. Volatility is residual volatility 
computed from the firm’s one-year daily abnormal returns. Firm size (natural log of total assets) and firm age (number of years since incorporation) are also not 
winsorised as no apparent extreme values are observed. The third and fourth columns show the number of observations and the number of missing observations. 
  
 149 
 
 
In table 4.2.6b, I consider different outlier treatment procedures given the presence of 
extreme values in my dataset. There are several extreme or implausible values in the raw 
data (panel A) as evidenced by the skewness statistics, the minimum and maximum values 
and the mean and median values. The skewness statistic for measures of profitability, book 
to market, sales growth, leverage, free cash flow, financial distress, payroll synergies and 
residual volatility are all substantially above the 3 threshold. While this measures whether 
the data is normally distributed, it also indicates the presence of extreme values. The large 
difference between the mean and median values (e.g., for Z score and sales growth), the 
very low (high) minimum (maximum) values, and the spread between the maximum and 
minimum values (e.g., for the book to market, profitability and leverage ratios) are further 
indications of the existence of extreme and/or implausible values. 
 
These results (table 4.2.6b) raise some questions about data integrity and the suitability of 
DataStream as a source of data for the current research. I attempt to evaluate data integrity 
by manually checking a sample of observations. Here, I compare the data obtained from 
DataStream to the data in original annual reports obtained from the Perfect Information 
database. The main variables with, potentially, extreme observations are profitability, book 
to market ratios, sales growth, leverage, free cash flow and financial distress (as can be 
seen from table 4.2.6b). Financial distress (measured by Taffler Z score) is nonetheless, the 
outcome of several constituent variables, and, hence, the reasons behind extreme Z score 
observations are likely to be multiple. After a review, I find that the ‘problem’ variables 
generating the extreme values are earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA), total revenue and total shareholder equity. That is some firms 
report negative EBITDA, zero total revenues and negative shareholder equity in some 
years. 
 
The approach I adopt for this review process involves identifying a sample of firms with 
the highest (20 firms) and lowest values (20 firms) for each ‘problem’ variable. I then 
obtain the firms’ original annual reports from Perfect Information database and compare 
the data from DataStream to the data presented in the reports. I conclude that the values are 
extreme (not implausible) if the data from both databases is the same. 
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The extreme observations for profitability (EBITDA to total capital employed) are due to 
negative reported earnings (EBITDA) for some firms and negative or low capital employed 
(due to negative or low shareholder equity) for others. The table below shows the values 
for EBITDA and capital employed obtained from original financial statements. 
 
Table 4.2.6c: Comparing earnings (EBITDA) data from DataStream to data from 
source documents 
Company Year EBITDA 
(£million) 
Capital 
Employed 
(£million) 
Profitability ratio 
(EBITDA/Capital 
Employed) 
Ratio computed 
using DataStream 
Information 
Panel A: Firms with extreme negative profitability 
SocialGo Plc 2009 -1.663  0.048 -34.64 -34.64 
Business Control Solutions 
Group PLC 
2002 -1.816 0.050 -36.32 -36.32 
Birmingham City PLC 1998 1.167 -0.082 -14.23 -34.62 
Xn Checkout Holdings 2002 -4.606 0.180 -25.59 -25.59 
Intelligent Environments 
Group PLC 
2001 -5.575 0.228 -24.45 -24.45 
Panel B: Firms with extreme positive profitability 
Act Group PLC 1994 24.159 1.065 22.26 22.26 
Michael Page 2000 73.352 3.901 18.80 18.80 
Chalkwell Investments 2005 0.084 0.005 16.80 16.80 
Anglo United PLC 1991 36.162 2.442 14.80 14.80 
EG Solutions PLC 2005 0.101 0.008 12.63 12.63 
Notes: The table compares earnings (EBITDA – earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation) data from DataStream to data obtained from source documents (annual reports) 
available from Perfect Information for a sample of firms with extreme values. The ratios (results) 
are presented in decimals. I manually check the data for several other firms but do not report these 
results for simplicity. Generally, I find that for the sample examined, the data from DataStream is 
consistent with the data from annual reports. 
 
Table 4.2.6c investigates data integrity by comparing firm-earnings data obtained from 
DataStream to the data in the annual financial statements. I focus on a sample of extreme 
observations. I find that, for the sample examined, the data from DataStream reflects the 
data in original reports. Several firms report negative earnings over several periods. These 
negative earnings deplete firm equity over time. Large negative earnings and low equity 
values leads to the extreme negative ratios for profitability. Similarly, some firms report 
negative capital employed (due to low or negative shareholder equity accompanied by high 
leverage). This often leads to extremely low profitability ratios. This observation persists 
when other measures of profitability (such as return on assets and return on sales) are 
employed. 
 
Sales growth is another variable with seemingly extreme observations. For example, the 
minimum sales growth in panel A is –100% and the maximum sales growth is 3700%. The 
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–100% sales growth arises as several firms report positive sales followed by close to zero 
sales in a number of consecutive years. This leads to a sales growth of –100% in the first 
year. I also find that several energy and mining firms report zero sales in the early years 
after listing. As deduced from their annual reports, these firms are generally focused on 
investing in exploratory activities. Small sales followed by very large sales leads to the 
observation of extreme positive values of sales growth. To evaluate the integrity of this 
data, I also obtain source documents for a sample of firms with extreme sales growth 
ratios. Table 4.2.6d presents some of the reasons why some firms in the sample examined 
report negative or very low sales in a number of years. 
 
Table 4.2.6d: Reasons why firms report zero (or very low) sales in a number of years 
Company Year Total sales – Perfect 
Information 
Rationale for reporting zero revenues 
Medavinci PLC 2006-2010 0 million Relatively inactive company (no sales) 
– with several dormant subsidiaries. 
Huy PLC 2008 0 million Disposal of key subsidiaries, hence 
sales for continuing operations equal 
£0 million. 
Alba Mineral 
Resources 
2005-2009 0 million Projects still at early stage of 
development 
Alexander Mining PLC 2004-2007 0 million Newly listed mining company, 
exploration costs incurred pending any 
sales. Revenues generated from 2008 
onwards. 
Copper Resources 
Corporation 
2002-2005 0 million Newly (2005) listed mining company 
with a portfolio of investments and no 
history of sales. 
Agcert International 
PLC 
2002-2005 0 million New listed company, with no history of 
sales. Sales in 2005 worth only £3,000. 
Notes: The table shows some of the reasons why a sample of firms report very low or zero sales in 
a number of years. Most firms (e.g., Alexander Mining and Copper Resource Corporation) report 
low or zero sales when they are newly listed. Other firms (e.g., Medavinci PLC) report zero sales 
due to periods of inactivity and eventual bankruptcy. A majority of the companies with zero sales 
are newly formed mining and energy companies. Other examples in this category include 
Peninsular Gold PLC, Sound Oil PLC, Thor Mining PLC, Clontarf Energy PLC, Shanta Gold Ltd, 
Empyrean Energy PLC, Latitude Resources PLC, Anglo Asian Mining PLC, Sirius Minerals PLC. I 
also find that these companies are generally delisted after a number of years, perhaps, due to 
acquisitions or bankruptcies. 
 
 
Table 4.2.6d shows some of the reasons why firms report very low (or zero) sales in a 
number of years. Some firms in my sample report very low (or zero) sales in the early 
years of listing on the stock exchange. This is the case with several energy and mining 
firms. High sales followed by low sales or the reverse, leads to extreme values of sales 
growth. 
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Besides profitability and sales growth, book to market ratios as well as leverage ratios also 
appear to contain some implausible values. This is due to the presence of negative equity 
values in DataStream. Following Powell and Yawson (2007), book value of equity is 
computed as the equity capital and reserves minus total intangibles and leverage is 
computed as the debt to equity ratio. I find that DataStream reports negative equity values 
(for several firm-year observations), hence leading to negative book to market and leverage 
ratios. To assess the integrity of this data, I obtain original annual reports for a sample of 
firms with negative book values and compare these with the data reported by DataStream.  
 
 
Table 4.2.6e: Comparing ‘total shareholder equity’ data from DataStream to data 
from source documents 
Company Year  Total shareholders’ 
Equity – DataStream (£ 
million) 
Reported equity in 
consolidated balance 
sheet (£ million) 
Go-Ahead Group PLC  2009 -19.100 -19.100  
CVS Group PLC 2008 -1.620  -1.620  
Rank Group PLC 2007 -13.300  -13.300  
Yell Group PLC 2002 -49.900  -49.900  
Britvic PLC 2010 -30.700  -30.700  
Premier Foods PLC 2005 -18.000  -18.000  
William Hill PLC 2001 -48.739  -40.700  
CRP Leisure PLC 1993 -0.013  -0.013  
Stanhope Properties 2004 -14.682  -14.682  
Premier Health Group 1997 -4.498  -4.498  
Notes: The table compares ‘total shareholder equity’ data from DataStream to data obtained from 
source documents (annual reports) available from Perfect Information. I find that, for the sample 
examined, the data from DataStream is consistent with the data from annual reports. Besides the 
above, other firm years with negative equity (and book) values in their annual reports include: 
Healthcare Holdings (2001), LP Hill PLC (2009), Vimio PLC (2003), Xploite PLC (2001), Argonaut 
Games PLC (1999) and Heart of Midlothian (1996), amongst others. I find that many firms report 
negative equity in the early years of listing, perhaps, due to net losses on operations. 
 
Table 4.2.6e compares the data for ‘total shareholder equity’ obtained from DataStream to 
the data from annual reports for a sample of firms with negative equity values.  
 
In general, the review suggests that the data from DataStream is consistent with the data in 
source documents. The results from tables 4.2.6c, 4.2.6d and 4.2.6e suggest that the data 
available on DataStream reflects the data in annual reports. It appears that the extreme 
observations are genuine and are not due to data integrity issues. Nonetheless, these 
extreme observations cannot be left in the sample as they can potentially distort statistical 
inferences. Panel B and C of table 4.2.6b explores different techniques for eliminating 
outliers. 
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 I adopt a winsorising approach (which involves the replacement of extreme values with 
threshold values) as opposed to an elimination approach (which eliminates extreme values) 
as it does not result in the loss of data. As seen in panel B, the use of the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentile winsorising approach still yields a data distribution (for sales growth, financial 
distress, free cash flow and payroll synergies) with some extreme values. For example, the 
minimum and maximum profitability ratios are -366.00% and 244.45%, respectively. The 
minimum and maximum sales growth levels are -87.61% and 793.77%. 
 
As shown in panel C, winsorisation at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile (in line with Christidis and 
Gregory (2010)) appears to substantially improve the distribution of most of the variables. 
With the exception of residual volatility, all variables have skewness statistics below the 3 
threshold. The distribution of the variables is likely to be more normal leading to more 
reliable results from empirical analysis. Also, the mean values are more plausible and 
much closer to the median values. For example the mean (median) profitability is now 
about 8.52% (11.78%). There is an improvement in the range with the minimum and 
maximum values appearing to be more plausible. For example, the minimum and 
maximum profitability ratios are -65.34% and 59.79%, respectively. The minimum and 
maximum sales growth levels are -38.59% and 137.88%. The descriptive statistics are fully 
discussed in chapter 5. This winsorising approach (5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile) and the results in 
panel C are therefore adopted for the rest of the analysis. Some sensitivity analyses are 
conducted and the results (presented and discussed in section 5.4) suggest that the 
conclusions do not substantially change even if the winsorisation approach specified in 
panel B (1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile) is adopted.  
4.2.7 Summary 
This section discusses the sample and data employed in the empirical analysis in this study. 
The study uses a sample of public listed UK firms drawn from the period between 1988 
and 2009. The data clean-up criteria results in the elimination of several firms which do not 
meet the criteria for inclusion. This clean-up process generates a final sample 2,970 firms 
made up of 1,172 active firms, 1,773 dead firms and 25 suspended firms. The required 
financial data to compute proxies for the old and new hypotheses for each of the 2,970 
firms is obtained from DataStream for the full period for which data is available (i.e., 
between 1988 and 2009). This data collection process generates a panel data set of 32,363 
firm-year observations. Data for 2,799 acquisition bids for UK public targets made 
between 1
st
 July 1989 and 30
th
 June 2011 is collected from Thomson OneBanker. Other 
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required M&A related data required for the analysis is also obtained from Thomson 
OneBanker. Data from the two databases (Thomson OneBanker and Thomson 
DataStream) is matched using the June approach (discussed in section 4.2.5) that aligns a 
firm’s financial characteristics in the current period to its takeover probability in the next 
period. This procedure takes account of the lag between firms’ financial year-end and time 
at which financial statements are publicly available. The final step in the development of 
the database is the identification and elimination of extreme values by winsorising at 5
th
 
and 95
th
 percentile. This process leads to the generation of a clean dataset to be used in the 
derivation (and evaluation) of the takeover prediction model. 
 
4.3  Methodology for hypotheses validation – Chapter 5  
4.3.1 Overview 
Chapter 5 is the first of three empirical chapters discussing the results from the analysis. 
This chapter (5) tests the validity and significance of the hypotheses which were developed 
in chapter 3. This section discusses the methodology used in chapter 5 for validation of 
hypotheses. The hypotheses are validated both through univariate and multivariate analysis 
(section 4.3.2). The hypothesised curvilinear relationships are tested for robustness using 
alternative methods (section 4.3.3). The old and new variables are combined to generate 
the new model (section 4.3.4) and the model is tested for intertemporal variation of 
parameters (section 4.3.5).  
4.3.2 Univariate and multivariate analysis 
Univariate methods (parametric and non-parametric) are used to conduct preliminary 
analysis on the validity of the prediction variables and hypotheses employed in this study. 
These tests evaluate the effect of each individual independent variable on a firm’s takeover 
probability. These tests include: the difference of means test (t-test), the independent 
samples median test (M test) and the Mann Whitney U test (U-test).  The t-test evaluates 
the hypothesis that the mean of a variable is the same across targets and non-targets
139
. The 
‘M-test’ tests the hypothesis that the median of a variable is the same across targets and 
non-targets. The ‘U-test’ tests the hypothesis that the distribution of a variable is the same 
                                                 
139 Given the nature of the data, it is unclear whether the variance of the variables for the target and 
non-target subgroups is equal. The nature of the variances will dictate the appropriate test to use. 
To investigate this, Levene’s Test for equality of variances is conducted at a 5% level. These results 
obtained from the test determine whether equal variances should or should not be assumed in 
difference of means tests. 
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across targets and non-targets. These tests allow for a statistical determination of whether 
the difference in the mean (t-test), median (M-test) or distribution (U-test) of a variable 
across the targets and the non-targets subgroups is statistically significant within a certain 
confidence level. 
  
The univariate analyses are augmented with multivariate analyses which allow for the 
effects of other independent variables to be controlled for while testing the significance of 
each variable. Several multivariate models have been proposed and used in the literature 
for discriminating between potential targets and non-targets. Amongst these are linear 
models such as multiple linear discriminant models, logit models, multinomial logit 
models, probit models and hazard models (Palepu (1986), Powell (2004), Brar (2009), 
Ouzounis et al. (2009), Cornett et al. (2011), Bhanot et al. (2010) and Cremers et al. 
(2009)). Other data mining and nonlinear models such as support vector machines, 
decision trees, rough set models, neural networks, recursive partitioning and multicriteria 
discriminant analysis have been applied (see, for example, Espahbodi and Espahbodi 
(2003) and Pasiouras et al. (2007))
140
.  
 
Despite the proliferation of different models, the logit model has remained popular as a 
base model for takeover prediction modelling. The logit model is based on logistic 
regression analysis which models a sigmoid-shaped relationship between the probability of 
a particular outcome for a binomially distributed response variable and a linear 
combination of explanatory variables (Moutinho and Hutcheson (2011)). The popularity of 
logit models in takeover prediction can be attributed to two core strengths of the model – 
(1) Robustness to the statistical properties of accounting variables (see Press and Wilson 
(1978), Walter (1994) and Barnes, (2000)), and (2) Theoretical relevance and analytical 
tractability (see Palepu (1986) and Barnes (2000)). The logit model is only restricted by the 
assumption that the explanatory variables are truly independent i.e., no multicollinearity 
exists between explanatory variables (Barnes (2000)). The model is robust to the 
distribution of the independent variables (see Press and Wilson (1978) and Cox (1970)). 
The assumption of independence can be tested by computing variance inflation factors or 
examining the correlation matrix (Moutinho and Hutcheson (2011)) – further discussed 
below.  
 
                                                 
140 Table 2.6.6 (chapter 2) shows the different methods that have been used by different researchers 
to develop takeover prediction-type models. As discussed in section 2.6.2, the logit model is more 
suitable for this study when compared to these non-parametric techniques. 
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Palepu (1986) argues that ‘whether or not a firm is acquired in a particular period depends 
on the number and types of acquisition bids it receives in that period. The number (and 
types) of bids a firm receives depends on the firm’s characteristics as well as the motives 
of the bidder’ (p. 15). In his model, the attributes of the target which cannot be 
quantitatively measured as well as the characteristics of the target-bidder combination are 
assumed to be stochastic. This position is slightly extended (in section 3.4) by 
hypothesising that a firm’s probability of being acquired will depend on a broader range of 
factors including some macroeconomic considerations. These factors are proxied by 
quantitative variables and enter the model explicitly.  
 
Assuming that there are many acquirers in the market and that acquirers’ acquisition 
motives are stochastic, the probability of a firm being acquired can be modelled as a logit 
function of its characteristics and its operating environment (Palepu (1982)). The logit 
function therefore classifies the firm as a target or non-target based on its conditional or 
posterior takeover probability (Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003)). This classification is 
done by computing the odds of the firm being a takeover target in period t conditional upon 
its observed characteristics and attributes prior to period t. The logit model is used as the 
primary method to test the hypothesised linear and curvilinear (U-shape and inverted U-
shape) relationships. The methodology for testing the significance of hypothesised linear 
relationships is standard and involves the analysis of standard errors and p-values. The 
Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS) statistical package (version 8) is employed as 
this allows for the computation of heteroscedasticity-consistent (or White’s) standard 
errors. The sample used in the study consists of repeated observations – i.e., each firm is 
observed over several years. As a robustness check, the Data Analysis and Statistical 
Software (STATA – version 12) is also used to estimate clustered standard errors. 
 
The hypotheses development section of the study is focused on developing a 
comprehensive range of predictive variables to ensure that all relevant variables are 
considered. This approach leads to the development of a broad range of variables. Some of 
these variables are likely to be correlated to a certain degree. The inclusion of correlated 
(or collinear) independent variables in the prediction model is likely to give rise to wide 
confidence intervals and inflated standard errors (see Brookes (2008), Gujarati (2003)), 
although the model parameters are still likely to be ‘BLUE’ – Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimators (see Brookes (2008), p. 173). The ‘wide confidence intervals and inflated 
standard errors’ might result in a false non-rejection of the null hypothesis that coefficients 
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(betas) of affected variables are equal to zero (Brookes (2008)). The level of 
multicollinearity between the variables employed in this study is inspected by computing 
bivariate correlations, variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance.  
 
Table 4.3.2a shows correlation matrices with Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficients (parametric) and Spearman’s rho (non-parametric) for the main variables in 
the model. 
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Table 4.3.2a Panel A: Pearson Correlation Matrix – Bivariate correlation coefficients of independent variables 
 
Notes: The table shows Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between the independent variables in the study and the P. value of the correlation statistic for a two 
tailed test. The variables are shown as V1 to V16 (variable 1 to variable 16) on the horizontal and vertical axis with their associated hypothesis and variable shown in the first 
column.  
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15
ADAR V1 P. Corr
Profitability V2 P. Corr 0.052
Sig. 0.000
Book to Market V3 P. Corr 0.017 -0.028
Sig. 0.006 0.000
Sales Growth V4 P. Corr -0.017 -0.010 -0.157
Sig. 0.007 0.087 0.000
Firm Size V5 P. Corr 0.017 0.256 0.061 -0.090
Sig. 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
FCF V6 P. Corr 0.070 0.555 0.103 -0.130 0.453
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Liquidity V7 P. Corr -0.007 -0.253 -0.095 0.082 -0.274 -0.259
Sig. 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leverage V8 P. Corr -0.011 0.027 -0.108 -0.010 0.224 0.075 -0.276
Sig. 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tangible Assets V9 P. Corr -0.002 0.098 0.352 -0.076 0.275 0.094 -0.389 0.157
Sig. 0.733 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age V10 P. Corr 0.013 0.129 0.263 -0.198 0.285 0.218 -0.221 0.036 0.204
Sig. 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ZSCORE V11 P. Corr 0.002 0.033 0.034 0.029 -0.096 0.068 0.398 -0.324 -0.207 -0.060
Sig. 0.777 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Payroll Expenses V12 P. Corr -0.037 -0.464 -0.163 0.070 -0.415 -0.559 0.400 -0.136 -0.208 -0.220 0.056
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
HHI V13 P. Corr 0.025 -0.079 0.018 0.062 0.023 -0.051 0.023 0.003 0.127 -0.092 -0.026 0.024
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LIBOR-BOEBR V14 P. Corr -0.014 -0.031 0.036 -0.069 0.037 0.044 -0.008 0.013 -0.007 0.000 -0.011 -0.005 0.003
Sig. 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.172 0.018 0.240 0.968 0.058 0.426 0.646
FTSE Change V15 P. Corr -0.123 0.080 -0.008 0.030 0.006 0.035 -0.014 0.002 0.067 0.030 0.014 -0.075 -0.050 -0.280
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.014 0.701 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000
Residual Vol. V16 P. Corr 0.047 -0.154 -0.009 -0.015 -0.121 -0.164 0.011 0.084 -0.004 -0.074 -0.042 0.103 -0.031 -0.035 -0.102
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.153 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.534 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 4.3.2a Panel B: Spearman Correlation Matrix – Bivariate correlation coefficients of independent variables 
 
Notes: The table shows Spearman’s rho between the independent variables in the study and the p value (two tailed test) of the statistic. The variables are shown as V1 
to V16 (variable 1 to variable 16) on the horizontal and vertical axis with their associated hypothesis and variable shown in the first column.  
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15
ADAR V1 P. Corr
Profitability V2 P. Corr 0.066
Sig. 0.000
Book to Market V3 P. Corr 0.015 -0.116
Sig. 0.019 0.000
Sales Growth V4 P. Corr 0.012 0.159 -0.180
Sig. 0.060 0.000 0.000
Firm size V5 P. Corr 0.034 0.242 0.075 -0.019
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
FCF V6 P. Corr 0.086 0.529 0.022 -0.003 0.370
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.608 0.000
Liquidity V7 P. Corr 0.011 -0.107 -0.147 0.043 -0.147 -0.041
Sig. 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leverage V8 P. Corr 0.000 0.095 0.017 0.014 0.362 0.100 -0.406
Sig. 0.943 0.000 0.004 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tangible Assets V9 P. Corr 0.003 0.104 0.391 -0.059 0.296 0.095 -0.364 0.298
Sig. 0.655 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age V10 P. Corr 0.024 0.157 0.292 -0.201 0.320 0.252 -0.216 0.165 0.255
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Z SCORE V11 P. Corr 0.028 0.237 0.167 0.098 0.029 0.276 0.366 -0.491 -0.178 0.032
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Payroll Expenses V12 P. Corr -0.028 -0.319 -0.194 -0.042 -0.392 -0.289 0.214 -0.192 -0.161 -0.174 -0.106
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
HHI V13 P. Corr 0.033 -0.180 -0.128 0.025 -0.010 -0.070 0.076 -0.032 -0.032 -0.181 -0.112 0.027
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LIBOR-BOEBR V14 P. Corr -0.033 -0.028 0.036 -0.065 0.042 0.035 -0.006 0.015 0.003 0.020 -0.021 -0.013 0.024
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.255 0.006 0.619 0.001 0.000 0.052 0.000
FTSEChange V15 P. Corr -0.098 0.062 -0.017 0.036 -0.011 0.027 0.009 0.008 0.047 0.006 0.045 -0.058 -0.119 -0.269
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.106 0.146 0.000 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Residual Vol. V16 P. Corr -0.046 -0.041 0.057 -0.064 -0.029 -0.076 -0.089 0.105 0.089 -0.007 -0.106 -0.021 -0.194 -0.040 -0.203
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 4.3.2a shows a significant correlation (with very low p–values) between most of the 
key variables used in the study. Nonetheless, the level of correlation appears to be modest 
(i.e., the Pearson and Spearman bivariate correlation coefficients are close to zero in most 
cases) and such a level of correlation is unlikely to lead to substantial problems of 
multicollinearity. The main exception is the free cash flow variable which is moderately 
correlated to profitability (correlation coefficient: 0.555), payroll expenses (correlation 
coefficient: -0.559) and firm size (correlation coefficient: 0.453). Payroll expense (as a 
proportion of total sales) is also moderately correlated to firm size (correlation coefficient: 
-0.415) and liquidity (correlation coefficient: 0.400). Some overlap between the free cash 
flow, liquidity and payroll expenses was anticipated (see section 3.4) as firms with high 
expenses are likely to have low available free cash flow. Some overlap between leverage, 
payroll expenses and free cash flow was also expected. The correlation between measures 
of leverage and free cash flow, as well as, leverage and payroll synergies appears to be 
low. 
 
Tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) are, arguably, better measures of the level of 
multicollinearity as they consider the possibility that one independent variable can be a 
function of two or more other independent variables (Brookes (2008)). The Tolerance 
assesses how much multicollinearity can be tolerated in the model
141
. The VIF measures 
the proportion of the inflation in standard errors resulting from multicollinearity. Tolerance 
and VIF for all variables in the model are shown in table 4.3.2b. In the absence of the 
polynomial terms, the VIFs for all variables are low (below 3.00) and tolerances for all 
variables are high (above 0.30). This level of multicollinearity is, perhaps, not a problem as 
it is well below the recommended VIF threshold of 10 (see O’Brien (2007) for a literature 
review on recommended VIFs). This suggests that the level of multicollinearity in the 
model is modest. As expected, the inclusion of the polynomial terms leads to a substantial 
increase in the VIFs and tolerances of their related terms. The VIF of firm size increases 
from 1.46 to 88.98 when firm size squared is added to the model. The results show that the 
standard errors of the polynomial terms are likely to be substantially inflated leading to a 
rejection of the underlying hypotheses. 
                                                 
141 It is computed as )1(
2R , where 2R  is the coefficient of determination obtained by regression 
the variable on all other independent variables. 
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T able 4.3.2b: Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors 
  
Without polynomial terms With polynomial terms 
Hypothesis/Variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
1 ADAR 0.971 1.030 0.969 1.032 
1 Profitability 0.367 2.723 0.366 2.732 
1 LMDummy 0.368 2.720 0.365 2.739 
2 Book to Market 0.544 1.838 0.537 1.861 
2 NBVDummy 0.582 1.717 0.564 1.772 
3 Idummy 0.943 1.060 0.941 1.062 
4 FCF 0.556 1.798 0.502 1.994 
5 Sales Growth 0.907 1.103 0.891 1.123 
5 Liquidity 0.622 1.607 0.605 1.654 
5 GRDummy 0.920 1.087 0.910 1.099 
6 Tangible assets 0.664 1.507 0.653 1.532 
7(9) Firm size 0.664 1.506 0.005 189.375 
7(9) Firm size sq. – – 0.005 185.778 
10 Leverage 0.775 1.290 0.078 12.742 
10 Leverage sq. – – 0.086 11.688 
11a Z SCORE 0.707 1.414 0.623 1.606 
11b ZSDummy 0.651 1.537 0.644 1.552 
8(12) AGE (Inc) 0.830 1.205 0.069 14.466 
8(12) AGE (Inc) Sq – – 0.073 13.689 
13 Rumours 0.988 1.012 0.988 1.012 
14 Payroll Expenses 0.587 1.703 0.098 10.221 
14 Payroll Expenses Sq. – – 0.096 10.465 
15 SRDummy 0.989 1.011 0.988 1.012 
16 Residual Vol. 0.865 1.156 0.862 1.160 
17 HHI 0.934 1.071 0.926 1.080 
18 LIBOR-BOEBR 0.889 1.125 0.889 1.125 
19 FTSEChange 0.842 1.188 0.840 1.191 
Notes: The table shows tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all the variables in this 
study. ‘Without polynomial terms’ represents the results (Tolerance and VIFs) when the squared 
(polynomial) terms are excluded from this analysis. The results show that all VIFs are below the 10 
threshold proposed by O’Brian (2007) The squared terms are highly correlated with their original 
variables hence increasing the VIF. The computation of these proxies as well as variable definitions 
is discussed in chapter 3. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Profitability is the ratio of 
EBITDA to total capital employed. LMDummy takes a value of 1 when a firm makes a loss and a 
value of 0 otherwise. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of 
equity. NBVDummy takes a value of 1 when a firm’s BTM is negative and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio 
of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Ln Assets is the natural 
log of a firm’s total assets. SRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm announced any share repurchases 
in the period and a value of 0 otherwise. MRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is the target in a 
merger rumour and a value of 0 otherwise. ZScore is a firm’s Taffler Z Score. ZSDummy takes a 
value of 1 if a firm has a negative Z Score and a value of 0 otherwise. HR Cost to sales is the ratio of 
payroll expenses to revenues. Herfindahl index is the concentration of the firm’s industry in a 
particular year. Residual volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s abnormal return in the year 
to June 30th. FTSEChange is the performance of the FTSE All Share index in the year to June 30th. 
LIBOR-BOEBR is the spread between the LIBOR and the Bank of England’s base rate. 
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Given the likelihood of bias in the p-values (t-statistics and standard errors) for polynomial 
terms, a further robustness test of curvilinear relationships is conducted. This is discussed 
in section 4.3.3. It is worth reiterating that the use of models with polynomial terms is 
standard practice in contemporary accounting and finance literature (see, for example, 
Cornett et al. (2011)). 
 
In the modelling, I also consider the impact of selected variables by testing alternative 
models. In all regression analyses, I start with a univariate model with only one 
independent variable. As will be discussed in chapter 5, the addition of other control 
variables does not change the initial results in most cases. In chapter 6, I also examine the 
performance of models with and without some of the proposed independent variables. The 
results in chapter 6 (section 6.2) show that models with all the proposed independent 
variables outperform models without the variables. 
4.3.3 Robustness test of curvilinear relationships 
As discussed in section 3.4, the curvilinear relationships (e.g., for firm size) are tested by 
adding a squared term of the key variable (i.e., firm size squared) to the model and testing 
for its statistical significance in the model. This technique for testing for the existence of 
quadratic or curvilinear trends (U-shape and inverted U-shape relationship) is popular in 
the finance literature (see, for example, Loderer and Waelchli (2010)). It is, however, noted 
that this technique generates multicollinearity problems (as discussed in 4.3.2) which 
might impact on the interpretation of the results obtained. I attempt to alleviate this 
problem by conducting two further robustness tests for the four hypothesised curvilinear 
relationships (i.e., firm size, leverage, payroll and firm age).  
 
The first robustness check involves centering the proxies of the four hypotheses. The test 
variable (i.e., firm size) is centered about its mean and the square of the centered variable 
is computed. Centering around the mean potentially reduces the collinearity problem while 
also allowing for the squared term to be interpreted without reference to the key variable 
(Aiken and West (1991)). That is, the statistical significance of the squared term 
(irrespective of the level of significance of the key variable) suggests a significant 
curvilinear relationship. The second robustness check involves the use of piecewise 
regression analysis. Piecewise regression analysis models the curvilinear relationship in a 
different way by assuming the existence of breakpoints in the relationship between 
takeover probability and the key variable (i.e., firm size) and testing for changes in beta 
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(see Gujarati (2007)). For simplicity, I consider four firm size breakpoints (equivalent to 
20
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
, and 80
th
 percentiles in the firm size distribution). I run the model at 
different breakpoints (e.g., for firm size between 0 and 20
th
 percentile, 20
th
 and 40
th
 
percentile, 40
th
 and 60
th
 percentile, 60
th
 and 80
th
 percentile, and 80
th
 and 100
th
 percentile) 
and analyse the sign and significance of the coefficients (beta) of the key variable. The 
model is shown below. 
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                     ( ) 
Where, ∑       is a set of control variables,       is the key variable with slope N,    is 
the constant term,   is the error term and    refers to the Nth percentile for variable     . 
 
As shown in equation 4.3.3 (1), the key variable under test is   . The piecewise regression 
model allows the slope of    to change at different points of the distribution. If the 
hypothesis predicts an inverted U-shape relationship between     and takeover probability 
(  ), then it is expected that the coefficient of   should be positive and the coefficient of   
should be negative (and statistically significant). The coefficients of   and   could also, 
perhaps, be positive and negative (respectively) depending on the degree of curvature in 
the relationship. 
4.3.4 The (new) takeover prediction model 
The new model is a model which combines the new hypotheses (variables) and the old 
hypotheses (variables), discussed in section 3.3 and 3.4, under a predictive modelling 
framework. The model postulates that the probability of a firm receiving a bid in the next 
period is a (logit) function of a vector of 27 firm-related, industry-related and market-
related variables observed in the current period. The hypotheses and independent variables 
employed in the takeover prediction model are developed in chapter 3. The basic model is 
shown below. 
     (   )    (
   
     
)                     ( ) 
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    is the takeover likelihood of firm i at time t and         is a vector of 27 variables for 
firm i at time t-1.     can be computed as the inverse of the logit function – i.e., the logistic 
function – as shown below. 
         
  (       )  
 
          
            ( ) 
 
The model coefficients (β) are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation 
technique with RATS computer software. This method generates the set of coefficients 
which optimises the likelihood of observing the underlying data (further discussed in Long 
and Freese (2006)). As noted in section 4.3.2, a main concern in pool regression analysis is 
the potential correlation of residuals across firms, industry and time when a panel data set 
is used (Powell and Yawson (2007)). In the first instance standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity obtaining Huber-White (robust) standard errors. The pooled estimation 
model computes robust standard errors under the assumption that these standard errors are 
uncorrelated across firms, industry and time. Evidence from Mitchel and Mulherin (1996) 
suggests that takeovers potentially cluster across industries and over time. To resolve this 
issue, robust standard errors are corrected for clustering by using the Rogers (1993) 
method for correcting standard errors for correlation with a cluster (e.g., firm, year, 
industry) – Rogers (clustered) standard errors. This methodology for correcting for 
clustering (Rogers standard errors) has been applied in other studies such as Powell and 
Yawson (2007). 
 
4.3.5 Model stability: Test of intertemporal variation in target 
characteristics 
Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 discuss the methodology for hypotheses testing. These tests are 
conducted over the entire study period. Powell (1997) suggests that the characteristics of 
targets can exhibit intertemporal variation. That is, the characteristics of targets can be 
unstable through time. If this is the case, the new model (discussed in section 4.3.4) is 
likely to lack consistency and robustness in its performance across time. Shorter estimation 
periods have been used in an attempt to mitigate the effect of intertemporal variation (see, 
for example, Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003))
142
. The downside to this approach is the 
significant loss of information and, perhaps, the inability to generalise the findings of the 
study. Powell (1997) neither provides a statistical test to support his argument of 
                                                 
142 Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) employ data from July 1997 to December 1997 (6 months) to 
estimate their models. 
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intertemporal variation nor discuss the reasons for such variations (also see Thomas (1997) 
for a critique of Powell (1997)).  
 
Powell (1997) finds that some variables which were significant predictors of takeover 
likelihood in the 1984–1987 period were insignificant in the 1988-1991 period. Statistics 
provided by Harford (2005) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) show that these two 
periods represent two different phases of the fourth merger wave – a growth in merger 
activity (1984–1987) and a decline in merger activity (1988–1991).  Harford (2005) 
contends that the 1990–1991 period of economic recession, perhaps, led to a substantial 
decline in merger activity in this period. This evidence broadly suggests that Powell’s 
finding can partly be attributed to changing macroeconomic conditions across the two 
estimation samples. Powell (1997) does not control for changes in macroeconomic 
conditions in his model. The new model is likely to be relatively more stable across time as 
hypothesis 18 and hypothesis 19 (discussed in sections 3.4.11 and 3.4.12 respectively), 
perhaps, control for changing macroeconomic conditions. I evaluate this contention by 
testing the new model for intertemporal variation in target characteristics.  
 
Thomas (1997) discusses a suitable methodology for testing for intertemporal variation in 
independent variables. The methodology involves comparing the characteristics of targets 
in one period (period 1) to the characteristics of targets in the next period (period 2) using a 
logit model. The model used for this test is similar to equation 4.3.4(1). The dependent 
(binary) variable in the model takes a value of 1 for targets in the second period (period 2) 
and a value of 0 for targets in the first period (period 1). Given the study period (1988 and 
2009), 20 yearly breakpoints (used for the identification of period 1 and period 2) are set 
from 1989 to 2008. At each breakpoint (e.g., 1990), I investigate whether the 
characteristics of targets prior to this breakpoint (e.g., 1988–1989) are different from the 
characteristics of targets after the breakpoint (e.g., 1990–2009). I use the Chi Squared (  ) 
test and t test to test the null hypothesis that all model coefficients (betas) are jointly equal 
to zero and that individual model coefficients are equal to zero, respectively. I conclude 
that target characteristics do not exhibit intertemporal variation if the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. The results of these analyses are presented and discussed in section 5.5. 
4.3.6 Summary 
This section discusses the methodology used in validating the hypotheses as well as the 
development of the prediction model. The problem of potential multicollinearity (mainly 
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due to the polynomial term) is raised. Some of the independent variables, particularly, the 
profit margin and return on assets, are moderated and highly correlated with other 
independent variables. As discussed in section 4.3.2, this problem can be resolved by using 
the variables as substitutes in the model. Further, results from the analysis of variance 
inflation factors, suggest that the level of multicollinearity within the system of 
independent variables is insignificant. Section 4.3.3 also discusses key robustness checks 
for the existence of curvilinear relationships (in line with the hypotheses). These checks 
include mean centering of squared terms and the use of a piecewise regression analysis 
model. The development of the new model by combining the old and new variables is also 
discussed. Finally, a test of model stability (through evaluating the level of intertemporal 
variation in target characteristics) is discussed. The objective of this final test is to assess 
whether model parameters are relatively stable and, hence, useful in prediction from one 
year to another.  
 
4.4 Evaluating model predictive ability – Chapter 6 
4.4.1 Overview 
This section discusses the methodology employed in chapter 6 to evaluate the new model’s 
performance (i.e., its ability to distinguish between targets and non-target within-sample 
and its ability to predict future takeover targets). Its performance is ascertained by 
comparing it with a benchmark model using Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
curve and out-of-sample analyses. Section 4.4.2 discusses the development and use of 
benchmark models for comparison, section 4.4.3 discusses the use of ROC curve analysis 
and section 4.4.4 discusses the use of out-of-sample performance analysis. 
4.4.2 Benchmark models: old and old (balanced) models 
The new model is evaluated by comparing its performance with that of a control or 
benchmark (described as ‘old’) model. The old model employs the same dataset and 
methods as the new model but is restricted to the old variables only. The only difference 
between the old and new model is the fact that the new model has 15 additional prediction 
variables (the new variables) as shown in table 4.4.2. This makes the old model a suitable 
benchmark to isolate the effects of the new variables.  
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Table 4.4.2: Old model versus new model – Variables 
 
Hypotheses OLD MODEL (Exp. sign) NEW MODEL (Exp. sign) 
Inefficient Management ROCE(–) ROCE (–) 
  ADAR (–) ADAR (–) 
    LMDUMMY (+/–) 
Undervaluation BTM (+) BTM(+) 
    NBVDUMMY (+/–) 
GR Mismatch Sales Growth  (+/–) Sales Growth  (+/–) 
  Liquidity  (+/–) Liquidity  (+/–) 
  GRDummy (+) GRDummy (+) 
Industry Disturbance IDUMMY (+) IDUMMY (+) 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+) FCF (+) 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+) PPP/TA (+) 
Firm Size Ln Assets (–) Ln Assets (+) 
    Ln Assets sq. (–) 
Capital Structure Leverage (+/–) Leverage (+) 
    leverage Sq. (–) 
Firm Age Age  (–) Age  (–) 
    Age squared (+) 
Share Repurchases   SRDUMMY (+/–) 
M&A Rumours   RDUMMY (+) 
Payroll Synergies   HR. Cost to sales (+) 
    HR. Cost to Sales Sq. (–) 
Financial Distress   Z Score (–) 
    ZSDUMMY (–) 
 Industry Concentration   Herfindahl  Index (–) 
Asymmetric Valuation   R&D Intensity (–) 
Market Sentiment   FTSEChange (+) 
Market Liquidity   LIBOR-BOE  (–) 
Constant Term Yes Yes 
Notes: The table shows the independent variables in the old (and old balanced) and new models. 
These variables are derived from the old and new hypotheses (respectively) as discussed in section 
3.2 and 3.3. The new model uses 15 more variables than the old model. The expected sign (i.e., the 
hypothesised relationship between takeover probability and each variable) is shown in brackets.  
 
In the first instance, an unbalanced panel dataset is employed in the analysis. The new 
model has 27 variables of which 12 are old variables and 15 are new variables. The use of 
27 variables in the new model (as compared to 15 variables in the old model) imposes 
greater data restrictions on the dataset as complete data is required to run the analysis. 
Some observations that will be dropped from the new model (due to incomplete data) are 
maintained in the old model since the data is not required. The effect is that the old model 
will be tested on a larger dataset than the new model. It is uncertain whether this difference 
in sample applied for testing can constitute a source of bias in the analysis. To ensure that 
the difference in the size of the test sample does not introduce bias into the analysis, the 
coefficients of the old model are redeveloped using a balanced panel dataset. The derived 
model is referred to as the old (balanced) model. It is worth noting that such a model 
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cannot be replicated in practice without full knowledge of the new variables. It is, hence, 
only used for testing purposes in this study. 
4.4.3 Model comparison using area under Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC) curves 
ROC curve analysis is typically used to evaluate the explanatory power of logit models 
(Hanley and McNeil (1982) and DeLong et al. (1988)). Simply put, a ROC curve is a 
graphical plot that depicts the performance of a binary classification system or model (such 
as logit model) as the discrimination threshold (i.e., cut-of probability) is varied 
(Krzanowski and Hand (2009)). As suggested by Krzanowski and Hand (2009), the 
performance of the model is ascertained by computing the ratio of true positives to total 
positives (sensitivity) and the ratio of false positives to total negatives (specificity) at 
different cut-off probability thresholds. True positives are the number of firms predicted as 
targets that are actual targets. Total positives are the number of targets in the prediction 
sample. False positives are the type II errors i.e., predicted targets which are actual non-
targets. Total negatives are the number of non-targets in the prediction sample. The typical 
ROC curve is obtained by plotting sensitivity against (1 – specificity).  
 
Once the ROC curve is obtained, a key statistic of interest to the investigator is the area 
under the ROC curve. As suggested by Hanley and McNeil (1982) and DeLong et al. 
(1988) the area under the ROC curve is a suitable measure of the predictive power of a 
logit model. More interestingly, ROC curves have been used to directly compare the 
performance of two or more logit model. Studies such as DeLong et al. (1988) and Hanley 
and McNeil (1982, 1983) have developed tests which can be used to directly compare the 
area under the ROC curve of two or more logit models.  
 
The use of ROC curve analysis is popular in the area of bankruptcy prediction. Studies 
such as Altman et al. (2010), Christidis and Gregory (2010) and Tinoco and Wilson 
(2013), amongst others, have employed this technique. To my knowledge, no prior studies 
in takeover prediction have employed such tests. In this study, besides the use of classic 
performance measures such as pseudo R squares (Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R 
squares) and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit statistic, I use ROC curve analysis to 
directly compare the new model’s performance to the performance of the old (or 
benchmark) model. 
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4.4.4 Model comparison using portfolio target concentration  
4.4.4.1 Overview 
A common and intuitive technique for comparing prediction models is to directly compare 
their ability to predict an event out-of-sample (see, for example, Palepu (1986), Bartley and 
Boardman (1986, 1990), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000), Powell (2001, 2004) and Pasiouras et 
al. (2007)). The first step in the process is to identify a suitable portfolio selection method. 
Next, the model coefficients (generated using data in period t) are used to compute 
takeover probabilities out-of-sample (period t+1). Firms are then ranked in order of 
increasing takeover probability and the portfolio selection method is used to identify the 
target portfolio. The portfolio’s target concentration – a measure of predictive ability – is 
computed as follows. 
 
                      
                                              
                                 
 
 
There are several methods for identifying the target portfolio including the use of cut-off 
probabilities, fixed-size portfolios (e.g., portfolio of 100 stocks), percentiles, deciles and 
quintiles. Different methods have been used in prior research with no consensus on what 
method is optimal. The portfolio selection method is important in this study as the returns 
to predicted targets (analysed in chapter 7) are based on these portfolios. To avoid any bias 
due to choice of portfolio selection method, I explore the use of a wide range of portfolio 
selection techniques. The techniques explored are discussed in sections 4.4.4.2 and 4.4.4.3. 
4.4.4.2 Cut-off probabilities for identifying the target portfolio 
The logit model (for takeover prediction) reports its output in terms of probability. That is, 
the model uses its coefficients to transform the independent variables for any observation 
(firm-year) into a probability value. This probability value represents the likelihood that 
the firm will receive a bid in the next period based on the publicly available information 
available about the firm, its industry and the market. The expectation is that the computed 
probabilities will range from 0 to 1. A key task is to determine a cut-off point over which 
the computed probability is ‘high enough’ for the firm to be considered a potential target. 
While a median break point of 0.5 may sound intuitive (see Palepu (1986) for a 
discussion), with firms above this breakpoint classified as targets and vice versa, it is 
empirically unjustified as the number of non-targets far outweigh the number of targets in 
the sample (Palepu (1986), Powell (2001)).  
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As noted by Powell (2001), determining an optimum cut-off probability involves a trade-
off between the cost of committing a type I error and the cost of committing a type II 
error
143
. Two major procedures for determining cut-off probabilities have been proposed in 
the literature by Palepu (1986) and Powell (2001). The two procedures are only slightly 
different. The difference is based on whether the researcher assumes that the cost of 
committing a type I error and the cost of committing a type II error are (or are not) equal 
and constant (Powell (2001)). 
 
The first procedure, proposed by Palepu (1986) and extended in Barnes (1998), is based on 
an objective to minimise the total number of misclassifications. The underlying objective is 
to minimise both type I and type II errors since it is assumed that the costs of committing 
both types of errors are equal (Palepu 1986). The second procedure proposed by Powell 
(2001) is based on an objective to maximise the proportion (concentration) of targets in the 
selected target portfolio. This cut-off allows non-targets to be classified as targets only if 
this markedly increases the number of actual targets (i.e., target concentration) within the 
takeover portfolio. This is based on the assumption that the cost of a type II error is higher 
than the cost of a type 1 error. By design, Powell’s (2001) method imposes a stricter rule 
for including each prospective target into the target portfolio. 
 
Arguably, both procedures have merits and demerits and their underlying objectives are 
both valid. In both cases, cut-off probabilities are computed using ex-ante data. It is 
assumed that the cost of committing a type I and type II error are constant over time hence 
cut-off probabilities developed ex-ante are applicable ex-post. Further, the use of ex-ante 
data to develop cut-off points for predictive tests prevents look-ahead bias in the analysis. 
As noted by Powell (2001), Palepu’s procedure leads to the selection of a lower cut-off 
probability when compared with Powell’s procedure. The implication (as discussed in 
Barnes (1998) and Powell (2001)) is that target portfolios developed using the Palepu 
(1986) approach are likely to have a higher number of targets but also a higher number of 
non-targets misclassified as targets. Powell’s procedure aligns with the overall objective of 
identifying an optimal portfolio within which the proportion of targets is highest and the 
number of misclassifications of non-targets is lowest. This procedure is very similar to that 
                                                 
143 A type I error is a case where the selected cut-off probability allows a target to be incorrectly 
classified as a non-target ex-post. Similarly, a type II error is a case where the selected cut-off 
probability (ex-ante) allows a non-target to be incorrectly classified as a target (ex-post). Type I and 
type II errors are discussed further in section 4.4.6. 
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proposed by Barnes (1998, 1999 and 2000). The Powell (2001) procedure for computing 
optimal cut-off probabilities is adopted in this study
144
. To ensure that the results are not 
biased by this choice, I also consider other methods of identifying targets, suggested and 
employed by more recent studies (discussed in section 4.4.4.3). 
4.4.4.3 Portfolio sorts for identifying the target portfolio 
The use of probability deciles and quintiles to classify targets is common in the literature 
(see, for example, Brar et al. (2009) and Cremers et al. (2009)). Here, firms in the holdout 
sample within the top probability decile or quintile (i.e., decile or quintile of firms with the 
highest takeover likelihood) are simply considered as potential targets. While this is a 
useful technique from an investment perspective, it can, perhaps, not be theoretically 
justified. Under this methodology, a firm’s likelihood of receiving a bid is a function of the 
likelihood of other firms receiving a bid. For example, if 20% of firms in a sample have a 
high takeover probability (say above 0.6), then a firm, i, with a takeover probability of 0.5 
will fall in a lower decile (or quintile) and will be considered as a non-target. The firm’s 
classification as a target or non-target is therefore contingent on the takeover probabilities 
of other firms in the holdout sample. Further, the use of deciles (quintiles) implicitly 
assumes that 10.00% (20.00%) of firms in the holdout sample will receive a bid every year. 
The UK average, as shown in section 4.2.6, is about 5.05%. The use of cut-off 
probabilities, potentially, circumvents some of the problems with portfolio sorts. Cut-offs 
probabilities are developed ex-ante (test sample) and applied ex-poste (holdout sample). 
The technique is popular in the literature and is used here to ensure comparison and 
consistency with prior studies. 
 
The empirical evidence on investor diversification tendencies asserts that small investors 
choose to hold only a small number of stocks in their portfolios mainly due to the 
transaction costs and management fees involved (Statman (1987) and Goetzmann and 
Kumah (2008)). For example, after examining the portfolios of over 62,000 US 
small/individual investors between 1991 and 1996, Goetzmann and Kumah (2008) 
conclude that the average US individual investor holds between four and six stocks in their 
                                                 
144 As discussed in Powell (2001, p. 1000), once takeover probabilities for all firms in the holdout 
sample are computed, the optimal cut-off probability can be obtained through the following four 
steps. 
(1) Rank the firms in each year by their takeover probabilities.  
(2) Construct 10 portfolios of equal sizes – using deciles. 
(3) Compute the ratio of actual targets to total firms for each portfolio – target concentration. 
(4) Select the lowest takeover probability in the portfolio with the highest target concentration 
ratio. 
 172 
 
portfolio. Similar results for small investors have been reported by Barber and Odean 
(2000). Using a sample of 123,640 European firms, Faccio et al. (2011) show that the 
situation is surprisingly not very much different for large investors despite the extensively 
documented benefits of diversification. Their results show that only 43.5% of large 
investors are diversified (i.e., hold equity in two or more firms) of which 6.3% (0.87%) 
hold equity in more than 10 (50) firms and only 0.34% of large investors in Europe (UK 
inclusive) hold equity in more than 100 firms.  
 
The evidence above suggests that investors might be keen on maintaining a small number 
of stocks in their portfolio rather than investing in all stocks that meet their investment 
criteria. The use of cut-off probabilities in prediction models does not allow for the control 
of the number of predicted targets and therefore might not be a suitable selection criterion 
for all investors. Consistent with prior studies (Brar et al. (2009), Cremers et al. (2009)), 
deciles and quintiles of target portfolios are obtained by applying the ‘portfolio sorts’ 
methodology. For the purpose of this study and to allow for robustness, several other 
portfolios sizes, types and strategies are employed. These are summarised in the table 
(4.4.4) below. 
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Table 4.4.4: Portfolios employed – Description and rationale 
Portfolio Description or definition Rationale 
Cut off Portfolio of firms with 
probability of receiving a bid 
greater than the cut-off 
probability attained using the 
Powel (2001) procedure 
The importance of cut-off probabilities is so that an 
investor using only limited data e.g. data for 20 non-
randomly selected firms can analyse them independently to 
see if they are likely to be targets. Deciles, quintiles require 
that the whole data set be analysed. 
Decile 10 
(D10) 
Decile (10%) of firms with 
highest probability of receiving a 
bid 
Convention; employed in studies such as Cremers et al. 
(2009) and Brar et al. (2009). 
Quintile 5 
(Q5) 
Quintile (20%) of firms with 
highest probability of receiving a 
bid 
Convention; employed in studies such as Cremers et al. 
(2009) 
Port5% Portfolio of 5% of firms with 
highest probability of receiving a 
bid 
Descriptive statistics show that on average 5.05% of UK 
listed firms between 1989 and 2009  received a bid each 
year  
Port100 Portfolio of 100 firms with 
highest probability of receiving a 
bid 
None but might be a viable option for large fund managers 
and institutional investors 
Port50 Portfolio of 50 firms with highest 
probability of receiving a bid 
Used by Morgan Stanley Target Equity Index (2003–2011) 
and Wansley et al. (1983) 
Port30 Portfolio of 30 firms with highest 
probability of receiving a bid 
Theoretically approximated as the size of a well-diversified 
portfolio. Fisher and Lowrie (1970) argue that over 95% of 
diversification benefits can be captured with a ‘diversified’ 
portfolio of 30–32 stocks   
Port10 Portfolio of 10 firms with highest 
probability of receiving a bid 
Provides a viable option for small and individual investors 
Notes: This table shows the different techniques used to identify the optimal portfolio of predicted 
targets. It is assumed that all portfolios are constructed and held on the 1st of July in the respective 
year until the 30 June in the next year (one year holding period). Both equal-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios are assessed and the portfolios are rebalanced annually. This is further 
discussed in section 4.5. 
 
One advantage of cut-off probabilities (section 4.4.4.2) over portfolio sorts is that cut-off 
probabilities offer more flexibility and real-time prediction. This is particularly important 
given that firm financial data becomes public at different points in time (discussed in 
section 4.2.5). A modeller employing cut-off probabilities can determine whether a firm is 
a potential target at any point when its financial information becomes public. A modeller 
using portfolio sorts will need to wait until all financial results for all firms in the sample 
are made public before constructing his/her portfolio. As discussed in section 4.2.5, it is 
assumed that happens at the end of June each year – the June approach. Further, the use of 
cut-offs allows a firm’s takeover likelihood to be independently determined, i.e., not 
determined by the likelihood of other firms in the population becoming targets. The 
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‘portfolio sorts’ methodology implicitly assumes a firm’s takeover likelihood is determined 
relative to the takeover likelihood of other firms
145
. 
4.4.5 Summary 
Section 4.4 discusses the methodology applied to evaluate the model’s predictive ability. 
The performance of the new model is directly compared with the performance of two 
control models (the old and old (balanced) models) using both ROC curve analysis and 
out-of-sample target portfolio analysis. The old model is a model which is developed using 
only the old takeover prediction hypothesis. The use of this model as a control model 
allows for the contribution of the new variables to be empirically determined. The old 
(balanced) model is an additional robustness check for the effect of sample size differences 
which involves testing the old model on a balanced sample – exact sample use by the new 
model. The empirical analysis and tests are conducted over different test samples and 
different holdout periods. Several methods (including cut-offs and portfolio sorts) are used 
to identify the target portfolio. The target portfolio is evaluated using a comprehensive 
performance metric which considers the level of type I and type II errors, the target 
concentration and the overall model predictive ability. Overall, this method of testing, is 
perhaps, more extensive and robust, when compared to the methods used in prior studies. 
 
4.5  Evaluating model investment potential - Chapter 7 
A key research question this study seeks to explore is whether takeover prediction can 
form the basis of a successful investment strategy. This builds on prior research findings 
that takeover targets gain substantial abnormal returns during the period surrounding the 
takeover announcement. Chapter 6 focuses on developing portfolios of firms which are 
predicted to receive takeover bids in the next period. This sub-section discusses the 
methods used in the computation of the abnormal returns earned by these portfolios. 
 
Portfolio abnormal returns are computed following the calendar-time portfolio approach 
discussed in Ang and Zhang (2004). The first step in this process is computing the 
portfolio returns from stock returns. This is done as follows. Monthly discrete (or simple) 
returns are computed from the return index [RI] DataStream data-type which represents 
                                                 
145 For example, a firm with takeover probability of 0.7 will only be included in a target portfolio 
(obtained from deciles) if its takeover probability is higher than the takeover probability of 90% of 
the population. An established cut-off probability of 0.67, will mean that such a firm will be 
included in the target portfolio even if 80% of the firms in the population have a takeover 
probability greater than 0.67.  
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share prices adjusted for dividend payments. The monthly discrete returns for each stock 
are computed for the period July year t (X1) to June year t+1 (X2) to coincide with the 
portfolio holding period as discussed in section 4.2.5 – the June approach. Simple firm 
returns are computed as follows. 
          
         
   
            ( ) 
 
      and      are the adjusted (for dividends, splits and repurchases) share prices for each 
stock in month t+1 and month t respectively. Unlike prior studies (such as Palepu (1986) 
and Brar et al. (2009)), which employ a state-based sampling methodology where targets 
are matched with a sample of (non-randomly selected) surviving non-targets, survival bias 
is avoided in this study by using a panel data set of both live and dead (delisted) firms. 
Inadvertently, several of these firms are delisted for different reasons including 
bankruptcy, liquidation, and administration, amongst others. To ensure that the potential 
loss associated with these events are accounted for in the analysis, firms that go bankrupt, 
are suspended or are delisted, are ascribed a return of –100% in the month of bankruptcy 
(or delisting) and are taken out of the portfolio from the next month.  
 
The methodology for identifying bankrupt firms is consistent with Christidis and Gregory 
(2010). The data regarding firm status is obtained from the LSPD
146
 Database and the 
LSPD Master Index File which provides a reason of death in each case using different 
codes: liquidation (7), delisted and all dealings terminated (14), receiver appointed (16), 
administrative receivership (20), and cancelled or suspended (21)
147
. Individual firms are 
identified in the LSPD Master Index File using SEDOL codes. These codes are matched 
with the respective DataStream codes and the ‘–100%’ returns are manually entered for 
each case in the month in which the delisting takes place. 
 
In line with Cremers et al. (2009), returns are computed for both equal-weighted portfolios 
and value-weighted portfolios and portfolios are rebalanced annually. Equal-weighted 
portfolios assume that an equal amount is invested in each firm in the portfolio at the 
beginning of the portfolio holding period and the portfolio is held until the end of the 
holding period. The value-weighted portfolios assume that an investor allocates his 
investment to the stocks in the portfolio in proportion to their market value at the 
                                                 
146 Source file G Records: G 10 type of Death 
147 It is worth noting that firms which are delisted due to a takeover are not treated in the same way 
as bankrupt or delisted firms. 
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beginning of the portfolio holding period – June 30th. The average return on the portfolio in 
month t (denoted average monthly unadjusted return, AMUR) is computed by averaging 
the returns for each firm in the portfolio in a particular month. (The computation of risk-
adjusted returns is discussed in the next section). For equal-weighted portfolios, this is 
given by 
      
 
 
∑                          ( )
 
   
 
And for value-weighted portfolios this is given by 
      ∑            
 
   
            ( ) 
Where   is the month for which returns are being computed, N is the number of firms in 
the portfolio,           is the discrete return on firm   in month  , and   is the weight
148
 
of firm   within the portfolio. The AMUR computed above, therefore, represents the 
monthly returns on an investor’s portfolio (value or equal-weighted) from one month to 
another.  
 
Annual rebalancing is, potentially, problematic as the weights are subject to the value of 
the firm on a single day. An alternative to annual rebalancing is monthly rebalancing 
where the weighting in each stock is adjusted for growth or decline in market value in each 
month. This method, however, involves active stock trading which increases the portfolio 
management costs (such as transaction costs and monitoring costs) and, therefore, reduces 
the potential returns from the strategy.  
 
The second step in the process of computing portfolio abnormal returns is to adjust 
portfolio returns for risk. This section discusses the models used in the computation of 
abnormal returns (or risk-adjusted returns) which are obtained by adjusting portfolio 
returns for risk factors such portfolio risk, market risk and return volatility amongst others. 
Several approaches (with different strengths and weaknesses) have been employed in the 
literature in a bid to adjust returns for the risks involved. To allow for robustness and 
comparison of the results with previous literature, portfolio monthly returns (AMUR) are 
adjusted for risk by using popular risk adjustment models including the CAPM, Three-
                                                 
148 Defined (or computed) as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the total market value of 
the firms in the portfolio at the start of the holding period. 
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factor model (Fama and French (1992)) and the Four-factor model (Carhart (1997)). The 
table below shows the specifications of the different models employed.  
 
Table 4.5.3: Risk adjustment models  
Panel A: Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
                (       )                       ( ) 
Panel B: Fama and French three-factor model 
                (       )                                   ( ) 
Panel C: Four-factor model 
               (       )                            
                ( ) 
Note: The table shows different risk adjustment models that are used to compute abnormal returns 
(alpha) earned by target portfolios. Equations 4.5.3 (1) to 4.5.3 (3) specify the different measures 
employed in adjusting for portfolio risks. The alpha (  ) is equivalent to the constant term obtained 
through regression analysis. This represents the risk-adjusted abnormal return for portfolio i.  
 
In these equations (equations 4.5.3 (1) to 4.5.3 (3)),     is the discrete return (AMUR) on 
portfolio i in month t,     is the risk free rate in month t,    is the abnormal (excess) 
monthly return or portfolio alpha in the period,     is the market return in month t, SMB 
(Small Minus Big) and HML (High Minus Low) are the Fama & French factors, UMD 
(Winners Minus Losers) is the momentum factor. SMB (the difference in the returns of 
value-weighted portfolios of small stocks and big stocks), HML (the difference in the 
returns of value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-
market stocks) and UMD (the difference in the returns of winners and losers) depict the 
monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for the common size factor, book to 
market equity factor and momentum factor in stock returns.         are regression 
coefficients for the different risk factors. The data for the monthly risk free rate (RF), the 
monthly market return (RM), and the risk factors (SMB, HML and UMD) for the UK 
market are obtained from Gregory et al. (2013)
149
.  
 
As per these equations, I fit monthly excess portfolio returns (       ) to excess market 
return (       ), the size factor (    ), the book to market factor (    ) and the 
momentum factor (    ). The intercept or constant term from this regression provides an 
estimate of returns that cannot be explained by common risk factors.  
                                                 
149 The data is available freely through this link: 
http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/  
[Last accessed 15 June 2014] 
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Standard errors obtained are corrected for heteroscedasticity to obtain robust (white) 
standard errors. Given that the process involves time series regressions of firm returns, for 
robustness, t-statistics are also estimated using Newey-West standard errors (with up to 5 
lags) which correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in residuals. This analysis is 
done in STATA. The results are generally similar and the conclusions do not change. 
 
4.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the sample selection, data and methodology for the empirical 
analysis in the study. The study employs a sample of UK firms between 1988 and 2009 for 
developing and testing the takeover prediction model. After eliminating firms which do not 
meet the required criteria (see section 4.2.2), a final sample of 2,970 firms (1,172 active 
firms, 1,773 dead firms and 25 suspended firms) is obtained. Financial accounting data 
pertaining to the old and new hypotheses (see table 4.2.3) is collected from DataStream for 
all 2,970 firms between 1988 and 2009. This results in a panel data of 32,363 firm-year 
observations. Data for 2,799 acquisition bids for UK public targets made between 1
st
 July 
1989 and 30
th
 June 2011 is collected from Thomson OneBanker. The algorithm discussed 
in section 4.2.5 which employs the ‘June approach’ is used to match the data from 
OneBanker and DataStream to create a unique database, with suitably aligned data, to 
facilitate the model development process. The logit model is used as the base model for 
testing the hypotheses and for developing the takeover prediction model.  
 
The issue of model stability across time and intertemporal variation of model parameters is 
discussed in section 4.3.5. The level of model stability will, perhaps, influence the choice 
of the optimal model estimation period (discussed in 4.4.3). The new model is evaluated by 
testing its ability to predict targets out-of-sample (predictive ability). Different portfolio 
selection techniques are used to ensure robustness of the results. The model’s ability to 
generate abnormal returns for investors is also tested using the methodology discussed in 
section 4.5.  
 
Overall, the focus of the methodology employed across the three empirical chapters of this 
study (chapters 5, 6 and 7) is to ensure that a robust process is followed both in the 
development and testing of the takeover prediction model. As discussed in chapter 2 (see 
sections 2.5 and 2.6), the results of several prior studies are, perhaps, affected by 
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substantial methodological biases or shaped by the choice of methods. This study, 
therefore, contributes to the literature by providing a more robust and comprehensive test 
of old prediction hypotheses as well as by introducing (and evaluating) several new 
hypotheses for takeover prediction. 
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CHAPTER 5  HYPOTHESES VALIDATION  
 
5.1 Overview 
The objective of this chapter is to test and validate both the old and the new hypotheses 
discussed in chapter 4. These hypotheses (and associated proxies) are combined to develop 
the new model which is evaluated in chapter 6. In this chapter, the empirical tests are 
conducted using the unbalanced panel data set. The process of eliminating outliers from the 
dataset is discussed in section 4.2.6. The final dataset is analysed using the univariate and 
multivariate techniques discussed in section 4.3. The old hypotheses are evaluated in 
section 5.2 and the new hypotheses are evaluated in section 5.3. The impact of the chosen 
data winsorisation procedure is evaluated in section 5.4. Tests for model stability and 
intertemporal variation in model parameters are conducted in section 5.5.  
 
5.2 Hypotheses evaluation: Old hypotheses 
5.2.1 Overview 
The old hypotheses discussed in the study are tested using the full sample. This retest is 
important given the differences between the sample design and methodology in this study 
and those employed in prior studies. The key sampling and methodological differences 
between this study and prior studies are discussed in section 2.6.3 and section 4.2.3. The 
old hypotheses discussed here include: the inefficient management, firm undervaluation, 
growth-resource mismatch, industry disturbance, firm size, free cash flow, tangible 
property and firm age hypotheses. The multivariate model is a logit regression model 
which generates parameter estimates through the maximum likelihood method. The 
analyses are conducted using the RATS econometrics software and p-values are computed 
from heteroscedasticity-consistent (or Huber-White) standard errors. The descriptive 
statistics obtained after adjusting for outliers (as discussed in section 4.2.6) are presented in 
table 5.2.1.  
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Table 5.2.1: Descriptive Statistics for proxies of management inefficiency, firm undervaluation and growth-resource mismatch 
   
N Mean Mean MWU Std. Skewness Min Max 25th Median Median 75th 
 Hypothesis    Valid   Diff. (Sig) U (Sig.) Dev       Percentile   Diff. (Sig) Percentile 
Inefficient Profitability 0 30,728 0.084 
 
 0.286 -0.860 -0.653 0.598 -0.003 0.118  0.232 
management 
 
1 1,635 0.114 -0.030*** ** 0.235 -0.889 -0.653 0.598 0.040 0.151 -0.033 0.219 
 ADAR 0 24,232 0.0001   0.003 0.831 -0.035 0.060 -0.001 0.0001  0.001 
    1 1,635 -0.0004 0.0005*** *** 0.003 -0.835 -0.017 0.013 -0.002 -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.001 
Under  BTM 0 26,045 0.493    0.582 0.908 -0.440 1.986 0.123 0.372  0.751 
Valuation 
 
1 1,541 0.468 0.025* 
 
0.536 0.760 -0.440 1.986 0.128 0.379 -0.007 0.754 
 Positive  0 26,045 0.530   0.536 1.293 0.000 1.986 0.123 0.372  0.751 
 BTM 1 1,541 0.507 0.023*  0.487 1.211 0.000 1.986 0.128 0.379 -0.007 0.754 
Growth  Sales  0 26,893 0.183 
 
 0.395 1.590 -0.386 1.379 -0.026 0.090  0.266 
resource growth 1 1,566 0.172 0.011 
 
0.367 1.843 -0.386 1.379 -0.014 0.082 0.008** 0.235 
mismatch Liquidity 0 30,708 0.151   0.178 1.560 0.000 0.656 0.023 0.082  0.205 
 
 
1 1,635 0.119 0.032*** *** 0.146 2.000 0.000 0.656 0.020 0.067 0.015*** 0.154 
 Leverage 0 30,714 0.490   0.655 1.987 0.000 2.689 0.016 0.263  0.651 
    1 1,634 0.566 -0.076*** *** 0.674 1.812 0.000 2.689 0.068 0.365 -0.102*** 0.740 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for key variables and compares the results for targets to those of non-targets. The hypotheses and their proxies are 
shown in the first two columns. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed, ADAR is the average daily abnormal return, book to market is the ratio of 
book value of equity to market value of equity, Positive BTM presents statistics for book to market ratio by winsorising all observations with negative book to market 
ratios at 0 (i.e., replacing negative BTM ratios with 0), Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period, Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short 
term investments to total assets and Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. In the third column, ‘0’ indicates the results for non-targets and ‘1’ indicates the results for 
targets. Mean difference for each variable is the difference between the mean for non-targets and targets prior to rounding-up. MWU (U-test) generates the U statistic and 
the level of significance of U. U (sig) shows the U statistic obtained (and the level of significance of U) when testing whether there is a difference in the distribution of a 
variable for targets and non-targets. The Median Diff (sig.) shows the difference in median between targets and non-targets for each variable (and its level of significance). 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5.2.1 cont’d: Descriptive statistics for proxies of asymmetric valuation, firm size, free cash flow, tangible assets, firm age and financial 
distress 
   
N Mean Mean MWU Std. Skewness Min Max 25th Median Median 75th 
 Hypothesis    Valid   Diff.  U  Dev.       Percentile   Diff.  Percentile 
Asymmetric Residual  0 24,232 0.017   0.017 4.481 0.000 0.059 0.006 0.013 
 
0.023 
valuation volatility 1 1,174 0.017 0.001 
 
0.015 1.786 0.000 0.059 0.004 0.014 -0.001** 0.023 
Firm Ln 0 30,719 17.682 
 
 2.237 0.210 6.908 25.976 16.218 17.493 
 
18.991 
size assets 1 1,635 18.169 -0.486*** *** 1.795 0.493 12.528 24.029 16.868 17.983 -0.490*** 19.195 
Tangible PPE/TA 0 30,471 0.309   0.249 0.002 0.002 0.863 0.093 0.264 
 
0.460 
property 
 
1 1,634 0.339 -0.030*** *** 0.259 0.002 0.002 0.863 0.111 0.294 -0.030*** 0.513 
FCF FCF/TA 0 23,693 -0.042   0.184 -1.461 -0.553 0.187 -0.090 0.008 
 
0.071 
 
 
1 1,467 0.000 -0.042*** *** 0.134 -1.758 -0.553 0.187 -0.044 0.023 -0.015*** 0.078 
Payroll HR cost 0 22,234 0.341   0.271 1.779 0.057 1.166 0.165 0.265 
 
0.405 
synergies to sales 1 1,338 0.314 0.027*** 
 
0.225 1.942 0.057 1.166 0.168 0.257 0.008 0.381 
Firm Age 0 28,334 31.874   32.618 1.048 0.000 163.000 6.000 17.000 
 
54.000 
age 
 
1 1,552 30.760 1.114 
 
31.711 1.204 0.000 164.000 7.000 16.000 1.000* 49.000 
Financial  ZSCORE  0 25,877 29.909   66.563 2.851 -17.593 273.926 2.076 8.212 
 
20.499 
 Distress 
 
1 1,459 25.954 3.955** ** 60.249 3.221 -17.593 273.926 2.195 7.434 0.778*** 16.834 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for key variables and compares the results for targets to those of non-targets. The hypotheses and their proxies are 
shown in the first two columns. Residual volatility (a proxy of the asymmetric valuation hypothesis) is computed from the firm’s one-year daily abnormal returns, Ln 
assets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets, PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets, FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow 
(operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets, HR cost to sales is the ratio of payroll expenses to total revenue, Age is the number of years since 
incorporation and ZSCORE is the firm’s Taffler Z score. In the third column, ‘0’ indicates the results for non-targets and ‘1’ indicates the results for targets. Mean difference 
for each variable is the difference between the mean for non-targets and targets prior to rounding-up. MWU (U-test) generates the U statistic and the level of significance 
of U. U (sig) shows the U statistic obtained (and the level of significance of U) when testing whether there is a difference in the distribution of a variable for targets and 
non-targets. The Median Diff (sig.) shows the difference in median between targets and non-targets for each variable (and its level of significance). *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.2.1 compares the descriptive statistics (including, mean, standard deviation, 
skewness, minimum, maximum, and quartiles) for each firm-level hypothesis (and proxy) 
for targets (denoted by ‘1’) and non-targets (denoted by ‘0’). The results of the descriptive 
statistics presented in table 5.2.1 are further discussed in sections 5.2.2 to 5.2.9 and 5.3.7 to 
5.3.9. The outlier elimination process is fully discussed in section 4.2.6 (chapter 4). The 
process involved winsorisation of key variables at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile. This process 
has substantially reduced the level of skewness in the distribution of the variables and has 
eliminated implausible values. It is worth acknowledging that, while steps have been taken 
to eliminate extreme values, their presence does not necessarily pose any problems to the 
multivariate analysis as the base model (i.e., the logit probability model) does not assume 
that the independent variables are normally distributed (Cox (1970), Press and Wilson 
(1978) and Lo (1986)). The fact that the logit estimator maintains its consistency 
irrespective of the distributional characteristics of the independent variable has remained 
its main strength (Lo (1986)). 
 
In addition to the univariate analysis (results to be further discussed in sections 5.2.2 to 
5.2.9), different logit regression models are run. The general model is specified in equation 
4.3.4(1) and restated below. 
 
     (  )                                ( ) 
Here,   is the hypothesis (proxy) to be tested and    is the parameter estimate from the 
logit regression analysis. The results from this analysis are presented in table 5.2.1b. 
 
In table 5.2.1b, model 1A is a univariate logit regression model with no control variables. 
The values reported in the table represent the coefficients (and their statistical significance) 
obtained by regressing each independent variable (old hypothesis and proxy) against the 
dependent variable (takeover probability). Model 1B, 1C and 1D are multivariate logit 
regression models. Model 1B combines all ‘old’ hypotheses (proxies) as model 
independent variables. No industry dummies are added to model 1B. Model 1C uses all the 
old variables as well as the LMDummy and NBVDummy. Their relevance is discussed in 
section 3.3.2 and section 3.3.3. As in model 1B, no industry dummies are added to model 
1C. Model 1D is similar to model 1C but also includes industry dummies to control for 
industry effects. 
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Table 5.2.1b: Pooled regression results for existing hypotheses  
Panel A: Robust (Huber-White) Standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D 
Inefficient  Profitability (-) 0.395*** 0.060 -0.268 -0.270 
Management LMDummy (+/-) -0.424*** - -0.272* -0.268* 
 
ADAR (-) -70.488*** -83.317*** -83.350*** -82.160*** 
Undervaluation BTM (+) -0.076* -0.120* -0.206*** -0.176** 
 
NBVDummy (+/-) 0.023 - -0.220** -0.236** 
Growth-resource  Sales Growth (+/-) -0.074 -0.074 -0.079 -0.082 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/-) -1.216*** -0.605** -0.638** -0.602** 
 
Leverage (+/-) 0.161*** 0.043 0.054 0.052 
 
GRDummy (+) 0.026 -0.030 -0.036 -0.045 
Industry Dist. IDUMMY (+) -0.097 -0.008 0.000 -0.021 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-) 0.094*** 0.040** 0.035** 0.043** 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+) 1.539*** 0.908*** 0.886*** 0.857*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+) 0.463*** 0.520*** 0.455*** 0.403** 
Firm Age Age  (-) -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term     -3.506*** -3.229*** -3.472*** 
Industry dummies NO NO NO YES 
Usable Observations 
 
16,854 16,854 16,854 
Deviance (–2LL) 
 
7,206 7,202 7,193 
Pseudo-R^2 
 
0.006 0.007 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients   105.550*** 113.290*** 132.045*** 
 
 
 
Panel B: Roger standard errors (adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering)  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 1E (firm) Model 1F (Year) Model 1G (Industry) 
Inefficient  Profitability (-)  -0.268 -0.268 -0.268 
Management LMDummy (+/-)  -0.272* -0.272** -0.272 
 
ADAR (-)  -83.350*** -83.350** -83.350** 
Undervaluation BTM (+)  -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
 
NBVDummy (+/-)  -0.220* -0.220* -0.220** 
Growth-resource  Sales Growth (+/-)  -0.079 -0.079 -0.079 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/-)  -0.638** -0.638** -0.638** 
 
Leverage (+/-)  0.054 0.054 0.054 
 
GRDummy (+)  -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 
Industry Dist. IDUMMY (+)  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-)  0.035* 0.035* 0.035*** 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+)  0.886*** 0.886*** 0.886*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+)  0.455*** 0.455*** 0.455** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** 
Constant Term    -3.229*** -3.229*** -3.229*** 
Usable Observations  16,854 16,854 16,854 
Deviance (–2LL)  7,146 7,144 7,146 
Pseudo-R^2  0.016 0.016 0.016 
LR Test of Coefficients  98.94*** 440.16*** 98.94*** 
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 Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate) and the independent variable are the old prediction hypotheses. 
The hypothesis being tested is shown in the first column and its associated proxy is shown in the 
second column. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. LMDummy takes a 
value of 1 when a firm makes a loss in a given year and a value of 0 otherwise. ADAR is the 
average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity. NBVDummy takes a value of 1 when the BTM is negative and a value of 0 
otherwise. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity 
is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity 
ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth 
opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a 
takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. Ln Total Assets is the natural log 
of the firm’s total assets. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital 
investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign 
is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 1A represents univariate logit regression models where 
the dependent variable is takeover probability and the sole independent variable is the variable in 
question (proxy). For example the coefficients of profitability (a proxy for management 
inefficiency) are obtained from regressing profitability as the sole independent variable with 
takeover probability as the binary dependent variable (with no control variables). Model 1B is a 
multivariate logit model which uses all the old variables as independent variables and regresses 
them on firm takeover probability. Model 1C is a multivariate logit model which uses all the old 
variables (including LMDummy and NBVDummy) as independent variables and regresses them 
on firm takeover probability. Model 1D replicates model 1C but adds industry dummies. Industry 
classifications are discussed in table 4.2.2. Panel B presents results obtained when standard errors 
are computed using the Rogers (1993) methodology of adjusting robust standard errors for 
correlation across different clusters (firm, years and industry). ‘Usable observations’ is size of the 
sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of 
model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
 
 
 
Models 1E, 1F and 1G (panel B) are similar to model 1C but the standard errors in the 
three models are corrected for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively, following 
the Rogers (1993) methodology. The results from panel A and B show are generally 
consistent. This indicates that correcting for clustering across firms, years and industries 
does not materially change the conclusions. The results from models 1A to 1G (panels A 
and B) are discussed in sections 5.2.2 to sections 5.2.9. 
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5.2.2 Inefficient management hypothesis 
The inefficient management hypothesis (as discussed in section 3.2.2) predicts that 
takeover likelihood decreases with firm performance i.e., poorly managed firms are more 
likely to be takeover targets. Different variables including profitability (the return on 
capital employed) and 1-year average daily abnormal returns (ADAR) are used to proxy 
for management performance.  A dummy variable (LMDummy) is also used to directly test 
whether loss-making firms are more likely to receive takeover bids. Figure 5.2.2 plots the 
variations in average profitability for targets and non-targets for the period 1988-2009. 
 
Figure 5.2.2 Variations in average profitability for UK targets and non-targets 
 
Notes: Figure 5.2.2 plots the variations in average profitability (measured as the ratio of EBITDA to 
capital employed) for targets and non-targets for the period 1988 to 2009. The chart shows that, 
post 1996, targets have achieved higher profitability year-on-year when compared to non-targets.  
 
 
There is no discernable trend in the profitability of targets and non-targets between 1988 
and 1995. Over this period, I find that targets report higher profits in 3 out of 8 years. Post 
1995, there is a clear tendency for targets to generate higher average annual profits when 
compared to non-targets. Indeed, targets generate comparatively higher profits in 14 out of 
14 years between 1996 and 2009. The results shown in table 5.2.1 (panel A) suggest that 
targets are more profitable than non-targets, on average. The average profitability (proxied 
by the ratio of EBITDA to capital employed) of UK non-targets (targets) is 8.40% 
(11.40%). The difference in mean profit margin between the two samples is –3.00pp 
(percentage points) significant at the 1% level. The results are again corroborated by 
median values. The median values show that UK targets are more profitable than non-
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targets. The median profitability is 15.10% for targets and 11.8% for non-targets, yielding 
a difference of 3.30pp (insignificant at the 10% level). The results from the U-test also 
show that the distribution of profitability for targets and non-targets is integrally different 
at a 5% significance level. The finding is consistent with Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1998) 
who report that takeover likelihood increases with accounting profitability (measured by 
return on equity and operating margin, respectively). 
 
The picture painted above is somewhat reversed when management efficiency is measured 
from the market’s perspective by using stock performance (proxied by ADAR – average 
daily abnormal return in the 260 days to June 30
th
). The results (shown in table 5.2.1) 
indicate that targets perform worse than non-targets in the year prior to the bid 
announcement. Targets have an ADAR of –0.004% while non-targets have an ADAR of 
0.001% in the one-year period to 30 June prior to the period in which they receive a bid. 
The difference in means of 0.005pp is significant at the 1% level. These findings are 
corroborated by the median and percentile values, as well as, the results from the U-test. 
The results are also consistent with Palepu’s finding that targets earn significant negative 
abnormal returns prior to takeover bids (Palepu (1986)).  
 
The results from the univariate analysis (discussed above) are replicated in the multivariate 
analysis (models 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D in table 5.2.1b). Models 1A and 1B suggest the 
existence of a significantly negative relationship between ADAR and takeover likelihood 
and a positive relationship between accounting profitability and takeover likelihood. The 
coefficient of profitability is positive and significant in model 1A – univariate regression 
model – but loses significance when other determinants of takeover probability are 
controlled for. This would seem to suggest that firms with higher profitability are more 
likely to receive takeover bids. However, when the LMDummy
150
 is added to the 
regression, the sign of the profitability variable changes and becomes negative. This 
suggests that within the sample of profitable firms (i.e., for all profitable firms), firms with 
lower profitability are more likely to be takeover targets. The results from models 1A, 1C  
and 1D confirm that loss-making firms are less likely to be takeover targets as takeover 
probability is negatively related to the LMDummy variable (statistically significant at the 
1% level). The results in model 1C are robust to clustering across firms, years and 
industries (as shown in models 1E, 1F and 1G). Put together, these results suggest that, all 
else equal, targets tend to be profit-making firms which experience a decline in their 
                                                 
150 The dummy variable takes a value of 1 when a firm makes a loss and a value of 0, otherwise. 
 188 
 
ADAR over the past year
151
. Overall, the results suggest that profitable firms lacking future 
growth opportunities (as proxied by abnormal stock returns) constitute attractive targets for 
bidders. 
 
While prior studies argue that targets are generally characterised by inefficient 
management (Palepu (1986), Powell (1997), Barnes (2000), Espahbodi and Espahbodi 
(2003), and Brar et al. (2009)), there has been no clear qualification of ‘management 
inefficiency’. Different measures of management inefficiency have been used across 
studies, with a number of studies reporting inconsistencies between accounting measures 
of performance, market measures of performance and takeover likelihood (see, for 
example, Palepu (1986), Powell (1997), Barnes (1998) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi 
(2003))
152
. This study perhaps sheds some light by highlighting the differences between the 
two types of performance measures and their effects on takeover probability. 
 
5.2.3 Undervaluation hypothesis 
The undervaluation hypothesis (discussed in section 3.2.3) predicts that firms that are, 
potentially, undervalued (as proxied by book to market (BTM) ratios) are likely to have a 
higher takeover likelihood
153
. As discussed in section 3.3.2, the book value of equity to 
market value of equity (BTM) ratio is used as a proxy of firm valuation. The results on the 
difference in BTM ratios between targets and non-targets are fairly mixed when year-on-
year results are examined. Figure 5.2.3 shows that targets have a substantially higher mean 
BTM ratio in several years (including 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 
2003). The average BTM ratio of targets and non-targets are indifferent in 1995, 1998, 
2002 and 2004. Non-targets have a substantially higher mean BTM ratio in 1990, 1991, 
1993, 1996, 1997, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009. 
 
                                                 
151 Evidence from the negative relationship between sales growth and takeover probability (see 
table 5.2.1 panel A and table 5.2.1b) also support the contention that takeover targets are profitable 
firms with declining opportunities for future growth (or poor future prospects). 
152 Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1998), for example, find that, contrary to the inefficient management 
hypothesis (and their qualification of management inefficiency), the relationship between takeover 
likelihood and profitability is positive. 
153 All else equal, undervalued firms (as discussed in section 3.3.3) are likely to have a higher BTM, 
a higher ETP and higher dividend yield, when compared with the population of firms. 
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Figure 5.2.3: Variations in BTM ratios for UK targets and non-targets 
 
Note: Figure 5.2.2 shows the variation in average book to market (BTM) ratios of UK firms from 
1988 to 2009. Firms with higher BTM ratios are perceived to be comparatively undervalued, and 
hypothesised to be more susceptible to takeover bids (see section 3.2.3). It is therefore expected that 
targets will have higher BTM ratios when compared to non-targets. The results show a mixed 
picture from one year to the other. 
 
The results from univariate analysis (table 5.2.1) show that, overall, targets have a lower 
mean BTM ratio. The mean BTM ratio of targets and non-targets is 46.80% and 49.30% 
respectively. These results suggest that on average, targets are not undervalued when 
compared to non-targets. The difference in mean BTM ratios of 2.50pp is significant at the 
10% level. The results do not provide support for the undervaluation hypothesis. The 
median BTM ratio for targets and non-targets is 37.90% and 37.20% respectively. The 
difference in median is nonetheless, not statistically significant. The results reported above 
do not change even when observations with negative book values are winsorised at 0.00%. 
Again, the results from the multivariate analyses do not support the undervaluation 
hypothesis. Model 1A shows that takeover probability is negatively related to the BTM 
ratio. The negative relationship persists as other determinants of takeover likelihood are 
controlled for (see model 1B, 1C and 1D). As shown in models 1E, 1F and 1G, these 
results are robust to clustering across firms, years and industries. On a whole the results 
suggest that contrary to the hypothesis, firms with low BTM values have a higher takeover 
likelihood.  
 
The finding that the undervaluation hypothesis is not supported in a UK sample is 
consistent with other UK studies including Powell (1997, 2004) and Powell and Yawson 
(2007). Powell and Yawson (2007), for example, find no significant relationship between a 
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firm’s market to book value and its takeover likelihood. The proxy for undervaluation 
(BTM ratio) used in this study is similar (but the inverse) to the proxy (MTB ratio) used in 
most prior studies in takeover prediction including (Palepu (1986), Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992), Powell (1997, 2001, 2004), Powell and Yawson (2007), Cremers et al 
(2009) and Brar et al. (2009)). To my knowledge, no study in takeover prediction has 
applied an alternative proxy. It is worth reiterating that while this measure (BTM or MTB) 
of undervaluation has been extensively used in the literature, it is, perhaps, inadequate (and 
a limitation of the study) as discussed in section 3.2.4. There are therefore opportunities for 
further research to explore the suitability of alternative and improved proxies for 
undervaluation. 
5.2.4 Industry disturbance hypothesis 
The industry disturbance hypothesis (discussed in section 3.2.4) argues that the likelihood 
of takeovers within an industry will increase with the announcement of a merger bid in that 
industry in the same year. The sample is made up of 1,635 takeover bids (made between 
July 1989 and June 2011) of which 332 (20.31%) bids occur in ‘disturbed’ industries154. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the multivariate analysis shows that the industry disturbance 
dummy variable (IDummy) has a negative (though statistically insignificant) relationship 
with takeover probability. The results do not support the contention that firms in takeover-
active industries are more likely to receive a bid than others. The relationship is 
statistically insignificant across all four models (1A, 1B, 1C and 1D).  
 
In comparison with prior research, Palepu (1986) finds that, contrary to the hypothesis, the 
likelihood of takeovers decreased when a takeover is completed in the industry. Other 
researchers (such as Barnes (1998), Powell (2004), Brar et al. (2009) and Ouzounis et al. 
(2010)) do not find the hypothesis relevant for inclusion in target prediction models. One 
reason for this non-significance could be that, the proxy (IDummy) is a poor measure of 
disturbance given the high-frequency of takeovers within the UK and US contexts. 
Depending on the dynamics and concentration of the industry, one or a few takeovers 
might not be sufficient to stimulate a restructuring response from other firms within the 
industry. Further, the industry classification system used in this study – which employs 12 
industry groups – is, perhaps, too broad to capture the effects of any disturbance caused by 
a completed merger.  
                                                 
154 That is, 20.31% of bids in the sample occur in industries where other bids have been announced. 
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5.2.5 Free cash flow hypothesis 
The free cash flow hypothesis (discussed in section 3.2.5) predicts that targets should have 
significantly higher levels of free cash flow to asset ratio (FCF) compared to non-targets. 
The results from table 5.2.1 show that targets have higher levels of FCF compared to non-
targets.  Targets have a mean FCF of about 0.00% of their total assets (i.e., no free cash 
flow) while non-targets have a mean FCF equivalent to –4.20% of their total assets (i.e., 
net cash outflow of 4.20% of their total assets). The difference in mean FCF between 
targets and non-targets (4.2pp) is statistically significant at a 1% level. The U-test also 
confirms the significant difference in the distribution of the FCF variable between targets 
and non-targets. These results are further supported by values obtained for the 25
th
, 50
th
 
and 75
th
 percentile on FCF for targets and non-targets. The median FCF for non-targets and 
targets are 0.80% and 2.30% respectively. The difference in median FCF of 1.5pp is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are partly consistent with Powell and 
Yawson (2007) who report that UK targets have an average FCF of 1.53% while firms 
which were not engaged in any restructuring activities (layoffs, divestitures and 
bankruptcy) had a lower average FCF of 0.93%. The results reported by Powell and 
Yawson (2007) are slightly higher than those in this study. This is because their study 
covers the period 1992-2002 (during which UK firms recorded high free cash flows – see 
figure 5.2.5), while the current study covers the period 1988-2009.  
 
Figure 5.2.5: Variations in free cash flow ratios for UK targets and non-targets 
 
Notes: Figure 5.2.5 plots the average free cash flow to total assets (FCF/TA) ratio for UK targets 
and non-targets between 1988 and 2009. Free cash flow is computed as operating cash flow less 
capital expenditures. IAS 7 – Cash flow statements was only issued by the IASB in December 1992 
(effective 1 January 1994) explaining why FCF/TA was significantly lower prior to this date. Post 
FYE 1995, it targets have a higher average FCF/TA when compared to non-targets. 
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Figure 5.2.5 shows the variation of the FCF/TA ratio of UK firms over the period 1988 – 
2009. The extreme negative values in the early years are, perhaps, due to the fact that IAS 
– 9 (issued in December 1992) only came into effect on 1 January 1994 (Alexander et al. 
(2007)). Figure 5.2.5 supports the conclusion from the univariate analysis. It shows that 
from FYE 2005 onwards, targets report higher (more positive or less negative) average free 
cash flows than non-targets in every year. 
 
In line with the results from the univariate analysis, the results from the multivariate 
analysis provide support for the FCF hypothesis.  As hypothesised (section 3.3.5), the 
availability of FCF increases a firm’s likelihood of receiving a bid as shown in models 1A, 
1B, 1C and 1D. The coefficient of the FCF variable is significant at the 1% level across all 
four models. The results remain robust when the standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
(as in models 1E, 1F and 1G) following Rogers (1993). The results support the findings of 
prior studies (e.g., Powell (1997) and Brar et al. (2009)) showing that firms with free cash 
flow attract takeover bids. 
5.2.6 Growth-resource mismatch hypothesis 
The growth-resource mismatch hypothesis (discussed in section 3.2.6) predicts that firms 
with a mismatch between their resources and their growth opportunities are likely to have a 
higher takeover likelihood. The key proxy for the mismatch between growth opportunities 
and firm resources is the growth-resource dummy (GRDummy) which is computed from 
three variables – sales growth, liquidity and leverage. The derivation of this proxy from the 
three variables is discussed in section 3.3.6. The three composite variables cannot be fully 
interpreted in the growth-resource context through univariate analysis. Their descriptive 
statistics are, nonetheless, discussed below. 
 
Table 5.2.1 shows that targets have lower levels of sales growth compared to non-targets as 
indicated by the mean, median, 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile for sales growth. The mean sales 
growth for targets is 17.20% as against 18.30% for non-targets. The difference in sales 
growth (of 1.1 pp) is not statistically significant. The result from the U-test also confirms 
that the distribution of sales growth for targets and non-targets are not statistically 
different. The median test shows a statistically significant difference of 1.0% in the median 
sales growth for targets (8.2%) and non-targets (9.2%). The difference (0.8pp) is 
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significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that targets perhaps experience poor 
growth in sales prior to bid announcements. 
 
Consistent with Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Palepu (1986), targets have 
comparatively lower levels of liquidity. On average, cash and near cash resources 
constitute 11.9% of the total assets of targets, as against 15.1% for non-targets. The 
difference in mean liquidity between targets and non-targets (of 3.2 pp) is significant at the 
1% level. The median and quartile values further reinforce this finding. The U-test further 
confirms a significant difference in the distribution of the liquidity measure for targets and 
non-targets. The median liquidity level for targets is 6.70% as against 8.20% for non-
targets. The difference (1.5pp) is also significant at the 1% level.   
 
Contrary to Palepu (1986) but consistent with Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), targets are 
significantly more levered than non-targets. Targets have a mean leverage of 56.60% as 
against 49.00% for non-targets. The difference in mean leverage (of 7.6pp) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results from the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles also show 
that targets are more levered than non-targets. The median leverage for targets (non-
targets) is 36.50% (26.35%) and the difference in median (10.2pp) is significant at the 1% 
level. The U-test also confirms that the difference in leverage between targets and non-
targets is statistically significant. 
 
In summary, this preliminary evidence suggests that targets have lower liquidity and higher 
leverage on average when compared with non-targets. The implication is that targets 
generally require high resources to service their debt but suffer from a general lack of 
liquidity. These firms also appear to suffer a decline in sales in the year prior to receiving a 
bid. Further evidence can be drawn by looking at the proportion of firms with growth-
resource mismatch that do (and do not) receive a takeover bid. Of the sample of 1,635 
targets, 387 targets (or 23.67% of targets) experience a growth-resource mismatch prior to 
receiving a bid. Nonetheless, 24.46% of non-targets
155
 experience a growth-resource 
mismatch but do not receive a bid. This suggests that a growth-resource mismatch does 
not, perhaps, increase a firm’s takeover likelihood, on average. Further analysis is 
conducted using the multivariate framework. 
 
                                                 
155 7,517 (of 30,729) non-targets also experience a growth-resource mismatch. 
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The results from the multivariate analysis (see models 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D, table 5.2.1b) 
show no support for the hypothesis. In line with Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) but 
contrary to Palepu (1986), the coefficient of the GRDummy variable is not statistically 
significant in any of the four models. Model 1A shows that takeover likelihood decreases 
with sales growth and liquidity but increases with leverage. The leverage variable loses its 
significance when other factors are controlled for in model 1B, 1C and 1D. The results do 
not support Palepu’s (1986) finding that takeover probability is positively related with the 
GRDummy. In line with Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), the evidence suggests that the 
growth-resource mismatch hypothesis is either not supported or the GRDummy variable 
poorly operationalises the concept. 
5.2.7 Tangible assets hypothesis 
The tangible assets hypothesis (as discussed in section 3.2.7) predicts that takeover 
likelihood increases with the proportion of tangible fixed assets in a firm’s portfolio. 
Figure 5.2.7 shows the variation in the level of tangible assets held by UK targets and non-
targets for the period 1989-2009. The chart shows that, with the exception of 1988, 1993, 
1997, 2006 and 2007, targets have higher levels of tangible assets when compared to non-
targets. 
 
Figure 5.2.7: Variations in the level of tangible assets held by UK targets and non-
targets  
 
Notes: Figure 5.2.7 shows the variation in the level of tangible assets (proxied as the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets) held by UK targets and non-targets for the period 
1989-2009. The tangible assets hypothesis discussed in section 3.2.7 posits that targets are likely to 
have higher levels of tangible assets when compared to non-targets. In line with the hypothesis, the 
chart shows that targets have comparatively higher levels of tangible assets across several years. 
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In line with the hypothesis, the results from the univariate analysis (table 5.2.1) show that, 
overall, targets have substantially more tangible property than non-targets. On average, 
30.9% of total assets in non-targets comprises of tangible assets while this figure is up to 
33.9% for targets. The difference between tangible assets for targets and non-targets 
(3.00pp) is significant at the 1% level. The U-test also confirms the difference in the 
distribution of tangible assets between targets and non-targets. The results are further 
supported by the median and 75
th
 percentile values. The median value for targets is 29.4% 
as opposed to 26.4% for non-targets. The difference in median (3.00pp) is significant at the 
1% level. These results are consistent with prior empirical findings (e.g., Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992)). Ambrose and Megginson (1992), for example, find that US targets 
have a mean (median) real property ratio of 66.6% (63.6%) as opposed to non-targets with 
a mean (median) tangible assets ratio of 58.9% (52.3%)
156
. 
 
The results from the multivariate analyses further assert the validity of this hypothesis. 
Models 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D (in table 5.2.1b) show that the probability of receiving a bid 
increases with a firm’s level of tangible assets. In all cases (models 1A, 1B, 1C and 1D), 
the coefficient of the tangible assets variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
results are robust to industry differences as well as clustering (models 1E, 1F and 1G). As 
hypothesised, the presence of tangible property within a firm increases its likelihood of 
receiving a bid. These results are consistent with empirical findings reported in Ambrose 
and Megginson (1992) and Powell (2001). 
5.2.8 Firm size hypothesis (old) 
The (old) firm size hypothesis (discussed in section 3.2.8) predicts that takeover 
probability decreases with firm size for transaction cost reasons. This implies that, on 
average, non-targets should be comparatively larger firms when compared to targets. 
Contrary to this popular notion (see Palepu (1985), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), 
Barnes (1998), Powell (2004), Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Brar et al. (2009), 
amongst others), targets are marginally bigger than non-targets. As in prior research, firm 
size is measured as the natural log of total assets. Figure 5.2.8 shows the variation of target 
and non-target firm size from one year to another for the period 1988-2009. The chart 
shows that with the exception of 1990,1991,1992,1994, 1995 and 2008 targets, on average, 
are at least as large as non-targets across the period. 
                                                 
156 The difference in mean tangible assets for targets and non-targets is significant at the 0.05 level 
of significance. 
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Figure 5.2.8: Variations in the average firm size of UK targets and non-targets 
 
Notes: Figure 5.2.8 shows the difference in firm size (expressed as log total assets) between targets 
and non-targets for the period 1988-2009. The old firm size hypothesis contends that non-targets 
are comparatively larger than targets. The figure shows that, on average, targets are indeed larger 
than non-targets across several years. 
 
 
Targets in the sample have a mean firm size of 18.169 (equivalent to £77.75 million) while 
non-targets have a mean firm size of 17.682 (equivalent to £47.77 million). The results 
here are broadly in line with prior studies.  Powell and Yawson (2007), for example, report 
that UK targets are significantly larger (in terms of total assets) when compared with firms 
not engaged in any restructuring activities (layoffs, divestitures and bankruptcies). 
 
 The difference in firm size between targets and non-targets (£29.97 million) is significant 
at the 1% level.  The results obtained from the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles reaffirm the 
finding that targets are not the smallest firms in the population. In line with Gibrat’s Law 
(discussed in section 3.4.2), the level of skewness in the data is very low – the distribution 
of the natural log of firm size is approximately normally distributed. The results from the 
analysis of median also show that the median target has a firm size of 17.983 (equivalent to 
£64.55 million) which is significantly higher than the size of the median non-target (17.493 
– equivalent to £39.55 million) at the 1% level. 
 
Contrary to the predictions of the (old) firm size hypothesis, the multivariate analysis (see 
table 5.2.1b) finds a positive relationship between size and takeover probability. The 
simple logit model (model 1A) confirms the findings of the univariate analysis. This model 
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shows that firm size has a positive relationship with takeover probability. The coefficient 
of firm size in model 1A is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of firm size remains 
significant (at the 1% level) when other variables are controlled for (as in models 1B, 1C 
and 1D). These results are robust when standard errors are corrected for clustering across 
firm, years and industries (models 1E, 1F and 1G). These findings suggest that the 
hypothesised relationship between firm size and takeover probability (i.e., the old firm size 
hypothesis) is unsupported. In line with discussions in section 3.3.2, the new firm size 
hypothesis is tested in section 5.3.2. Overall, as will be further discussed in section 5.3.2, I 
find evidence that as hypothesised (i.e., the new firm size hypothesis), firm size has an 
inverse U-shaped relationship with takeover likelihood. 
5.2.9 Firm age hypothesis 
The firm age hypothesis (as discussed in section 3.2.9) predicts that takeover probability 
will decline with firm age implying that targets will be, perhaps, younger than non-targets, 
on average. Figure 5.2.9 plots the average age of UK targets and non-targets for the period 
1988 to 2009. 
 
Figure 5.2.9: Variations in the average age of UK targets and non-targets 
 
Notes: figure 5.2.9 shows variations in the average age of target and non-target firms in the UK for 
the period 1989-2009. Age is measured as the number of years since the year of incorporation. The 
firm age hypothesis predicts that targets are comparatively younger firms. In support of the 
hypothesis, the chart shows that, on average, targets are comparatively younger than non-targets 
across several years. 
 
The chart shows that targets are comparatively younger across several years. The main 
exceptions are 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2004 in which non-targets were younger than targets, 
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on average. The results in table 5.2.1 (panel B) support the contention that targets are 
younger than non-targets, on average. The mean age of targets in the sample is 32.76 years 
as against 31.87 years for non-targets. The difference in mean age is not significant at a 
10% level. The U-test also shows no support for the hypothesised relationship. The results 
from the median partly support the hypothesis. The median age of targets (of 16 years) is 
lower than the median age of non-targets (of 17 years). The median difference (of 1 year) 
is significant at the 10% level.  
 
The hypothesis is supported by the multivariate analysis (table 5.2.1b). The results confirm 
that younger firms are highly susceptible to takeover bids. Models 1B, 1C and 1D show 
that, all else equal, the likelihood of receiving a bid decreases with firm age. The 
coefficient of the firm age variable is statistically significant at the 1% level (models 1B, 
1C and 1D). As shown in models 1E, 1F and 1G, these results are robust to the clustering 
of standard errors across firms, years and industries. Brar et al. (2009) noted the possibility 
of a negative relationship between firm age and takeover probability but did not test such a 
relationship empirically. These results therefore provide some empirical support to Brar et 
al.’s (2009) contention on firm age. The findings also support prior empirical evidence 
(e.g., Hopenhayn (1992), Pakes and Ericson (1998) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009)) 
suggesting that the probability of firm exit (through bankruptcies or takeovers) is 
negatively related to age.  
 
This study introduces a firm lifecycle hypothesis which builds on the firm age hypothesis. 
While younger firms are likely to be more susceptible to takeovers, the literature suggests 
that old firms (with assets trapped within outdated structures) might also be revitalised 
through takeovers (Loderer et al. (2009)). This expansion of the firm age hypothesis is 
investigated in section 5.3.5. 
5.2.10 Summary 
Section 5.2 evaluates the empirical validity of the old prediction hypotheses. Consistent 
with the management inefficiency hypothesis, takeover likelihood increases with market 
underperformance. In line with the qualification of management inefficiency discussed in 
section 3.2.2, takeover likelihood increases with accounting performance but declines with 
market performance, all else equal. Contrary to the undervaluation hypotheses, on average, 
targets report lower BTM ratios when compared to non-targets. The multivariate analysis 
also shows a negative relationship between BTM and takeover probability.  
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The univariate and multivariate analysis support the free cash flow (FCF) and the tangible 
assets hypotheses – takeover probability increases with firm free cash flow and tangible 
assets, respectively. The relationship between firm age and takeover likelihood is 
supported by multivariate analysis (but not by the univariate analyses). In line with the 
firm age hypothesis, on average, targets are younger than non-targets. The mean age of 
targets in the sample is 30.76 years as against 31.87 years for non-targets. The multivariate 
analysis shows no support for the industry disturbance and growth-resource mismatch 
hypotheses. While 23.67% of targets experience a growth-resource mismatch prior to 
receiving a bid, 24.46% of firms which experience a growth-resource mismatch do not 
receive a bid.  Contrary to the (old) firm size hypothesis, the results show no support for 
the contention that targets are small firms.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that several of the old hypotheses (including the 
undervaluation, industry disturbance, growth-resource mismatch and firm size hypotheses) 
are not supported by the empirical evidence. The only hypotheses which are empirically 
supported are the inefficient management, firm age, free cash flow and tangible assets 
hypotheses. Perhaps, some of the proxies used to measure firm undervaluation, growth-
resource mismatch and industry disturbance are inadequate (further discussed in sections 
5.2.3, 5.2.4 and 5.2.6). The next section evaluates the empirical validity of the new 
takeover prediction hypotheses. 
 
5.3 Hypotheses evaluation: New hypotheses 
5.3.1 Overview 
This study proposes several ‘new’ prediction variables which could, potentially, improve 
the success rates in takeover prediction. Some of these variables are drawn from other 
areas of M&A research but have not been employed in takeover prediction to date. The 
‘newness’ in other variables is the fact that the study proposes a different relationship 
between the variable and the probability that a firm will receive a bid. For example, 
although leverage has been used as a control variable in some takeover prediction research 
(e.g., Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997), Espahbodi and 
Espahbodi (2003), Brar et al. (2009)), there has been no theoretical explanation of (or 
hypothesis on) the relationship between leverage and takeover likelihood. The reported 
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findings on leverage have been inconsistent across studies (further discussed in 3.3.3). This 
issue is further discussed in section 3.3. 
 
Section 5.2 shows that several of the old hypotheses are not empirically supported. This 
suggests that the old hypotheses, perhaps, do not really explain why certain firms receive 
takeover bids. This study contributes to the literature by introducing new 
variables/hypotheses to the takeover prediction literature and by developing and testing 
‘new’ hypotheses based on theory using ‘old’ variables. Similar to section 5.2 above, the 
tests conducted in this section employ univariate analysis (descriptive statistics) and logit 
regression analysis. Piecewise regression analysis and centering of curvilinear variables are 
introduced to ascertain robustness in the analysis (these methods are discussed further in 
section 4.3.3). The new hypotheses tested in this section include: the firm size hypothesis, 
firm capital structure hypothesis, financial distress hypothesis, firm lifecycle hypothesis, 
M&A rumours hypothesis, payroll synergies hypothesis, share repurchase hypothesis, 
asymmetric valuation hypothesis, industry concentration hypothesis, market liquidity 
hypothesis and market economics hypothesis.  
5.3.2 Firm size hypothesis (new) 
The results from table 5.2.1 panel B (further discussed in section 5.2.9) confirms that 
contrary to the (old) firm size hypothesis, targets are, perhaps, not the smallest firms in the 
population. The average (or median) target is significantly (at the 1% level) larger than the 
average (or median) non-target. The results from the 25
th
 percentile and 75
th
 percentile also 
support this finding. Contrary to the old firm size hypothesis, the results from models 1A, 
1B, 1C and 1D (table 5.2.1b) show that takeover probability increases with firm size. This 
is counterintuitive as it is unlikely that the biggest firms in the population are most at risk 
of becoming targets. The (new) firm size hypothesis put forward in this study, argues that 
firm size has an inverted U-shape relationship with takeover probability. This hypothesis 
of a nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between size and takeover likelihood is 
fully discussed in section 3.3.2. Table 5.3.2a presents results obtained from tests of this 
hypothesis. 
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Table 5.3.2a: The relationship between firm size and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors 
Hypotheses Proxies Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 2D Model 2E 
Firm Size Ln Assets (+) 1.136*** 2.119*** 2.155*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 
 
Ln Assets Sq.(-) -0.045*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.056*** 
Inefficient  Profitability (-) 
 
-0.046 -0.047 -0.046 -0.047 
Management ADAR (-) 
 
-83.844*** -82.517*** -83.844*** -82.517*** 
Undervaln BTM(+) -0.171*** -0.136** -0.171*** -0.136** 
Growth-  S. Growth (+/-) 
 
-0.108 -0.111 -0.108 -0.111 
resource Liquidity (+/-) 
 
-0.414 -0.377 -0.414 -0.377 
Mismatch Leverage(+/-) 0.059 0.056 0.059 0.056 
 
GRDummy (+)  -0.050 -0.055 -0.050 -0.055 
Industry Dist. IDUMMY (+)  0.007 -0.016 0.007 -0.016 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+)  0.545* 0.502* 0.545* 0.502* 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+)  0.532** 0.482*** 0.532*** 0.482*** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant    -26.209*** -22.822*** -23.303*** -23.303*** -2.702*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES NO YES 
Firm size centred NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations  32,354 16,854 16,854 18,638 16,854 
Deviance(–2LL) 
 
12,819 7,174 7,164 9,555 7,164 
Pseudo-R^2 
 
0.008 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 
LR Test of Coefficients 177.021*** 169.762*** 188.333***  188.250*** 188.333*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust (Rogers) standard errors 
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 2F (Firm) Model 2G (Year) Model 2H (Industry)  
Firm Size Ln Assets (+)  2.119*** 2.119*** 2.119***  
 
Ln Assets Sq.(-)  -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055***  
Control variables (in model 2B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variables are firm size (Ln total assets) and firm 
size squared (Ln total assets squared) and the control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal 
return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales 
growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is 
shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)).Model 2A represents a logit regression model where the dependent 
variable is takeover probability and the independent variables are firm size (Ln total assets) and 
firm size squared (Ln total assets squared). This model has no control variables. Model 2B–2E are 
multivariate logit models with firm size as the independent variable and all the old variables as 
control variables, regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 2C is similar to 2B but also 
controls for industry using industry dummies. Model 2D replicates model 2B but centres the 
independent variable – firm size – (about the mean) to reduce the effect of multicollinearity in the 
model. Model 2E replicates model 2D but controls for industry differences using industry 
dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 2F, 2G and 2H are equivalent to 
model 2B adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ is size of the 
sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2Log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of 
model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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The coefficients of firm size and firm size squared are positive and negative respectively 
(significant at the 1% level) across all five models (2A–2E). The results show that the 
relationship between firm size and takeover probability is nonlinear and follows an 
inverted U-shape function, as suggested by the new firm size hypothesis (discussed in 
section 3.3.2). This hypothesised inverted U-shaped relationship appears to be robust to 
different model specifications (see models 2C, 2D and 2E).  For example, the relationship 
persists when firm size (the natural log of total assets) is centred about the mean or when 
industry dummies are included in the model. The inclusion of firm size squared to the old 
model substantially increases the pseudo R square by 42.85% from 0.007 (see table 5.2.1b) 
to 0.010 (see table 5.3.2a). The relationship remains robust when standard errors are 
corrected for clustering across firm, years and industries as in panel B. The contribution of 
the new variables to the old model is further discussed in section 6.2. 
 
For additional robustness, piecewise regression analysis (discussed in section 4.3.3) is 
employed to confirm the findings obtained above. The sample of firms is divided into five 
quintiles which are generated by ranking all the firms in the sample by their firm size, then 
splitting them into five equal groups (groups 1 to 5). Group 1 represents the smallest 20% 
of firms in the sample and group 5 represents the largest 20% of firms in the sample. If the 
new firm size hypothesis holds, there is likely to be a positive relationship between 
takeover probability and firm size for firms in group 1 (small firms) and a negative 
relationship between takeover probability and firm size for firms in group 5 (large firms). 
The descriptive statistics for the different groups are presented in table 5.3.2b.  
 
Table 5.3.2b: Descriptive statistics of firm size groups 
 
 
N Range Min. Max. Mean Mean (£) Std. Dev. Skewness 
Group 1 6,471 9.034 6.908 15.942 14.750 £2,546,456 1.155 -1.993 
Group 2 6,471 1.101 15.942 17.043 16.524 £15,007,773 0.315 -0.129 
Group 3 6,471 1.002 17.044 18.046 17.533 £41,140,491 0.288 0.074 
Group 4 6,471 1.435 18.046 19.481 18.677 £129,185,635 0.406 0.229 
Group 5 6,471 6.494 19.482 25.976 21.052 £1,388,709,110 1.192 0.909 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for different size quintiles. Groups (1-5) are generated 
by ranking all firms in the sample by their firm size and splitting the sample into five equal groups 
(quintiles). Group 1 contains the smallest 20% of firms in the sample and Group 5 contains the 
largest 20% of firms in the sample. 
 
The average firm size (natural log of total assets) of firms in group 1 is 14.75 (equivalent to 
£2.55 million). The largest firm in that group has a firm size of £8.39 million. The 
distribution is slightly negatively skewed (and the range is broad) with some firms 
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reporting low total asset values. The average firm in group 5 has total assets of £1.39 
billion.   
 
As shown in panels A and B (table 5.3.2c), I estimated two piecewise regression models, 
one without industry dummies and the other controlling for industry effects. The two 
models retain the old prediction variables as control variable. For simplicity, only the result 
for the key variable (firm size) is presented in table 5.3.2c. The results for the other 
variables are broadly similar to those presented in table 5.3.2a. 
 
Table 5.3.2c: Piecewise regression analysis for firm size groups – with and without 
industry dummies 
 
  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
Panel A: Piecewise regressions 
     Firm Size Ln (Total Assets) 0.745*** 0.237 0.394* 0.890 -0.188*** 
 Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry Dummies NO NO NO NO NO 
 Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Piecewise regressions (with industry dummies) 
          
Firm Size Ln (Total Assets) 0.736*** 0.229 0.455* 0.100 -0.190*** 
 Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis for different quintiles of firm size 
where the dependent variable is takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable is firm 
size (Ln total assets) and the control variables in the model include profitability, ADAR, book to 
market ratio, sales growth, liquidity, leverage, GRDummy, IDummy, free cash flow ratio, tangible 
assets ratio, and firm age. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is 
the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous 
period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the 
firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a 
firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value 
of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free 
cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of 
tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since 
incorporation. Industry dummies include dummies for the industry groups shown in table 4.2.2. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The results confirm that takeover probability increases in firm size for firms in group 1 
(significant at the 1% level) and decreases in firm size for firms in group 5 (significant at 
the 1% level). These results reinforce the finding that takeover probability has an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with firm size, with the smallest and largest firms appearing to be 
more shielded from takeover activity, all else equal. 
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These results are important from a modelling perspective for researchers (or investors) 
employing the full sample of listed firms in their analysis. It is worth noting that several 
studies (see, for example Brar et al. (2009)) typically restrict their samples to larger firms.  
I find that the hypothesised relationship is still robust (significant at the 5% level) even 
when firms in group 1 (i.e., firms with total assets below £8.39 million) are excluded from 
the sample. The relationship only ceases to be significant when firms in groups 3 to 5 are 
considered (i.e., when 40% of the population of firms is left out of the analysis). The 
discrepancy between the results reported here and the results in the prior takeover 
prediction literature can be attributed to the manner in which the sample in this study is 
designed. This study uses a panel sample and employs the full sample of (UK) listed firms 
while several prior studies employ non-representative matched-samples, which are 
sometimes restricted to large listed firms (see, for example, Palepu et al. (1986), Espahbodi 
and Espahbodi (2003) Brar et al. (2009) and Ouzounis et al. (2010)).  
5.3.3 Firm capital structure hypothesis  
The firm capital structure hypothesis proposed in this study argues that takeover 
probability should increase with leverage up to the point where leverage becomes ‘too 
high’ for a potential bidder. At this point, takeover probability should start to decline with 
leverage. Overall, an inverted U-shape relationship should exist between leverage and 
takeover probability. The theoretical foundations of this hypothesis are discussed in section 
3.3.3. In line with the hypothesis, the results show that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between takeover probability and firm leverage. As discussed in section 3.3.3, this 
hypothesised curvilinear relationship is tested by adding a squared leverage term in the 
model and testing for its significance as shown in table 5.3.3a.  
 
There is no consensus on the relationship between capital structure and takeover likelihood 
in the literature. Palepu (1986) finds a significant negative relationship between takeover 
probability and leverage, Powell (1997) reports an insignificant negative relationship 
between takeover probability and leverage, Barnes (1998, 2000) finds a positive but 
insignificant relationship between takeover probability and leverage and Brar et al. (2009) 
argue that leverage has no explanatory power on takeover likelihood (and excludes the 
variable from their model). Other researchers (e.g., Powell and Yawson (2007)) have 
included leverage as a proxy for growth-resource imbalances without any indication of its 
potential effect on takeover probability.  
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Table 5.3.3a: The relationship between leverage and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors 
Hypotheses  Proxies 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 
Firm capital  Leverage (+) 0.656*** 0.345** 0.356** 0.222** 0.226** 
structure Leverage Sq. (–) -0.212*** -0.116* -0.123** -0.116* -0.123** 
Inefficient  Profitability (-) 
 
0.094 0.0812 0.094 0.081 
Management ADAR (-) 
 
-82.636*** -81.579*** -82.636*** -81.579*** 
Underval. BTM(+) -0.131** -0.099 -0.131 -0.099 
GR  S. Growth (+/–) 
 
-0.087 -0.086 -0.087 -0.086 
Mismatch GRDummy (+) -0.080 -0.087 -0.080 -0.087 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)  -0.008 -0.023 -0.008 -0.023 
FreeCashFlow FCF(+)  0.938*** 0.907*** 0.938*** 0.907*** 
TangibleAssets PPP/TA(+)  0.586*** 0.536*** 0.586*** 0.535*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)  0.034** 0.043** 0.034** 0.043** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term -3.127*** -3.564*** -3.794*** -3.414*** -3.639*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES NO YES 
Leverage centred NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations  32,348 16,856 16,856 16,856 16,856 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,918 7,206 7,196 7,206 7,196 
Pseudo-R^2 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 
LR Test of Coefficients 
42.842 
*** 
104.249 
*** 
123.963 
*** 
104.249 
*** 
123.963 
*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 3F (Firm) Model 3G (Year) Model 3H (Industry)  
Firm capital Leverage (+)  0.345** 0.345** 0.345***  
structure Leverage Sq. (–)  -0.116* -0.116** -0.116*  
Control variables (in model 3B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variables are firm leverage (total debt to total 
equity ratio) and firm leverage squared (total debt to total ratio squared) and the control variables 
are the old prediction hypotheses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. 
ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of 
equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the 
previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years 
since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 3A represents 
a univariate logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover probability and the 
independent variables are firm leverage and firm leverage squared. This model has no control 
variables. Model 3B – 3E are multivariate logit models with leverage as the independent variable 
and all the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 3C is 
similar to 3B but also controls for industry using industry dummies. Model 3D replicates model 3B 
but centres the independent variable – leverage – (about the mean) to reduce the effect of 
multicollinearity in the model. Model 3E replicates model 3D but controls for industry differences 
using industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 3F, 3G and 3H are 
equivalent to model 3B adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ 
is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and 
the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 206 
 
 
As shown in table 5.3.3a, the coefficients of leverage and leverage squared are positive and 
negative respectively (significant at the 5% level) across models 3A to E. The results are 
robust to mean-centering as well as controlling for industry differences. The relationship 
remains robust when standard errors are corrected for clustering across firm, years and 
industries as in panel B. The results show that the relationship between leverage and 
takeover probability is curvilinear and follows an inverted U-shape function, as suggested 
by the hypothesis (discussed in section 3.3.3). Consistent with the hypothesis, the findings 
suggest that the effect of capital structure on takeover probability can, perhaps, be captured 
by modelling the relationship under a nonlinear framework. 
 
Piecewise regression analysis (similar to the analysis discussed in section 5.3.2) is used as 
a robustness check and to understand this relationship further. The firms in the sample are 
ranked by leverage and grouped into five quintiles. The descriptive statistics for the 
different quintiles are presented in table 5.3.3b (see panel A). About 20% of the 
observations in the sample report zero leverage.  
 
Table 5.3.3b: Descriptive statistics of leverage groups 
 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev Skewness 
Group 1 6,470 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 5.550 
Group 2 6,469 0.150 0.001 0.151 0.059 0.045 0.431 
Group 3 6,471 0.247 0.151 0.398 0.269 0.072 0.090 
Group 4 6,468 0.393 0.398 0.791 0.568 0.111 0.280 
Group 5 6,470 1.898 0.791 2.689 1.574 0.690 0.619 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for different leverage quintiles. Groups are generated 
by ranking all firms in the sample by their leverage and splitting the sample into five equal 
groups (quintiles). Group 1 contains the 20% of firms with the lowest leverage in the sample and 
Group 5 contains the 20% of firms with the highest leverage in the sample. Group 1 is made up of 
firms which do not employ substantial long term debt in their capital structure. 
 
The results in table 5.3.3b shows that several firms in the sample employ very little debt 
(see group 1). The average firm in group 5 is heavily levered – debt of 157% of its equity. 
The relationship between leverage and takeover probability for firms in group 1–5 is 
reported in table 5.3.3c. 
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Table 5.3.3c: Piecewise regression analysis for leverage groups – with and without 
industry dummies 
  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
Panel A: Piecewise regressions – equal samples 
Firm Capital Structure Leverage 135.485 -2.738 -1.019 1.281** 0.075 
 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummies NO NO NO NO NO 
 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Piecewise regressions with industry dummies – equal samples 
Firm Capital Structure Leverage 139.858 -2.317 -0.932 1.251** 0.056 
 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis for different quintiles of leverage 
where the dependent variable is takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable is firm 
leverage (total debt to total equity) and the control variables in the model include profitability, 
ADAR, book to market ratio, sales growth, liquidity, leverage, GRDummy, IDummy, free cash 
flow ratio, tangible assets ratio, firm size and firm age. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total 
capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of 
book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues 
from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. 
Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch 
between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the 
ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the 
ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log 
of the firm’s total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Industry dummies include 
dummies for the industry groups shown in table 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The results show that takeover probability has a significantly positive relationship with 
leverage for firms in group 4. This positive relationship is not consistent for higher levels 
of leverage – group 5 (as suggested by the hypothesis). The finding is robust to industry 
variations. The piecewise regression analysis provides some support for the argument that 
the relationship between takeover likelihood and leverage is non-linear.  
5.3.4 Financial distress hypothesis 
The financial distress hypothesis (as discussed in section 3.3.4) argues that takeover 
likelihood, potentially, increases with the degree of financial distress (measured using 
Taffler’s Z scores). The hypothesis further argues that firms with a high probability of 
going bankrupt (i.e., firms with Z scores below 0) will have a low takeover probability due 
to the added risk to be borne by a potential bidder. The first (second) part of the hypothesis 
is tested by examining the relationship between takeover probability and firm Z scores (Z 
score dummies). This hypothesis is fully discussed in section 3.3.4. 
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The results in table 5.2.1 show that targets have lower Z scores than non-targets, on 
average. That is, targets have an average Z score of 25.954 while non-targets have an 
average Z score of 29.954. The difference in mean Z score between the two groups is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The U-test confirms that the distributions of the Z 
score variable for targets and non-targets are significantly different (at the 5% level). The 
median test also provides further statistical support for the hypothesis as targets have a 
median Z score value of 7.434 which is significantly different (at the 1% level) from the 
8.212 median Z score of non-targets.  
 
The results from the regression analysis are presented in table 5.3.4. The multivariate 
results in table 5.3.4 do not support the hypothesis that takeover likelihood decreases with 
Z score. The results show that, consistent with the hypothesis, takeover probability is 
negatively related to firm’s Z scores but this relationship is not statistically significant. The 
second part of the hypothesis suggested that highly distressed firms will have a lower 
takeover likelihood, compared to their non-distress counterparts, all else equal. The 
ZSDummy is used to test this hypothesis (further discussed in section 3.3.4).  
 
The ZSDummy takes a value of 1 when the Z score is negative (below 0) and a value of 0 
otherwise. Of the 32,363 firm-years in the sample, 5,242 firm-years are associated with 
negative Z scores (i.e., ZSDummy = 1) of which 5.00% or 260 firm-years receive takeover 
bids. Therefore, 15.90% of the 1,635 takeover targets in the sample have negative Z scores 
prior to receiving takeover bids. This indicates that a majority (85.1%) of targets can be 
considered as ‘non-distressed’ firms. This relationship is further tested under a multivariate 
framework as shown in table 5.3.4.  
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Table 5.3.4: The relationship between level of financial distress and takeover 
probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors 
Hypotheses  Proxies Model 4A Model  4B Model 4C 
Financial distress Z Score (-) -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 
 
ZSDummy (-) -0.151** -0.239** -0.238** 
Inefficient  Profitability (-)  0.017 0.025 
Management ADAR (-)  -91.152*** -89.880*** 
Underval. BTM(+)  -0.129* -0.090 
GR  S. Growth (+/–)  -0.049 -0.053 
Mismatch Liquidity  (+/–)  -0.722** -0.631* 
 
Leverage  (+/–)  0.089 0.086 
 
GRDummy (+)  -0.068 -0.072 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)  0.028 0.008 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)  0.725** 0.688** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)  0.539*** 0.489*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)  0.034* 0.043** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003** 
Constant Term  -2.812*** -3.367*** -3.630*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES 
Observations 27,336 14,684 14,684 
Deviance(–2LL) 11,384 6,405 6,396 
Pseudo-R^2 0.000 0.007 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients 9.596*** 98.264*** 115.826*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 4D (Firm) Model 4E (Year) Model 4F (Industry)  
Financial distress Z Score (-)  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
 ZSDummy (-)  -0.239** -0.239*** -0.239**  
Control variables (in model 4B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variables are proxies of the financial distress 
hypothesis (Z Score and ZSDummy) and the control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. 
ZScore refers to a firm’s Taffler Z score. ZSDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm’s Z Score is negative 
and a value of 0 otherwise. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the 
average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market 
value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. 
Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total 
debt to total equity. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth 
opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover 
occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating 
cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, 
plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of 
years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)).Model 4A 
represents a univariate logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover probability 
and the independent variables are Z score and ZSDummy. This model has no control variables. 
Model 4B and 4C are multivariate logit models with Z score and ZSDummy as the independent 
variables and all the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 
4C is similar to 4B but also controls for industry using industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry 
classifications). Models 4F, 4G and 4H are equivalent to model 4B adjusted for firm, year and industry 
clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log 
likelihood ratio of the model and the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
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The expectation is that the coefficient of the ZSDummy should be negative indicating that 
firms with negative Z scores have a lower likelihood of receiving a bid. The results shown 
in table 5.3.4 (models 4A–4C) indicate that raw Taffler Z scores have no predictive power 
in the sample. ZSDummy has a negative coefficient in model 3A to 3C (significant at the 
5% level). The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that, consistent with the 
hypothesis, as Z scores fall below 0 (ZSDummy takes a value of 1) the probability that the 
firm will receive a bid reduces. The relationship remains robust when standard errors are 
corrected for clustering across firm, years and industries as in panel B. The indication is 
that firms in financial distress are less likely to become takeover targets. The results 
broadly contradict the findings of Powell and Yawson (2007), who argue bankrupt (highly 
distressed) firms are similar to takeover targets. The results indicate that while financial 
distress potentially increases the likelihood of takeover, highly distressed firms (with Z 
score below 0) are unlikely to be attractive takeover targets. 
5.3.5 Firm lifecycle hypothesis 
The firm survival literature has established that young firms face a higher risk of industry 
exit compared to older firms. The empirical results discussed in section 5.2.9 (on firm age 
hypothesis) support this contention. This finding, however, leaves much to be answered 
about what eventually happens to firms as they grow old
157
. In line with Loderer and 
Waelchli (2010), the firm age hypothesis is expanded into the firm lifecycle hypothesis 
which attempts to develop a more holistic view of how takeover probability varies with 
firm age. The hypothesis (discussed in section 3.3.5) suggests that firm age is a U-shaped 
function of takeover probability. Here, takeover probability is hypothesised to initially 
decline with age and subsequently increases with age as firms grow old. The results of tests 
of this hypothesis are presented in table 5.3.5a. 
 
                                                 
157 It is unlikely that firms live perpetually (Loderer and Waelchli (2010)) but there is no empirical 
relationship between bankruptcy and firm age (Shumway (2001)). 
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Table 5.3.5a: The relationship between firm age and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors 
Hypotheses  Proxies 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E 
Firm Life cycle Age (-) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004** -0.004* 
 
Age sq. (+) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Inefficient  Profitability (-) 
 
0.062 0.056 0.062 0.056 
Management ADAR (-) 
 
-83.270*** -82.187*** -83.270*** -82.187*** 
Undervaluatn. BTM(+) 
 
-0.119* -0.086 -0.119* -0.086 
Growth  S. Growth (+/–) 
 
-0.076 -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 
Resource  Liquidity (+/–) 
 
-0.609** -0.557* -0.609** -0.557* 
Mismatch Leverage  (+/–) 
 
0.043 0.040 0.043 0.040 
 
GRDummy(+) 
 
-0.030 -0.040 -0.030 -0.040 
Industry Dist. IDUMMY(+) 
 
-0.009 -0.024 -0.009 -0.024 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+) 
 
0.913*** 0.881*** 0.913*** 0.881*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+) 
 
0.517** 0.480*** 0.517*** 0.480*** 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-) 
 
0.040** 0.049*** 0.040** 0.049*** 
Constant Term -2.653*** -2.975*** -3.734*** -3.615*** -3.852*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES NO YES 
Age  centred NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations  26,588 16,854 16,854 18,373 16,830 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,206 7,205 7,196 7,196 7,196 
Pseudo-R^2 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 
LR Test of Coefficients 26.135*** 105.609*** 124.027*** 105.609*** 124.027*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 5F (Firm) Model 5G (Year) Model 5H (Industry)  
Firm Life cycle Age (-)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  
 Age sq. (+)  0.000 0.000 0.000  
Control variables (in model 5B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variables are firm age and firm age squared and 
the control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. The coefficients of firm age squared are 
small and positive but are shown as 0.000 (3 decimal places) due to space limitations. Profitability is 
the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to 
market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate 
of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term 
investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. GRDummy takes a 
value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a 
value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value 
of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to 
total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. 
Firm size is the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The 
hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 5A represents a univariate logit 
regression model where the dependent variable is takeover probability and the independent 
variables are firm age and firm age squared. This model has no control variables. Model 5B and 5C 
are multivariate logit models with firm age and firm age squared as the independent variables and 
all the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 5C is similar 
to 5B but also controls for industry using industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry 
classifications). Model 5D and 5E used centre values (about the mean) for firm age and firm age 
squared. Models 5F, 5G and 5H are equivalent to model 5B adjusted for firm, year and industry 
clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 
log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The argument that old firms do not typically ‘die’ but are recycled into new firms through 
acquisitions (proposed by Loderer and Waelchli (2010)) is not empirically supported. The 
results in table 5.3.5 (model 5A to 5E), shows that the coefficient of the Age squared 
variable is positive (but not statistically significant). The results do not therefore support 
the firm lifecycle hypothesis proposed in this study. The question of what happens to firms 
as they grow old is therefore still very much open for debate. 
 
As in section 5.3.2 and section 5.3.3, further analysis on the relationship between the 
distribution of firm age and takeover probability can be conducted by using different age 
subgroups. The sample of firms is ranked by age and (group 1- group 5) quintiles are 
created. The descriptive statistics of the five groups are shown in table 5.3.5b. 
 
Table 5.3.5b: Descriptive statistics of firm age groups 
 
  N Range Minimum Maximum Mean  SD Dev. Skewness 
Group 1 6,614 5 0 5 2.704 1.592 -0.094 
Group 2 5,463 5 6 11 8.288 1.679 0.154 
Group 3 6,018 14 12 26 17.784 4.265 0.336 
Group 4 5,864 37 27 64 44.294 11.133 0.091 
Group 5 5,927 99 65 164 87.891 15.772 0.677 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for different firm age quintiles. Groups are generated 
by ranking all firms in the sample by their firm age and splitting the sample into five equal 
groups (quintiles). Group 1 contains the youngest 20% of firms in the sample and Group 5 
contains the oldest 20% of firms in the sample. 
 
Group 1 consists of young firms (with incorporation age of under five years). The average 
age of firms in this group is 2.7 years. The average age of firms increase from one group to 
the other, with firms in group five having an average age of 87.9 years. The oldest firm is 
164.0 years old. The skewness of within-group distributions is low. The results of the 
regression analysis between firm age and takeover probability for different firm age groups 
(controlling for other determinants of takeover probability) are shown in table 5.3.5c. For 
conciseness, the regression coefficients for the control variables are not presented as they 
are in line with the results shown in table 5.3.5a. 
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Table 5.3.5c: Piecewise regression analysis for firm age groups: with and without 
industry dummies 
 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 1,2 Group 3,4,5 
Panel A: Piecewise regressions 
        
Firm age 0.007 -0.020 -0.017 -0.006 -0.006 0.031* -0.003** 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Piecewise regressions (with industry dummies) 
      
Firm age 0.012 -0.021 -0.018 -0.006 -0.006 0.032* -0.003** 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis for different quintiles of firm age 
where the dependent variable is takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable is firm 
age (number of years since incorporation) and the control variables in the model include 
profitability, ADAR, book to market ratio, sales growth, liquidity, leverage, GRDummy, IDummy, 
free cash flow ratio, tangible assets ratio, firm size and firm age. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA 
to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the 
ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total 
revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to 
total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is 
a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. 
FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. 
PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is 
the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Industry dummies include dummies for the industry 
groups shown in table 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
The coefficient of firm age is statistically insignificant across all groups. Nonetheless, the 
results indicate that takeover probability is, perhaps, increasing in firm age below 11 years 
(groups 1 and 2) and decreasing in firm age between 11 and 164 years (groups 3, 4 and 5). 
The indication is that the negative relationship between firm age and takeover probability 
(discussed in sections 3.2.9 and 5.2.9) is mainly driven by older firms (i.e., firms with 
incorporation age between 11 and 164 years). This finding is robust to different model 
specifications as shown in table 5.3.5c. These findings broadly support prior empirical 
evidence suggesting that the probability of firm exit (through bankruptcies or takeovers) is 
negatively related to age due to a firm’s ability to learn, actively or passively, over time 
(Hopenhayn (1992), Pakes and Ericson (1998) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2009)). The results 
are inconsistent with Loderer and Waelchli (2010) who argue that takeover hazard initially 
declines with age and then increases as firms grow older. The firm lifecycle hypothesis is 
therefore not empirically supported. 
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5.3.6 M&A rumours hypothesis 
The M&A rumours hypothesis argues that the presence of merger rumours about a specific 
firm increases its takeover likelihood or indicates an increased takeover likelihood
158
. This 
hypothesis is fully discussed in section 3.3.6. Of the 32,363 firm-years in the sample, 
0.53% or 173 firm-years are associated with merger rumours. 8.67% or 15 of these 
rumours are associated with subsequent takeover bids occurring within a one year period. 
The relationship between the presence of takeover rumours and takeover likelihood is 
analysed using a multivariate framework as shown in table 5.3.6.  
 
In line with the hypothesis, there is a direct relationship between the presence of merger 
rumours and the associated firm’s takeover probability. The relationship is significant (at 
the 5% level) in model 6A (with no control variables) but insignificant (in models 6B and 
6C) when other drivers of takeover likelihood are controlled for. The results in model 6B 
are replicated in models 6D, 6E and 6F in which robust standard errors are also corrected 
for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. The results broadly support the 
hypothesis that rumours increase the likelihood of takeovers (or indicate an increased 
takeover likelihood). As shown in table 4.3.2a, the M&A rumour dummy is not correlated 
with any other independent variable. This indicates the M&A rumours are informative and 
do not, necessarily, proxy for other determinants of takeovers. The findings in table 5.3.6 
(while not statistically robust), perhaps, provide some support to Bommel (2003) – 
rumours are informative at equilibrium – and Pound (1990) and Jindra and Walking (2004) 
– several tender offers are preceded by rumours. The results, however, indicate that 
rumours have no significant residual value when included as part of the prediction model.  
 
 
                                                 
158 No assumption is made about a cause-and-effect relationship between rumours and takeover 
likelihood. 
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Table 5.3.6: The relationship between merger rumours and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors  
Hypotheses  Proxies 6A 6B 6C 
Merger rumours MRDummy (+) 0.583** 0.043 0.011 
Inefficient  Profit (-)  0.060 0.054 
Management ADAR (-)  -83.311*** -82.229*** 
Underval. BTM(+)  -0.120* -0.088 
GR  S. Growth  (+/–)  -0.074 -0.073 
Mismatch Liquidity  (+/–)  -0.605** -0.554* 
 
Leverage  (+/–)  0.042 0.040 
 
GRDummy (+)  -0.030 -0.040 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)  -0.008 0.024 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)  0.908*** 0.875*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)  0.520*** 0.481*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)  0.040** 0.048*** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003** 
Constant Term  -2.890*** -2.863*** -3.746*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES 
Observations 32,363 16,854 16,854 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,946 7,205 7,196 
Pseudo-R^2 0.000 0.006 0.007 
LR Test of Coefficients 3.951** 105.564*** 123.965*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 6D (Firm) Model 6E (Year) Model 6F (Industry)  
Merger  MRDummy (+)  0.043 0.043 0.043  
rumours       
Control variables (in model 6B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable is M&A rumours (MRDummy) and the 
control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total 
capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of 
book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues 
from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a 
mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. 
IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. 
FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. 
PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is 
the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised 
sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)).Model 6A represents a univariate logit regression model 
where the dependent variable is takeover probability and the independent variable is the 
MRDummy. This model has no control variables. Model 6B is a multivariate logit model with 
MRDummy as the independent variable and all the old variables as control variables, regressed on 
firm takeover probability. Model 6C replicates model 6B but controls for industry differences using 
industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 6D, 6E and 6F are equivalent 
to model 6B adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ is size of 
the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of 
model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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The lack of robustness can partly be attributed to the significant weaknesses in the way the 
data for merger rumours is collected. The primary weakness, as noted in the hypotheses 
chapter, is the reliance on rumours available on Thomson DataStream. Over the study 
period, Thomson DataStream reports fewer than 500 merger rumour occurrences which 
can only be matched to 198 (of 32,363) distinct firm-years. A more holistic database (such 
as the Financial Times archives [FT CD Rom]) might, perhaps, provide a more complete 
dataset of merger rumours. However, such a dataset requires an item-level treatment 
approach which was considered infeasible for the current study given the sample size. 
These ‘preliminary’ results, nonetheless, pave the way for further studies in the area. 
5.3.7 Payroll synergies hypothesis 
The payroll synergy hypothesis contends that takeover probability is an inverse U-shaped 
function of a firm’s payroll burden (HR cost to sales ratio)159. That is, takeover likelihood 
increases with payroll burden but declines when payroll burden becomes very high. This 
hypothesis is fully discussed in section 3.3.7. The descriptive statistics (table 5.2.1 panel B) 
indicate that, on average, targets have a lower payroll burden when compared to non-
targets.  On average non-targets pay 34.10% of their sales revenues to their employees as 
salaries and benefits, while targets pay 31.40%. The difference between the two 
subsamples is statistically significant at a 1% level. The result from the U-test is 
statistically insignificant. The median payroll bill is 25.70% of sales revenue for targets 
and 26.50% for non-targets. The difference in median is insignificant at the 10% level.  
 
The payroll synergies hypothesis (U-shaped relationship) is further investigated using a 
multivariate framework as shown in table 5.3.7a. This is achieved by regressing HR costs 
to sales and squared HR Costs to sales on takeover probability (controlling for other 
determinants of takeover probability). 
 
                                                 
159 HR (human resource) costs include expenses on employee salaries and benefits. 
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Table 5.3.7a: The relationship between HR costs (to sales) and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors 
Hypotheses  Proxies 7A 7B 7C 7D 7E 
Payroll HR/Sales (+) 0.967*** 1.063** 1.198** 0.420* 0.490* 
Synergies HR/Sales sq.(–) -1.266*** -0.975** -1.073** -0.975** -1.073** 
Inefficient Profitability (-) 
 
-0.129 -0.134 -0.129 -0.134 
Management ADAR (-) 
 
-76.714*** -75.316*** -76.714*** -75.316*** 
Underval BTM(+) 
 
-0.131* -0.096 -0.131* -0.096 
Growth-  S.Growth (+/–) 
 
-0.046 -0.041 -0.046 -0.041 
resource Liquidity  (+/–) 
 
-0.630** -0.555* -0.630** -0.555* 
Mismatch Leverage  (+/–) 
 
-0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 
 
GRDummy(+) 
 
0.003 -0.012 0.003 -0.012 
Industry Dist. IDummy(+) 
 
0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 
FreeCash FCF(+) 
 
1.077*** 1.047*** 1.077*** 1.047*** 
Tangible Asts PPP/TA(+) 
 
0.499*** 0.445** 0.499*** 0.445** 
Firm Size LnAssets (+) 
 
0.068*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 
Firm Age Age  (-) 
 
-0.003** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** 
Constant    -2.914*** -4.224*** -4.547*** -3.979*** -3.074** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES NO YES 
HR Cost/Sales centred NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 23,572 16,163 16,163 16,163 16,163 
Deviance(–2LL) 10,260 6,678 6,668 6,678 6,668 
Pseudo-R^2 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients 28.647*** 102.829*** 123.309*** 102.828*** 123.309*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors 
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 7F (Firm) Model 7G (Year) Model 7H (Industry)  
Payroll  HR/Sales (+)  1.063** 1.063** 1.063**  
Synergies HR/Sales sq.(–)  -0.975** -0.975** -0.975**  
Control variables (in model 7B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variables are payroll costs to sales ratio and 
payroll costs to sales ratio squared and the control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal 
return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales 
growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years 
since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 7A represents 
a univariate logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover probability and the 
independent variables are HR cost to sales and squared HR cost to sales, with no control variables. 
Model 7B – 7E are multivariate logit models with HR cost to sales as the independent variable and 
all the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 7C is 
similar to 7B but also controls for industry using industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry 
classifications). Model 7D replicates model 7B but centres the independent variable – HR cost to 
sales – (about the mean) to minimise multicollinearity in the model. Model 7E replicates model 7D 
but controls for industry differences using industry dummies. Models 7F, 7G and 7H are 
equivalent to model 7B adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ 
is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and 
the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The coefficient of the HR cost to sales ratio is negative and statistically significant at the 
10% level and the coefficient of the HR Cost to sales ratio squared is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level across all (five) model specifications
160
. The 
relationship remains robust when standard errors are corrected for clustering across firm, 
years and industries as in panel B. The distribution of firm payroll (HR) costs to sales ratio 
can be expected to substantially vary across industries as some industries are more labour 
intensive than others. Nonetheless, the results show that even after explicitly controlling 
for industry differences (as in model 7E) or correcting standard errors for clustering by 
industry (as in model 7H), the relationship between HR cost to sales ratio and takeover 
probability remains robust. 
 
These results support the contention that takeover probability has a nonlinear relationship 
with payroll burden. As hypothesised, the results show that takeover probability, perhaps, 
initially decreases with payroll burden, then increases as payroll burden increases. 
Piecewise regression analysis is used to ensure robustness in the results. This is achieved 
by creating five quintiles (group 1- group 5) based on HR costs to sales ratio ranks. Firms 
in group 1 (group 5) are the 20% of firms in the sample with the lowest (highest) HR cost 
to sales ratio or payroll burden. If the hypothesised relationship is true, one will expect the 
relationship between payroll burden and takeover probability to, perhaps, be negative (and 
significant) for firms in group 1, and positive (and significant) for firms in group 5. It is 
likely that this relationship will be weak for firms in groups 3 as they, presumably, have 
the ‘average’ payroll burden or represent the turning point in the relationship. Table 5.3.7b 
shows the descriptive statistics of each of the five groups. 
 
Table 5.3.7b: Descriptive statistics of HR costs to sales groups 
 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD Deviation Skewness 
Group 1 4,715 0.086 0.057 0.144 0.097 0.028 -0.064 
Group 2 4,714 0.080 0.144 0.224 0.184 0.023 -0.015 
Group 3 4,714 0.086 0.224 0.314 0.266 0.025 0.079 
Group 4 4,714 0.147 0.310 0.457 0.370 0.042 0.376 
Group 5 4,714 0.709 0.457 1.166 0.779 0.273 0.445 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for different HR cost to sales quintiles. Groups are 
generated by ranking all firms in the sample by their HR cost to sales ratio (payroll burden) and 
splitting the sample into five equal groups (quintiles). Group 1 contains the 20% of firms with the 
lowest payroll burden and Group 5 contains the 20% of firms with the highest payroll burden. 
 
                                                 
160 Model 7D and 7E, which use centred variables, requires the coefficient of the squared term to be 
significant, to indicate nonlinearity. 
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Firms in group 1 have a mean HR cost to sales ratio of 9.7%. The distribution of HR cost 
to sales for group 1 is not (significantly) skewed. Firms in group 5 have an average HR 
cost to sales ratio of 77.9%. The results for the piecewise regression analysis are presented 
in table 5.3.7c. 
 
Table 5.3.7c: Piecewise regression analysis for HR costs to sales groups – with and 
without industry dummies 
 
  
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
Panel A: Piecewise regressions 
     Payroll Synergies  HR cost/sales 1.638 4.980 -4.771 -2.032 -0.430 
 Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry Dummies NO NO NO NO NO 
 Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Piecewise regressions (with industry dummies) 
          
Payroll Synergies  HR cost/sales 1.481 5.532* -5.117* -1.783 -0.358 
 Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis for different quintiles of HR costs 
to sales where the dependent variable is takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable 
is the HR (payroll) cost to sales ratio and the control variables in the model include profitability, 
ADAR, book to market ratio, sales growth, liquidity, leverage, GRDummy, IDummy, free cash 
flow ratio, tangible assets ratio, firm size and firm age. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total 
capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio 
of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total 
revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to 
total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is 
a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. 
FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. 
PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is 
the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Industry 
dummies include dummies for the industry groups shown in table 4.2.2. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The relationship between takeover probability and payroll burden is positive for firms in 
groups 1 and 2 and negative for firms in groups 3, 4 and 5. The results are statistically 
significant when industry differences are controlled for. These results support the 
hypothesis that takeover probability increases with payroll costs (as evident in groups 1 
and 2) but decreases when payroll costs become really high (as evident in groups 3, 4 and 
5). The results reported in tables 5.3.7a and 5.3.7c are partly consistent with Capron 
(1999), Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) who argue that 
M&A is an effective way of restructuring firms with high payroll burdens (at least, in 
Europe). This is because a new management team is less likely to uphold existing 
employee contracts. The results also support the argument that the acquisition of 
companies with a high payroll cost to sales ratio provides bidder management with an 
 220 
 
opportunity to create operational synergies through layoffs. Finally, the results are in line 
with the suggestion that at very high levels, payroll costs can act as a deterrent to takeovers 
due to implicit costs associated with restructuring. Overall, the results are consistent with 
the findings in table 5.3.7a – an inverse U-shaped relationship between takeover 
probability and payroll burden. 
 
5.3.8 Share repurchases hypothesis 
The share repurchase hypothesis argues that the presence of share repurchases activity 
either increases or decreases a firm’s takeover likelihood, depending on the predominant 
role (e.g., managerial signalling, takeover defence tactic, free cash flow distribution, 
capital structure adjustment) of share repurchase activity. These hypotheses are fully 
discussed in section 3.3.8. The sign of the relationship will, perhaps, shed light on the 
predominant motives for share repurchases. The sample employed in this study has a total 
of 191 share repurchase announcements. Of these 191 announcements, 9.94% or 19 
announcements are subsequently followed by takeover bids while 90.05% or 172 
announcements are associated with no bids over the next year
161
. 
 
The results of the multivariate analysis are shown in table 5.3.8. As shown in table 5.3.8, 
the announcement of share repurchases activity increases a firm’s takeover probability in 
the next period. The coefficient of the share repurchase variable is positive and significant 
at the 1% level in model 8A. This finding supports the proposition that share repurchases 
activity predominantly plays a signalling role. However, the relationship is not robust to 
different model specifications and controls.  
                                                 
161 Thomson OneBanker defines a repurchase as ‘deals in which a company buys back its shares in 
the open market or in privately negotiated transactions or a company’s board authorises the 
repurchase of a portion of its shares’. The number of share repurchases reported by Thomson 
OneBanker is very low as it relies on other databases for the collection of repurchase data and does 
not collect the data directly from companies. There is a high likelihood that the data provided is 
incomplete. This represents a weakness in the empirical analysis and an opportunity for further 
research using alternative more comprehensive data sources. 
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Table 5.3.8: The relationship between Share repurchases and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors  
Hypotheses  Proxies 8A 8B 8C 
Share repurchase SRDummy (+/-) 0.737*** 0.129 0.110 
Inefficient  Profit (-)  0.060 0.054 
Management ADAR (-)  -83.304*** -82.219*** 
Underval. BTM(+)  -0.120* -0.088 
GR  S. Growth  (+/–)  -0.073 -0.0723 
Mismatch Liquidity  (+/–)  -0.608** -0.556* 
 
Leverage  (+/–)  0.043 0.040 
 
GRDummy (+)  -0.030 -0.040 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)  -0.008 -0.024 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)  0.907*** 0.875*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)  0.517*** 0.479*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)  0.040** 0.048*** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003** 
Constant Term  -2.970*** -3.498*** -3.740*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES 
Observations 32,363 16,854 16,854 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,944 7,205 7,196 
Pseudo-R^2 0.000 0.006 0.007 
LR Test of Coefficients 7.593*** 105.695*** 124.070*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors 
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 8D (Firm) Model 8E (Year) Model 8F (Industry)  
Share  SRDummy (+/-)  0.129 0.129 0.129  
repurchase       
Control variables (in model 8B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable is share repurchases (SRDummy) and 
the control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total 
capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of 
book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues 
from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a 
mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. 
IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. 
FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. 
PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is 
the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised 
sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 8A represents a univariate logit regression model 
where the dependent variable is takeover probability and the independent variable is SRDummy, 
with no control variables. Model 8B and 8C are multivariate logit models with SRDummy as the 
independent variable and all the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover 
probability. Model 8C is similar to 8B but also controls for industry using industry dummies (see 
table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 8D, 8E and 8F are equivalent to model 8B adjusted 
for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ is size of the sample used in the 
analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of model coefficient is the 
Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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The results partly support the contention that managers are more likely to engage in 
repurchase programmes when they believe that their shares are undervalued. This share 
repurchases programme, incidentally, signals the availability of significant free cash flow 
resources and a lack of suitable future investment projects, as well as the likelihood that the 
repurchasing firm is undervalued
162
. As shown by the results (table 5.3.8), this signal 
increases the firm’s takeover likelihood. These results are also consistent with the finding 
that firms gain significant abnormal returns from repurchase announcements (see, for 
example, Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry et al. (1995), Grullon 
and Michaely (2004), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2005)), as these abnormal returns can 
partly be due to the increased likelihood that such firms will eventually receive takeover 
bids. The evidence does not fully support the contention that share repurchases constitute a 
dependable takeover defence tactic (Harris and Raviv (1988), Bagwell (1991) and Persons 
(1994)) as the likelihood of receiving a bid is higher for firms with share repurchases 
activity.  
 
5.3.9 Asymmetric valuation hypothesis  
The asymmetric valuation hypothesis predicts that takeover likelihood will decrease with 
the level of information asymmetry. The degree of firm-level information asymmetry is 
proxied by a firm’s residual volatility in daily stock abnormal returns in the year to June 
30
th
. If the hypothesis is supported, on average, targets should have a lower residual 
volatility when compared to non-targets. Takeover probability should also decline with 
residual volatility. This hypothesis is fully discussed in section 3.3.9. The results in table 
5.2.1 show that targets (non-targets) have an average residual volatility of 0.0165 (0.0171) 
– the two figures are rounded to 3 decimal places in the table. The difference in residual 
volatility (of 0.0014) is not significant at the 10% level.  
 
The median residual volatility for both targets and non-targets is 0.014 and 0.013. The 
median test shows that there is a significant (at the 5% level) difference of median between 
targets and non-targets. Table 5.3.9 shows the results from multivariate analysis. 
 
                                                 
162 See Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Vermaelen 
(1984), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), Hertzel and Jain (1991), Comment and Jarrell (1991) and 
Dann et al. (1991) for a discussion. 
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 Table 5.3.9: The relationship between residual volatility and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors  
Hypotheses  Proxies 9A 9B 9C 
Asymmetric V. Residual Vol. (-) -2.306 -3.564* -3.652* 
Inefficient  Profit (-)  0.050 0.043 
Management ADAR (-)  -86.409*** -85.335*** 
Underval. BTM(+)  -0.120* -0.087 
GR  S. Growth  (+/–)  -0.077 -0.076 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/–)  -0.598** -0.547* 
 
Leverage  (+/–)  0.049 0.046 
 
GRDummy(+)  -0.033 -0.044 
Industry. Disturbance IDummy (+)  -0.022 -0.039 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)  0.857*** 0.822*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)  0.519*** 0.481*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)  0.039** 0.048** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term  -2.989*** -3.426*** -2.998*** 
Industry dummies NO NO YES 
Observations 25,406 16,854 16,854 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,223 7,204 7,195 
Pseudo-R^2 0.000 0.006 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients 1.560 108.053*** 126.585*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 9D (Firm) Model 9E (Year) Model 9F (Industry)  
Asymmetric V. Residual Vol. (-)  -3.564* -3.564 -3.564  
       
Control variables (in model 9B)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variable is residual volatility the control variables 
are the old prediction hypotheses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. 
ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of 
equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the 
previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to total equity. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch 
between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes 
a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio 
of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio 
of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log of 
total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in 
brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 9A represents a univariate logit regression model where the 
dependent variable is takeover probability and the independent variable is residual volatility, with 
no control variables. Model 9B and 9C are multivariate logit models with residual volatility as the 
independent variable and all the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover 
probability. Model 9C is similar to 9B but also controls for industry using industry dummies (see 
table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 9D, 9E and 9F are equivalent to model 9B adjusted 
for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Observations’ is size of the sample used in the 
analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of model coefficient is the 
Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Consistent with the asymmetry valuation hypothesis, residual volatility has a negative 
relationship with takeover probability. The coefficient of residual volatility is significant at 
the 10% level in model 9B and 9C. The relationship is robust when controlled for industry 
differences using industry dummies as in model 9C. The findings suggest that information 
asymmetry may deter bidders from making takeover bids for prospective targets. One 
reason for this (as discussed in section 3.3.9) is that information asymmetry may lead to a 
systematic reduction in the post-merger value of the combined firm due to the tendency for 
the bidder to over-pay for the target (when target value is unknown). If this is the case, the 
level of post-merger value reduction may increase with the level of information asymmetry 
thus explaining the negative (linear) relationship between information asymmetry and 
takeover likelihood. The contention – information asymmetry negatively impacts on firm 
value – is consistent with the findings of prior studies such as Hansen (1987), 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Martynova and Renneboog (2009)) and Officer 
et al. (2009). The finding is robust when standard errors are corrected for firm clustering 
but not for year and industry clustering as shown in panel B
163
. 
 
5.3.10 Industry concentration hypothesis 
The hypothesis argues that takeover probability will decrease as the concentration of a 
firm’s industry increases, as takeovers are less likely to occur in concentrated industries. 
This hypothesis is discussed in section 3.3.10. Industry concentration is modelled by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The index increases as the number of firms within an 
industry reduces i.e. as the industry becomes more concentrated. The proxy for industry 
concentration is further discussed in section 3.3.10. The relationship between HHI and 
takeover probability should be negative (and significant), if the hypothesised relationship is 
true. The results of the multivariate analysis (logit regression with takeover probability as 
dependent variable and HHI as independent variable) are presented in table 5.3.10.  
 
 
                                                 
163 It is worth reiterating that the use of industry dummies controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
across industries. Standard errors (clustered by industry) control for any correlation between the 
error terms for firms within the same industry. 
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Table 5.3.10: The relationship between industry concentration and takeover 
probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors  
Hypotheses  Proxies 10A 10B  10C 10D 
Industry Concentration HHI (-) -0.272 -0.957* -1.150** -1.413* 
Inefficient  Profitability (-)   0.033 0.043 
Management ADAR (-)   -81.792*** -80.917*** 
Undervaluation BTM(+)   -0.121 -0.091 
GR  S. Growth (+/-)   -0.059 -0.075 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/-)   -0.587* -0.552* 
 
Leverage (+/-)   0.037 0.040 
 
GRDummy (+)   -0.032 -0.041 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)   0.009 -0.024 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)   0.891*** 0.870*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)   0.573*** 0.464*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)   0.045*** 0.050** 
Firm Age Age  (-)   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term  -2.862*** -2.917*** -2.920*** -3.676*** 
Industry dummies NO YES NO YES 
Observations 30,866 30,866 16,851 16,851 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,782 12,770 7,196 7,189 
Pseudo-R^2 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients 0.923 24.801** 111.860*** 126.446*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 10E (Firm) Model 10F (Year) Model 10G (Ind.)  
Industry Conc. HHI (-)  -1.150** -1.150** -1.150**  
Control variables (in model 10C)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate) and the independent variable is industry concentration proxied by 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal 
return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales 
growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years 
since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 10A 
represents a univariate logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover 
probability and the independent variable is HHI, with no control variables. Model 10B, 
additionally controls for industry using industry dummies. Model 10C and 10D are multivariate 
logit models with HHI as the independent variable and the old variables as control variables, 
regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 10D is similar to 10C but also controls for industry 
using industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 10E, 10F and 10G are 
equivalent to model 10C adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively.  
‘Observations’ is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of 
the model and the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results from the regression analysis show that there is a negative relationship between 
takeover probability and industry concentration, as hypothesised. The coefficient of HHI is 
insignificant in model 10A. This model is a univariate model with no controls for industry 
differences or other determinants of takeover likelihood.  As in model 10B, the coefficient 
of HHI becomes statistically significant (at the 10% level) when industry differences are 
controlled for. Taken together, the results suggest that industry concentration on its own 
(as defined in this study) does not drive takeover activity. In model 10A, the marginal 
contribution of industry concentration is, possibly, clouded out by noise in the model (e.g., 
from other determinants of takeover likelihood). Further, the classification method used in 
this study is, perhaps, too broad to meaningfully capture the industry concentration for 
close or direct competitors. Model 10B reduces noise in the model by restricting the 
analysis to broad industry subgroups. The results in model 10B suggest that changes in 
industry concentration over time, potentially, affect the takeover likelihood of firms within 
the industry. 
 
Consistent with this argument, model 10C shows that the coefficient of HHI in model 10A 
becomes significant (at the 5% level) when other determinants of takeover likelihood are 
added to the model. Model 10D is similar to model 10C but also controls for industry. The 
results from model 10C confirm that takeover likelihood declines with industry 
concentration both across firms, industries and time. The results of model 10D (which 
controls for industry) indicates that the takeover likelihood of firms within an industry 
declines as the industry’s concentration increases over time, and vice versa. The 
relationship between industry concentration and takeover probability is robust when 
standard errors are corrected for firm, industry and year as shown in panel B. 
 
The results are in line with Powell and Yawson (2005) who suggest that low concentration 
industries are more likely to see higher takeover activity. The findings extend the cross-
sectional results of Powell and Yawson (2005) by showing that within an industry, 
takeover likelihood increases as the concentration of firms within that industry decreases 
over time, and vice versa. The results also support the contention that competition in low 
concentration industries and antitrust protection in high concentration industries can shape 
the likelihood of takeovers occurring within these industries. This is further discussed in 
section 3.3.10. 
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5.3.11 Market liquidity hypothesis 
The market liquidity hypothesis predicts that more takeovers are likely to be witnessed in 
periods of high market liquidity. In this study, market liquidity is measured as the 
difference between the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the Bank of England 
Base Rate (BOEBR). The LIBOR represents the rate at which major financial institutions 
lend to each other and to other major firms while the BOEBR represents the interest rate 
charged by the Bank of England (BOE) for overnight lending to financial institutions. A 
significant spread between the LIBOR and the BOEBR (i.e., low market liquidity) may 
arise in situations where banks are unwilling to lend to each other due to uncertainties in 
the market. Firms requiring investment capital (e.g., financing for M&A activity) can more 
easily obtain finance at good rates when the LIBOR rate is low (i.e., spread between 
BOEBR and LIBOR is small). Hence, more takeover activity can be expected during such 
periods. The hypothesis is further discussed in section 3.3.11. Table 5.3.11 presents the 
results of logit regression analysis between takeover probability and market liquidity. 
 
The results show that as hypothesised, a firm’s takeover likelihood increases with 
increased market liquidity. That is, takeover likelihood increases as the spread between 
LIBOR and BOEBR reduces. The relationship between market liquidity and takeover 
probability is robust when standard errors are corrected for firm, industry and year as 
shown in panel B. The coefficient of the market liquidity measure is negative and 
significant across all model specifications
164
. In essence, as the market becomes more 
liquid, funds become more available and firms can access funds more cheaply and easily, 
corporate investments in the form of takeovers are more likely to be undertaken. The 
results are consistent with Harford (2005) who finds that merger waves occur in periods of 
high market liquidity, and argues that market liquidity, indeed, triggers merger waves. 
                                                 
164 The coefficient of the market liquidity variable is significant at the 1% level when other key 
factors driving takeover likelihood are controlled for. 
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Table 5.3.11: The relationship between market liquidity and takeover probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors  
Hypotheses  Proxies 11A  11B  11C 11D 
Market Liquidity LIBOR-BOEBR (-) -0.090** -0.084** -0.235*** -0.229*** 
Inefficient  Profit (-)   0.055 0.051 
Management ADAR (-)   -82.240*** -81.229*** 
Underval. BTM(+)   -0.117* -0.085 
Growth S. Growth (+/-)   -0.080 -0.081 
resource Liquidity (+/-)   -0.619** -0.569** 
mismatch Leverage (+/-)   0.043 0.041 
 
GRDummy (+)   -0.029 -0.040 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)   -0.015 -0.032 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)   0.923*** 0.893*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)   0.498*** 0.456*** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)   0.042*** 0.050*** 
Firm Age Age  (-)   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term  -2.898*** -2.956*** -3.430*** -3.665*** 
Industry dummies NO YES NO YES 
Observations 32,363 32,335 16,854 16,854 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,946 12,922 7,201 7,201 
Pseudo-R^2 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients 4.116** 43.288*** 114.255*** 132.196*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 11E (Firm) Model 11F (Year) Model 11G (Ind.)  
Market  LIBOR-BOEBR (-)  -0.235*** -0.235** -0.235***  
Liquidity       
Control variables (in model 11C)  YES YES YES  
Constant  YES YES YES  
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate) and the independent variable market liquidity proxied by the 
spread between the LIBOR and the Bank of England base rate (LIBOR-BOEBR). The control 
variables are the old prediction hypotheses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital 
employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book 
value of equity to market value of equity. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from 
the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a 
mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. 
IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. 
FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. 
PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Firm size is 
the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised 
sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 11A represents a univariate logit regression model 
where the dependent variable is takeover probability and the independent variable is (LIBOR–
BOEBR), with no control variables. Model 11B, additionally controls for industry using industry 
dummies. Model 11C and 11D are multivariate logit models with (LIBOR–BOEBR) as the 
independent variable and the old variables as control variables, regressed on firm takeover 
probability. Model 11D is similar to 11C but also controls for industry using industry dummies (see 
table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). Models 11E, 11F and 11G are equivalent to model 11C 
adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively.  ‘Observations’ is size of the sample 
used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and the test of model 
coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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5.3.12 Market economics hypothesis 
The market economics hypothesis predicts that takeover activity is likely to increase with 
positive market performance due to the positive sentiment and confidence that results from 
market growth (proxied by the one-year change in the FTSE All Share index - 
FTSEChange). This hypothesis builds on the merger wave literature showing that more 
merger deals are completed during periods of high stock market valuation (Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) and Dong et al. (2006)) and that merger activity generally increases in 
periods of economic growth (Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Harford (2005)). This 
hypothesis is further discussed in section 3.4.12. Table 5.3.12 shows results from the test 
of this hypothesis. 
 
The results from the logit regression analysis show that market growth (which potentially 
creates a positive market sentiment, as hypothesised) increases the likelihood for firms to 
engage in M&A activity. The coefficient of the market sentiment variable is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results are robust (statistically significant at the 1% level) 
when other determinants of takeover probability are controlled for. The relationship is 
robust when standard errors are corrected for firm, industry and year as shown in panel B. 
These results are consistent with prior empirical evidence (see, for example, Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2001), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Harford (2005) and Dong et al. (2006)). 
As discussed in section 3.4.12, this relationship might be attributed to the relative ease of 
justifying takeover activity in growth periods, the desire to benefit from transitory 
economic growth and the potential for increased profitability from takeover activity during 
periods of market growth.  
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Table 5.3.12: The relationship between market performance and takeover 
probability 
Panel A: Regression results with robust standard errors  
Hypotheses  Proxies 12A 12B 12C 12D 
Market Economics FTSEChange(+) 0.930*** 0.911*** 0.815*** 0.815*** 
Inefficient  Margin (-)   -0.007 -0.012 
Management ADAR (-)   -76.641*** -75.519*** 
Underval. BTM(+)   -0.107* -0.074 
Growth S. Growth   -0.085 -0.087 
resource Liquidity   -0.634** -0.584** 
mismatch Leverage   0.047 0.044 
 
GRDummy (+)   -0.035 -0.046 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+)   0.031 0.015 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+)   0.923*** 0.892*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+)   0.462** 0.417** 
Firm Size Ln TA (+)   0.046*** 0.054*** 
Firm Age Age  (-)   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term  -2.992*** 3.051*** -3.632*** -3.877*** 
Industry dummies NO YES NO YES 
Observations 32,363 16,854 16,854 16,854 
Deviance(–2LL) 12,929 12,906 7,196 7,187 
Pseudo-R^2 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.008 
LR Test of Coefficients 37.679*** 75.561*** 123.552*** 141.860*** 
 
Panel B: Regression results with clustered robust standard errors  
Hypotheses Proxies Model 12E (Firm) Model 12F (Year) Model 12G (Ind.) 
Market Economics FTSEChange(+) 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.815*** 
Control variables (in model 12C) YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES 
Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate) and the independent variable market performance proxied by the 
performance of the FTSE All share index. The control variables are the old prediction hypotheses. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal 
return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales 
growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total equity. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Firm size is the natural log of total assets. Age is the number of years 
since incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 12A 
represents a univariate logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover 
probability and the independent variable is FTSEChange, with no control variables. Model 12B, 
additionally controls for industry using industry dummies. Model 12C and 12D are multivariate 
logit models with FTSEChange as the independent variable and the old variables as control 
variables, regressed on firm takeover probability. Model 12D is similar to 12C but also controls for 
industry using industry dummies (see table 4.2.2 for industry classifications). ‘Observations’ is size 
of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of the model and the test 
of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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5.3.13 Summary 
This section has presented empirical results for tests of the new hypotheses discussed in 
section 3.4. The methodology underlying these analyses is fully discussed in section 4.3. I 
find empirical evidence to support seven of the eleven new takeover prediction hypotheses. 
The empirically validated hypotheses include: (new) firm size, capital structure, payroll 
synergies, share repurchases, industry concentration, market liquidity and market 
economics hypotheses. As hypothesised (see section 3.4.2), the smallest and largest firms 
have the lowest takeover likelihood. The multivariate analyses confirm the existence of an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between firm size and takeover probability. Similarly, the 
multivariate analysis lends empirical support to the hypothesised inverse U-shaped 
relationship between leverage and takeover probability. In line with the payroll synergies 
hypothesis, the results confirm that takeover probability has a U-shaped relationship with 
payroll burden. As anticipated, the relationship between share repurchase activity and 
takeover likelihood is non-zero. The evidence on share repurchases is consistent with the 
undervaluation and free cash flow signalling perspective of the share repurchase 
hypothesis (discussed in section 3.4.8).  The empirical evidence also suggests that, as 
hypothesised, industry concentration reduces a firm’s takeover likelihood. The evidence 
also affirms the validity of the market liquidity hypothesis and the market economics 
hypothesis, as market liquidity and market performance increase the propensity for firms to 
engage in M&A activity. 
 
Notwithstanding, the empirical evidence does not fully support four of the eleven new 
hypotheses. These include: financial distress, firm lifecycle, asymmetric valuation and 
merger rumour hypotheses. The evidence on the financial distress hypothesis is 
inconclusive. While Taffler Z score does not appear to significantly affect takeover 
probability, there is some evidence that highly distressed firms are less likely to receive 
takeover bids. The hypothesised U-shaped relationship between age and takeover 
likelihood (the firm lifecycle hypothesis) is not empirically supported. While young firms 
appear to have a high takeover likelihood, there is no evidence that old firms are also 
susceptible to takeovers. In line with the M&A rumours hypothesis, the presence of 
rumours appears to increase a firm’s takeover likelihood. Nonetheless, this relationship is 
statistically insignificant when other drivers of takeover likelihood are included in the 
model. This is despite no significant correlation between the takeover rumour dummy and 
any of the other independent variables. Similarly, consistent with the asymmetric valuation 
hypothesis, the relationship between R&D intensity and takeover probability is negative 
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but not statistically significant across all models. The results suggest that the asymmetric 
valuation and merger rumour hypotheses are valid but do not have residual predictive 
ability after other drivers of takeover likelihood are controlled for. The next section 
evaluates the potential contribution of the new variables in a takeover prediction model. 
5.4 Assessing the impact of the outlier elimination procedure on 
the results in sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
5.4.1 Overview 
The data used in the analyses in sections 5.2 and 5.3 was winsorised at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentile to control for the presence of outliers in the raw data obtained from DataStream. 
The outlier elimination procedure and the quality of the data are discussed in sections 
4.2.6. In section 4.2.6, it was concluded that the extreme values (outliers) were actual 
observations and were not due to errors in DataStream. These outliers were eliminated 
from the data set by winsorising the affected variables at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles. As a 
robustness check, I consider the impact of the winsorisation procedure (5
th
 and 95
th
) by 
also looking at the results obtained if a less extensive winsorisation procedure (1
st
 and 99
th
) 
is adopted. I review the impact on the descriptive statistics in section 5.4.2, old hypothesis 
in sections 5.4.3 and new hypothesis in section 5.4.4. As noted in sections 4.6.2, all 
dummy variables (such as LMDummy, NBVDummy, GRDummy, IDummy, SRDummy, 
MRDummy), industry variables (Herfindahl index) and market variables (such as 
FTSEChange and LIBOR-BORBR) are excluded from the winsorisation process. Firm size 
(natural log of total assets) and firm age (number of years since incorporation) are also not 
winsorised as no apparent extreme values are observed. I do not therefore discuss the effect 
of the winsorisation procedure on hypotheses proxied by these variables. 
5.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.4.2 compares the descriptive statistics for each firm-level hypothesis (and proxy) 
for targets (denoted by ‘1’) and non-targets (denoted by ‘0’). The data used in this table is 
winsorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. The results in this table can directly be compared 
to those in table 5.2.1 which employs data winsorised at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile. The 
main effect of using a less extensive winsorising procedure is the presence of, seemingly, 
extreme observations as can be seen from the lower (higher) minimum (maximum) values. 
The quartiles (25
th
 percentile, median and 75
th
 percentile) of the distribution are only 
marginally affected. The conclusions for the difference in mean and median tests, as well 
as the results for the Mann Whitney U test are unaffected. 
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Table 5.4.2: Descriptive Statistics for proxies of management inefficiency, firm undervaluation and growth -resource mismatch 
   
N Mean Mean MWU Std. Skewness Min Max 25th Median Median 75th 
 Hypothesis    Valid   Diff. (Sig) U (Sig.) Dev       Percentile   Diff. (Sig) Percentile 
Inefficient Profitability 0 30,728 0.056 
 
 0.638 -2.262 -3.660 2.444 -0.003 0.118  0.232 
managmt 
 
1 1,635 0.117 -0.060*** ** 0.466 -1.815 -3.660 2.444 0.040 0.121 -0.003 0.219 
 ADAR 0 24,232 0.0001   0.002 -0.276 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.0002  0.001 
    1 1,635 -0.0003 0.0004*** *** 0.002 -0.469 -0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.0001 0.0001*** 0.001 
Under  BTM 0 26,045 0.505    1.000 1.288 -3.375 5.578 0.123 0.372  0.751 
valuation 
 
1 1,541 0.450 0.056*** 
 
0.749 0.431 -3.375 5.578 0.128 0.379 -0.007 0.754 
Growth  Sales  0 26,893 0.299 
 
 1.040 5.383 -0.876 7.928 -0.026 0.090  0.266 
resource growth 1 1,566 0.289 0.011 
 
1.024 5.793 -0.876 7.928 -0.014 0.082 0.009** 0.235 
mismatch Liquidity 0 30,708 0.158   0.202 1.998 0.014 0.930 0.023 0.082  0.205 
 
 
1 1,635 0.122 0.037*** *** 0.159 2.445 0.000 0.930 0.020 0.067 0.015*** 0.154 
 Leverage 0 30,714 0.486   1.455 2.178 -5.301 9.180 0.016 0.263  0.651 
    1 1,634 0.614 -0.128*** *** 1.499 2.580 -5.301 9.180 0.068 0.365 -0.102*** 0.740 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for key variables and compares the results for targets to those of non-targets. The hypotheses and their proxies are 
shown in the first two columns. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed, ADAR is the average daily abnormal return, book to market is the ratio of 
book value of equity to market value of equity, Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period, Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term 
investments to total assets and Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. In the third column, ‘0’ indicates the results for non-targets and ‘1’ indicates the results for 
targets. Mean difference for each variable is the difference between the mean for non-targets and targets prior to rounding-up. MWU (U-test) generates the U statistic and 
the level of significance of U. U (sig) shows the U statistic obtained (and the level of significance of U) when testing whether there is a difference in the distribution of a 
variable for targets and non-targets. The Median Diff (sig.) shows the difference in median between targets and non-targets for each variable (and its level of significance). 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5.4.2 cont’d: Descriptive statistics for proxies of asymmetric valuation, tangible assets , free cash flow and financial distress 
   
N Mean Mean MWU Std. Skewness Min Max 25th Median Median 75th 
 Hypothesis    Valid   Diff.  U  Dev.       Percentile   Diff.  Percentile 
Asymm. Residual  0 24,232 0.025   0.017 1.770 0.005 0.095 0.013 0.020 
 
0.031 
Valuation Volatility 1 1,174 0.0244 0.001 
 
0.015 1.977 0.005 0.095 0.015 0.020 -0.000** 0.029 
Tangible PPE/TA 0 30,471 0.311   0.253 0.758 0.000 0.937 0.093 0.264 
 
0.460 
property 
 
1 1,634 0.341 -0.030*** *** 0.264 0.631 0.000 0.937 0.111 0.294 -0.030*** 0.513 
FCF FCF/TA 0 23,693 -0.072   0.323 -3.682 -2.020 0.334 -0.090 0.008 
 
0.071 
 
 
1 1,467 0.001 -0.071*** *** 0.163 -3.597 -2.020 0.334 -0.044 0.023 -0.015*** 0.078 
Payroll HR cost 0 22,234 0.561   1.519 6.739 0.031 12.823 0.165 0.265 
 
0.405 
synergies to sales 1 1,338 0.434 0.127*** 
 
1.181 9.146 0.031 12.823 0.168 0.257 0.008 0.381 
 ZSCORE 0 25,877 73.559   321.709 6.574 -63.432 2623.100 2.076 8.212 
 
20.499 
  
 
1 1,459 57.510 16.049** ** 268.485 7.668 -63.432 2623.100 2.195 7.434 0.778*** 16.834 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for key variables and compares the results for targets to those of non-targets. The hypotheses and their proxies are 
shown in the first two columns. Residual volatility (a proxy of the asymmetric valuation hypothesis) is computed from the firm’s one-year daily abnormal returns, 
PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets, FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to 
total assets, HR cost to sales is the ratio of payroll expenses to total revenue, Age is the number of years since incorporation and ZSCORE is the firm’s Taffler Z score. In the 
third column, ‘0’ indicates the results for non-targets and ‘1’ indicates the results for targets. Mean difference for each variable is the difference between the mean for non-
targets and targets prior to rounding-up. MWU (U-test) generates the U statistic and the level of significance of U. U (sig) shows the U statistic obtained (and the level of 
significance of U) when testing whether there is a difference in the distribution of a variable for targets and non-targets. The Median Diff (sig.) shows the difference in 
median between targets and non-targets for each variable (and its level of significance). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The difference in the BTM between targets and non-targets becomes statistically more 
significant with targets having a lower BTM ratio when compared to non-targets. The 
difference in Z Score also substantially increases although the level of significance in the 
difference in mean test does not change. Overall, the results from table 5.4.2 confirm that 
the conclusions drawn in sections 5.2 and 5.3 are robust to the winsorisation procedure 
adopted (5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile). That is, a less extensive winsorisation procedure (1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentile) does not change any of the conclusions from the univariate analysis. 
5.4.3 Data winsorisation and hypothesis evaluation: Old hypothesis 
In this section, I discuss the effect of the winsorising procedure (5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile) on 
the results of the multivariate analysis – test of old hypotheses. In table 5.4.3, I present the 
results obtained when a less extensive winsorisation procedure (1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile) is 
adopted. This table can directly be compare with table 5.2.1b which presents results 
obtained when a more extensive winsorising procedure (5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile) is adopted. 
 
Table 5.4.3: Pooled regression results for existing hypotheses  
Panel A: Robust (Huber-White) Standard errors 
 
Hypotheses Proxies Model 13A Model 13B Model 13C 
Inefficient  Profitability (-) 0.168*** 0.057 -0.019 
Management LMDummy (+/-) -0.424*** - -0.216** 
 
ADAR (-) -98.636*** -117.836*** -120.842*** 
Undervaluation BTM (+) -0.059** -0.027 -0.034 
 
NBVDummy (+/-) 0.023 - -0.031 
Growth-resource  Sales Growth (+/-) -0.010 0.004 0.006 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/-) -1.215*** -0.507** -0.443** 
 
Leverage (+/-) 0.055*** 0.029 0.029 
 
GRDummy (+) 0.026 0.005 -0.005 
Industry Dist. IDUMMY (+) -0.097 -0.008 -0.023 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-) 0.094*** 0.017 0.011 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+) 1.539*** 1.059*** 0.960*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+) 0.458*** 0.462*** 0.447*** 
Firm Age Age  (-) -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Constant Term     -3.506*** -2.696*** 
Industry dummies NO NO NO 
Usable Observations 
 
16,854 16,854 
Deviance (–2LL) 
 
7,206 7,202 
Pseudo-R^2 
 
0.006 0.007 
LR Test of Coefficients   105.550*** 113.290*** 
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Panel B: Robust standard errors adjusted for firm, year and industry clustering  
Hypotheses Proxies  Model 13D (firm) Model 13E (Year) Model 13F (Industry) 
Inefficient  Profitability (-)  -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
Management LMDummy (+/-)  -0.216** -0.216** -0.216* 
 
ADAR (-)  -120.842*** -120.842*** -120.842*** 
Undervaluation BTM (+)  -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
 
NBVDummy (+/-)  -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
Growth-resource  Sales Growth (+/-)  0.006 0.006 0.006 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/-)  -0.443** -0.443* -0.443* 
 
Leverage (+/-)  0.029 0.029 0.029 
 
GRDummy (+)  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
Industry Dist. IDUMMY (+)  -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-)  0.011 0.011 0.011 
Free Cash Flow FCF (+)  0.960*** 0.960*** 0.960*** 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+)  0.447*** 0.447*** 0.447** 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** 
Constant Term    -2.696*** -2.696*** -2.696*** 
Usable Observations  16,854 16,854 16,854 
Deviance (–2LL)  7,146 7,144 7,146 
Pseudo-R^2  0.016 0.016 0.016 
LR Test of Coefficients  98.94*** 440.16*** 98.94*** 
 Notes: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent variable is 
takeover probability (bivariate) and the independent variable are the old prediction hypotheses. 
The hypothesis being tested is shown in the first column and its associated proxy is shown in the 
second column. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. LMDummy takes a 
value of 1 when a firm makes a loss in a given year and a value of 0 otherwise. ADAR is the 
average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to 
market value of equity. NBVDummy takes a value of 1 when the BTM is negative and a value of 0 
otherwise. Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity 
is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity 
ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth 
opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a 
takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. Ln Total Assets is the natural log 
of the firm’s total assets. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less capital 
investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. The hypothesised sign 
is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Model 13A represents univariate logit regression models where 
the dependent variable is takeover probability and the sole independent variable is the variable in 
question (proxy). For example the coefficients of profitability (a proxy for management 
inefficiency) are obtained from regressing profitability as the sole independent variable with 
takeover probability as the binary dependent variable (with no control variables). Model 13B is a 
multivariate logit model which uses all the old variables as independent variables and regresses 
them on firm takeover probability. Model 13C is a multivariate logit model which uses all the old 
variables (including LMDummy and NBVDummy) as independent variables and regresses them 
on firm takeover probability. Model 13D, 13E and 13F are similar to model 13C but the standard 
errors presented are corrected for firm, year and industry clustering, respectively. ‘Usable 
observations’ is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2 log likelihood ratio of 
the model and the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
As in section 5.4.2 above, the conclusions from the multivariate analysis do not 
substantially change when a less extensive winsorisation procedure is adopted. I find that 
all variables maintain their signs (as in table 5.2.1b). With the exception of the BTM 
variable, all variables maintain their statistical significance. As in table 5.2.1b, the BTM 
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variable is significant in the univariate model (model 13A). Nonetheless, it losses 
significance (but maintains its size) in the multivariate models (model 13B, 13C, 13D, 13E 
and 13F). 
 
5.4.4 Data winsorisation and hypothesis evaluation: New hypothesis 
In table 5.4.4, I investigate the impact of the winsorisation procedure on the conclusions 
from the multivariate tests of the new hypotheses. Several of the new hypotheses 
(including firm size, firm lifecycle, M&A rumours, share repurchases, industry 
concentration, market liquidity and market economics) are excluded from this robustness 
check as their associated proxies where not subject to winsorisation. The affected 
hypotheses include capital structure (panel A), payroll synergies (panel B), financial 
distress (panel C) and asymmetric valuation (panel D). 
 
The results in table 5.4.4 show that the expected sign of the variables do not change when a 
less extensive winsorising approach is adopted. Nonetheless, the capital structure and 
asymmetric valuation hypotheses lose their significance in the multivariate model. The 
results (and conclusions) for the payroll synergies and financial distress hypotheses do not 
change. 
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Table 5.4.4: New hypotheses evaluation: summary of regression results (data 
winsorised at 1st and 99th percentile) 
Proxies (Expected sign) 
Model 14A 
(Univariate) 
Model 14B 
(White)  
Model 14C 
(Industry)  
Model 14D 
(Firm) 
Panel A: Capital structure hypothesis 
Leverage (+) 0.091*** 0.044* 0.044 0.044* 
Leverage squared (-) -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Control variables NO YES YES YES 
Constant term YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Payroll synergies hypothesis 
HR. Cost/Sales (+) 0.726*** 1.063** 1.063** 1.063** 
HR. Cost/Sales squared (-) -1.082*** -0.975** -0.975** -0.975** 
Control variables NO YES YES YES 
Constant term YES YES YES YES 
Panel C: Financial distress hypothesis 
Z Score  (-) -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
ZSDummy (-) -0.115* -0.120 -0.120 -0.120 
Control variables NO YES YES YES 
Constant term YES YES YES YES 
Panel D: Asymmetric valuation hypothesis 
Residual volatility. (-) -0.648 -2.819 -2.819 -2.819 
Control variables NO YES YES YES 
Constant term YES YES YES YES 
Notes: 14A model with no control variables, 14B model with control variables. Control variables 
include all variables in model 1B (section 5.2.1). These include profitability, ADAR, BTM, sales 
growth, liquidity, GRDummy, IDummy, Ln total assets, FCF/TA, PPE/TA and age. Profitability is 
the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. LMDummy takes a value of 1 when a firm makes a 
loss in a given year and a value of 0 otherwise. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book 
to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. NBVDummy takes a 
value of 1 when the BTM is negative and a value of 0 otherwise. Sales growth is the rate of change 
in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term 
investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 
when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 
otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 
otherwise. Ln assets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash 
flow (operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible 
assets (property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since 
incorporation. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)). Standard errors in model 
14B are heteroschedastic-consistent (Huber-White standard errors). Model 14C and 14D are similar 
to model 14B but employs robust standard errors corrected for industry and firm clustering 
(Rogers standard errors). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
5.4.5 Summary 
This section has reviewed the impact of the winsorisation procedure (5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentile) adopted in this study. The effect on the conclusions from the univariate 
(descriptive statistics) and the multivariate (logit regressions) analyses are investigated in 
sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4, respectively. The results suggest that the vast majority of the 
conclusions are robust to the choice of winsorisation procedure. That is, a less extensive 
winsorisation procedure does not dramatically affect the results and conclusions from 
sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
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5.5 Tests for intertemporal variation in target characteristics 
Sections 5.2, and 5.3, focused on identifying the unique characteristics of takeover targets. 
The analyses in these sections involved the use of a full dataset with observations pulled 
from the 1988 to 2010 period. Consistent with prior studies, no year dummies are included 
in the models. As discussed in section 4.3.5, the characteristics of targets can exhibit 
intertemporal variation as suggested by Powell (1997). That is, the characteristics of targets 
in one period can be markedly different from the characteristics of targets in another 
period. This has implications for takeover prediction modelling as intertemporal variation 
in target characteristics is likely to impact on model stability (hence, its predictive ability) 
over time. The focus in this section is to determine whether target characteristics 
significantly change from one period to another. Hence, no analyses are done for non-
targets.  
 
The stability of target characteristics over time is evaluated by testing for intertemporal 
variation using the methodology discussed in section 4.3.5. This methodology is adopted 
from the test of intertemporal variation proposed by Thomas (1997). The methodology 
(fully discussed in section 4.3.5) involves comparing the characteristics of targets in one 
period (period 1) to the characteristics of targets in the next period (period 2) using the 
logit model shown in equation 4.3.4(1). Here, the dependent variable in the model takes a 
value of 1 for targets in the second period (period 2) and a value of 0 for targets in the first 
period (period 1)
165
.  
 
Given that the data spans from 1988 to 2009, 20 yearly breakpoints are set from 1989 to 
2009. At each breakpoint (e.g., 1994), I investigate whether the characteristics of targets 
prior to this breakpoint (e.g., 1988–1993) are different from the characteristics of targets 
after the breakpoint (e.g., 1994–2009) by running the regression model. A significant 
coefficient for a characteristic (e.g., R&D intensity) in the regression model will indicate 
that the characteristic (R&D intensity) of targets in one sub-period (e.g., period 1) is 
different from the characteristic (R&D intensity) of targets in the second sub-period (e.g., 
period 2). Such a finding will suggest the existence of intertemporal variation and non-
stability in the characteristics (e.g., R&D intensity) of targets over time. The results of the 
analyses are summarised in the table 5.5.1.  
                                                 
165 All non-targets are excluded from the sample and only targets are considered for this analysis. 
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Table 5.5.1: The differences in the characteristics of targets over time 
Hypotheses Proxies  
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
Inefficient 
Management 
Profitability - - - - - - - - - - -       
LMDummy      +         +             
ADAR    +     + + + + + + +       
Undervaluation 
BTM                  - - - - - - 
NBVDummy       + + + + +         -   
GR Mismatch 
Sales Growth                 -     +     
Liquidity                             
GRDummy          +   - -   - -     - 
Industry Dist. IDummy        + + + + + + + +       
Free Cash Flow FCF/TA  + + + + + +                 
Tangible assets PPP/TA        - - - - - - - - - - - 
Firm Size 
Ln Assets        +       -             
Ln Assets sq.       -       + +     +   + 
Capital Structure 
Leverage                      + + +   
leverage Sq.                      - -     
Firm life cycle 
Age                               
Age sq                              
Share Repurchases SRDummy         -                   
M&A Rumours MRDummy                              
Payroll Synergies 
HR.Cst/Sales                          +   
HR.Cst/Sales Sq.            + +               
Financial Distress 
Z Score                         +   
ZSDummy                 +           
I Concentration Herf. Index        + + + + + + + + + + + 
Asymmetric valuatn Residual Vol.      - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Market Economics FTSEChange        - - - - - - -   -   - 
Market Liquidity LIBOR-BOEBR      - - - - - - - - + + + + 
Chi Square Test Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: The table shows the changes in the characteristics of targets over time measured using a 
multivariate model proposed by Thomas (1997). The sample used is made up of 1,631 takeover 
targets where bids were announced between 1989 and 2011. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to 
total capital employed. LMDummy takes a value of 1 when a firm makes a loss in a given year 
and a value of 0 otherwise. ADAR is the average daily abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is 
the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. NBVDummy takes a value of 1 when 
the BTM is negative and a value of 0 otherwise. Sales growth is the rate of change in total 
revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of cash and short term investments to 
total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is 
a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. 
IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s industry and a value of 0 otherwise. Ln 
Total Assets is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow 
(operating cash flow less capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets 
(property, plant and equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. 
SRDummy takes value of 1 if a firm makes a repurchase announcement in a particular year and a 
value of 0 otherwise. MRDummy takes value of 1 if a firm is rumoured to be a takeover target in a 
particular year and a value of 0 otherwise. HR cost to sales is the ratio of total cost of payroll to 
revenues. Z Score is a firm’s Taffler Z score. ZSDummy takes value of 1 if a firm has a negative Z 
Score in a particular year and a value of 0 otherwise. Herf Index (Herfindahl Index) is a proxy for 
industry concentration. Residual Vol. (volatility) is the standard deviation of a firm’s one year (to 
June 30th) excess returns. FTSEChange is the performance of the FTSE All Share index over the 
previous year. LIBOR-BOEBR (a measure of market liquidity) is the spread between the LIBOR 
and the base rate. In the first regression (column 3 - 1994), for example, the dependent variable 
takes a value of 1 for all targets between 1994 and 2009 and a value of 0 for all targets between 
1988 and 1994 – ‘1994’ is the breakpoint. This procedure is followed for all 20 regression models – 
for all 20 breakpoints. The greyed-out boxes show that the variable is insignificant (at the 10% 
level) in the model. The positive sign (‘+’) or the negative sign (‘-’) indicate that the variable is 
positive or negative (respectively) and significant at the 10% level, respectively. The Chi Squared 
test is a joint test of model coefficients (conducted at the 10% level). A significant Chi Square in 
the model is denoted by ‘Y’. 
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For simplicity, only the significant changes across time are presented in table 5.5.1. Results 
for the 1989 – 1993 and 2008 – 2009 breakpoints are not presented as the results are not 
significant (i.e., there are no intertemporal variations in the characteristics of targets at 
these breakpoints). The grey boxes in the table indicate that the results (changes in the 
characteristics of targets) are not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
The analyses (e.g., 2000) compare targets in one period (1988–1999) to targets in the 
second period (2000–2009) in terms of their takeover prediction variables. The question 
here is whether the variables remain consistent from one period (1988–1999) to another 
(2000–2009) – hence, no intertemporal variation. A non-significant result for a particular 
variable (e.g., Ln total assets), indicates that there are no significant differences in the 
characteristic (size of targets) between the two periods. The Chi Square test (significant at 
the 10% level) in all periods (1992–2008) reveals that there is some level of intertemporal 
variation in some of the characteristics of targets over time. That is, the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the independent variables are jointly equal to zero is rejected (for all 
breakpoints between 1992 and 2008, inclusive). 
 
The results are broadly consistent with Powell (1997) who argues that the characteristics of 
targets are unstable over time. The results show that targets report higher abnormal returns 
(ADAR) between 1998 and 2004 and were less profitable prior to 2005. This intertemporal 
variation in target market performance (ADAR), potentially, explains some of the 
inconsistency on the relationship between performance and takeover likelihood in 
empirical research (see Agrawal and Jaffe (2003)). The results also show a general decline 
in the book to market ratio of targets over time – mainly post-2002. Similarly, the level of 
liquidity and the proportion of tangible assets for target firms have continuously declined 
over time. There is also some evidence that, comparatively, targets had more free cash 
flow and were drawn from less concentrated industries in the first half of the period.  
 
There is, perhaps, no persistent inter-temporal variation in target sales growth, firm size, 
leverage, share repurchases, rumours, Z score (and Z score dummy) and R&D intensity 
across time. The changes shown for market economics (FTSEChange) and market liquidity 
(LIBOR-BOEBR) more adequately capture the changing environmental conditions (not 
changes in target characteristics). For example, the period post-2004 (leading up to the 
global financial crises) is linked with an increase in the spread between the LIBOR and the 
Bank of England base rate. Overall, the results show that, as suggested by Powell (1997), 
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some of the characteristics of targets change slightly over time. I find that the changes are 
in a single direction implying a high level of stability of the prediction variables over time. 
The results suggest that short-term takeover prediction models (employing fewer years of 
data) can, potentially, be better predictive tools. This finding, perhaps, justifies the 
modelling approach of Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) who use data over a short period 
of six months to develop their model. Nonetheless, the use of short periods (and hence 
limited data) generates new questions of whether model parameters are sufficiently trained 
to predict targets out-of-sample, especially in dynamic economic environments. This issue 
will be further explored in chapter 6. 
 
5.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to test and validate both the old and new prediction 
hypotheses discussed in chapter 3 using the methodologies discussed in chapter 4. A 
secondary objective of the chapter was to conduct a preliminary empirical analysis to 
evaluate the stability of target characteristics over time. Table 5.6.1 summarises the results 
from the empirical tests (univariate, multivariate and robustness checks) of the old and new 
hypotheses. The results for the old hypotheses are presented in panel A and those for the 
new hypotheses are presented in panel B. The univariate tests include the difference of 
means test, median test and U-tests. The multivariate test refers to the results from logit 
regression analyses (controlling for industry effects). The robustness tests for the old 
hypotheses (panel A) refer to the results obtained when all the old hypotheses are 
combined with all the new hypotheses in one model (see model section 6.2 for full details). 
Additionally, the robust tests for the new hypotheses (panel B) also include the results 
from ‘mean centering’ and piecewise regression analyses. In table 5.6.1, ‘YES’ indicates 
that the hypotheses is empirically supported (and vice versa) and ‘NA’ indicates that the 
test is ‘not applicable’ to the specific hypothesis. 
 
As summarised in table 5.6.1 (panel A), the evidence empirically validates some of the old 
hypotheses. The univariate and multivariate analysis lends support to the management 
inefficiency, free cash flow, tangible assets and firm age hypotheses. However, when the 
new hypotheses are included in the model (i.e., robustness check), only the management 
inefficiency, tangible assets and firm age hypotheses are empirically supported. These 
results fully discussed and further explored in section 6.2. 
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Table 5.6.1: Summary of validation test results for old and new takeover prediction 
hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses Proxies (Expected sign) Univariate  Multivariate Robustness   
Panel A: Old Hypotheses Supported Supported Supported 
Inefficient  Profitability (-) NO NO NO 
Management ADAR (-) YES YES YES 
Undervaluation BTM(+) NO NO NO 
Growth Resource  Sales Growth (+/-) 
NA NO NO 
Mismatch Liquidity (+/-) 
 
Leverage (+/-) 
 
GRDUMMY(+) 
Industry  
Disturbance 
IDUMMY(+) 
NA NO NO 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-) NO NO NO 
Free Cash Flow FCF(+) YES YES NO 
Tangible assets PPP/TA(+) YES YES YES 
Firm Age Age  (-) YES YES YES 
Panel B: New Hypotheses Supported Supported Supported 
Firm Size Ln Assets (+) 
YES YES YES 
 
Ln Assets Sq. (-) 
Capital Structure Leverage (+) 
NA YES YES 
 
Leverage Sq.(-) 
Share Repurchases SRDummy(+/-) NA NO NO 
M&A Rumours MRDummy (+) NA NO NO 
Payroll Synergies HR Cost/Sales (+) 
NA YES YES 
 
HR Cost/Sales. Sq. (-) 
Industry 
Concentration 
Herfindahl Index(-) NA YES YES 
Asymmetric 
Valuation 
Residual Volatility (-) NO YES NO 
Firm Life cycle Age (-) 
NA NO NO 
 
Age. Squared (+) 
Financial Distress Z Score (-) YES NO NO 
 
ZSDummy (-) NA YES YES 
Market Economics FTSEChange (+) NA YES YES 
Market Liquidity LIBOR-BOEBR (-) NA YES YES 
Notes: The table summarises the results of section 5.2 and 5.3 – tests of old and new hypotheses. 
‘Univariate’ refers to the results from the univariate analysis (t test, U-test and M test). 
‘Multivariate’ refers to the results from the logit regression analysis (including industry controls 
and mean-centering). ‘Robustness’ tests for the old hypotheses (panel A) refer to the results 
obtained when all the old hypotheses are combined with all the new hypotheses in one model. A 
summary of these results are discussed in section 6.2 ‘Robustness’ tests for the new hypotheses 
(panel B) additionally include the results from ‘mean centering’, piecewise regression analyse and 
standard errors corrected for firm, year and industry clustering. ‘YES’ (‘NO’) indicates that the 
results from the respective test provides (does not provide) support for the hypothesis. ‘NA’ 
indicates that the particular test was not applicable or no substantial testing was done.  
 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. ADAR is the average daily abnormal 
return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Sales 
growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio of 
cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Ln Assets is the natural 
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log of a firm’s total assets. SRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm announced any share repurchases 
in the period and a value of 0 otherwise. MRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is the target in a 
merger rumour and a value of 0 otherwise. ZScore is a firm’s Taffler Z Score. ZSDummy takes a 
value of 1 if a firm has a negative Z Score and a value of 0 otherwise. HR Cost to sales is the ratio of 
payroll expenses to revenues. Herfindahl index is the concentration of the firm’s industry in a 
particular year. Residual volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s abnormal return in the year 
to June 30th. FTSEChange is the performance of the FTSE All Share index in the year to June 30th. 
LIBOR-BOEBR is the spread between the LIBOR and the Bank of England’s base rate. The 
hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)).  
 
I find that takeover likelihood decreases with market (ADAR) performance but increases 
with accounting performance. Only the first part of the finding (i.e., ADAR and takeover 
likelihood) is consistent with the management inefficiency hypothesis as discussed in prior 
research (e.g., Palepu (1986)). The evidence here suggests that targets are profitable firms 
with low future prospects as opposed to the general contention that targets are inefficiently 
managed firms. The qualification (i.e., historical profitability) distinguishes takeover 
targets from the large number of underperforming firms in the population.  
 
The empirical result is inconsistent with the undervaluation hypothesis. On average, targets 
report lower BTM when compared to non-targets – with takeover probability declining 
with BTM. Consistent with the firm age hypothesis, the results confirm that takeover 
probability decreases with firm age. This finding – a negative relationship between age and 
takeover probability – is further supported by the multivariate analysis. There is empirical 
support for the free cash flow (FCF) and tangible assets hypotheses as the results show that 
a firm’s takeover likelihood increases with the level of FCF and the level of tangible assets. 
Nonetheless, the FCF becomes statistically insignificant (i.e., its residual explanatory 
power diminishes) when the new variables are included in the model. Contrary to the (old) 
firm size hypothesis, the results are inconsistent with the contention that targets are small 
firms (Palepu (1986)). The multivariate analysis also shows that takeover probability 
increases with firm size. Again, the results do not also support the growth resource 
mismatch and industry disturbance hypotheses.  
 
Section 5.3 discussed the results from the empirical tests of the new hypotheses. The 
empirical evidence lends some support to the (new) firm size, capital structure, financial 
distress, payroll synergies, industry concentration, market economics and market liquidity 
hypotheses. I find empirical support for the share repurchase and merger rumour 
hypotheses but the residual explanatory power (i.e., statistical significance) of the variables 
decline when all the other new variables are included in the model. The empirical evidence 
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does not fully support the firm lifecycle hypothesis. As hypothesised, the smallest and 
largest firms have the lowest takeover likelihood – an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between firm size and takeover probability. The results also provide empirical support for 
the capital structure hypothesis. Consistent with the hypothesis, the firms with the highest 
and lowest levels of leverage face the lowest threat of takeovers. The payroll synergies 
hypothesis is validated and remains robust to different empirical tests and alternative 
model specifications. The results confirm that takeover probability has a inverse U-shaped 
relationship with firm payroll burden. Here, takeover likelihood increases with payroll cost 
up until a level where payroll costs serve as a takeover deterrent. 
 
The relationship between share repurchase activity and takeover likelihood is positive. In 
support of the undervaluation and free cash flow signalling perspective (discussed in 
section 3.3.8), I find that a firm’s engagement in repurchase activity increases its takeover 
likelihood. As hypothesised, industry concentration moderates a firm’s takeover likelihood. 
Firms in low concentration industries are more susceptible to takeovers than firms in high 
concentration industries. The results show that takeover propensity is not only driven by 
firm characteristics but also by the prevailing market conditions. For example, I find that 
market liquidity (market liquidity hypothesis) and market performance (the market 
economics hypothesis) influence the propensity for firms to engage in M&A activity.  
 
The asymmetric valuation hypothesis is empirically supported. The relationship between 
residual volatility and takeover probability is negative (as hypothesised) and statistically 
significant. Nonetheless, the relationship is not robust (when standard errors are corrected 
for year and industry clustering). I find partial support for the financial distress hypothesis 
– takeover probability is negatively related to a firm’s Taffler Z score. Its residual 
explanatory power diminishes when other control variables are included in the model. In 
line with the hypothesis, there is some evidence that highly distressed firms (firms with Z 
score below zero) are less likely to receive takeover bids. Further, I find no support for the 
firm lifecycle hypothesis. The results show that the negative relationship between firm age 
and takeover probability reported across the firm survival literature (e.g., Agarwal and 
Gort (1996), Jovanovic (1982), Dunne et al. (1989), Audretsch (1991), Loderer and 
Waelchli (2010)) is only persistent for fairly established firms (firm age between 12 and 
164 years). This relationship reverts for a sample of young firms (below 12 years). In line 
with the M&A rumours hypothesis, the presence of M&A rumours appears to increase a 
firm’s takeover likelihood. Nonetheless, this relationship is statistically insignificant when 
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other determinants of takeover likelihood are added to the model. I attribute some of this 
lack of statistical validity to the weaknesses in the rumour data collection process.  
 
The old and new variables are combined to develop the new model in chapter 6. The 
chapter (6) focuses on measuring the performance of the new model when measured 
against a benchmark model – the old model. Several measures of performance including 
area under ROC curves and target concentration in out-of-sample tests are explored.  
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CHAPTER 6  MODEL PREDICTIVE ABILITY 
 
6.1 Overview 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the predictive power of the new model when 
compared to a benchmark model – the old model166. The development of the new and old 
models is discussed in section 4.4.2. Key statistics for logit regression models such as 
pseudo R squares (Cox and Snell R squares, Negelkerke R squares) and area under the 
ROC curve are initially used as the basis of comparison. In addition, I ascertain model 
performance by mimicking the real life usage of the model (albeit through ‘back-testing’) 
using out-of-sample tests. Out-of-sample (or holdout sample) predictive tests involve 
testing the model on new data, obtained from the post-estimation period, and not used in 
the development of the model. Section 6.2 evaluates the empirical relevance of the new 
variables by comparing the performance of the new model against that of the old model. 
 
In addition to evaluating the model’s performance (in section 6.2, 6.3, 6.4), I explore the 
variations in model performance across different market conditions (in section 6.5). I also 
evaluate the impact of the length of the estimation period on the model’s performance (in 
section 6.6). Further, I investigate the predictive ability of model parameters for 
predictions more than one year (and up to ten years) after parameter development (in 
section 6.7) and I explore the optimal choice of portfolio selection technique (in section 
6.8). As will be shown and discussed, these issues (or choices) are important in the 
development of an optimal prediction strategy. The methodology used for these analyses is 
fully discussed in section 4.4.  
 
                                                 
166 The new model is evaluated by comparing its performance with that of a control or benchmark 
(described as ‘old’) model. The old model employs the same dataset and methods as the new 
model but is restricted to the old variables only. The only difference between the old and new 
model is the fact that the new model has 15 additional prediction variables (the new variables) as 
shown in table 4.4.2. 
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6.2 The empirical relevance of the new variables  
 
6.2.1 Overview of regression results 
Section 5.3 tested the validity of the new hypotheses which were discussed in section 3.4. 
The results (summarised in section 5.3.13) show that the empirical evidence lends some 
support to eight of the eleven new hypotheses. As discussed in section 4.3.4, the new 
model is a model which combines the new hypotheses and the old hypotheses under a 
predictive modelling framework. This section empirically tests the relevance of combining 
the two sets of variables. It also explores the contribution of the new variables.  
 
In table 6.2.1a, panel A (Models 15A – 15D) presents regression results for the old model 
(old variable only) and the new model (old and new variables combined). Model 15A 
represents a logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover probability 
and the independent variables are the old prediction hypotheses (old model). Model 15B is 
similar to model 15A but controls for industry using industry dummies. Model 15C is the 
new model. It combines the old and new hypotheses. Model 15D is similar to model 15C 
but controls for industry using industry dummies. The results from chapter 5 revealed that 
some of the predictor variables do not significant impact on takeover likelihood (at the 
10% level). A question arises whether these variables should be excluded from the model. 
Panel B (model 15E – 15H) explores different versions of the new model. Model 15E is 
the new model without the new variables which are found to be insignificant (in section 
5.3). These variables include Age Squared, MRDummy, SRDummy and ZScore. Model 
15E is therefore a clean version of the new model. Model 15F is similar to model 15E but 
controls for industry differences using industry dummies. Model 15G is a restricted version 
of the clean new model. It excludes the old hypotheses which are found to be insignificant 
in the regression analyses in section 5.2 Model 15H replicates 15G but controls for 
industry differences using industry dummies. 
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Table 6.2.1a: Empirical relevance of the new variables 
 
Panel A: Regression  results from combining old and new variables 
Hypotheses Proxies (Exp. sign) 15A (Old) 15B (Old) 15C (New) 15D (New) 
Panel A: Old Hypotheses 
    
Inefficient Profitability (-) 0.060 0.054 -0.575** -0.582** 
Management LMDummy (+/-) 
  
-0.228 -0.228 
 
ADAR (-) -83.317*** -82.230*** -82.519*** -81.234*** 
Undervaluation BTM (+) -0.120* -0.088 -0.199** -0.165* 
 
NBVDummy (+/-) 
  
-0.082 -0.104 
GR Mismatch Sales Growth (+/-) -0.074 -0.073 -0.050 -0.072 
 
Liquidity (+/-) -0.605** -0.554* -0.442 -0.356 
 
Leverage (+/-) 0.043 0.040 
  
 
GRDummy (+) 0.030 -0.040 -0.064 -0.067 
Industry Dist. IDummy (+) -0.008 -0.024 0.078 0.039 
Firm Size Ln Assets (-) 0.040** 0.049*** 
  Free Cash Flow FCF (+) 0.908*** 0.875*** 0.641 0.602 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+) 0.520*** 0.481*** 0.454** 0.330* 
Firm Age Age  (-) -0.003*** -0.003**     
Panel B: New Hypotheses 
  
 
 
Firm Size Ln Assets (+) 
  
2.413*** 2.417*** 
 
Ln Assets sq.(-) 
  
-0.062*** -0.062*** 
Capital Structure Leverage (+) 
  
0.208 0.243 
 
Leverage Sq. (-) 
  
-0.061 -0.072 
Firm life cycle Age  (-) 
  
-0.007* -0.007* 
 
Age sq. (+) 
  
0.000 0.000 
S. Repurchases SRDummy (+/-) 
  
0.222 0.205 
M&A Rumours MRDummy (+) 
  
0.059 0.034 
Payroll Synergies HR. Cost/Sales (+) 
  
1.048* 1.334** 
 
HR.Cost/Sales Sq. (-) 
  
-1.179** -1.383** 
Financial Distress Z Score  (-) 
  
-0.000 -0.000 
 
ZSDummy (-) 
  
-0.042 -0.065 
I. Concentration Herf. Index (-) 
  
-0.755 -0.740 
Asymmetry  Residual Vol. (-) 
  
-3.250 -3.283 
Market Economics FTSEChange (+) 
  
0.469** 0.483** 
Market Liquidity LIBOR-BOEBR (-) 
  
-0.344*** -0.344*** 
Constant Term   -3.506*** -3.510*** -25.985*** -25.717*** 
Industry dummies NO YES NO YES 
Observations 16,854 16,854 14,093 14,093 
Deviance(–2LL) 7,153 7,135 5,782 5,766 
Cox and Snell’s R Square 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.015 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.018 0.021 0.039 0.042 
Hosmer-Lemeshow GOF (sig.) 3.968 10.418 12.086 12.025 
Area under ROC Curve (sig.) 0.599*** 0.610*** 0.642*** 0.648*** 
LR Test of model coefficients (sig.) 147.006*** 166.552*** 191.751*** 208.372*** 
 
 
 250 
 
Table 6.2.1a: Empirical relevance of the new variables (continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression  results for different versions of the new model 
Hypotheses Proxies (Exp.sign) 15E (Clean) 15F (Clean) 15G(Restricted) 15H(Restricted) 
Panel A: Old Hypotheses 
 
 
Inefficient Profitability (-) -0.578** -0.586** 
 
 
Management LMDummy (+/-) -0.208 -0.226 
 
 
 
ADAR (-) -86.020*** -81.405*** -83.659*** -82.321*** 
Undervaluation BTM (+) -0.203** -0.169** -0.126* -0.083 
 
NBVDummy (+/-) -0.073 -0.095   
GR Mismatch Sales Growth (+/-) -0.040 -0.062   
 
Liquidity (+/-) -0.438 -0.362 -0.628* -0.558 
 
GRDummy (+) -0.068 -0.072   
Industry Dist. IDummy (+) 0.080 0.039   
Free Cash Flow FCF (+) 0.606 0.578 0.456 0.449 
Tangible assets PPP/TA (+) 0.475*** 0.348* 0.422 0.295 
Firm Age Age  (-)  -0.004***  -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
Panel B: New Hypotheses  
 
  
Firm Size Ln Assets (+) 2.378*** 2.386*** 2.222*** 2.242*** 
 
Ln Assets sq.(-) -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.056*** -0.057*** 
Capital Structure Leverage (+) 0.224 0.236 0.201 0.240 
 
leverage Sq. (-) -0.068 -0.080 -0.067 -0.080 
Payroll Synergies HR. Cst/Sales (+) 1.025* 1.312** 1.227** 1.500** 
 
HR.Cst/SalesSq. (-) -1.089* -1.364** -1.105** -1.360** 
Financial Distress ZSDummy (-) -0.046 -0.058 -0.017 -0.037 
I. Concentration Herf. Index (-) -0.726 -0.728 -0.426 -0.322 
Asymmetry  Residual Vol (-) -3.246 -3.377 -3.341 -3.178 
Market Economics FTSEChange (+) 0.476** 0.482** 0.381* 0.408* 
Market Liquidity LIBOR-BOEBR (-) -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.357*** -0.350*** 
Constant Term   -25.597*** -25.731*** -24.409*** -24.714*** 
Industry dummies  NO YES NO YES 
Observations  14,093 14,093 14,549 14,549 
Deviance(–2LL) 5,784 5,870 6,036 6,027 
Cox and Snell’s R Square 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.014 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.039 0.042 0.036 0.040 
Homer-Lemslow GOF Test (Sig.) 13.565 11.806 7.633 12.281 
Area under ROC Curve (Sig.) 0.641*** 0.649*** 0.636*** 0.645*** 
LR Test of model coefficients (Sig.) 190.290*** 207.019*** 182.580*** 201.044*** 
Notes to table 6.2.1a: The table presents the results of logit regression analysis where the dependent 
variable is takeover probability (bivariate), the independent variables are the proxies of the old and 
new hypotheses. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total capital employed. LMDummy takes a 
value of 1 when a firm makes a loss and a value of 0 otherwise. ADAR is the average daily 
abnormal return. Book to market (BTM) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of 
equity. NBVDummy takes a value of 1 when a firm’s BTM is negative and a value of 0 otherwise. 
Sales growth is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. Liquidity is the ratio 
of cash and short term investments to total assets. Leverage is the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
GRDummy takes a value of 1 when there is a mismatch between a firm’s growth opportunities and 
its resources and a value of 0 otherwise. IDummy takes a value of 1 if a takeover occurs in a firm’s 
industry and a value of 0 otherwise. FCF/TA is the ratio of free cash flow (operating cash flow less 
capital investments) to total assets. PPE/TA is the ratio of tangible assets (property, plant and 
equipment) to total assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Ln Assets is the natural 
log of a firm’s total assets. SRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm announced any share repurchases 
in the period and a value of 0 otherwise. MRDummy takes a value of 1 if a firm is the target in a 
merger rumour and a value of 0 otherwise. ZScore is a firm’s Taffler Z Score. ZSDummy takes a 
value of 1 if a firm has a negative Z Score and a value of 0 otherwise. HR Cost to sales is the ratio of 
payroll expenses to revenues.   
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Notes to table 6.2.1a cont’d: Herf. Index (Herfindahl index) is the concentration of the firm’s 
industry in a particular year. Residual volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s abnormal 
return in the year to June 30th. FTSEChange is the performance of the FTSE All Share index in the 
year to June 30th. LIBOR-BOEBR is the spread between the LIBOR and the Bank of England’s base 
rate. The hypothesised sign is shown in brackets (e.g., (+), (-)).  
 
Panel A (Models 15A – 15D) presents regression results for the old model and the new model (with 
all the new variables). Model 15A represents a logit regression model where the dependent 
variable is takeover probability and the independent variables are the old prediction hypotheses 
(old model). Model 15B is similar to model 15A but controls for industry using industry dummies. 
Model 15C is the new model. It combines the old and new hypotheses. Model 15D is similar to 
model 15C but controls for industry using industry dummies. Industry classifications are discussed 
in table 4.2.2. Model 15E is the new model without the new variables which are found to be 
insignificant (in section 5.3). These variables include Age Squared, MRDummy, SRDummy and 
ZScore. Model 15E is therefore a clean version of the new model. Model 15F is similar to model 15E 
but controls for industry differences using industry dummies. Model 15G is a restricted version of 
the clean new model. It excludes the old hypotheses which are found to be insignificant in the 
regression analyses in section 5.2 Model 15H replicates 15G but controls for industry using 
industry dummies. ‘Observations’ is size of the sample used in the analysis, deviance is the -2Log 
likelihood ratio of the model and the test of model coefficient is the Chi Square test. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively (robust standard errors). 
 
Based on the results in table 6.4.1a, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, by 
comparing model 15A and 15C (or model 15B and 15D), I find that the inclusion of the 
new variables in the prediction model leads to a substantial increase in the pseudo R 
Squares (Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R squares)
167
. The indication is that the inclusion 
of the new variables substantially improves the explanatory power of existing prediction 
models. If the criticisms of pseudo R squared and its interpretation (e.g., see criticisms by 
Long and Freese (2006)) is set aside for a moment, the reported pseudo R squared are 
arguably low. Nonetheless, this magnitude of pseudo R squared is consistent with prior 
literature in takeover likelihood modelling (e.g., Powell (1997, 2001, 2004) and Cremers et 
al. (2009)). The inclusion of the new variables also substantially reduces the deviance (or -
2 log likelihood)
168
 of the model.  The improvement in pseudo R squares and deviance 
                                                 
167 Pseudo R squares in logistic regressions cannot be interpreted in the same way as R squared in 
linear regression. While R squared (obtained in linear regressions) measures a model’s ability of 
explaining the variability in the data, pseudo R squares (obtained in nonlinear regressions) simply 
compares the log likelihood of a null model to that of a full model. Although the pseudo R squared 
was proposed as a substitute for R squared in nonlinear regressions, its use has been highly 
criticised by econometricians (e.g., Long and Freese (2006)). Long and Freese (2006) contend that 
pseudo R-squared only has meaning and relevance when compared to another pseudo R-squared 
of the same type (e.g. Cox and Snell R.sq, Negelkerke R.sq, McFadden’s R.sq), computed from the 
same data set (e.g. UK public firms) and when the underlying model is predicting the same 
outcome (e.g. takeover likelihood). It is therefore suitable for comparing two models predicting the 
same outcome and derived from the same data, as in the case of this study. The pseudo R squared 
produced by the RATS software is based on the pseudo R squared for dichotomous dependent 
variables derived by Estrella (1998).  
168 The -2 log likelihood test is generally used to compare the fit of two models (model 1 and model 
2) when one model (model 1) is nested within the other (model 2). Model 2, in this case, represents 
the new model, as the old model is nested within it. The probability distribution for -2LL is a Chi 
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corroborates the observation that the area under the ROC curve increases when the new 
variables are added to the model (as in panel A). (The results from ROC curve analyses are 
fully discussed in section 6.2.2.) This suggests that the new variables generally improve the 
predictive ability of the old model. Hence, the new variables are relevant for prediction 
modelling.  
 
Second, the p–values of the Chi squared statistic of the Homer-Lemslow Goodness of Fit 
(GOF) test is greater than 10% (or 0.100) in all cases. This suggests that the new and old 
models adequately fit the data. Third, there is a slight increase in pseudo R squares and 
area under the ROC curve when industry dummies are added to the model. This suggests 
that the inclusion of industry dummies potentially improves the explanatory power of the 
model. Fourth, there is no evidence that cleaning-up the model by excluding the variables 
which are insignificant in the regression analysis (section 5.2 and 5.3) improves the 
model’s explanatory power. For example, the area under the ROC curve falls from 64.2% 
in model 15C (full new model) to 61.4% in model 15E (clean new model) and 63.6% in 
model 15G (restricted new model).  
 
These issues are explored in greater depth in sections 6.2.2 to 6.2.5 below using ROC 
curve analysis – comparing area under the ROC curve using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) 
and Delong et al. (1988) methodologies. It is worth noting that the results discussed here 
do not change when a balanced panel is employed. A summary of the results for area under 
the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC) is shown in table 6.2.1b. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Squared distribution with degrees of freedom Df2-Df1. The implication is that, the higher the 
difference between the -2LL of both models, the higher the probability that the difference is 
statistically significant, as per Chi Square distribution. Engle (1983) shows that -2 log likelihood test 
is asymptotically equivalent to the Wald test and the Lagrange multiplier test. 
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Table 6.2.1b: Summary of area under the ROC curve results: Models 15A - 15H 
 
Sample size Targets  Non Targets  
14,093 770 13,323 
     
Area under ROC curve statistics 
    
 
AUC SE  95% CI 
Model 15A:  Old model 0.599*** 0.010 0.591 0.607 
Model 15B: Old model (industry Adj.) 0.611*** 0.010 0.603 0.619 
Model 15C: New model 0.642*** 0.010 0.634 0.650 
Model 15D: New model (Industry Adj.) 0.649*** 0.010 0.641 0.657 
Model 15E: New model_Clean 0.641*** 0.010 0.633 0.649 
Model 15F: New model_Clean (Industry Adj.) 0.649*** 0.010 0.641 0.656 
Model 15G: New model_Restricted 0.636*** 0.010 0.628 0.644 
Model 15H: New model_Restricted (Industry Adj.) 0.645*** 0.010 0.637 0.653 
Notes: The table summarises the area under the ROC curve results for models 15A to 15H. Model 
15A represents a logit regression model where the dependent variable is takeover probability and 
the independent variables are the old prediction hypotheses (old model). Model 15B is similar to 
model 15A but controls for industry using industry dummies. Model 15C is the new model. It 
combines the old and new hypotheses. Model 15D is similar to model 15C but controls for industry 
using industry dummies. Industry classifications are discussd in table 4.2.2. Model 15E is the new 
model without the new variables which are found to be insignificant (in section 5.3). These 
variables include Age Squared, MRDummy, SRDummy and ZScore. Model 15E is therefore a clean 
version of the new model. Model 15F is similar to model 15E but controls for industry differences 
using industry dummies. Model 15G is a restricted version of the clean new model. It excludes the 
old hypotheses which are found to be insignificant in the regression analyses in section 5.2 Model 
15H replicates 15G but controls for industry using industry dummies. Standard Errors (SE) and 
95% Confidence Intervals (95% CI) are computed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) 
methodology. The SE results (to 3 decimal places) obtained using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) 
methodology is equivalent to standard erros computed using the DeLong et al. (1988) 
methodology. *, ** and *** indicate significance of AUC at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC) comparisons are performed in 
sections 6.2.2 to 6.2.5. 
6.2.2 AUC Comparisons: New versus old model  
This section compares the AUC results of models 15C and 15D (new models) to those of 
models 15A and 15B (old models). Models 15C and 15A are unadjusted models while 15D 
and 15B are industry adjusted models. The ROC curves generated (using the Medcalc 
software) are presented in table 6.2.2. 
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Table 6.2.2: AUC Comparisons: New versus old model 
Panel A: New versus old model (unadjusted) 
 
Panel B: New versus old model (industry-adjusted)  
 
Panel C: Summary of results 
 
Panel A Panel B 
AUC: New model 0.642*** 0.649*** 
AUC: Old model 0.599*** 0.611*** 
Difference between areas  0.043*** 0.038*** 
Standard Error of diff (H&M) 0.009 0.008 
Z Statistic 4.895 4.551 
Significance level (p. value) <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Notes: The table shows comparison of areas under the ROC curve (AUC) of the old and new 
models. The comparison is performed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. Panel A 
pesents ROC curves comparing the performance of the old and new models. Panel B presents 
results obtained when the old and new models are industry-adjusted. The ROC curves plot 
sensitivity on the y axis and 100-specificity on the x axis. Panel C presents key statistics for the 
curves panel A and B. These include the AUC and the statistical significance of the difference in 
AUC – computed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. The analysis are performed in 
MedCalc. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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As evident in panel A and B, the AUC for the new model (0.642) is greater than that of the 
old model (0.599). This relationship persists when industry differences are controlled for 
using industry dummies (panel B). The difference in the AUC (0.043) is significant at the 
1% level – based on the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. The results suggest that 
the new model is clearly an improvement of the old model and is a better fit to the 
underlying data. 
6.2.3 AUC Comparisons: New model (Clean) versus New model (General) 
Some of the new variables are found to lack residual explanatory power in the model. For 
example, I find that the coefficients of MRDummy (a proxy for the merger rumour 
hypothesis), SRDummy (a proxy for the share repurchase hypothesis), Z Score (one of the 
proxies for the financial distress hypothesis), and Age square (a proxy for the firm lifecycle 
hypothesis) were not statistically significant (at the 10% level) in the model. This finding 
partly questions their relevance in the model. Here, I evaluate whether a cleaner version of 
the new model (which excludes the variables with statistically insignificant coefficients) 
outperforms the more general version of the new model. The results from AUC analyses 
are presented in table 6.2.3. 
 
As shown in panel A and B, the AUC for the cleaner version of the new model (0.641) is 
less than that of the more general version of the new model (0.642). As shown in panel B, 
the results do not change when industry differences are controlled for using industry 
dummies. The difference in AUC (0.001) is not significant at the 10% level suggesting that 
the cleaner version of the new model neither outperforms nor underperforms the more 
general version. Given that the AUC of the general model is higher than the AUC of the 
cleaner model, there is no pressing need to exclude these variables (MRDummy, 
SRDummy, Taffler Z Score and Age Square) from the model. Such an approach can be 
perceived as a data-mining exercise and deviates from the objectives of chapter 3 – 
hypothesis development. Nonetheless, these variables appear to add little to the model’s 
explanatory power. In section 6.2.4, I consider a more restricted form of the model. 
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Table 6.2.3: AUC Comparisons: New model (Clean) versus New model (General) 
Panel A: Unadjusted  
 
Panel B: Industry-adjusted 
 
Panel C: Summary of results 
 
Panel A Panel B 
AUC: New model_Clean 0.641*** 0.649*** 
AUC: New model 0.642*** 0.649*** 
Difference between areas (sig.) 0.001 0.001 
Standard Error (H&M) 0.001 0.001 
Z Statistic 0.899 0.837 
Significance level (p. value) 0.368 0.403 
 
Notes: The table shows comparison of areas under the ROC curve (AUC) of the clean and general 
new models. The comparison is performed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. 
Panel A pesents ROC curves comparing the performance of the clean and general new models. 
Panel B presents results obtained when the models are industry-adjusted. The ROC curves plot 
sensitivity on the y axis and 100-specificity on the x axis. Panel C presents key statistics for the 
curves panel A and B. These include the AUC and the statistical significance of the difference in 
AUC – computed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. The analysis are performed in 
MedCalc. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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6.2.4 AUC Comparisons: New (restricted) versus new (general) model 
Several of the old variables are found to lack residual explanatory power in the model. For 
example, I find that the coefficients of sales growth, GRDummy (a proxy for the growth-
resource mismatch hypothesis), IDummy (a proxy for the industry disturbance hypothesis), 
NBVDummy (one proxy for the firm undervaluation hypothesis), profitability and 
LMDummy (proxies for the management inefficiency hypothesis) were not statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) in the model. This finding partly questions their relevance in 
the model. I evaluate whether a restricted version of the new model (which excludes the 
old variables with statistically insignificant coefficients) outperforms the more general 
version of the new model. The results from area under the ROC analyses are presented in 
table 6.2.4. 
 
As shown in panel A and B, the AUC for the restricted version of the new model (0.636) is 
slightly less than that of the more general version of the new model (0.642). The 
relationship is robust to industry adjustments. The significance of the difference in the 
AUC (0.004) suggests that the restricted version of the new model underperforms the more 
general version. The results indicate that despite their lack of statistical significance, these 
variables (sales growth, GRDummy, IDummy, NBVDummy, profitability and 
LMDummy) improve the model’s ability to correctly classify takeover targets. These 
variables should therefore be retained in the model. 
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Table 6.2.4: AUC Comparisons: New (restricted) versus new (general) model 
Panel A: Unadjusted 
 
Panel B: Industry-adjusted 
 
Panel C: Summary of results 
 
Panel A Panel B 
AUC: New model_Restricted 0.636*** 0.645*** 
AUC: New model 0.642*** 0.649*** 
Difference between areas 0.004* 0.004* 
Standard Error (H&M) 0.003 0.003 
Z Statistic 1.711 1.697 
Significance level (p. value) 0.087 0.090 
 
Notes: The table shows comparison of areas under the ROC curve (AUC) of the restricted and 
general new models. The comparison is performed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) 
methodology. Panel A pesents ROC curves comparing the performance of the clean and general 
new models. Panel B presents results obtained when the models are industry-adjusted. The ROC 
curves plot sensitivity on the y axis and 100-specificity on the x axis. Panel C presents key statistics 
for the curves panel A and B. These include the AUC and the statistical significance of the 
difference in AUC – computed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. The analysis are 
performed in MedCalc. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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6.2.5 AUC Comparisons: The impact of industry adjustment 
Another issue of concern is the relevance of including industry dummies in the model, i.e., 
whether the inclusion of industry dummies improves the model’s performance. The initial 
results in table 6.2.1a suggest that industry dummies improve model performance. For 
example, as can be seen from table 6.2.1a, the Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke R squares 
increases by about 0.001 and 0.004, respectively, when industry dummies are included in 
the model. The area under the ROC curve can be further used to compare the models 
directly. 
 
As shown in panel A and B (table 6.2.5), the area under ROC curve for the unadjusted 
version of the old model (0.599) is slightly less than that of the industry-adjusted version of 
the model (0.611). The difference in area under the ROC curve (0.011) is significant at the 
1% level. Similarly, the area under ROC curve for the unadjusted version of the new model 
(0.642) is slightly less than that of the industry-adjusted version of the model (0.649). The 
difference in area under the ROC curve (0.008) is significant at the 5% level. The results 
indicate that the unadjusted version of the models underperforms the industry-adjusted 
versions. The results suggest that industry-adjustment (using industry dummies), perhaps, 
improve the models’ performance.  
 
In summary, the results from section 6.2 suggest that the new model performs better than 
the old model when the AUC is considered. A general version of the model (with all new 
variables) performs at least as good as a more restricted version (with only the significant 
variables). Finally, industry adjustment improves the performance of the model. 
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Table 6.2.5: AUC Comparisons: The impact of industry adjustment 
Panel A: Old model 
 
Panel B: New model 
 
Panel C: Summary of results 
 
Panel A (old Model) Panel B (new model) 
AUC: Industry adjusted model 0.611*** 0.649*** 
AUC: Unadjusted model 0.599*** 0.642*** 
Difference between areas 0.011*** 0.008** 
Standard Error (H&M) 0.004 0.003 
Z Statistic 2.631 2.245 
Significance level (p. value) 0.009 0.025 
 
Notes: The table shows comparison of areas under the ROC curve of the unadjusted and industry-
adjusted models. The comparison is performed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) methodology. 
Panel A pesents ROC curves comparing the performance of the clean and general new models. 
Panel B presents results obtained when the models are industry-adjusted. The ROC curves plot 
sensitivity on the y axis and 100-specificity on the x axis. Panel C presents key statistics for the 
curves panel A and B. These include the area under the ROC curve (AUC) and the statistical 
significance of the difference in AUC – computed using the Hanley and McNeil (1982) 
methodology. The analysis are performed in MedCalc. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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6.3 Out-of-sample predictive ability  
 
Arguably, the best performance indicator for a predictive model is how well the model is 
able to predict the event out-of-sample (see, for example, Inoue and Kilian (2005)). Out-of-
sample testing has, increasingly, become the accepted method for validating prediction 
models in finance research
169
. The focus of this section is therefore to evaluate the new 
takeover prediction model’s ability to predict takeover targets in out-of-sample analyses. 
The old model is used as a benchmark in this analysis. A balanced panel dataset was not 
applied in this study as it would have led to a substantial loss of data (discussed in section 
4.4.2). The effect of using an unbalanced panel dataset is that the old model employs a 
larger sample (when compared to the new model) as it is less restrictive in its data 
requirements. This is further discussed in section 4.4.2. It is uncertain whether this larger 
sample accords an advantage or a disadvantage to the old model when it is directly 
compared with the new model. To eliminate potential bias in the comparison between the 
old and new model, the old model is redeveloped using a balanced panel – the exact 
dataset used by the new model. The results from this further robustness check are 
described as the ‘old (balanced) model’. 
 
As discussed in section 4.4.4, the parameters of the new and old models are generated 
using data in period t and these parameters are used to compute takeover probabilities (out-
of-sample) in period t+1. A cross-section of portfolio selection criteria including deciles, 
quintiles, percentiles and fixed portfolios are applied
170
. For simplicity, I consider these 
different selection criteria (portfolios types) as independently being used by different 
model users (or investors). Assuming equal weighting, the overall performance of the 
model can therefore be considered as the average performance across this portfolio 
selection criteria. This approach to portfolio selection is applied in each out-of-sample test 
and the total number of predicted targets as well as the number of actual targets over the 
portfolio holding period (with annual rebalancing) is computed. The portfolio 
concentration (which measures the model’s performance) is given by the ratio of actual 
number of targets in the portfolio to the total number of predicted targets from the selection 
criteria.  
                                                 
169 See, for example, Campbell and Thompson (2008), Welch and Goyal (2008), Pesaran and 
Timmermann (2002), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Shumway (2001), Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), 
Walter (1994) and Powell (2001), amongst others. 
170 In section 6.9, I further investigate which of these selection criteria is optimal for target 
prediction. 
 262 
 
 
 
Table 6.3.1: Out-of-sample predictive ability of the new, old and old (balanced) 
models 
Panel A: New model versus old model 
    
 
New Model Old Model  Diff in Conc. (%) 
 
Pred. Targets Conc. (%) Pred. Targets Conc. (%) Diff. (pp) p. value 
D10      1,490         156  10.47      1,852         155  8.37 2.10** 0.0136 
Q5      2,973         296  9.96      3,696         293  7.93 2.03*** 0.0030 
Port100      1,500         156  10.40      1,500         122  8.13 2.27** 0.0118 
Port50          750            84  11.20          750            61  8.13 3.07*** 0.0015 
Port30          450            49  10.89          450            40  8.89 2.00 0.1558 
Port10          150            14  9.33          150            12  8.00 1.33 0.6976 
Cut off      2,450         199  8.12      1,535         141  9.19 -1.06 0.8862 
Port5%          748            84  11.23          930            73  7.85 3.38*** 0.0046 
Overall    10,511      1,038  9.88    10,863         897  8.26 1.62*** 0.0002 
Sample    14,833      1,029  6.94    18,440      1,261  6.84 0.10 0.5051 
Panel B: New model versus old model (balanced) 
   
 
New Model  Old (Balanced) Model Diff in Conc. 
 
Pred. Targets Conc. Pred. Targets Conc. Diff. (pp) p. value 
D10      1,490         156  10.47      1,490         129  8.65 1.82** 0.0189 
Q5      2,973         296  9.96      2,973         231  7.77 2.18*** 0.0004 
Port100      1,500         156  10.40      1,500         127  8.47 1.93** 0.0137 
Port50          750            84  11.20          750            67  8.93 2.27*** 0.0046 
Port30          450            49  10.89          450            40  8.89 2.00** 0.0450 
Port10          150            14  9.33          150            14  9.33 0.00 1.0000 
Cut off      2,450         199  8.12      2,450         213  8.68 -0.56 0.4919 
Port5%          748            84  11.23          748            68  9.12 2.11** 0.0238 
Overall    10,511      1,038  9.88    10,511         889  8.46 1.42*** 0.0005 
Sample    14,833      1,029  6.94    14,833      1,029  6.94 0.00 1.0000 
Notes: The table presents summary results from out-of-sample predictions of the new, old and old 
(balanced) models. Panel A compares the performance of the new model with that of the old 
model. Panel B compares the performance of the new model with that of the old (balanced) model. 
The old and new models use all the variables in model 15A and 15C (table 6.2.1a), respectively. The 
models are developed in a recursive manner and used to predict targets one-year ahead. The first 
parameters are developed using data from 1989 to 1994. These parameters are used to make 
predictions (compute takeover probabilities for firms) in 1995. The model is then redeveloped 
again using data fom 1989 to 1995 for use in prediction in 1996. This process is continued until 2009 
where data for the period 1989 to 2008 is used to develop parameters for prediction in 2009. Firms 
are ranked by their (predicted) takeover likelihood and firms with the highest takeover likelihood 
are selected as potential targets. Different criteria (Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, D10, Q5 and Cut 
off) are used to determine what number of potential targets to select. Port100, Port50, Port30, and 
Port10 are portfolios of 100, 50, 30 and 10 firms with the highest probability of receiving the bids. 
D10 and Q5 are the ‘top’ decile and quintile portfolios respectively. Pred. is the number of 
predicted targets. Targets is the number of actual targets within Pred. Conc.% is the ratio (%) of 
Target to Pred. t-test for paired samples is used to compare the target concentrations achieved by 
the different models over the 15-year out of sample period spanning 1995 to 2009. ‘Overall’ 
represents the ‘average’ performance of each model. ‘Sample’ represents the performance of a 
model which simply predicts that every firm in the population is a takeover target. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 263 
 
Table 6.3.1 presents summary results on the performance of the recursive models over a 15 
year period. Panel A compares the performance of the new model with that of the old 
model. Panel B compares the performance of the new model with that of the old (balanced) 
model. The old and new models use all the variables in model 15A and 15C (table 6.2.1a), 
respectively. The models are developed in a recursive manner and used to predict targets 
one-year ahead. The first parameters are developed using data from 1989 to 1994. These 
parameters are used to make predictions (compute takeover probabilities for firms) in 
1995. The model is then redeveloped again using data from 1989 to 1995 for use in 
prediction in 1996. This process is continued until 2009 where data for the period 1989 to 
2008 is used to develop parameters for prediction in 2009. Firms are ranked by their 
(predicted) takeover likelihood and firms with the highest takeover likelihood are selected 
as potential targets. Different criteria (Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, D10, Q5 and Cut 
off) are used to determine what number of potential targets to select. Port100, Port50, 
Port30, and Port10 are portfolios of 100, 50, 30 and 10 firms with the highest probability 
of receiving the bids. D10 and Q5 are the ‘top’ decile and quintile portfolios respectively. 
Pred. is the number of predicted targets. Targets is the number of actual targets within 
Pred. Conc.% is the ratio (%) of Target to Pred. t-test for paired samples is used to 
compare the target concentrations achieved by the different models over the 15-year out of 
sample period spanning 1995 to 2009. 
 
With the exception of the Cut-off probability selection criteria, the new model appears to 
outperform the old model (and the old (balanced) model) in terms of its ability to predict 
targets in out-of-sample analysis. The model achieves an overall performance (target 
concentration) of 9.88%, by correctly predicting 1,038 actual targets out of a total of 
10,511 predictions. The old model achieves a significantly lower (at the 1% level) target 
concentration of 8.26%, by correctly predicting 897 actual targets out of a total of 10,863 
predictions. The old (balanced) model which uses exactly the same dataset as the new 
model is only able to correctly predict 889 actual targets (out of 10,511 predictions). The 
results also show that the new model outperforms the old and old (balanced) models across 
most of the different portfolios selection criteria.  
 
 
Overall, the results provides evidence that the new model has a superior out-of-sample 
predictive ability (i.e., the ability to correctly identify targets out-of-sample) when 
compared to the old model. The results are robust to the methodology applied in selecting 
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target portfolios (e.g., D10, Q5, Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10 and Port5%)
171
. The 
results remain robust when the sample differences between the old and new model are 
accounted for – as in the old (balanced) model. The out-of-sample performance results are 
given further context by comparing them against the results in prior studies (in section 6.4). 
 
6.4 Classification and predictive ability – old model versus prior 
UK studies  
 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 established that the new model is, on average, better than the old 
model both in terms of its classification ability (within-sample) and its predictive ability 
(out-of-sample). This section aims to provide some context to these results by comparing 
them against the results published in prior UK takeover prediction studies, mainly Powell 
(2001, 2004). Sample restrictions
172
 in this study do not allow for a direct comparison 
between the results obtained here and those reported in Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and 
Powell (1997). Powell (2001) builds on Powell (1997), using a UK dataset between 1986 
and 1995 to develop his model, which is tested on the population of UK firms listed in 
January 1996. The pooled sample of firms between 1986 and 1995 is made up of 9,891 
firm-year observations of which 471 observations are targets.  
 
In line with Barnes (1990, 1998, 1999, 2000), Powell (2001) employs a matched-sample 
methodology, matching the 471 targets to a selected sample of 471 non-targets
173
. The 
model is also applied out-of-sample using data (1,000 observations with 29 targets) from 
1996. The model achieves a target concentration of 2.44% (based on deciles). Using data 
from 1988 to 1995 (9,917 firm-year observations of which 330 observations are targets), 
the old model developed in this study achieves a much higher target concentration of 
14.04% in 1996 (based on deciles). The difference between the results reported in this 
                                                 
171 Besides being a robustness test, the consistency in performance across different portfolios 
indicates that the new model, generally, ascribes higher takeover probabilities to targets than non-
targets across the entire sample distribution, as compared to the old model.  
172 The new model does not have sufficient observations to derive robust model coefficients using 
data from 1988 to 1993. The first out-of-sample predictions are made in 1995. Barnes (1998, 1999, 
2000) employs a UK sample of firms between 1991 and 1994. The estimation sample in these 
studies consists of listed firms between 1991 and 1993. Barnes (1999), for example, employs five 
hypotheses for prediction including inefficient management, firm size, growth-resource mismatch, 
firm undervaluation and inefficient financial structure (leverage). The model developed from this 
sample is tested on data from 1994.  
173 The estimation sample obtained when outliers are eliminated is made up of 444 targets and 422 
non-targets – a final sample of 866 observations. 
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study and those reported in Powell (2001) can, perhaps, be attributed to the differences in 
the sampling methodology between the two studies
174
. The new model outperforms both 
models (Powell (2001) and old model) by achieving a target concentration of 20.59% in 
1996 (based on deciles). 
 
The key difference between Powell (2001) and Powell (2004) is that Powell (2004) 
employs a pooled population (as opposed to a matched-sample used in Powell (2001)). 
This pooled population sampling methodology is similar to the sampling technique 
employed in this study. The exact dataset used in Powell (2001) is applied in Powell 
(2004). This dataset consists of 9,037 UK firm-year observations with 447 targets between 
1986 and 1995. Data from 1996 (holdout sample) consisting of 1,000 observations of 
which 29 are targets is used to test his models. Powell’s model B achieves a target 
concentration of 4.72% in 1996 (using cut-off probabilities) and an overall predictive 
ability of 93.3%. This result shows an improvement of 14.85pp (percentage points) from 
the 78.45% overall predictive ability reported in Powell (2001). The difference can directly 
be attributed to a change in the sampling methodology (from matched-samples to pooled 
population sampling). While there is an improvement in classification ability, Powell’s 
(2004) model achieves less than 3% target concentration across all selection criteria, hence, 
underperforming both the old and new models in this study. In the 1996 holdout sample, 
the old model in this study achieves a higher target concentration of 12.75% using cut-off 
probabilities computed using  Powell’s methodology (developed in Powell (2001)).  
 
Sections 6.2 to 6.4 focus on ascertaining the superior performance of the new model. The 
results in these sections suggest that the new model (as well as the modelling methodology 
employed in this study) is indeed an improvement on previous models. In sections 6.5 to 
6.8, the focus shifts from comparing the models’ performances to evaluating the impact of 
some methodological choices applied in this study as well as in prior literature on the 
reported results. Section 6.5 explores how the performance of the models changes over 
time – stability of model performance. Section 6.6 empirically investigates the impact of 
the length of the estimation period on model performance. It answers the question ‘should 
more data or less data be used in the development of model parameters?’ Section 6.7 
investigates the usefulness of ‘stale’ model parameters. It explores whether other 
researchers and practitioners can use the parameters developed in this study for prediction 
                                                 
174 Powell (2001) employs a matched-sample approach (as opposed to the pooled population 
approach employed in this study) and excludes the firm age hypothesis in his model. 
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in the future. Section 6.8 explores the performance of different portfolio selection criteria 
with the goal of identifying the best selection criteria in this context. 
 
6.5 The (in)–stability of model predictive ability – A critique of 
prior studies 
6.5.1 Overview 
In this study, the models are recurrently redeveloped using new data and are tested (and 
retested) over several holdout periods (1995–2009). The reported performance of the 
models (see section 6.4) is the long run (1995–2009) average across different selection 
criteria (deciles, quintiles, percentiles, fixed portfolios and cut-offs) as discussed in section 
6.4. The results (reported in section 6.4) suggest that the new model outperforms the old 
model, on average, irrespective of the time periods considered and the portfolio selection 
techniques employed.  
 
Several prior studies develop takeover prediction models over an estimation sample of 
several years but test the model performance over a limited holdout period of one year (see 
table 6.5.1 for a summary). This issue has been discussed in section 2.5 and section 2.6 
where it was argued (in section 2.6) that such an approach of evaluating performance 
(based on one year of out-of-sample data), potentially, results in biased, unreliable or non-
generalisable conclusions.  
 
A majority of prior studies evaluate their model out-of-sample performance over a period 
of one year (e.g., Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell 
(2001, 2004)). Some studies (such as Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Barnes (1990), 
Powell (2007) and Brar et al. (2009)) do not conduct any out-of-sample tests. To my 
knowledge, only Cremers et al. (2009) adopts a robust out-of-sample testing framework. 
Nonetheless, Cremers et al. (2009) only evaluate their model’s potential to generate 
abnormal returns and not its ability to correctly predict actual targets in the out-of-sample 
period. This section illustrates how the use of a one year out-of-sample test period can lead 
to biased, non-robust and non-generalisable conclusions. This is achieved by highlighting 
the variations in model predictive ability from one year to another (section 6.5.2) and the 
impact of bull market and bear market periods (i.e., overall market growth and overall 
market decline, respectively) on model performance (section 6.5.3). 
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Table 6.5.1: A summary of the estimation samples and holdout samples used in 
prior studies. 
 
Study Estimation period Prediction period 
Palepu (1986) 1971–1979 1980 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) 1981–1986 None 
Walter (1994) 1981–1984 1985 
Barnes (1990) 1986–1987 None 
Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) 1991–1993 1994 
Powell (1997) 1984–1991 None 
Powell (2001, 2004) 1986–1995 1996 
Brar et al. (2009) 1992–2003 1992–2003 
Cremers et al. (2009) 1981–1991 (Recursive) 1992–2004 
Notes: The studies in this table focus on predicting takeover targets and generating abnormal 
returns from such predictions. The studies not included in this table focus on other issues such as 
methodologies for takeover prediction (e.g., Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003)). The estimation 
period is the period used to derive model parameters. The prediction period is the period over 
which the model is validated, either by its ability to identify actual targets or its ability to generate 
abnormal returns for investors. 
 
6.5.2 Variations in model predictive ability 
Variations in model predictive ability are highlighted by reviewing the models’ 
performances in out-of-sample tests from one year to another. The target concentrations 
achieved (using the decile selection criteria) by the new and old models in out-of-sample 
tests between 1995 and 2009 are reported in figure 6.5.2
175
.  
 
The out-of-sample performance of the models (i.e., percentage of correct prediction) 
significantly changes from one period to another. For example, the new model attains a 
target concentration of 20.59% in 1996 and 2.11% in 2007. Similarly, the old recursive 
model also attains a target concentration of 17.29% in 1997 and 5.60% in 2002. The 
standard deviation (representing the average distance from mean target concentration) is 
over 4.87% for the new model and 4.19% for the old model. 
                                                 
175 The results achieved using other estimation periods (five-year and ten-year) and other selection 
criteria (quintiles, percentiles, and fixed portfolios) are consistent with these results. 
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Figure 6.5.2: Variations in model predictive ability between 1995 and 2009 
 
 
 
Panel B: Summary descriptive statistics 
 
 
New model Old model 
Mean 10.46% 8.39% 
Median 10.23% 7.69% 
Standard Devn 4.87% 4.19% 
Kurtosis 0.40 -0.07 
Skewness 0.60 0.74 
Minimum 2.11% 2.27% 
Maximum 20.59% 17.29% 
Count 15 15 
 
Notes: The figure shows the variations in model predictive ability (out-of-sample) from one year to 
another. Deciles are used as the selection criteria.  A similar conclusion is reached when other 
portfolio selection criteria are applied. Panel A shows a graph that plots target concentration of the 
Y axis against year on the X axis. The analysis covers the 15-year period from 1995 to 2009. These 
results are achieved through recursive predictions. The first model parameters are developed using 
data from 1989 to 1994. These parameters are used to make predictions (compute takeover 
probabilities for firms) in 1995. The model is then redeveloped again using data fom 1989 to 1995 
for use in prediction in 1996. This process is continued until 2009 where data for the period 1989 to 
2008 is used to develop parameters for prediction in 2009. Firms are ranked by their (predicted) 
takeover likelihood and the 10% (decile) of firms with the highest takeover likelihood are selected 
as potential targets. Panel B shows descriptive statistics of the target concentration results. 
 
The substantial range in out-of-sample performance (18.48% and 15.02% for the new and 
old models, respectively) highlights the bias involved in testing a target prediction model 
over a single year. For example, using only data from 2007 to test the models yields a 
conclusion that the model achieves low target concentrations of 2.11% (new model) and 
2.27% (old model). This conclusion is clearly misleading. The results therefore suggest 
that, for robustness, out-of-sample testing should be carried out over a long time period as 
has been done in the current study. 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
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25.00%
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Panel A: Out-of-sample target concentration 
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6.5.3 Variations across bull and bear market periods 
In this section, I further illustrate that out-of-sample performance is generally higher if the 
out-of-sample test period corresponds to a period of market growth (bull period) as 
compared to a period of market decline (bear market period). To achieve this, the 
performance (cumulative annual returns) of the FTSE all-share index is compared against 
the top decile target concentrations achieved by the new and old models (see figure 
6.5.3b). Figure 6.5.3a plots the cumulative return on the FTSE All-Share index from 1991 
to 2010. 
 
Figure 6.5.3a: Identification of bull and bear markets using cumulative market 
returns 
 
Panel B: Bull and bear periods 
PERIOD CLASSIFICATION 
June 1994 – August 2000 BULL 1 
September 2000 –  March 2003 BEAR 1 
April 2003 – October 2007 BULL 2 
November 2007 – End BEAR 2 
 
Notes: The graph plots the cumulative return on the FTSEALL-SHARE index (y-axis) against time 
(x-axis). The base period for the computation of cumulative returns is January 1991. The goal is to 
visually identify peaks and troughs in the index. The period between a trough (positive-turning 
point) and a peak (negative-turning point) is considered as a BULL market period – indicating a 
period of market growth, and vice versa. The first Bull period is identified as June 1994 and this is 
used as the start period for the analysis. BULL 1 and BULL 2 refer to the periods of market growth 
while BEAR 1 and BEAR 2 refer to the periods of market decline. For simplicity secondary trends 
are not considered. 
 
Given the benefit of hindsight, one can approximate the start and end of bull and bear 
periods by using cumulative market (FTSE All-Share index) returns over time. From figure 
6.5.3a, two major periods of market decline are evident: post–2000 and post–2007. These 
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periods, perhaps, coincide with the dotcom crisis and the global financial crisis periods. 
Ignoring short term or secondary trends, and considering the size of the change in 
cumulative market return, I identify two major bull periods (BULL 1 and BULL 2) and 
two major bear periods (BEAR 1 and BEAR 2). BULL 1 is considered as the period 
between June 1994 and August 2000. This bull period (BULL 1) is followed by a bear 
period (BEAR 1) which runs from September 2000 to March 2003. BEAR 1 is followed by 
a bull period which runs from April 2003 to October 2007. The period post October 2007 
(October 2007 to June 2010) has been considered as a Bear Period for the purpose of this 
study
176
. 
 
Figure 6.5.3b: Cumulative returns on the FTSE All-Share index and variations in (old 
and new) model predictive ability 
 
Panel  B: Differences in performance (mean target concentration) 
 
New model Old model 
Bull period 13.04% 10.03% 
Bear period 7.50% 6.52% 
Difference 5.54% 3.51% 
P. value 0.01978 0.1016 
 
Notes: The graph in panel A plots the target concentration achieved by the old and new model 
between 1995 and 2009. This is presented against the backdrop of the cumulative return on the 
FTSEALL-SHARE index where ‘Bull’ represents periods of market growth and ‘bear’ represents 
periods of market decline. The base period for the computation of cumulative returns is January 
1991. Further details about the selection of bull and bear periods are presented in table 6.5.3a. The 
                                                 
176 It is assumed that (by June 2010) financial markets have not experienced a full recovery since the 
global financial crisis due to the uncertainty created by the European Debt (Bond Market) crisis. 
Further, if this post 2007 period is broken down to reflect the fact that the market experienced some 
growth post 2009, the period for analysis will be too short to allow for any robust analysis. 
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graph attempts to visually capture the variations in model performance with market performance. 
The graph shows that the performance of the models (particularly the new model) increases in bull 
periods and declines in bear periods. Panel B presents a summary of the results obtained in each 
period. The table shows a tendency for model performance to be better in bull periods. 
 
The model’s performance tends to vary substantially with the market (FTSE all-share 
index) performance as takeover activity generally increases in bull periods and declines in 
bear periods (Harford (2005)). As shown in figure 6.5.3b, the models report better target 
concentration ratios in bull periods when compared to bear periods. The results reported in 
panel B show that this is especially the case for the new model. It achieves an overall target 
concentration of 13.04% in the bull periods (BULL 1 and BULL 2) as against 7.5% in the 
bear period (BEAR 1 and BEAR 2). The difference in target concentration is significant at 
the 5% level.  
 
Overall, the results suggest a tendency for the models to perform better in bull market 
periods and worse in bear periods. These bull periods (as discussed in Harford (2005)) 
generally see higher takeover activity. Presumably, firms with target characteristics are 
more likely to be acquired during these bull periods (than in periods of market decline) as 
managers have a stronger incentive to engage in acquisitions during periods of market 
growth (Harford (2005)). The main implication of these results is that studies which 
employ one year out-of-sample tests are likely to report positively biased results if the test 
period corresponds to a year with overall market growth, and vice versa. This might partly 
account for the fact that Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) reports zero target concentrations in 
1994 and Powell (2001, 2004) reports moderate (3.24%) target concentrations in 1996. 
 
6.6 The length of the estimation period in target prediction 
models 
Prior empirical research has raised questions on the choice of estimation samples in model 
development. Pesaran and Timmerman (2002, 2007) highlight the problem of structural 
breaks in data and how such breaks can negatively impact on the forecasting ability of 
regression-based models. Pesaran and Timmerman (2002) propose a two stage process in 
prediction model development which starts with the identification of structural breaks in 
data series. The second stage in the process involves the use of post-break data (Pesaran 
and Timmerman (2007)) or pre-break data (Pesaran and Timmerman (2002)) to develop 
the model parameters. While such guidance is theoretically sound, the identification of 
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breaks in some datasets presents a significant empirical challenge (also noted in Pesaran 
and Timmerman (2002, 2007)). In section 5.4, I discussed the changing characteristics of 
takeover targets over time (1994-2007). A key observation from table 5.4.1 is that no 
single year can be neatly identified as a structural break in the characteristics of takeover 
targets. The tests conducted in table 5.4.1 are, in principle, analogous to the Chow test 
(Chow (1960)) and follow the suggestions of Thomas (1997).  
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Table 6.6.1: Comparison of the performance of the three-year and recursive models 
 
Panel A: Recursive versus three-year new model 
 
 
Recursive new model Three-year new model Difference in Conc. 
 
Number Targets Conc. % Number Targets Conc. % Diff. (pp) p. value 
D10 1,490 156 10.47 1,490 158 10.60 -0.13 0.9056 
Q5 2,973 296 9.96 2,973 308 10.36 -0.40 0.6061 
Port100 1,500 156 10.40 1,500 159 10.60 -0.20 0.8538 
Port50 750 84 11.20 750 81 10.80 0.40 0.8003 
Port30 450 49 10.89 450 57 12.67 -1.78 0.3263 
Port10 150 14 9.33 150 22 14.67 -5.33* 0.0878 
Port5% 748 84 11.23 748 82 10.96 0.27 0.9510 
Overall 8,061 839 10.41 8,061 867 10.76 -0.35 0.1100 
 
Panel B: Recursive versus three-year old model 
 
 
Recursive old model Three-year old model Difference in Conc. 
 
Number Targets Conc. % Number Targets Conc. % Diff. (pp) p. value 
D10 1,852 155 8.37 1,852 179 9.67 -1.30 0.1031 
Q5 3,696 293 7.93 3,696 368 9.96 -2.03** 0.0134 
Port100 1,500 122 8.13 1,500 155 10.33 -2.20** 0.0163 
Port50 750 61 8.13 750 73 9.73 -1.60 0.2711 
Port30 450 40 8.89 450 40 8.89 0.00 1.0000 
Port10 150 12 8.00 150 16 10.67 -2.67 0.1038 
Port5% 930 73 7.85 930 95 10.22 -2.37* 0.0952 
Overall 9,328 756 8.10 9,328 926 9.93 -1.82*** 0.0001 
Notes: The table presents summary results from out-of-sample predictions of the recursive and 
three-year new and old models. Panel A compares the performance of the recursive new model 
with that of the three-year new model. Panel B compares the performance of the recursive old 
model with that of the three-year old model. The old and new (recursive and three-year) models 
use all the variables in model 15A and 15C (table 6.2.1a), respectively. The recursive models have a 
base year of 1988 and use all data available prior to the year of prediction. The three-year model 
use three years of data up to the year prior to the year of predictions. The first predictions are made 
in 1995. The models are then redeveloped again to include data for 1995 for use in prediction in 
1996. This process is continued until 2009 where data for the period 1989 to 2008 (2006 to 2008) is 
used to develop parameters of the recursive (and three-year) model for prediction in 2009. Firms 
are ranked by their (predicted) takeover likelihood and firms with the highest takeover likelihood 
are selected as potential targets. Different criteria (Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, D10, Q5 and Cut 
off) are used to determine what number of potential targets to select. Port100, Port50, Port30, and 
Port10 are portfolios of 100, 50, 30 and 10 firms with the highest probability of receiving the bids. 
D10 and Q5 are the ‘top’ decile and quintile portfolios respectively. Pred. is the number of 
predicted targets. Targets is the number of actual targets within Pred. Conc.% is the ratio (%) of 
Target to Pred. t-test for paired samples is used to compare the target concentrations achieved by 
the different models over the 15-year out of sample period spanning 1995 to 2009. ‘Overall’ 
represents the ‘average’ performance of each model. ‘Sample’ represents the performance of a 
model which simply predicts that every firm in the population is a takeover target. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In this section, the impact of the length of the estimation window is evaluated by 
comparing the performance of a model which uses a three-year window to estimate model 
parameters (three-year rolling model)
177
 against the performance of a model which uses all 
the data available (a recursive model). For example, to predict targets in 2000, the three- 
year recursive model uses data from 1997 to 1999 to develop model parameters while the 
recursive model uses data from 1988 to 1999. Again, to predict targets in 2001, the three-
year rolling model uses data from 1998 to 2000 while the recursive model uses data from 
1988 to 2000
178
. The first predictions are made in 1995, and then predictions are made 
every year until 2009. The results obtained over the 15-year period (1995–2009) using both 
the old and the new models are reported in table 6.6.1. 
 
The results from table 6.6.1 show that between 1995 and 2009, the recursive model (long 
estimation window) underperforms the three-year model (short estimation windows) on an 
average basis, for both the old and new model specifications. For the new model, the 
recursive model achieves an overall target concentration of 10.41% while the three-year 
model achieves a slightly higher overall target concentration of 10.76%. The difference in 
target concentration (0.35 pp) is not significant. For the old model, the three-year model 
achieves a target concentration of 9.93% as against 8.10% achieved by the recursive 
model. The difference in target concentration (1.82 pp) is significant at the 1% level. The 
results suggest that shorter estimation windows can be more optimal for the development 
of takeover prediction models – at least for the old model. Perhaps, the reason for this is 
the argument that target characteristics change over time (further discussed in section 5.4). 
This finding is inconsistent with the observation that several studies in takeover prediction 
employ the longest estimation windows permitted by their data. 
  
Section 6.6 focused on the relevance of the length of the estimation window. The results 
from section 6.6 broadly indicate that the use of shorter estimation windows is potentially, 
a more optimal strategy for model development. The next section (section 6.7) considers 
the issue of stability of model parameters for prediction several years ahead. That is, 
whether parameters developed today are useful in making predictions several years from 
today. 
                                                 
177 Three years is preferred as it is the smallest time period which allows for robust coefficients to 
be developed. The coefficients obtained when one year and two years are used are insignificant 
and unstable over time. 
178 The base year for estimation used in the recursive model is 1988 while the base year used in the 
recursive model is continually rolled such that the estimation sample spans over three years. 
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6.7 Long term stability of model parameters – Stale versus fresh 
model parameters 
6.7.1 Overview 
This section seeks to assess the relevance and the stability of current model parameters 
(e.g., parameters developed using estimation data from 1988-1999) for prediction several 
years in the future (e.g., 2010-2020). The relevance of this investigation is based on the 
observation that model coefficients developed in finance research are frequently used by 
researchers and practitioners several years after their development. An example is the use 
of Taffler Z score model coefficients and the Altman’s Z score model coefficients 
(developed more than three decades ago – Taffler (1982, 1983, 1984) and Altman (1968)) 
in contemporary research (see Agarwal and Taffler (2007) and Shumway (2001), amongst 
others). This study, for example, also uses the original Taffler Z score model parameters to 
compute each observation’s likelihood of bankruptcy or financial distress. The main reason 
for the use of these presumably ‘stale’ model parameters is the cost associated with 
collection and analyses of new data
179
. The evidence (see Agarwal and Taffler (2007)) 
suggests that parameters might sometimes be robust across time, as in the case of Taffler Z 
score parameters.  
 
As discussed in section 2.5.6, several new studies (see, for example, Cremers et al. (2009), 
Bhanot et al. (2010) and Cornett et al. (2011)) employ firm takeover probabilities as one of 
the independent variables in their empirical research. Cornett et al. (2011), for example, 
investigate investors’ anticipation of bidder and target candidacy in takeovers and whether 
this anticipation moderates the distribution of wealth between bidders and targets during 
takeover contests. The researchers (Cornett et al. (2011) start by developing a model to 
measure takeover risk for each firm in their sample and this measure of risk is then used to 
develop a surprise instrument (a measure of market anticipation). Given that the main 
focus of Cornett et al. (2011) is not to measure takeover risk, the study employs a simple 
model akin to the Palepu (1986) model to measure takeover risk
180
.  While the results of 
                                                 
179 Cram et al. (2009), for example, contends that the choice of methodology (e.g., the use of 
matched-sample methodology) across several studies in accounting and finance is driven by data 
collection costs. 
180 Cornett et al. (2011) model probability of making a bid (bidder), receiving a bid (target) and not 
involved in M&A (non-target, non-bidder) as a logit function of sales shock, size, change in size, 
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these studies (which employ takeover probability as an input variable) is, potentially, 
moderated by how well the model captures the concept, little consideration is given to 
developing an optimal model. The new model developed in this study, perhaps, provides a 
more efficient model for ascribing takeover probabilities. Its application requires the 
redevelopment of model parameters from 19 hypotheses and 27 input variables. Given the 
data collection costs that this imposes (especially for future researchers), I consider the use 
of current model parameters (which might be considered to be stale in the next few years) 
for prediction of takeover targets or ascribing takeover risk in the future
181
.  
 
In this section, I use the phrase ‘stale model parameters’ to describe model parameters 
developed from, presumably, old data. I also use the phrase ‘fresh model parameters’ to 
describe parameters developed using the data assumed to be available at the point of 
portfolio development. In the first instance, the out-of-sample performance achieved using 
stale model parameters is evaluated over a period of ten years (section 6.7.2). Second, I 
investigate whether the length of the estimation sample (short estimation sample versus 
long estimation sample) affects the performance of stale models (section 6.7.3). 
Presumably, longer estimation windows can generate more stable and efficient stale 
parameters, in line with the findings in section 6.6. Third, the performance achieved using 
the stale model parameters is directly compared with the performance achieved using fresh 
model parameters (section 6.7.4). Last, I investigate whether the new model still 
outperforms the old model when stale model parameters are employed (section 6.7.5). 
 
6.7.2 Performance of stale model parameters over a holdout sample 
In this section, the long run variation of the performance of the new model employing stale 
parameters is evaluated. The results for the three-year and recursive variants of the new 
model are reported. The coefficients of the recursive variant of the new model are derived 
from data between 1988 and 1999. These coefficients are used to recurrently predict targets 
each year between 2000 and 2009 – without coefficient redevelopment. Data from 1994-
                                                                                                                                                    
industry concentration, growth-resource mismatch, return on assets, cash ratio, price run-up, 
information asymmetry and participation in previous mergers.  
181 It is unlikely that these tests will be useful for investors (with significant amount of resources). It 
is, however, likely that this will be useful for researchers (using takeover probability as one of the 
input variables in their research), management (simply interested in assessing their takeover risk 
from one year to another), or regulatory/law makers (interested in understanding the changing 
dynamics of takeover targets from one year to another or the impact of a particular regulation on 
takeover probability). 
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1996 is used to develop the coefficients of the three-year variant of the new model
182
. 
These coefficients are tested out-of-sample over the period from 1997–2009 – without any 
coefficient redevelopment. The expectation is that if the model’s predictive power declines 
over time, then a systematic decline in model predictive ability should be observed. Figure 
6.7.2 reports the performance of the stale new model when applied to out-of-sample data 
from 1997 to 2009. 
 
The stale three-year model is developed using data from 1994–1996 and tested out-of-
sample using data from 1997–2009. The chart in table 6.7.2 (panel B) highlights the 
variability in the model’s performance over the 13 year period across different portfolio 
selection criteria (D10, Q5 and Port100). Interestingly, the chart shows that the 
performance of the stale model does not systematically decline from 1997 to 2009 (or from 
2000–2009). Using the decile selection criteria, the model achieves target concentration of 
18.82 % in 1997 (the year after model development) and a target concentration of 17.33% 
in 2005 (eight years after model development). This non-decline in the performance of 
stale model parameters is also confirmed when the performance of the stale recursive 
model is assessed.  
 
The stale recursive model uses a longer estimation window (1988–1999) compared to the 
stale three-year model (1994–1996). As shown in panel A (table 6.7.2), its performance is 
consistent with the performance of the stale three-year model as there is no evidence of a 
systematic decline in performance across the ten-year test period. Further, the standard 
deviation of target concentration for both models (denoted SD (%) in table 6.7.2) can be 
considered moderate. The standard deviation of mean performance for the recursive model 
is 3.13% and the standard deviation of mean performance for the three-year model is 
3.94%. This moderate standard deviation further attests to the relative stability of the long 
run performance of the stale model parameters.  
 
 
 
                                                 
182 Data from 1994-1996 is used due to the small number of observations prior to this period. For 
example, the number of observations available for coefficient development between 1988 and 1990 
is 101 observations. This increases slightly to 180 between 1991 and 1993. There are 2,129 available 
observations between 1994 and 1996. The reason for this is the fact that many firms do not report 
operating cash flow data pre-1994. Use of pre-1994 is therefore likely to bias results. Nonetheless, 
the conclusions do not change even when the model is developed using only pre-1994 data. 
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Table 6.7.2: The long run out-of-sample performance of stale model parameters  
 
 
Panel C: Year on year performance  
 
Recursive model Three-year model 
 
D10 (%) Q5 (%) Port100 (%) Mean (%) D10 (%) Q5 (%) Port100 (%) Mean (%) 
1997 
    
20.59 18.63 20.00 19.74 
1998 
    
8.18 11.82 8.00 9.33 
1999 
    
12.62 9.76 12.00 11.46 
2000 8.82 7.84 9.00 8.56 10.78 8.82 11.00 10.20 
2001 10.28 8.41 11.00 9.90 11.21 10.28 12.00 11.17 
2002 5.66 4.74 6.00 5.47 2.83 5.69 3.00 3.84 
2003 9.28 9.28 10.00 9.52 9.28 10.82 9.00 9.70 
2004 14.89 11.70 15.00 13.87 8.51 10.11 9.00 9.21 
2005 11.22 12.82 11.00 11.68 9.18 10.77 9.00 9.65 
2006 8.08 4.57 8.00 6.88 9.09 6.60 9.00 8.23 
2007 1.05 1.06 2.00 1.37 4.21 2.12 4.00 3.44 
2008 7.95 6.25 8.00 7.40 6.82 6.82 7.00 6.88 
2009 6.02 4.85 5.00 5.29 6.02 7.88 6.00 6.63 
Mean 8.33 7.15 8.50 7.99 9.18 9.24 9.15 9.19 
Std Dev 3.49 3.39 3.44 3.37 4.21 3.72 4.09 3.89 
 
Notes: The table shows target concentrations (in percentages) achieved by stale (recursive and 
three-year) models in out of sample tests between 2000 – 2009 and 1997 – 2009, respectively. D10, 
Q5, Port100 are different portfolio selection criteria employed. Std Dev refers to the standard 
deviation of the target concentrations over the holdout period. 
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Overall, the results show that the performance of stale model parameters does not 
systematically decline over time. The implication is that model parameters developed in 
this study (model 15C, presented in table 6.2.1) can be potentially used by future 
researchers to ascribe takeover probabilities to UK firms. This is likely to reduce data 
collection costs while allowing future researchers to benefit from a developed and tested 
framework for assigning takeover probabilities. The conclusion from this analysis (i.e., the 
usefulness of current parameters for future prediction) is likely to persist until when there 
is a structural break in the characteristics of targets (see Pesaran and Timmerman (2002, 
2007)).  If such a break can be identified, it will, perhaps, be optimal to apply freshly 
developed model parameters
183
.  
 
This section has provided evidence to demonstrate that the performance of stale model 
parameters does not systematically decline over time. It could be suggested that, perhaps, 
the use of longer estimation windows in the development of stale model parameters will 
lead to better model training and hence, more stable parameters. Such parameters are likely 
to outperform stale parameters generated from short estimation windows. In section 6.7.3, I 
explore whether the length of the estimation sample affects the predictive ability of models 
employing stale parameters.  
6.7.3 The effect of length of estimation period on parameter stability –
stale models 
To investigate whether the length of the estimation window affects the performance of 
stale model parameters, I compare the performance of three-year (short estimation 
window) models and recursive (long estimation window) models employing stale 
parameters. To achieve this, I compare the performance of (1) a three-year model which 
uses parameters estimated using data from 1997 to 1999 and predicts targets annually from 
2000 to 2009 to (2) a recursive model whose parameters are estimated using data from 
1988 to 1999 and predicts targets from 2000 to 2009. The difference in performance 
between (1) and (2) can directly be attributed to the effect of the length of the estimation 
window. The results of the analyses are shown in table 6.7.3. 
 
                                                 
183 The performance of ‘stale’ and ‘fresh’ parameters over the sample period is directly compared in 
section 6.8.4. 
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Table 6.7.3: Investigating the effect of the length of the estimation period on model 
performance 
 
Long estimation window Short estimation window Diff in conc. (%) 
 
Pred. Targets Conc. (%) Pred. Targets Conc. (%) Diff. (pp) P. value 
D10 970 81 8.36 970 71 7.32 1.04 0.1749 
Q5 1,936 139 7.19 1,936 144 7.44 -0.25 0.5421 
Port100 1,000 85 8.50 1,000 71 7.10 1.40 0.1053 
Port50 500 49 9.80 500 34 6.80 3.00*** 0.0017 
Port30 300 32 10.67 300 20 6.67 4.00** 0.0239 
Port10 100 7 7.00 100 8 8.00 -1.00 0.6783 
Port5% 487 49 10.06 488 34 6.97 3.09*** 0.0013 
Sample 9,659 613 6.35 9,659 613 6.35 0.00 1.0000 
Overall 5,293 442 8.35 5,294 382 7.22 1.13*** 0.0045 
Notes: The table presents summary results from out-of-sample predictions of the stale new model 
derived from long and short estimation windows. It compares the performance of (1) a three-year 
model which uses parameters estimated using data from 1997 to 1999 and predicts targets annually 
from 2000 to 2009 to (2) a recursive model whose parameters are estimated using data from 1988 to 
1999 and predicts targets from 2000 to 2009. (1) is described as short estimation window and (2) is 
described as long estimation window. The difference in performance between (1) and (2) can 
directly be attributed to the effect of the length of the estimation window. Firms are ranked by their 
(predicted) takeover likelihood and firms with the highest takeover likelihood are selected as 
potential targets. Different criteria (Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, D10, Q5 and Cut off) are used to 
determine what number of potential targets to select. Port100, Port50, Port30, and Port10 are 
portfolios of 100, 50, 30 and 10 firms with the highest probability of receiving the bids. D10 and Q5 
are the ‘top’ decile and quintile portfolios respectively. Pred. is the number of predicted targets. 
Targets is the number of actual targets within Pred. Conc.% is the ratio (%) of Target to Pred. t-test 
for paired samples is used to compare the target concentrations achieved by the different models 
over the 10-year out of sample period spanning 2000 to 2009. ‘Overall’ represents the ‘average’ 
performance of each model. ‘Sample’ represents the performance of a model which simply predicts 
that every firm in the population is a takeover target. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The performance of the model employing a long estimation window (1988–1999) is 
compared with the performance of a model using a short estimation window (1997–1999) 
in table 6.7.3. The two models, presumable, apply stale parameters as they are tested 
recurrently (without parameter redevelopment) over a ten year period (2000–2009). The 
results show that the stale model which employs a short estimation underperforms the 
model which employs a long estimation window. The model with the long estimation 
window achieves an overall target concentration of 8.35% as against 7.22% achieved by 
the model which employs a short estimation window. The difference in performance or 
target concentration (1.13 pp) is significant at the 1% level. The level of outperformance is 
evident in three out of seven portfolios (including Port50, Port30 and Port5%). The results 
from table 6.7.3 suggests that, in terms of predictive ability of stale models, stale models 
developed using long estimation windows are more robust that those developed using short 
estimation windows.  
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Section 6.7.2 showed that the predictive ability of stale models does not systematically 
decline over time. Section 6.7.3 showed that the length of the estimation window affects 
the predictive ability of stale model parameters. The next section (section 6.7.4) takes this 
assessment a step forward by evaluating whether fresh model parameters have any 
predictive advantage over stale model parameters.  
6.7.4 The performance of stale model parameters versus fresh model 
parameters 
The ‘fresh’ recursive model refers to a model whose parameters are redeveloped every 
year such that they take account of the most recently available firm data. In this case, the 
first fresh model is developed using data from 1988–1999. This model is used to predict 
targets in 2000. The model is again redeveloped to incorporate data for 2000 (i.e., 
estimation sample; 1988–2000), and the new (or fresh) parameters are used to predict 
targets in 2001. This recursive process is followed every year up until 2008. The ‘stale’ 
recursive model, on the other hand, uses fixed parameters developed from data in the 
estimation period 1988 to 1999 to predict targets in consecutive years between 2000 and 
2009. Presumably, the model is ‘stale’ as it does not include new information to make 
predictions in subsequent years. For example, the model uses coefficients developed from 
the 1988–1999 data to make predictions in 2009. The target concentration achieved across 
different portfolios is computed as the ratio of actual targets predicted to the total number 
of predictions. The performance of the stale model in comparison to the fresh model 
(across different portfolio selection criteria) over the ten-year holdout sample period is 
shown in table 6.7.4.  
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Table 6.7.4: Comparing the performance of stale and fresh model parameters.  
 
Fresh parameters Stale parameters Diff in Conc. 
 
Pred. Targets Conc.(%) Pred. Targets Conc.(%) Diff. (pp) P. value 
D10 969 88 9.08 969 81 8.36 0.72 0.1401 
Q5 1,933 161 8.33 1,933 139 7.19 1.14** 0.0371 
Port100 1,000 91 9.10 1,000 85 8.50 0.60 0.2967 
Port50 500 49 9.80 500 49 9.80 0.00 1.0000 
Port30 300 24 8.00 300 32 10.67 -2.67 0.1039 
Port10 100 7 7.00 100 7 7.00 0.00 1.0000 
Port5% 487 47 9.65 487 49 10.06 -0.41 0.6462 
Overall 5,289 467 8.83 5,289 442 8.36 0.47 0.8580 
Sample 9,647 612 6.34 9,647 612 6.34 0.00 1.0000 
Notes: The table presents summary results from out-of-sample predictions of the new model 
derived from fresh and stale parameters. It compares the performance of (1) a model which uses 
parameters estimated using data from 1989 to 1999 and predicts targets annually from 2000 to 2009 
– stale parameters – to (2) a model whose parameters are estimated in a recursive manner using 
data from 1988 and predicts targets out-of-sample from 2000 to 2009 – fresh parameters. The 
difference in performance between (1) and (2) can directly be attributed to the effect of the 
‘staleness’ of model parameters. Firms are ranked by their (predicted) takeover likelihood and 
firms with the highest takeover likelihood are selected as potential targets. Different criteria 
(Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, D10, Q5 and Cut off) are used to determine what number of 
potential targets to select. Port100, Port50, Port30, and Port10 are portfolios of 100, 50, 30 and 10 
firms with the highest probability of receiving the bids. D10 and Q5 are the ‘top’ decile and quintile 
portfolios respectively. Pred. is the number of predicted targets. Targets is the number of actual 
targets within Pred. Conc.% is the ratio (%) of Target to Pred. t-test for paired samples is used to 
compare the target concentrations achieved by the different models over the 10-year out of sample 
period spanning 2000 to 2009. ‘Overall’ represents the ‘average’ performance of each model. 
‘Sample’ represents the performance of a model which simply predicts that every firm in the 
population is a takeover target. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
The fresh parameters outperform the stale parameters across a majority of portfolio 
selection criteria. The fresh parameters are able to correctly predict 25 (or 5.67%) more 
targets compared to the stale parameters over the 10 year period. Nonetheless, the 
difference in target concentration (0.47 pp) achieved by the two models is not significant at 
the 10% level. The results suggest that despite the finding that stale model parameters have 
considerable predictive power (as discussed in section 6.7.2), prediction with fresh 
parameters, whenever possible, is likely to lead to more optimal results.  
 
This section (section 6.7.4) has revealed that fresh model parameters have a higher 
predictive ability when compared with stale model parameters. While fresh model 
parameters are clearly the more optimal choice (e.g., from an investors perspective), the 
evidence suggests that stale parameters can still be useful in ascribing takeover 
probabilities (e.g., from a researcher’s perspective). The usefulness of the new model’s 
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stale parameters to future researchers (for example) is further explored in section 6.7.5. 
Section 6.7.5 evaluates whether the new model still outperforms the old model (as 
discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3) when stale model parameters are applied. 
6.7.5 Old versus new model suitability for future prediction – stale 
models 
Section 6.7.2 suggested that stale model parameters can still be useful in the prediction of 
future targets or in ascribing firm takeover probabilities in the future. Such application of 
stale parameters is likely to substantially reduce the cost of data collection and model 
building. In this section, the old model is compared with the new model based on their 
predictive abilities when stale model parameters are employed. This will allow for a 
recommendation to be made on what model to apply when stale parameters are being 
employed. Table 6.7.5 compares the performance of a stale new model and that of a stale 
old model. The two models are developed using data from 1989 to 1999 and tested for 
predictive ability over the ten-year period from 2000 to 2009. The variables in the old 
(new) model are similar to those in model 15A (15C) in table 6.2.1a. The results from the 
analysis are shown in table 6.7.5. 
 
The results in table 6.7.5 show that the stale new model substantially outperforms the stale 
old model on average. The stale new model achieves an overall target concentration of 
8.36% over the 10-year period (2000–2009) as compared to 6.90% achieved by the stale 
old model over the same period. The difference in target concentration (14 more correct 
predictions or 1.46 pp) is significant at the 5% level. The result achieved across different 
portfolios is consistent with the argument that the new model (with stale parameters) has a 
superior predictive ability when compared to the old model (with stale parameters). 
Overall, the findings in this section support the use of the new model over the old model 
when stale parameters are being adopted. These results are also consistent with earlier 
conclusions that the new model has a superior predictive ability when compared to the old 
model (see section 6.2 and 6.3). 
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Table 6.7.5: Comparing the performance of old and new models which employ stale 
parameters 
 
New model  Old model  Diff. in Conc. % 
 
Pred. Targets Conc.% Pred. Targets Conc.% Diff. (pp) P. value 
D10             969  81 8.36       1,230  86 6.99 1.37 0.2664 
Q5          1,933  139 7.19       2,455  160 6.52 0.67 0.5137 
Port100          1,000  85 8.50       1,000  74 7.40 1.10 0.3711 
Port50             500  49 9.80           500  35 7.00 2.80** 0.0128 
Port30             300  32 10.67           300  23 7.67 3.00* 0.0676 
Port10             100  7 7.00           100  9 9.00 -2.00 0.4433 
Port5             487  49 10.06           618  41 6.63 3.43** 0.0168 
Overall          5,289  442 8.36       6,203  428 6.90 1.46** 0.0101 
Sample          9,647  612 6.34     12,249  747 6.10 0.25 0.2957 
Notes: The table presents summary results from out-of-sample predictions of the new and old 
models derived from stale parameters. Firms are ranked by their (predicted) takeover likelihood 
and firms with the highest takeover likelihood are selected as potential targets. Different criteria 
(Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, D10, Q5 and Cut off) are used to determine what number of 
potential targets to select. Port100, Port50, Port30, and Port10 are portfolios of 100, 50, 30 and 10 
firms with the highest probability of receiving the bids. D10 and Q5 are the ‘top’ decile and quintile 
portfolios respectively. Pred. is the number of predicted targets. Targets is the number of actual 
targets within Pred. Conc.% is the ratio (%) of Target to Pred. t-test for paired samples is used to 
compare the target concentrations achieved by the different models over the 10-year out of sample 
period spanning 2000 to 2009. ‘Overall’ represents the ‘average’ performance of each model. 
‘Sample’ represents the performance of a model which simply predicts that every firm in the 
population is a takeover target. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
6.8 The choice of portfolio selection criteria 
 
Little has been said about how to identify an optimal cut-off point across the prediction and 
forecasting literature. The convention is for researchers to employ deciles, quintiles and 
percentiles (see, for example, Cremers et al. (2009), Brar et al. (2009) and Cornett et al. 
(2011)). Other researchers (such as Palepu (1986), Barnes (1990, 1999, 2000) and Powell 
(2001, 2004)) have proposed the use of optimal cut-off probabilities derived ex ante. As 
discussed in section 4.4.5, the use of the 25
th
 percentile (Cornett et al. (2011)), deciles 
(Brar et al. (2009)) and quintiles (Cremers et al. (2009)) is, perhaps, arbitrary as it 
integrally assumes that 25% (25
th
 percentile), 10% (deciles) or 20% (quintiles) of listed 
firms within the holdout sample are likely to receive takeover bids in each year. The 
empirical analysis in this study showed that on average only about 5.05% of UK firms 
received bids annually between 1988 and 2009
184
. In addition to deciles, quintiles and 
                                                 
184 This level of UK M&A activity is similar to the 5.00% (between 1986 and 1995) reported by 
Powell (2004). This level of activity is higher than the level reported in the US. For example, Cornet 
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optimal cut-off probabilities, I considered the diversity of potential model users, and 
employed other portfolio selection techniques including Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10 
and Port5% (fully discussed in table 4.4.5).  
 
The results from the analyses in this chapter reveal some differences in performance across 
these portfolio selection methods. The main difference between these portfolios is the 
number of potential targets each portfolio selects. In general, the use of deciles (D10), 
quintiles (Q5), Port5% and Port100 allow for the selection of a higher number of firms as 
potential targets. This implies a higher likelihood of correctly predicting a target, but also a 
substantial level of type II errors (i.e., non-targets predicted as targets). Such portfolios 
appear to be less risky as they are less likely to achieve zero target concentrations. Port30 
and Port10 can be considered ‘high risk’ portfolios as the likelihood of correctly predicting 
a target is lower than in the larger portfolios. Nonetheless, in these smaller portfolios, the 
impact of correctly predicting a target is higher and the level of potential misclassification 
is substantially less. For example, a correct prediction of one target when Port10 is being 
employed results in a target concentration of 10%. 
 
To assess and compare the performance of the portfolios, I adopt a simple ranking 
procedure which is analogous to the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum non-parametric test. This 
procedure involves ranking the eight portfolio selection procedures applied in this study 
(D10, Q5, Port5%, Port100, Port50, Port30, Port 10 and cut-off probabilities) across five 
key performance measures. These performance measures include: overall (mean) target 
concentration achieved, median target concentration achieved, maximum target 
concentration achieved, minimum target concentration achieved, and the standard 
deviation of target concentrations over the period. The mean and median target 
concentration achieved is a measure of long run performance. The maximum, minimum 
and standard deviation of target concentrations represent the level of variability in the 
performance (an indication of risk). The results obtained from the new (model 15C) and 
old (model 15A) model in out-of-sample predictions between 1995 and 2009 are used in 
this analysis. Table 6.8.1 presents a summary of these results and the rankings achieved by 
the different portfolio selection techniques. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
et al. (2011) report that 2.87% of listed US firms are targets between 1975 and 2004. An early study 
by Palepu (1986) reports a level of M&A activity of about 2.6% in 1979.  
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Table 6.8.1: Assessing the performance of different portfolio selection criteria.  
Panel A:  New model 
 
Mean % Median % Min % Max % Std. Dev. % Sum of ranks 
D10 10.47 10.23 2.11 20.59 4.70 29.00 
Q5 9.96 9.79 2.65 20.10 4.19 24.00 
Port100 10.40 10.00 2.00 20.00 4.59 21.50 
Port50 11.20 10.00 2.00 26.00 6.32 25.00 
Port30 10.89 10.00 3.33 30.00 7.74 28.50 
Port10 9.33 10.00 0.00 40.00 10.62 18.00 
Cut off 8.12 6.98 0.00 20.00 6.05 10.00 
Port5% 11.23 9.62 2.08 27.45 6.52 24.00 
Panel B: Old model 
D10 8.37 7.69 2.27 17.29 4.05 27.50 
Q5 7.93 7.20 2.27 15.85 3.14 21.50 
Port100 8.13 7.00 1.00 16.00 4.15 18.50 
Port50 8.13 8.00 2.00 18.00 4.92 23.50 
Port30 8.89 6.67 3.33 20.00 5.92 26.50 
Port10 8.00 10.00 0.00 20.00 6.53 20.50 
Cut off 9.19 9.85 0.85 18.64 4.64 28.00 
Port5% 7.85 6.35 1.52 17.54 4.89 14.00 
Notes: The table assesses the performance of different selection criteria across five key performance 
measures: overall target concentration achieved (Mean. %), median target concentration achieved 
(Median %), maximum target concentration achieved (Max. %), minimum target concentration 
achieved (Min. %), and the standard deviation of target concentrations over the period (Std. Dev. 
%). The best criterion is given a rank of eight and the worst criterion is given a rank of one. The 
ranks for each selection criterion across the different performance measures are added up to arrive 
at the Sum of ranks.  
 
 
The results from panel A and B, show that, on average, Port10 and Port30 report the 
highest standard deviation. This indicates a substantial variation in their performance from 
one year to another. Port5% and Port50 report the highest overall (long run) target 
concentrations (11.23% and 11.20%, respectively). The larger portfolios (D10, Q5 and 
Port100) achieve lower variation (or more stability) in their performance from one year to 
another. The results from panel B indicate that the larger portfolios (Port100, Q5 and D10) 
also report a higher minimum target concentration, on average. 
 
The results from the sum of ranks show that the larger portfolios (Port100, D10 and Q5) 
perform best when different parameters including overall (mean and median) concentration 
of targets in the portfolio, maximum target concentration achieved, minimum target 
concentration achieved and standard deviation of target concentration are considered. The 
smaller portfolios (e.g., Port10) tend to achieve the lowest ranks (or score) across all 
criteria. They appear to perform at extremes achieving high target concentration in certain 
years and low (or even zero) target concentration in other years. Overall, the findings 
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suggest that portfolio selection techniques which generate larger portfolios (e.g., D10) are 
more optimal as they result in slightly better long run performance and lower variability in 
performance. The selection of smaller target portfolios results in a high level of variability 
and inconsistency in the models’ performance.  
 
6.9 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
The primary goal of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of the new model 
developed in this study in terms of its ability to correctly classify targets and non-targets 
and its ability to correctly predict firms that will receive bids in a holdout sample. To 
achieve this goal, the performance of the old model is compared to the performance of a 
benchmark model – the old model. Another key objective of this chapter is to empirically 
determine an optimal modelling strategy in terms of the length of the estimation period in 
predictive model development and the optimal choice of portfolio selection techniques. 
The final objective of the chapter is to investigate the usability of stale model parameters in 
target prediction several years ahead. 
 
The evidence shows that the new variables introduced in this study improve the old 
model’s ability to correctly classify target and non-target firms within-sample and to 
correctly predict target firms out-of-sample. The new model outperforms the old model 
when the AUC is assessed and when their abilities to predict targets in a hold-out sample is 
compared. The implication is that the model more fully explains the differences between 
UK targets and non-targets. The results also confirm that the new model outperforms the 
old and old (balanced) models in out-of-sample prediction tests across a wide variety of 
scenarios or modelling choices. The results in this study compare favourably with 
comparable prior studies including Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (1997, 2001, 
2004).  
 
In critique of prior studies, I find that the performance of prediction models substantially 
vary from one year to another between 1995 and 2009. This performance appears to be 
positively correlated with the overall market (FTSE all-share index) performance. I find 
that the performance achieved by the models is higher in bull market periods and lower in 
bear market periods. These results suggest that the use of a one-year out-of-sample test 
period (such as in Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (2001, 2004), 
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amongst others) leads to non-robust and non-generalisable conclusions. In this respect, I 
propose that the approach to model out-of-sample testing adopted in this study, provides a 
more reliable test of model out-of-sample predictive ability. 
 
Again, I find that the use of longer estimation windows do not necessarily result in better 
predictive abilities for either the new or the old model. This finding suggests that the 
choice of estimation windows and selection criteria applied in prior research is, perhaps, 
arbitrary. The results also show that the use of portfolio selection techniques which lead to 
the prediction of a large number of targets (e.g., Port100, D10 and Q5) is a more optimal 
modelling strategy when the goal is to achieve the high target concentrations, with no 
consideration made for resulting transaction costs. I find that selection criteria which lead 
to the selection of a small number of targets (such as Port10 and Port30) lead to unstable 
and highly variable results. 
 
Finally, I find that stale model parameters retain predictive ability which does not 
systematically decline over time. This finding suggests that (stale) model parameters 
developed in this study can be used in future studies (constraint by data collection costs) to 
ascribe takeover likelihood to UK firms (see, for example, model 15C, table 6.2.1). This 
also suggests that these coefficients are, to some extent, robust over time. The stale 
parameters appear to perform better when longer estimation windows are applied. 
Notwithstanding, the results suggest that fresh model parameters have an added predictive 
power over stale model parameters. The implication is that fresh model parameters should 
be developed whenever possible. Overall, the results achieved in this chapter contribute to 
the literature by ascertaining that the new model is more ‘efficient’ than earlier models. It 
also contributes to the literature by exploring the importance of modelling choices (such as 
the length of the estimation window, the portfolio selection criteria and the use of stale 
versus fresh model parameters) in the development of optimal prediction models.  
 
While the new model is more efficient in predicting takeover targets compared to the old 
model as shown by the empirical results, it is uncertain whether an investor can use the 
new model to outperform the market. The focus of chapter 7 is therefore to investigate 
whether the new model, with its superior predictive ability, can form the basis of a 
profitable investment strategy. 
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CHAPTER 7  INVESTING IN PREDICTED TARGETS 
 
7.1 Overview 
A new takeover prediction model is developed and tested in chapter 6. The results suggest 
that this new model (and the new variables) improves the classification and predictive 
ability of takeover prediction models employed in prior studies. Interestingly, the results 
from chapter 6 indicate that target concentration of up to 11.23% could be achieved by 
holding a portfolio of the 5
th
 percentile of firms with the highest takeover likelihood as 
ascribed by the new model over the period 1995 to 2009. While this appears like a 
moderate level of performance, it represents a substantial improvement on prior prediction 
models which generally attained concentrations of about 3% or less, on average (see, for 
example, Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000), Powell (1997, 2001, 
2004), and Brar et al. (2009)), amongst others). It is also a substantial improvement over a 
random selection approach, given that targets make up about 5.05% of the population of 
firms in the sample each year (see section 4.2.6). 
 
As discussed in the section 2.3.3, there is a consensus within the literature that significant 
abnormal returns accrue to takeover targets (Huang and Walkling (1987), Bradley et al. 
(1988), Frank and Harris (1989), Parkinson and Shaw (1991), Stulz et al. (1990), Schwert 
(2000), Parkinson and Dobbins (1993), Moeller (2005), Cornett et al. (2011) and Danbolt 
and Maciver (2012)). This chapter builds on this finding by investigating whether the new 
model (general version with continuously updated coefficients) can form the basis of a 
profitable investment strategy. This evaluation is critical for investors such as fund 
managers who are looking for superior investment strategies.  
 
To an extent, testing whether superior returns can be generated from takeover prediction 
modelling can serve as a test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH – semi strong 
form). A finding that abnormal returns can be generated (consistently and over the long 
run) from an investment strategy focusing on investing in predicted targets will be 
inconsistent with the predictions of the EMH. This is because the (new) model employs 
publicly available information, which, per the EMH, should already be discounted in stock 
prices. 
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As in the previous chapter, several different portfolios are analysed for robustness, and the 
results obtained using the new model are compared with those from the old. The version of 
the new model employed in this chapter is that which uses all the new variables. This 
decision is based on the finding (in sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4) that the general new model 
(which includes all the new variables) slightly outperforms a more restricted new model 
(which excludes non-significant variables). The methodology employed in this chapter 
(including the computation of returns and the formation of portfolios) is discussed in 
sections 4.4 and 4.5. In section 7.2, the risk-adjusted returns generated by the new model 
are presented and discussed. In section 7.3, the new model’s potential to generate returns 
for investors is compared with that of the old model. Section 7.4 presents further analysis 
aimed at explaining some of the key results obtained in the chapter. Section 7.5 concludes 
the chapter and discusses some of its implications to research and practice. 
 
7.2  The returns generated by the new model 
7.2.1 Overview 
The main interest of this chapter is to evaluate whether the new model can inform a 
profitable investment strategy. This section investigates whether the new model can 
generate positive returns for investors by investigating its performance in backtests – i.e., 
retrospective evaluation of annual investment performance. The use of backtests to provide 
evidence on potential model performance is in line with the literature (see, for example, 
Cahan et al. (2011) and Cremers et al. (2009)). The procedure for computing portfolio 
returns is fully discussed in chapter 4. Stocks predicted as potential takeover targets based 
on their financial statements – assumed to be available on 30 June  X1 – are placed within 
a portfolio (target portfolio) and the discrete monthly returns on each stock within the 
target portfolio from July X1 to June X2 are computed. Both equal weighted and value 
weighted portfolio returns are computed from the discrete monthly returns of all firms 
within the portfolio. Equal weighted portfolio returns for each month is the arithmetic 
average of the returns to all the stocks within the portfolio in that month. Value weighted 
returns are computed by weighting stocks with respect to their market value at the start of 
the holding period (30 June X1). No monthly rebalancing is applied.  
 
Risk-adjusted portfolio returns (employing different risk adjustment methodologies, such 
as the capital asset pricing, Fama and French three factor and Carhart four factor models) 
are used in the evaluation. These different methodologies are fully discussed in section 4.5. 
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I focus on the different portfolios (deciles, quintiles, Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10 and 
Port5%) that were developed in chapter 6. The returns generated by these portfolios are 
presented and discussed in the sections below. 
 
7.2.2 Average Monthly Risk-Adjusted Returns (AMRR) 
In this section, the simple calendar time portfolio (monthly) returns (AMUR) generated by 
the model are adjusted for risk using factor models. The methodology applied is fully 
discussed in section 4.5.3. It is consistent with Ang and Zhang (2004). The methodology 
involves regressing the excess equal and value-weighted portfolios returns (AMUR – RF) 
on the monthly factors (RM–RF, SMB, HML, UMD) in the four factor model (Carhart 
(1996)). The regression model (equation 4.5.3 (3)) is shown below; 
               (       )                                            ( ) 
 
In these equation,     is the discrete return (AMUR) on portfolio i in month t,     is the 
risk free rate in month t,    is the abnormal (excess) monthly return or portfolio alpha in 
the period,     is the market return in month t, SMB (Small Minus Big) and HML (High 
Minus Low) are the Fama & French factors, UMD (Winners Minus Losers) is the 
momentum factor. SMB (the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of small 
stocks and big stocks), HML (the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks) and UMD (the difference in 
the returns of winners and losers) depict the monthly return on the zero investment 
portfolio for the common size factor, book to market equity factor and momentum factor in 
stock returns.         are regression coefficients for the different risk factors. The data for 
the monthly risk free rate (RF), the monthly market return (RM), and the risk factors 
(SMB, HML and UMD) for the UK market are obtained from Gregory et al. (2013).  
 
Table 7.2.2a presents the results obtained when a continuously-updated model (or 
recursive modelling strategy) is used to predict potential targets from 1995 to 2009 and a 
decile optimal portfolio selection strategy is used to select the target portfolio. For 
robustness, results obtained using other factor models – the CAPM and the Fama and 
French three-factor model – are also presented. 
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Table 7.2.2a: Regression coefficients from decile portfolios: 1995 to 2009 
 
(1) Equal Weighted D10 Portfolio (2) Value Weighted D10 Portfolio 
 
CAPM FF3F Carhart CAPM FF3F Carhart 
Alpha 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006* 
RM - RF 1.005*** 0.875*** 0.895*** 1.035*** 0.951*** 0.939*** 
SMB 
 
1.234*** 1.260*** 
 
0.797*** 0.783*** 
HML 
 
-0.076 -0.001 
 
-0.041 -0.083 
UMD 
  
0.098 
  
-0.055 
Notes: The table presents results for cross sectional regression of portfolio returns on return-
generation factors (CAPM, Fama and French three Factor and Carhart model factors). The 
regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal (1) or value (2) weighted return on the 
portfolio and     is the risk free rate. The independent variables include the factors in the Carhart 
model; RM - RF (excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD 
(momentum factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for 
these factors (including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio 
holding period is 180 months from July 1996 to June 2011. The estimate of the intercept term 
‘Alpha’ provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-
time portfolio is zero. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
The results obtained using the decile portfolio selection strategy show that the portfolios 
generate average monthly excess returns (or alphas) of 0.3% (equal-weighted portfolio) 
and 0.6% (value-weighted portfolio) during the July 1996 to June 2011 holding period. 
The alpha generated by the equal-weighted portfolios is insignificant while that generated 
by the value-weighted portfolios is significant (at the 10% level) using the Carhart model. 
These results suggest that takeover prediction as investment strategy is potentially 
profitable in certain instances. Nonetheless, further tests are needed to explore this finding. 
The first test conducted is to investigate whether the results are shaped by the portfolio 
formation strategy. Table 7.2.2b presents summary results obtained when different 
portfolio formation strategies (including quintiles, fixed portfolios and cut-offs) are 
employed. For simplicity, only the portfolio alphas generated from different factor models 
are presented. 
 
 
 
 293 
 
Table 7.2.2b:  Abnormal returns (alphas) generated by the new model 
Panel A: Portfolio Alpha - Equal Weighted  
 
 
Target conc.% CAPM FF3F Carhart 
D10 10.47 0.005 0.004 0.003 
Q5 9.96 0.005 0.004 0.003 
Port100 10.40 0.005 0.005 0.004 
Port50 11.20 0.006 0.005 0.005 
Port30 10.89 0.006 0.005 0.004 
Port10 9.33 0.006 0.007 0.004 
CUT OFF 8.12 -0.018** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
Port5% 11.23 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Average 10.20*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
Median 10.44 0.005 0.005 0.004 
Panel B: Portfolio Alpha - Value Weighted 
  
 
Target conc.% CAPM FF3F Carhart 
D10 10.47 0.005 0.005 0.006* 
Q5 9.96 0.005 0.004 0.005* 
Port100 10.40 0.005 0.004 0.005 
Port50 11.20 0.006 0.007 0.008 
Port30 10.89 0.008 0.008 0.009 
Port10 9.33 0.005 0.005 0.007 
CUT OFF 8.12 -0.020** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
Port5% 11.23 0.006 0.006 0.007 
Average 10.20*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
Median 10.44 0.005 0.005 0.007 
Note: The table presents alphas (constant term and significance) for cross sectional regression of 
portfolio returns on return-generation factors (CAPM, Fama and French three Factor and Carhart 
model factors) for different portfolio formation strategies. The regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is 
shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal (panel A) or value (panel B) weighted 
return on the respective portfolios (D10, Q5, Port100. Port50, Port30, Cut Off, Port5%) and     is 
the risk free rate. The independent variables include the factors in the Carhart model; RM - RF 
(excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD (momentum 
factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for these factors 
(including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio holding period 
is 180 months from July 1996 to June 2011.  Target Conc % represents the proportion of actual 
takeover targets within the portfolio. The estimate of the intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test of 
the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 7.2.2b (panel A and B) show that the results (alpha) obtained using the Carhart 
model is not markedly different from those obtained using the CAPM or the Three Factor 
model. The results indicate that the new model is incapable of generating abnormal returns 
consistently across different portfolio formation strategies. The model generates positive 
abnormal returns (significant at the 10% level) only when value-weighted portfolios are 
applied and this is limited to the decile portfolio formation strategy. Some portfolios, like 
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Port30 and Port50 generate substantially higher alphas (insignificant at the 10% level) of 
up to 0.8% and 0.9% respectively. These alphas are, perhaps, insignificant because of the 
high volatility in the returns generated by the portfolios. Besides lacking statistical 
significance, these levels of returns (e.g., 0.5% per month) are also likely to be 
economically low. This will be further discussed in section 7.3. 
 
The use of the cut-off portfolio formation strategy leads to the generation of significant 
negative alphas. This is, perhaps, because the use of cut-offs to identify target portfolio 
leads to the generation of very large target portfolios. As shown in table 6.3.1, when 
deciles (Port100) are used to generate target portfolios between 1995 and 2009, the target 
portfolio obtained consists of a total of 1,490 (1,500) predicted targets of which 156 (156) 
are actual targets. The target portfolio obtained using cut-offs consists of a total of 2,450 
predicted targets of which 199 predicted targets actually receive takeover bid. The cut-off 
procedure generates an extremely low cut off probability of 0.047 using data from 1998 to 
1994, leading to a prediction that 995 (from a sample of 1,031) firms will receive a bid in 
1995, of which only 50 firms do. This, potentially, negatively impacts on the returns 
generated by the new model when cut-off probabilities are used. 
 
On a whole, the evidence suggests that the new model cannot be consistently employed by 
investors to successfully generate significant positive returns in the long run. It generates 
positive abnormal returns in most instances but these returns are not statistically different 
from zero. The results are broadly consistent with the EMH, as it confirms that significant 
positive abnormal returns cannot be generated consistently, in the long run, by relying on 
investment strategies which employ publicly available information. These results are also 
consistent with the conclusions of Palepu (1986) and Powell (2001, 2004) who concede 
that abnormal returns can hardly be generated by using takeover prediction models.  
 
While consistent with current theory and prior evidence, the results substantially extend 
prior literature by investigating the performance of the model over a significantly longer 
holding period (July 1996 to June 2011). This holding period is interspersed by substantial 
variations in overall market performance due to two sub-periods of market collapse – the 
dotcom crisis (after 2000) and the global financial crisis (after 2007). These periods are 
characterised by general falling prices and poor stock performance. Do these periods of 
crisis have an impact on (or explain) the reported results? Will the model perform 
differently if these periods were excluded from the analysis? That is, will investors be able 
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to use the model successfully, if they restricted its use to non-crises periods? This test is 
further justified on the grounds that, outside the takeover prediction literature, several 
studies (for example, Maheu and McCurdy (2000), Pagan and Sossounov (2003) and 
Lunde and Timmerman (2004), amongst others) have developed models for the prediction 
of market cycles. Also, some takeover prediction researchers have restricted their 
investigations to particular time periods – usually one year. Does this have an impact on 
the reported results? I explore some of these pertinent questions in section 7.2.3. 
7.2.3 Variability of portfolio returns  
The result in section 7.2.2 suggests that, on average, the new takeover prediction model 
does not generate positive abnormal returns in backtests. These results are in line with the 
literature (Palepu (1986), Powell (2001, 2004)) but employ more robust analyses, over a 
long time period. Palepu (1986) and Powell (2001, 2004) arrive at their conclusion by 
testing model performance in a single year. In section 6.5, this approach was criticised and 
empirical evidence was presented to show that conclusions based on the approach lacked 
robustness and generalisability. The results in section 7.2.2 are based on long run average 
performance. That is, the model’s performance is tested over 15 years (180 months) and 
the average performance over this period is reported. In this section, I present results (in 
support of my critique of prior studies in section 6.5.) to show that performance 
substantially varies from one period to another. 
 
Further, the returns to the portfolios in this study appear to be driven by overall market 
trends. This is particularly the case as a substantial proportion of the portfolios (over 90% 
in several cases, as shown in table 6.3.1) are made up of firms which do not receive a bid 
during the period. While actual targets can be expected to generate abnormal returns upon 
bid announcements (further tested in section 7.4), the average non-target within predicted 
target portfolios can be expected to earn returns in line with the market (further analysed in 
section 7.4). The high number of non-targets together with their moderate performance (as 
will be shown in section 7.4) is likely to neutralise any returns generated by actual targets 
within the portfolio. The implication is that the portfolios will, perhaps, generate positive 
unadjusted returns in bull periods and negative unadjusted returns in bear periods as the 
non-targets within the portfolio earn returns, broadly, in line with the market. It is unclear 
whether these returns, when adjusted for risk, will be statistically different from zero (this 
is further investigated below).  
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Further, the results in section 6.5.3 revealed that the models achieve higher target 
concentrations in bull periods as compared to bear periods. In section 6.5.3, I argue (in line 
with Harford (2005)) that this is partly driven by higher market liquidity and a greater 
incentive to engage in mergers in bull periods. (This issue is further discussed in the 
development of the market economics hypothesis in section 3.3.12). These higher target 
concentrations achieved during bull periods, all things being equal, should also lead to 
higher portfolio returns in bull periods as compared to bear periods. Interestingly, there is a 
growing literature on the prediction of bull and bear markets (see, for example, Pagan and 
Sossounov (2003) and Lunde and Timmerman (2004), amongst others). If indeed, a 
prediction model can generate higher returns during bull periods (to be investigated), then 
it is worth exploring whether a two-stage prediction strategy can be of some benefit to 
investors. In this case, the first stage of the strategy will involve predicting market cycles 
and the second stage of the model will involve predicting takeover targets. The prediction 
of macroeconomic cycles generally involves the use of time series models (such as 
GARCH models) which are fundamentally different from the logit regression models 
employed in this study. Combining the logit and GARCH model in a single modelling 
framework is likely to present a significant challenge. This study does not pursue this line 
of enquiry. 
 
The goal here is to evaluate whether the results obtained above (i.e., the model’s inability 
to consistently outperform the market) remain robust even when only periods of market 
growth (bull markets) are considered. To test this, I employ a simple approach to 
distinguish between bull and bear periods and investigate whether portfolio performance is 
enhanced in bull periods as compared to bear period. It is worth stating that several 
methods for identifying (or predicting) bull and bear markets trends have been proposed in 
the literature. While models such as the Markov-Switching and GARCH models provide 
an advanced and more efficient method for identifying different regimes (see, for example, 
Maheu and McCurdy (2000)), a simple ex-post assessment of price index peaks and 
troughs (dating algorithm) is, perhaps, sufficient for the purpose of this study
185
. This form 
of assessment assumes perfect foresight of future regime changes and is, therefore, over-
optimistic. Similar dating algorithms have been proposed and used in studies such as Pagan 
and Sossounov (2003) and Lunde and Timmerman (2004). The task here is not to predict 
bull and bear periods and hence, I benefit from hindsight by identifying bull and bear 
periods based on cumulative market returns (following Lunde and Timmerman (2004)).  
                                                 
185 The prediction of Bull and Bear periods is beyond the scope of the current study. 
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Figure 6.5.3 plots the cumulative return on the FTSE All-Share index from 1991 to 2010. 
As discussed in section 6.5.3, one can approximate the start and end of bull and bear 
periods by using cumulative market (FTSE All-Share index) returns over time. From figure 
6.5.3, two major periods of market decline are evident: post–2000 and post–2007. These 
periods coincide with the dotcom crisis and the global financial crisis periods. Ignoring 
short term or secondary trends, and considering the size of the change in cumulative 
market return, one can identify two major bull periods (BULL 1 and BULL 2) and two 
major bear periods (BEAR 1 and BEAR 2). BULL 1 is considered as the period between 
June 1994 and August 2000. This bull period (BULL 1) is followed by a bear period 
(BEAR 1) which runs from September 2000 to March 2003. BEAR 1 is followed by a bull 
period which runs from April 2003 to October 2007. The period post October 2007 
(October 2007 to June 2010) has been considered as a Bear Period for the purpose of this 
study. The short period of market growth post August 2008 is ignored as it does not give 
sufficient observations for robust time series regression analysis. Table 7.2.3a and 7.2.3b 
shows the alphas generated by the new model over different market states.  
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Table 7.2.3a: Abnormal returns (alphas) generated by the new model during bull 
and bear periods 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted D10 Portfolio 
 
BULL 1 BEAR 1 BULL 2 BEAR 2 
Alpha 0.034*** 0.013* -0.004 -0.041*** 
RM - RF 0.741*** 0.956*** 0.916*** 0.846*** 
SMB 1.133*** 1.353*** 1.259*** 0.995*** 
HML -0.579*** 0.514*** 0.499 0.258 
UMD -0.051 0.006 -0.540** 0.075 
Panel B: Value-Weighted D10 Portfolio 
 
BULL 1 BEAR 1 BULL 2 BEAR 2 
Alpha 0.028*** 0.009 -0.003 -0.027*** 
RM - RF 0.662*** 0.912*** 1.122*** 1.076*** 
SMB 0.471*** 1.018*** 1.023*** 0.460*** 
HML -0.531*** 0.510** -0.164 -0.173 
UMD -0.070 -0.109 -0.461*** -0.223** 
N (Months) 50 31 55 44 
Notes: The table presents results for cross sectional regression of portfolio returns on return-
generation factors (Carhart model factors) when portfolios are formed using deciles. The regression 
model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal (panel A) or value (panel B) weighted 
return on the decile portfolio and     is the risk free rate. The independent variables include the 
factors in the Carhart model; RM - RF (excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to 
market factor) and UMD (momentum factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a 
discussion. UK Data for these factors (including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. 
(2013). The portfolio holding period are respectively BULL 1 (July 1996 – August 2000), BEAR 1 
(September 2000 – March 2003), BULL 2 (April 2003 – October 2007), BEAR 2 (November 2007 to 
June 2011). N (Months) represents the length of the holding period in months. The estimate of the 
intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return 
on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
The results obtained using the decile portfolio selection strategy show that the portfolios 
generate average monthly excess returns (or alphas) of 3.4% (equal-weighted portfolio) 
and 2.8% (value-weighted portfolio) in BULL 1. These results are significant at the 1% 
level. The results are not replicated in BULL 2 as the alphas generated in this period are 
not statistically different from zero. The alpha’s generated in BEAR 2 are significantly 
negative (–4.1% for the equal-weighted model and –2.7% for the value-weighted model).  
 
The results obtained when alternative portfolio formation strategies (including quintiles, 
fixed portfolios and cut-offs) are employed are presented in table 7.2.3b. For simplicity, 
only the portfolio alphas generated from different factor models are presented. These 
results reinforce the suggestion that takeover prediction as investment strategy is 
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potentially profitable in certain instances. The new model generates average alpha of 4.4% 
(equal-weighted portfolios) and 3.3% (value-weighted portfolios) in BULL 1. The model 
also generates positive but insignificant alpha in BEAR 1 (at the 10% level). The model 
generally performs poorly in BULL 2 as it generates an average alpha of – 0.8% (equal-
weighted portfolios) and –0.6% (value-weighted portfolios) during this period. As 
expected the model performs very poorly in BEAR 2 – the global financial crises period – 
generating an average alpha of –5.9% (equal-weighted portfolios) and –3.4% (value-
weighted portfolios) during this period.  
 
In summary, the results show that employing the model during the ‘dotcom bubble’ – 
BULL 1 – would have generated significant abnormal returns to investors while employing 
the model during the ‘global financial crisis’ would have led to significant losses. The 
results highlight the level of variability and the likely inconsistency in the performance of 
the model. Overall, in the long run, the positive alphas generated in BULL1 appears to be 
neutralised by the negative alphas generated in BEAR 2 leading to an overall mediocre 
performance as reported in table 7.2.2a and 7.2.2b. These results suggest that even with 
perfect foresight of periods of market growth, an investor is unlikely to consistently 
generate positive risk-adjusted returns using the model (e.g., during BULL 2). 
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Table 7.2.3b: Carhart Alphas generated by the new model in bull and bear periods 
Panel A: Equal Weighted portfolio returns 
 
 
BULL 1 BEAR 1 BULL 2 BEAR 2 
D10 0.034*** 0.013* -0.004 -0.041*** 
Q5 0.026*** 0.013** -0.002 -0.029*** 
Port100 0.036*** 0.013 -0.004 -0.041*** 
Port50 0.049*** 0.012 -0.006 -0.057*** 
Port30 0.063*** 0.018 -0.010 -0.071*** 
Port10 0.088*** 0.024 -0.021 -0.100*** 
CUT OFF 0.011** 0.012 -0.010 -0.090*** 
Port5% 0.048*** 0.012 -0.006 -0.060*** 
Average 0.044*** 0.015*** -0.008*** -0.061*** 
Median 0.042 0.013 -0.006 -0.059 
Panel B: Value Weighted portfolio returns 
 
 
BULL 1 BEAR 1 BULL 2 BEAR 2 
D10 0.028*** 0.009 -0.003 -0.027*** 
Q5 0.019*** 0.010 -0.002 -0.017*** 
Port100 0.030*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.028*** 
Port50 0.038*** 0.007 -0.006 -0.033*** 
Port30 0.050*** 0.023 -0.002 -0.045*** 
Port10 0.056*** 0.057 -0.017 -0.070*** 
CUT OFF 0.008* -0.001 -0.007 -0.084*** 
Port5% 0.037*** 0.008 -0.005 -0.034*** 
Average 0.033*** 0.015*** -0.006*** -0.042*** 
Median 0.034 0.009 -0.004 -0.034 
N (Months) 50 31 55 44 
Note: The table presents Carhart alphas obtained from cross sectional regression of portfolio 
returns on return-generation factors (Carhart model factors) when different portfolio formation 
strategies are employed. The regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal (panel A) or value (panel B) weighted 
return on the various portfolios (D10, Q5, Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, Cut Off, Port5%) and     
is the risk free rate. The independent variables include the factors in the Carhart model; RM - RF 
(excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD (momentum 
factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for these factors 
(including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio holding period 
are respectively BULL 1 (July 1996 – August 2000), BEAR 1 (September 2000 – March 2003), BULL 2 
(April 2003 – October 2007), BEAR 2 (November 2007 to June 2011). N (Months) represents the 
length of the holding period in months. The estimate of the intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test 
of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Powell (2004) can be used to provide some context to the results from this section. Powell 
(2004) reports returns to portfolios formed in January 1996 and held for a period of 12, 24 
and 36 months. Powell (2004) shows that the binomial model achieves zero abnormal 
returns in the first 12 months (January 1996 – December 1996) and negative abnormal 
returns if the predicted target portfolio is held for 24 months (January 1996–December 
1997) or 36 months (January 1996 – December 1998). This period coincides with periods 
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of significant market growth – BULL 1. Notwithstanding, Powell (2004) notes that the 
model generates positive abnormal returns if the portfolio is limited to larger, more liquid, 
low leverage and better performing firms.  
 
The new model appears to improve on Powell’s model (Powell (2004)) as it leads to the 
generation of positive abnormal returns during BULL 1. Further, the results in this section 
suggest that studies (such as Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2001) and Powell (2001, 
2004)) which apply a short (usually one-year) holdout period to test model performance, 
potentially, report biased and non-generalisable results.  
 
7.2.4 The new model versus the old model  
The purpose of this section is to compare the performance of the old model with that of the 
new model in terms of their ability to generate abnormal returns. The results from section 
7.2.2 showed that the new model generates mediocre abnormal returns over the long run.  
 
Table 7.2.4 presents summary performance results for the old and new models. The old 
model attains lower levels of portfolio concentration but generate higher levels of alpha 
across corresponding portfolios. Similar to the new model, the alphas generated by the old 
model when equal-weighted portfolios are applied are generally insignificant. The old 
model outperforms the new model when value-weighted portfolios are applied as it is able 
to generate long run positive alphas of up to 3.3% in some instances (see, for example, 
Port30). Indeed, when compared to the new model, the old model performs well across 
several portfolios, achieving an average alpha of 1.8% per month over the test period. 
These results are inconsistent with the general premise of takeover prediction as a 
prediction strategy – investors can earn significant abnormal returns by investing in 
takeover targets. Further analysis on the old model’s performance across different market 
states is done in section 7.3. The results here (table 7.2.4) show that the ability to predict 
more takeover targets successfully does not necessarily translate into better returns for 
shareholders. This is evident as the old model underperforms the new model in terms of 
predictive ability but outperforms the new model in terms of potential to generate 
abnormal returns for investors. Some of the potential reasons for this finding are further 
explored in section 7.3. 
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Table 7.2.4:  Abnormal returns (alphas) generated by the new and old models 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Portfolios 
 
New Model Old Model Difference 
 
Conc.% Alpha Conc.% Alpha Conc.% Alpha 
D10 10.47 0.003 8.37 0.008 2.10** -0.005 
Q5 9.96 0.003 7.93 0.005 2.03*** -0.002 
Port100 10.40 0.004 8.13 0.010* 2.27** -0.006 
Port50 11.20 0.005 8.13 0.013 3.07*** -0.008 
Port30 10.89 0.004 8.89 0.016 2.00 -0.012 
Port10 9.33 0.004 8.00 0.017 1.33 -0.013 
CUT OFF 8.12 -0.023*** 9.19 0.001 -1.06 -0.024 
Port5% 11.23 0.003 7.85 0.011 3.38*** -0.008 
Average 10.20*** 0.000 8.31*** 0.010*** 1.62*** -0.010*** 
Median 10.44 0.004 8.13 0.011 2.31 -0.007 
Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios 
 
New Model Old Model Difference 
 
Conc.% Alpha Conc.% Alpha Conc.% Alpha 
D10 10.47 0.006* 8.37 0.012*** 2.10** -0.006 
Q5 9.96 0.005* 7.93 0.009*** 2.03*** -0.004 
Port100 10.40 0.005 8.13 0.019*** 2.27** -0.014 
Port50 11.20 0.008 8.13 0.025*** 3.07*** -0.017 
Port30 10.89 0.009 8.89 0.033*** 2.00 -0.024 
Port10 9.33 0.007 8.00 0.015 1.33 -0.008 
CUT OFF 8.12 -0.023*** 9.19 0.008** -1.06 -0.031 
Port5% 11.23 0.007 7.85 0.021*** 3.38*** -0.014 
Average 10.20*** 0.003*** 8.31*** 0.018*** 1.62*** -0.018*** 
Median 10.44 0.007 8.13 0.017 2.31 -0.011 
Note: The table presents alphas (constant term and significance) for cross sectional regression of 
portfolio returns on return-generation factors (CAPM, Fama and French three Factor and Carhart 
model factors) for different portfolio formation strategies. The regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is 
shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal (panel A) or value (panel B) weighted 
return on the various portfolios (D10, Q5, Port100, Port50, Port30, Port10, Cut Off, Port5%) and     
is the risk free rate. The independent variables include the factors in the Carhart model; RM - RF 
(excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD (momentum 
factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for these factors 
(including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio holding period 
is 180 months from July 1996 to June 2011.  Conc. % represents the proportion of actual takeover 
targets within the portfolio. The estimate of the intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
This section has explored the performance of the new model in the long run and across 
different sub-periods. The results show that the model performs well in some periods (e.g., 
BULL 1) but also performs poorly in other periods (e.g., BEAR 2). Overall, in the long run 
(over the 180 months period), the model generates positive abnormal returns only when the 
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value-weighted portfolios are employed together with decile or quintile selection portfolio 
strategy. Given that transaction costs have not been considered, the abnormal returns are at 
best mediocre as they range from only 0.5% to 0.6% per month
186
.  
 
In section 7.2.4, I compare the performance of the new model with the performance of the 
old model. The results reveal that even though the new model outperforms the old model in 
terms of predicting actual targets, it underperforms the old model in terms of its ability to 
generate returns for investors. The finding suggests that, in the case of takeover prediction 
as an investment strategy, high predictive ability does not necessarily translate to high 
returns to investors. In section 7.3, I conduct several tests to explore some reasons why the 
new model underperforms the old model. I also explore possible factors that moderate the 
returns to target portfolios. 
 
7.3 Factors that influence the magnitude of portfolio returns  
7.3.1 Overview 
The results from chapter 6 suggest that the new variables considerably improve the 
predictive ability of the old takeover prediction model. The focus of this chapter was to test 
whether takeover prediction models (such as the new model) can, potentially, generate 
abnormal returns for investors in the long run. The results in section 7.2 suggest that an 
investment strategy relying on the prediction of takeover targets is unlikely to consistently 
generate significant positive returns in the long term. These results from the new model are 
consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and corroborate prior empirical 
studies (such as Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000), Powell (2001, 2004) and Cahan 
et al. (2011)). The results from the old model are consistent with the results of studies by 
Brar et al. (2009) and Cremers et al. (2009) who argue that abnormal returns can be 
generated from prediction models – albeit without sufficiently robust empirical evidence as 
critiqued earlier.  
 
It is interesting to take these findings a step further by empirically investigating why the 
new model’s portfolios underperform, on average, despite their higher target 
concentrations (as established in chapter 6). While some seminal studies have concluded 
                                                 
186 Several studies have derived trading strategies that yield much higher returns. For example, 
Diether et al. (2009) show that a trading strategy that buys stocks with low short-selling activity 
and sells short stocks with high short-selling activity generates an abnormal return of roughly 
1.39% (1.41%) per month for NYSE (Nasdaq) stocks. 
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that takeover prediction (and therefore benefiting from it) is in fact difficult, their 
conclusions are attributed to the fact that their models reported low predictive abilities 
(further discussed in section 2.5). Here, I show that the new model which attains a 
comparatively higher target concentration underperforms the old model, suggesting that 
target concentration is not a prerequisite for achieving high abnormal returns. In sections 
7.3.2, 7.3.3 and 7.3.4, I investigate the roles of type II errors (predicted targets which do 
not receive takeover bids), bankrupt firms and small firms in prediction portfolios. The key 
question here is whether the concentration of these categories of firms explains the poor 
performance of the new model and the differences in performance between the new and 
old models. In section 7.3.5, I explore whether the inability to generate high returns can be 
explained by the contention that stock prices already reflect takeover probability – market 
efficiency. 
7.3.2 The effect of type II errors 
Studies in takeover prediction (e.g., Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000), Powell 
(2001, 2004) and Cahan et al. (2011), amongst others) frequently argue that the presence of 
poorly performing non-targets in the prediction portfolio (i.e., predicted targets which do 
not receive a bid or type II errors) explains why prediction portfolios generate mediocre 
returns. The suggestion is that these type II errors (i.e., non-targets with a target’s profile) 
are strategically better-off if acquired by another firm. The expectation, therefore, is that 
such firms are likely to continue to perform poorly unless acquired by a new management 
team. If this is the case, the presence of type II errors in the target portfolio will explain a 
substantial portion of the low returns to these portfolios.  
 
I conjecture that while targets perform well, non-targets in portfolios (type II errors) 
perform poorly, thus dragging down the overall performance of portfolios. I investigate 
whether type II errors (predicted targets which do not receive bids) underperform other 
non-targets and whether portfolios without type II errors (100% target concentration) earn 
significant abnormal returns. To investigate this proposition (underperformance of type II 
errors), I compare the performance of non-targets in the predicted targets portfolio (Q5) 
with the performance of non-targets in Q1 (portfolio of firms with lowest acquisition 
likelihood). If the proposition is valid, I expect a significant difference in performance 
between non-targets in Q5 and non-targets in Q1, with Q5 non-targets underperforming
187
.  
                                                 
187 Bankrupt/delisted firms are also excluded from the non-target subsamples to ensure that their 
extreme performance does not bias the results as the intention is solely to investigate how the 
average non-target performs. The performance of bankrupt firms is investigated in section 7.3.3. 
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Second, I also expect that abnormal returns will be earned if the model was perfect 
(achieving a 100% target concentration). To investigate this, I compute the returns earned 
by a portfolio of targets only. Finally, I compare the results for the new model with those 
for the old model. My focus is to evaluate whether difference in the abnormal returns to 
targets and non-targets selected by the two models explain the differences in performance. 
The results of the analysis are summarised in table 7.3.2. 
 
The portfolio of predicted targets in Q5 (consisting of actual targets and non-targets) 
generates an alpha of 0.30% and 0.50% (insignificant at the 10% level) for the new and old 
models, respectively. When all the actual targets are taken-off the portfolio, the portfolio 
alpha does not change (i.e., the non-targets only portfolio alpha equals 0.30% and 0.50% 
for the new and old models, respectively). The alpha earned by the target-only portfolio 
(i.e., portfolio made up of only the actual targets in Q5) is slightly higher (0.50%) for the 
new model but still insignificant. Interestingly, the results suggest that a perfect (new or 
old) model – which generates small188 portfolios with 100% target concentration – fails to 
generate a significant positive alpha over the period.  
 
These results support the contention that the ability to successfully predict takeover targets 
does not imply superior investment performance. These results are consistent with Cremers 
et al. (2009) who find that the presence of targets within predicted target portfolios do not 
explain the returns to these portfolios. In their study, Cremers et al. (2009) find that 
portfolio alpha does not change when actual targets are excluded from these portfolios. 
They write: ‘To shed light on the source of these abnormal returns, we remove from our 
samples all firms that were actual targets, and recompute abnormal returns accruing to the 
different portfolios. Our results remain consistent and of (an arguably surprisingly) similar 
magnitude. Therefore, these abnormal returns are not caused by the announcement returns 
to realised targets’ (Cremers et al. (2009), p. 1424, footnote 19). The results mirror their 
finding and partly explain why the new model underperforms the old model (in terms of 
generating abnormal returns) even though it achieves a substantially higher target 
concentration. 
 
                                                 
188 The portfolios analysed here are obtained by taking out all the non-targets from Q5. 
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Table 7.3.2: The effects of type II errors on portfolio returns  
Panel A: Full-period analysis - New model 
  
  
All Q5 All Q1 NT Q5 Targets Q5 NT Q1 Targets Q1 
 
Alpha 0.003 -0.005 0.003 0.005 -0.008*** -0.005 
 
RM - RF 0.860*** 0.732*** 0.872*** 0.106*** 0.817*** 0.732*** 
 
SMB 1.108*** 0.495** 1.129*** 0.126*** 0.653*** 0.495** 
 
HML 0.101 -0.580** 0.081 0.364*** -0.186** -0.580** 
 
UMD 0.062 -0.244 0.068 0.017 -0.153* -0.244 
Panel B: Full-period analysis - Old model 
  
  
All Q5 All Q1 NT Q5 Targets Q5 NT Q1 Targets Q1 
 
Alpha 0.005 -0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.008 
 
RM - RF 0.892*** 0.839*** 0.902*** 0.884*** 0.839*** 0.806*** 
 
SMB 1.123*** 0.739*** 1.146*** 0.841*** 0.739*** 0.621*** 
 
HML 0.037 -0.199* -0.013 0.580*** -0.199* 0.070 
 
UMD 0.124 -0.263*** 0.127 0.205* -0.263*** 0.166 
Panel C: Sub-period analysis - New model 
  
  
All Q5 All Q1 NT Q5 Targets Q5 NT Q1 Targets Q1 
BULL 1 Alpha 0.026*** -0.007 0.025*** 0.039*** -0.022*** -0.007 
BEAR 1 Alpha 0.013** -0.073* 0.013** 0.019 -0.026*** -0.073* 
BULL 2 Alpha -0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.004 
BEAR 2 Alpha -0.028*** 0.018 -0.029*** -0.035*** 0.022*** 0.018 
Panel D: Sub-period analysis - Old model 
  
  
All Q5 All Q1 NT Q5 Targets Q5 NT Q1 Targets Q1 
BULL 1 Alpha 0.030*** -0.021*** 0.029*** 0.038*** -0.021*** -0.011 
BEAR 1 Alpha 0.016** -0.034*** 0.017** 0.001 -0.034*** -0.045* 
BULL 2 Alpha 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.003 
BEAR 2 Alpha -0.032*** 0.043*** -0.031*** -0.053*** 0.043*** 0.083*** 
Notes: The table presents results for cross sectional regression of portfolio returns on return-
generation factors (CAPM, Fama and French three Factor and Carhart model factors). The 
regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal weighted return on the various 
portfolios (All Q5, NT Q5, targets Q5, NT Q1 and Targets Q1) and     is the risk free rate. All Q5 is 
a portfolio consisting of 20% of firms with the highest takeover likelihood in each year (predicted 
targets). NT Q5 (non-targets Q5) is a subset of All Q5 consisting of a portfolio of all predicted 
targets which do not receive a takeover bid (type II errors). Targets Q5 is a subset of All Q5 
consisting of a portfolio of predicted targets which receive a bid as predicted. NT Q1 (Targets Q1) 
is a portfolio of non-targets (actual targets) in quintile 1 (quintile of firms with least likelihood of 
receiving a takeover bid. The independent variables in the model include the factors in the Carhart 
model; RM - RF (excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD 
(momentum factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for 
these factors (including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio 
holding period in panels A and B is 180 months from July 1996 to June 2011. The portfolio holding 
periods in panels C and D are respectively BULL 1 (July 1996 – August 2000), BEAR 1 (September 
2000 – March 2003), BULL 2 (April 2003 – October 2007), BEAR 2 (November 2007 to June 
2011).The estimate of the intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean 
monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. Panel A presents results for the full 
period. Panel B presents results for different sub periods. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 307 
 
One potential reason for the underperformance of target-only portfolios (Targets Q5) is 
that their returns (even if high) are explained by the risk factors in the four factor model. 
To further explore why target-only portfolios underperform, I look at the raw returns to 
these portfolios. For the new model (for example), I find that the target-only portfolio 
generates a buy-and-hold and an average monthly return of 530% and 1.342%, respectively 
between July 1996 and June 2011. That is, £1 invested in the portfolio in July 1996 would 
have grown to £5.30 by June 2011. During the same period, the market (FTSE All Share 
index) achieved a buy-and-hold and an average monthly return of 168% and 0.641%, 
respectively. Clearly, the target-only portfolio outperforms the market portfolio. The low 
return to the target-only portfolio (for the new and old models) appears to be explained by 
the high loading on the HML factor in the factor model (see, table 7.3.2).  The coefficient 
of the HML factor when the entire portfolio (All Q5) is considered is 0.101 (new model, 
panel A) and 0.037 (old model, panel B) insignificant at the 10% level. When only targets 
are considered (Targets Q5), the coefficient of the HML factor changes to 0.364 (new 
model) and 0.580 (old model), significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the returns to 
target (Target Q5) are mainly explained by the ‘value premium’ captured by the HML risk 
factor in the factor model
189
. 
 
Contrary to the suggestions of prior researchers (e.g., Cahan et al. (2011)), non-targets in 
Q1 appear to underperform the non-targets in Q5. That is non-targets with a low takeover 
likelihood underperform non-targets with a high takeover likelihood. This is especially the 
case with the new model. This finding is inconsistent with the argument that predicted 
target portfolios underperform due to the exceptionally poor performance of type II errors. 
Cahan et al. (2011) argue that predicted target portfolios underperform due to the presence 
of non-targets (type II errors) – potential targets which do not receive takeover bids. The 
findings here show that type II errors do not (comparatively) underperform other non-
targets as suggested by Cahan et al. (2011).  
                                                 
189 The value premium is the attributed to the tendency for value-stocks to outperform growth 
stocks. The conclusions here do not change when the CAPM is applied. 
 308 
 
7.3.3 The effect of bankrupt firms 
Empirical research by Powell and Yawson (2007) has shown that targets and bankrupt 
firms share certain characteristics. The implication is that predicted target portfolios are 
likely to have a substantial number of potential candidates for bankruptcy, liquidation, or 
delisting. The presence of such firms in a prediction portfolio is substantially detrimental 
as they can lead to a 100% loss of investment. To my knowledge, no prior study has taken 
this issue into consideration. The use of a matched-sample methodology in some studies 
(such as Palepu et al. (1986), Brar et al (2009) and Cahan et al. (2011)) not only generates 
survival bias in the analysis but also underestimates the effect of bankrupt firms in 
takeover prediction portfolios.  
 
The use of a pooled population sample in this study guards against survival bias. Further, 
to factor in the effect of bankruptcy on portfolio returns, a return of –100% is ascribed to 
each delisted/bankrupt firm in the month in which it is delisted. This is bound to have a 
negative effect on portfolio returns, if prediction portfolios contain a substantial number of 
bankrupt firms as suggested by Powell and Yawson (2007). Unlike the old model, the new 
model attempts to control for the risk of bankruptcy (financial distress hypothesis) using 
Taffler Z Scores. This is discussed in sections 3.3.4 and 5.3.4. The expectation is that new 
model portfolios will, perhaps, have fewer bankrupt firms when compared to old model 
portfolios. Therefore, the differences in concentration of bankrupt firms between the two 
models’ portfolios (if such differences exist) are unlikely to explain the differences in 
abnormal returns to these portfolios as the old model outperforms the new model. 
Nonetheless, the returns to the portfolios are likely to be higher if bankrupt firms are 
excluded (or not considered) in the analysis. The effect of excluding bankrupt firms is also 
likely to be more significant for the old model.  
 
Figure 7.3.3 shows the distribution of targets, non-targets and bankrupt firms in the new 
and old models’ predicted target portfolios (Q5) and non-target portfolios (Q1) between 
2000 and 2009.  
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Figure 7.3.3: Proportion of bankrupt firms in quintile 5 (Q5) and quintile 1 (Q1)  
  
  
Notes: Panels A to D show the distribution of non-targets, targets and bankrupt firms in Q5 and Q1 for the old and new models. Q5 (Q1) is the quintile of firms with 
the highest (lowest) takeover likelihood. The axis in panels A to D starts at 75% to improve visibility and allow for cross-comparison. For the New model, Q5 is 
composed of 89.51% non-targets, 9.96% targets and 0.54% bankrupt firms. Q1 is composed of 94.74% non-targets, 3.52% targets and 0.74% bankrupt firms. For the old 
model, Q5 is composed on 91.23% non-targets, 7.86% targets and 0.91% bankrupt firms. Q1 is composed on 94.87% non-targets, 4.42% targets and 0.70% bankrupt 
firms. 
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As expected, Q5 has more targets and fewer non-targets than Q1 in every year (2000–
2009). The number of bankrupt firms in Q1 (22 for the new model and 34 for the old 
model) is slightly higher than the number of bankrupt firms in Q1 (16 for the new model 
and 26 for the old model) over the period. The old model has a higher number of bankrupt 
firms in its predicted target portfolio (Q5). The proportion of bankrupt firms in Q1 and Q5 
is higher at the onset of bear periods (dotcom crises: 2000 and 2001 and global financial 
crisis: 2007). This is, perhaps, because many more firms are likely to fail during market 
downturns. Bankrupt firms in target portfolios, perhaps, contribute towards the poor 
performance of these portfolios. The effect is likely to be higher for the old model given 
the higher number of bankrupt firms in its target portfolio. To test the effect of bankrupt 
firms on the results obtained, I exclude bankrupt firms from the portfolios and recompute 
the equal-weighted portfolio returns. The results are presented in table 7.3.3. 
 
Table 7.3.3: The effect of bankrupt firms on portfolio returns 
Panel A: Full-period analysis 
 
  
New model Old model 
  
All Q5 Q5 (WB) All Q5 Q5 (WB) 
 
Alpha 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007* 
 
RM - RF 0.860*** 0.860*** 0.892*** 0.886*** 
 
SMB 1.108*** 1.113*** 1.123*** 1.116*** 
 
HML 0.101 0.106 0.037 0.024 
 
UMD 0.062 0.059 0.124 0.113 
Panel B: Sub-period analysis 
 
  
New model Old model 
  
All Q5 Q5 (WB) All Q5 Q5 (WB) 
BULL 1 Alpha 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 
BEAR 1 Alpha 0.013** 0.015** 0.016** 0.017** 
BULL 2 Alpha -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
BEAR 2 Alpha -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.028*** 
Notes: The table presents results for cross sectional regression of equal-weighted portfolio returns 
on return-generation factors (CAPM, Fama and French three Factor and Carhart model factors). 
The regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal weighted return on the various 
portfolios (All Q5, Q5(WB)) and     is the risk free rate. All Q5 is a portfolio consisting of 20% of 
firms with the highest takeover likelihood in each year (predicted targets). Q5 (WB) is All Q5 
without bankrupt firms. The independent variables in the model include the factors in the Carhart 
model; RM - RF (excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD 
(momentum factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for 
these factors (including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio 
holding period in panels A and B is 180 months from July 1996 to June 2011. The portfolio holding 
periods in panels C and D are respectively BULL 1 (July 1996 – August 2000), BEAR 1 (September 
2000 – March 2003), BULL 2 (April 2003 – October 2007), BEAR 2 (November 2007 to June 2011). 
The estimate of the intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean 
monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. Panel A presents results for the full 
period. Panel B presents results for different sub periods. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
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The results show that the returns to target portfolios improve if bankrupt firms are 
excluded from the portfolios. In the case of the new model, the return to the portfolio 
remains insignificant (panel A). The alpha earned by Q5 increases from 0.30% to 0.40%. 
In the case of the old model, the return to Q5 increases from 0.5% (insignificant) to 0.7% 
(significant at the 10% level). As shown in figure 7.3.3, the old model generates portfolios 
with a higher number of bankrupt firms than the new model
190
. This partly explains why 
the exclusion of bankrupt firms has a more profound effect on target portfolios generated 
by the old model. Sub-period analysis also reveals an increase in performance when 
bankrupt firms are excluded from the sample. Overall, the results suggest that the presence 
of bankrupt firms within predicted target portfolios reduces the abnormal returns earned by 
the portfolios. This effect is more substantial for the old than the new model. 
7.3.4 The effect of small firms 
Prior empirical research has suggested that, on average, small firms are likely to be non-
liquid (and hence not readily tradable), highly risky (e.g., bankruptcy risk) and more likely 
to be underperforming when compared to their large counterparts (see, for example, 
Mansfield (1962), Singh and Whittington (1975), Chan and Chen (1991), Fama and French 
(1995, 1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Yang and Chen (2009) and van Dijk (2011), 
amongst others). Some prior takeover prediction studies (such as Brar et al. (2009)) restrict 
their samples to large firms with market capitalisation of $100 million or greater. Taking 
out small firms from an investment portfolio might be justified on the grounds of liquidity 
problems which are exacerbated by small firms with stocks that are not easily tradable. It 
can also be expected that investors in practice will impose some qualitative criteria on their 
investments which amongst others can be the restriction of investment to firms above a 
certain minimum size.  
 
Evidence from Morgan Stanley Target Equity Index (2003–2011) and Cahan et al. (2011), 
for example, shows that Morgan Stanley IQ and Deutsche Bank potentially employ a 
qualitative screening procedure in addition to the quantitative based predictions in their 
investment decision making. Gompers and Metrick (2001) also find that institutional 
investors show a preference for larger stocks over small stocks. The results from section 
7.2 revealed notable differences between returns to equal-weighted and value-weighted 
                                                 
190 This is, perhaps, because the new model attempts to control for the incidence of bankruptcy 
through the inclusion of financial distress variables (Taffler Z Score and Z Score dummy). 
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portfolios. It is probable that the presence of many small firms within prediction portfolios 
drags down the returns of predicted target portfolios.  
 
As discussed in sections 3.2.8, 3.3.2, 5.2.8 and 5.3.2, the old and new models treat firm 
size differently (linear and inverted U-shaped relationship with takeover likelihood, 
respectively). The coefficients of the models indicate that the old model attributes higher 
takeover likelihood to large firms (positive relationship) while the new model attributes 
higher takeover likelihood to medium-size firms (inverted U-shaped relationship. This 
suggests that the firms in the new model’s portfolios are on average smaller than those in 
the old model’s portfolios.  Indeed, this is the case. The average market capitalisations of 
the new and old models’ portfolios over the period 1995 to 2009 are £304 million and 
£1,803 million, respectively. The old model’s portfolios are made up of significantly larger 
firms and the average market capitalisations of the firms in portfolios are comparatively 
higher in each year. The results in table 7.2.4 show that, when equal and value-weighted 
portfolios are considered, the old model outperforms the new model across several 
portfolios. The difference is more significant for value-weighted portfolios.  
 
In this section, I investigate whether the presence of a significant number of small firms in 
the portfolios partly accounts for the underperformance of the new model and whether the 
returns to the old model’s target portfolios can be further improved by investing in the 
largest firms only. To investigate these issues, firms with market values below three 
thresholds of (1) £50 million (2) £100 million and (3) £500 million are excluded from the 
analysis (in succession) and alphas generated by the screened portfolios are recomputed. 
This size control is in addition to the SMB (small minus big) factor already included in the 
alpha generation model. The results are shown in table 7.3.4. 
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Table 7.3.4: The effect of small firms on portfolio returns 
Panel A: Full-period analysis - New model 
  
All Q5 Q5 Large: 50M Q5 Large: 100M Q5 Large: 500M 
 
Alpha 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004 
 
RM - RF 0.860*** 0.899*** 0.907*** 0.956*** 
 
SMB 1.108*** 1.011*** 0.059*** 0.741*** 
 
HML 0.101 0.186*** 0.135** 0.027 
 
UMD 0.062 0.018 -0.023 -0.075 
Panel B: Full-period analysis - Old model 
  
All Q5 Q5 Large: 50M Q5 Large: 100M Q5 Large: 500M 
 
Alpha 0.005 0.006** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 
RM - RF 0.892*** 0.969*** 0.982*** 0.960*** 
 
SMB 1.123*** 0.932*** 0.841*** 0.555*** 
 
HML 0.037 0.075 0.033 0.042 
 
UMD 0.124 0.025 0.000 -0.016 
Panel C: Sub-period analysis - New model 
  
All Q5 Q5 Large: 50M Q5 Large: 100M Q5 Large: 500M 
BULL 1 Alpha 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
BEAR 1 Alpha 0.013** 0.011 0.011 0.014 
BULL 2 Alpha -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
BEAR 2 Alpha -0.028*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
Panel D: Sub-period analysis - Old model 
  
All Q5 Q5 Large: 50M Q5 Large: 100M Q5 Large: 500M 
BULL 1 Alpha 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
BEAR 1 Alpha 0.016** 0.015** 0.015* 0.014* 
BULL 2 Alpha 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.002 
BEAR 2 Alpha -0.032*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.008** 
Notes: The table presents results for cross sectional regression of equal-weighted portfolio returns 
on return-generation factors (CAPM, Fama and French three Factor and Carhart model factors). ). 
The regression model (eqn. 4.5.3(3)) is shown below: 
(       )         (       )                                  
The dependent variable is (    –    ) where     is the equal weighted return on the various 
portfolios (All Q5, Q5 Large: 50M, Q5 Large: 100M and Q5 Large: 500M) and     is the risk free 
rate. All Q5 is a portfolio consisting of 20% of firms with the highest takeover likelihood in each 
year (predicted targets). Q5 Large: 50M (100M and 500M) is similar to ALL Q5 but excludes firms 
with a market capitalisation of less than £50million, £100million and £500million, respectively. 
Market capitalisation is computed at the start of the holding period (i.e., using June 30th closing 
prices). The independent variables in the model include the factors in the Carhart model; RM - RF 
(excess market return), SMB (size factor), HML (book to market factor) and UMD (momentum 
factor). See Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993) for a discussion. UK Data for these factors 
(including the UK risk free rate) is provided by Gregory et al. (2013). The portfolio holding period 
in panels A and B is 180 months from July 1996 to June 2011. The portfolio holding periods in 
panels C and D are respectively BULL 1 (July 1996 – August 2000), BEAR 1 (September 2000 – 
March 2003), BULL 2 (April 2003 – October 2007), BEAR 2 (November 2007 to June 2011).The 
estimate of the intercept term ‘Alpha’ provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean monthly 
excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
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The results from table 7.3.4 show that the exclusion of firms with market value below £50 
(£100 and £500) million from the predicted target portfolios (Q5) generally improves its 
long run performance. For the new model, the exclusion of firms with market value below 
£100 million results in an improvement of its alpha from 0.30% (insignificant at 10% 
level) to 0.40% (significant at 10% level). This indicates that the imposition of a size 
restriction of at least £100 million on predicted targets leads to the generation of significant 
abnormal returns from prediction modelling (using the new model). The performance of 
the portfolio is, however, not further improved when firms with market value below £500 
million are excluded. In the case of the old model, the performance of the portfolio 
increases by 0.1 percentage point as the different size restrictions (£50 million, £100 
million and £500 million) are successively imposed. The use of size restrictions has no 
discernable impact on returns generated in the different sub-periods. Overall, the results 
show that the presence of small firms within predicted target portfolios has a negative 
impact on the returns of the portfolios. The exclusion of small firms from the new model 
portfolios lead to the generation of significant abnormal returns (albeit, these returns are 
still lower than those generated by the old model). 
 
7.3.5 The effect of potential market-wide bid anticipation  
I conjecture that the models predict targets which can be predicted by other market 
participants – implying that their stock prices already partly reflect takeover probabilities. 
This is consistent with studies which argue that market anticipation partly explains the run-
up in target prices prior to the announcement of takeover bids (see for example, Franks et 
al. (1977), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Pound (1990)). 
Assuming that the new model sums up the market’s belief about the takeover likelihood of 
different firms, one could argue that actual target firms in D1 and Q1 (i.e., firms with low 
takeover probability that actually receive a bid), will be a surprise to the market.  In such a 
case, I would expect the targets in Q1 and D1 to earn significantly higher returns than 
targets in D10 and Q5, with the difference in return between the two groups attributable to 
the surprise element.  
 
The proposition is grounded in the market anticipation hypothesis and the EMH. It 
contends that targets which are ‘predictable’191 will earn lower returns compared to targets 
                                                 
191 ‘Predictable’ here refers to highly anticipated takeover targets. 
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which are ‘less predictable’, as the market discounts takeover probabilities in share prices. 
If the new model, to an extent, reflects the market’s perspective on likely takeover targets, 
then correctly predicted targets will earn lower returns. Hence, predicted target portfolios 
will generate low returns. Prior research has suggested that takeovers are highly anticipated 
events (Pound and Zeckhauser (1990)). The potential to generate windfall gains from this 
event is a motivation for investors to try to anticipate potential takeover bid 
announcements. The literature review (section 2.5.5) also highlighted the use of takeover 
prediction models in practice. Based on the EMH, it is likely that share prices reflect the 
market’s belief of a firm’s takeover probability. Under this framework, the market reaction 
on the announcement day is a revision of the market’s assessment of the firm’s likelihood 
of receiving a takeover bid. I demonstrate this as follows. 
 
For example, consider a firm i, and two mutually-exclusive and collectively-exhaustive 
states: B (‘bid’) and N (‘no bid’), in period T. The probability of state B occurring is given 
by    and the probability of state N occurring is given as,     . The price per share of 
firm i today (  ) is equal to λ. In state N, the price per share of firm i, is given by   . In 
state B, the price per share of i, is given by   .    is a function of    as (  -  )/    is the 
bid announcement premium α (α > 0). This implies that    = (1+ α)    . If the market is 
efficient, the price of the stock, at every point in time, will reflect the market’s anticipation 
of the likelihood of receiving a bid and can be modelled as follows. 
       (    )                     ( ) 
 If the market receives no new information for firm i between    and T (exclusive), then; 
λ =     ==>          (      )           ( ) 
Therefore, in an efficient market, the price of the stock at point T, other things being equal, 
is a function of its current price (λ), the probability that it will receive a takeover bid (  ) 
and the expected bid premium (α). 
 
Suppose the expected bid premium, α is 25% (0.25). If the market believes firm i, has a 
20% chance of receiving a bid (scenario 1 – low takeover probability,       ), then its 
price today (  ) will be 1.05 λ. That is, in an efficient market, its price will increase by 5% 
to reflect the 20% likelihood of a price increase of 25% at time T. If the market believes 
that the firm has an 80% chance of receiving a takeover bid at T (scenario 2 – high 
takeover probability,       ), then its price at    will be 1.20 λ – i.e., a 20% increase in 
share price to reflect the probability of a 25% price increase at T. If the firm receives a bid 
in period T, then its price will be 1.25 λ, otherwise its price will be λ. Under scenario 1, the 
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market reaction (or announcement return) at time T will be ([1.25 λ – 1.05 λ] / 1.05 λ = 
0.1904) representing a 19.04% bid announcement return. Under scenario 2, the market 
reaction at time T will be ([1.25 λ – 1.20 λ] / 1.20 λ = 0.0416) representing a 4.16% bid 
announcement return. This simplistic framework shows that, all things being equal, larger 
announcement gains are likely to accrue to ‘surprise’ targets as compared to highly 
anticipated targets. 
 
The implication of this analysis is that the market reaction to takeover announcements for 
‘predictable’ targets will be lower than the market reaction for ‘less-predictable’ targets. 
Assuming that to some extent, the takeover prediction model sums up the market’s belief 
about the takeover likelihood of different firms, one could argue that actual target firms in 
Q1 (i.e., firms with low takeover probability that actually receive a bid) will, on average, 
earn a higher return from mergers than their counterparts in Q5 (i.e., firms with high 
takeover probability that actually receive a bid). This suggestion of a ‘market surprise 
premium’ to targets with lower takeover probabilities complements Cornett et al. (2011). 
Cornett et al. (2011) finds that part of the large difference in announcement returns to 
targets and bidders in takeovers is due to the fact that bidders are more easily predicted 
than targets.  Hence, the likelihood of becoming a bidder (but not a target) is factored into 
the share prices of firms long before the event date. The implication for investing in 
portfolios of predicted targets is that predicted target portfolios might earn lower than 
expected returns over the holding period partly because the market price of targets in these 
portfolios already reflect their high takeover probability.  
 
I test this conjecture – the existence of a limited market surprise – by comparing the 
announcement returns to targets in Q1 and Q5. I focus on a short time period (day –20 to 
day 20 surrounding the bid. A significant positive difference between the returns to targets 
in Q1 and Q5 will, perhaps, indicate the existence of a ‘market surprise premium’. This 
premium should, perhaps, be greater for the old model when compared to the new model.  
That is, firms in Q5 should constitute more of a market surprise for the old model when 
compared to the new model. This is because, unlike the old model, the new model utilises 
variables such as merger rumours, share repurchases, market liquidity, industry 
concentration and market economics which have been shown to be key drivers or 
determinants of M&A activity. Figure 7.3.5 plots the average and cumulative daily 
portfolio returns to targets in Q1 and Q5 for the new and old models. 
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Figure 7.3.5: Daily returns to targets in Q1 and Q5 – Old and New models 
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Notes: Figure 7.3.5 tracks the simple and cumulative returns to targets in quintile 1 (Q1) and quintile 5 (Q5) around the merger announcement day. The purpose of this 
analysis is simply to capture market reaction to the takeover bids for different targets. For simplicity, the reported returns are not adjusted for market risk. While this 
might impact on the results, the impact is, perhaps, low as the study period is the 40 days surrounding the bid. Q1 (Q5) represents the 20% of firms with the lowest 
(highest) takeover probability as prescribed by the old and new models. Only actual targets within these portfolios (Q1 and Q5) are used in the analysis. Panel A and C 
compare the average daily returns for targets in Q1 and targets in Q5, per the new and old models, respectively. Panel C and D compare the cumulative daily returns 
to targets in Q1 and Q5, per the new and old models, respectively. For the new model (panel A and C), the number of targets in Q1 (Q5) is 47 (219). The average 
announcement day return for Q1 and Q5 targets are 14.81% and 11.64%, respectively (significant at the 1% level). The difference in average announcement day return 
between Q1 and Q5 is 3.17% (not significant at the 10% level). For the old model (panel B and D), the number of targets in Q1 (Q5) is 91(183). The average 
announcement day return for targets in Q1 and Q5 are 20.32% and 10.63% respectively. The difference in average announcement day return of 9.65% is statistically 
significant at 5% level. 
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Two arguments can be forwarded here. First, targets in Q1 outperform targets in Q5, 
perhaps, because the market partially anticipates that targets in Q5 will receive takeover 
bids. Second, the targets in Q5 for the new model are less of a market surprise when 
compared to the targets in Q5 for the old model. Consistent with the arguments, the results 
in panels A and B show that targets in Q1 generate higher announcement day returns than 
targets in Q5. The difference in returns to targets in Q1 and Q5 is larger for the old model 
(panel B) as compared to the new model (panel A), as anticipated. In panel A (B), targets 
in Q1 generate returns of 14.81% (20.32%) while targets in Q5 generate returns of 11.64% 
(10.63%) on the announcement day. The difference in announcement returns between Q1 
and Q5 (9.69 percentage points for the old model and 3.17 percentage points for new 
model) is significant at the 5% level for the old model and insignificant for the new model. 
As discussed above, this difference can be attributed to market surprise as the targets in Q1 
and Q5 have the lowest and highest takeover likelihood, respectively.  
 
The results in panels A and C are supported by the results in panels B and D. Panel D (old 
model) shows that the cumulative returns to targets in Q1 remain below 5.00% until two 
days before the bid. By the bid announcement day, the cumulative returns are just under 
30.00%. Targets in Q5, however, experience a continuous growth in the cumulative returns 
with more than half of the returns being earned prior to the bid announcement. This 
suggests that, in the case of the old model, targets in Q1 are less predictable (and more of a 
market surprise) than targets in Q5. The difference in cumulative returns to targets in Q1 
and Q5 is less apparent in the case of the new model, suggesting a limited market surprise 
element. 
 
Overall, the results suggest the existence of a ‘market surprise premium’ earned by ‘less-
predictable’ targets (targets in Q1) over ‘predictable’ targets (targets in Q5) when the bid is 
announced. As suggested, it can be argued that some of the lower returns earned on the 
predicted targets portfolio can, perhaps, be attributed to the fact that the market already 
partially anticipates that targets in predicted target portfolios will receive takeover bids
192
. 
This market anticipation means that, on average, targets in Q5 are likely to earn lower 
returns than other targets, and hence the returns to takeover prediction portfolios are likely 
to be lower than expected. However, the announcement day and cumulative returns earned 
                                                 
192 An alternative explanation for this observation is that, targets in Q1 are better managed firms 
and hence command a higher premium than targets in Q5. This argument will also be somewhat 
inconsistent with the EMH, as it implies that share prices do not already reflect firm performance. 
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by targets in Q5 of the new model do not differ significantly from those of the old model. 
The difference in announcement day returns (for example) between both models (1.01%) is 
not significant at the 10% level. In summary, the results suggest that a lack of a ‘market 
surprise premium’ to targets in Q5 partly explain why target prediction models are likely to 
earn below expected returns. Nonetheless, the results do not explain why the old model 
outperforms the new model. 
7.3.6 The effect of the portfolio management strategy 
I anticipate that the underperformance of targets prior to takeover bids, as well as, the use 
of an annual portfolio rebalancing strategy (fixed holding periods from 1
st
 July X1 to 30
th
 
June X2) dilutes the returns to takeover target portfolios. The use of a fixed portfolio 
holding period, while in line with the literature (Soares and Stark (2009)), might mean that 
targets are invested-in too early, i.e., several months before they receive a takeover bid. 
Panel A (in figure 7.3.6) shows the distribution of bid announcement months over the 
portfolio holding period 1
st
 July X1 to 30
th
 June X2 for the targets in the sample. The 
sample used consists of 990 targets (between 1991 and 2009) out of the 1,323 targets 
employed in this study
193
. Following the June approach, portfolios are formed on 1st July 
each year. Nonetheless, only 7.0% of bids are announced in July. A substantial number of 
bids (50.6%) are announced between January and June – 6 to 12 months after the portfolio 
formation date.  
 
Panel B shows the market-adjusted returns to takeover targets in the months around the bid 
announcement date (month -11 to month +11). On average, targets generate negative 
abnormal returns each month between month –11 and month –3. The cumulative abnormal 
return earned by targets between month –11 and month –3 is –13.01%. Targets start to 
generate positive returns in month –2, but the average return earned by targets in month –2 
and month –1 is just 3.41%. A substantial portion of the returns to targets is generated in 
the month in which the bid is announced. I find that targets generate returns of 25.92% in 
the announcement month and returns of 2.50% in month +1. The cumulative return earned 
between month –2 and month +2 (–4 and month +1) is 31.55% (30.20%).  
                                                 
193 The difference is due to data unavailability.  
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Figure 7.3.6: Portfolio construction and  returns to takeover targets  
Panel A: The distribution of target bid announcement dates by month 
 
Panel B: Average and cumulative monthly (market-adjusted) returns to takeover targets 
 
Panel C: Cumulative monthly (market-adjusted) returns for different holding periods 
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Notes: All takeover targets in the sample with available data are used in the analysis. The sample 
consists of 990 targets (between 1991 and 2009) out of the 1,323 targets employed in this study due 
to missing data. Portfolios are formed at the end of June each year and held from the 1st July to the 
30th June in the next year. Panel A shows the distribution of bid announcement months from July to 
June. The results show that bid announcements are fairly evenly spread out through the year. 
While targets are invested-in from July each year, the chart shows that many targets only receive 
bids several months after the portfolio formation date (1st July). Over 50.6% of targets receive their 
bids after in the second half of the holding period (January to June). Panel B presents average and 
cumulative monthly returns earned during the period starting eleven months prior to the bid 
(month -11) to eleven months after the bid (month +11). Month 0 is the bid announcement month. 
The analysis employs event study methods to compute the market-adjusted monthly returns to 
targets around the announcement period. The purpose of this analysis is to show that, on average, 
targets earn negative returns in the months prior to the bid announcement. The results show that, 
on average, targets only start to generate positive returns two months before the bid. Panel C 
shows the cumulative monthly returns generated by targets for different holding periods. The 
returns of 14.24% to holding period -11 to 0, for example, denotes the market-adjusted returns 
earned by holding all 990 targets for the twelve-month period starting eleven months before the 
bid is announced (month -11 to month 0). Likewise, the returns of 0.05% to holding period month 
+1 to +12, denotes the returns earned by holding targets for 12 months starting the month after the 
bid is announced. 
 
Overall, this finding highlights the importance of correctly identifying the announcement 
month and the risk involved with predicting targets too early when predicting targets for 
investment purposes. The results are consistent with prior studies showing that targets 
generate significant gains upon merger announcements. These announcement returns are 
similar (in magnitude) to those reported in some prior studies. For example, Frank and 
Harris (1989) report announcement month abnormal returns of between 20.6% and 29.1% 
to UK targets.  
 
Panel C reports the twelve-month cumulative market-adjusted returns to targets for 
different holding periods around the announcement month. The market-adjusted returns of 
14.24% attributed to holding period -11 to 0, for example, is the returns earned by the 990 
targets for the twelve-month period starting eleven months before the bid is announced 
(month -11 to month 0). The results in panel C show that if a holding period from month –
11 to month 0 (inclusive)  is considered, the average cumulative market-adjusted returns 
earned by targets is under 14.24%. These returns increase systematically as the start of the 
holding period is closer to the announcement month. For example, the market-adjusted 
return for holding period –8 to +3 is 22.27% and the return for holding period –5 to +6 is 
26.42%. As expected, the cumulative market-adjusted returns earned between month +1 
and +12 (i.e., the twelve-month period starting one month after the bid announcement) is 
close to zero (0.05%). The highest average cumulative market-adjusted return (30.58%) is 
earned when the holding period is –2 to +9. These results suggests that holding a portfolio 
of targets too early (i.e., several months before the announcement month) is suboptimal.  
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In summary, I show that several targets receive takeover bids several months after they are 
included in the predicted target portfolio (panel A). On average, targets earn substantially 
negative returns up to two months before their bid announcement (panel B). In terms of 
overall portfolio returns, this suggests that the high returns earned by targets in the bid 
announcement month are partly neutralised by their poor performance in the months prior 
to the bids. This is supported by the finding that over 50.6% of targets only receive bids six 
to twelve months after their inclusion in predicted target portfolios. This, perhaps, partly 
explains why target portfolios earn less-than-expected returns.  
 
7.5 Chapter summary and conclusion 
In the previous chapter, it is shown that the new variables introduced in this study 
markedly improved the predictive ability of previous takeover prediction models. It is 
shown that the new model can even achieve average target concentrations of up to 11.23% 
in some portfolios (recursive model Port5%). Given this promising performance, the main 
goal of this chapter is to test whether, contrary to the EMH, investors can use this model to 
outperform the market. The results from the analysis show that indeed the new model 
generates substantial abnormal returns in certain periods. For example, the model generates 
significant alpha in BULL 1 (July 1996 – August 2000). During this period, the model is 
able to generate alpha of 2.80% (value weighted portfolios) and 3.40% (equal-weighted 
portfolios) per month. Nonetheless, the results show that the model performs poorly in 
certain periods which coincide with periods of market downturn or decline.  For example 
in BEAR 2 (November 2007 – June 2011), the model achieves negative alphas of – 4.10% 
(equal-weighted portfolios) and – 2.70% (value-weighted portfolios).  
 
It appears the performance of the model during periods of decline is so poor that any gains 
generated in periods of market growth are completely wiped out by the losses experienced 
during periods of decline. The long run average performance across several different 
portfolio selection techniques (deciles, quintiles, cut-offs and fixed portfolios) and different 
factor models (CAPM, Fama and French three factor and Carhart) is positive but 
statistically not different from zero. Even when the long run returns are positive 
(significant at 10%), their magnitude is economically small (e.g., 0.60% alpha generated 
by value-weighted D10) when compared to results presented in the literature on trading 
strategies. These results indicate that, on average, the model is unlikely to generate 
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significant (economic) long run returns for investors. The old model, which is less accurate 
in predicting takeover targets, performs better in an investment setting. The old model 
achieves long run alphas of up to 3.30% in value-weighted portfolios (Port30). This level 
of alpha is economically attractive and is unlikely to disappear even when transaction costs 
are controlled for. The implication of this finding is that success in accurately predicting 
takeover targets does not naturally lead to superior investment performance.  
 
The second part of the chapter explores potential determinants of the returns to target 
portfolios (including the presence of type II errors, the inclusion of bankrupt firms, the 
effects of small firms and the effect of potential market-wide bid anticipation) and attempts 
to explain why the new model underperforms. 
 
First, I explore whether the presence of non-targets in predicted target portfolios (type II 
errors) explains the poor performance of these portfolios. Studies such as Cahan et al. 
(2011) have argued that type II errors are generally poorly-performing firms which are 
better off being acquired. I do not find evidence in support of this contention. I find that the 
presence of non-targets does not explain the poor performance of the portfolios. The alpha 
earned by the portfolios (new and old models) remains unchanged (in terms of magnitude) 
when all non-targets are excluded. This finding is consistent with Cremers et al. (2009) 
who report that the positive returns to their predicted target portfolios are not driven by the 
targets within the portfolios. This finding partly explains why the new model 
underperforms the old model even though it achieves higher target concentrations.  
 
Second, I investigate whether the presence of bankrupt firms within predicted target 
portfolios explains their poor performance. I find that the exclusion of all bankrupt firms 
from the predicted target portfolio improves the alpha of the portfolio. The effect is more 
apparent in the case of the old model than the new model. The alpha of the old model 
becomes positive and significant (at the 10% level) when bankrupt firms are excluded from 
the portfolio. The alpha of the new model increases by 0.1 percentage point but remains 
insignificant at the 10% level. The results suggest that bankrupt firms within target 
portfolios have a negative influence on the performance these portfolios. 
 
Third, I explore whether the probable poor performance of the small firms within the 
portfolios explains the long run performance. I find that the exclusion of small firms from 
the portfolios leads to improvements in the long run results. For example, the new model 
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generates a significant alpha (of 0.4% per month) when firms with market capitalisation of 
less than £100 million are excluded from the target portfolios. These results suggest that 
the presence of small firms within predicted target portfolios negatively impacts on their 
performance.  
 
Fourth, I anticipate that the underperformance of targets prior to takeover bids, as well as, 
the use of an annual portfolio rebalancing strategy (fixed holding periods from 1
st
 July X1 
to 30
th
 June X2) dilutes the returns to takeover target portfolios. I find that several targets 
receive takeover bids several months after they are included in the predicted target 
portfolio. Over 50.6% receive bids six to twelve months after their inclusion in predicted 
target portfolios. On average, targets earn substantially negative returns up to two months 
before their bid announcement. This suggests that the high returns earned by targets in the 
bid announcement month are partly neutralised by their poor performance in the months 
prior to the bids. This mismatch between the portfolio holding period and the bid 
announcement month, perhaps, partly explains why target portfolios earn less-than-
expected returns.  
 
Fifth, I anticipate that the takeover bids successfully predicted by the new model are also 
widely anticipated by the market. If this is the case, the share prices of these targets are 
likely to already reflect the probability that these firms will be subject to future takeover 
bids. This will mean lower bid announcement returns when such bids are eventually 
announced. I find evidence in support of this contention. Successfully predicted targets 
earn lower announcement day returns, on average, when compared to type I errors – 
predicted non-targets which receive takeover bids. This lower announcement returns to 
predictable targets partly explains why target portfolios are likely to earn lower-than-
expected returns but does not explain why the old model outperforms the new model.  
 
Overall, I find that target portfolios generated using the new and old models outperform 
the market when value-weighted portfolios are employed. The old model outperforms the 
new model and its alphas are more economically significant across several portfolios. The 
finding that the returns to target portfolios are not explained by the presence of targets 
within these portfolios most likely explains this observation. The presence of small firms, 
bankrupt firms and type II errors, the effect of market-wide anticipation as well as the 
mismatch between the portfolio holding period and the bid announcement month 
negatively impacts on the returns to predicted target portfolios. 
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CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The main objectives of this thesis were to investigate the characteristics of takeover targets, 
evaluate whether takeover targets can be predicted using publicly available information, 
assess whether takeover prediction modelling can form the basis of a profitable investment 
strategy and – if not – explain why investing in predicted targets is likely to be a 
suboptimal investment strategy. A UK sample was selected as a suitable sample for the 
study given its size, the level of takeover activity within the market and its unique 
institutional features (see sections 1.3 and 1.4). Several interesting findings have emerged 
from the study. This chapter discusses some of the key findings and presents concluding 
remarks. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 summarises the key findings and 
contributions of the study. Section 8.3 discusses the implications of these findings to 
research. Section 8.4 discusses some of the potential limitations of the thesis and highlights 
opportunities for future research. 
 
8.2 Summary and discussion of findings and contributions 
8.2.1 Overview 
This section summarises some of the key findings and contributions of the thesis. These 
can be summarised into three categories including (1) the profile of takeover targets, (2) 
takeover prediction modelling methodology, and (3) investing in predicted targets. 
8.2.2 The profile of takeover targets  
I empirically test a number of hypotheses which attempt to explain the takeover 
phenomenon from the perspective of targets. Eight of these hypotheses (including 
management inefficiency, firm undervaluation, growth-resource mismatch, industry 
disturbance, firm size, firm age, free cash flow and tangible assets hypotheses) have been 
investigated in different combinations by prior researchers. These eight old hypotheses are 
retested in this study using an improved methodology. In addition, I introduce and test 
eleven new takeover prediction hypotheses. To my knowledge, this study is the first to 
develop and tests any of these eleven new hypotheses in a takeover prediction setting. 
These hypotheses are proxied by variables that have been used in prior accounting and 
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finance research. Of the eleven new hypotheses, three hypotheses (including firm size, firm 
age and capital structure) build on the old prediction hypotheses. 
 
A common theme in this literature is the role of the market for corporate control. The 
management inefficiency hypotheses generally contend that within an active takeover 
market, poorly performing management teams will be replaced by more efficient 
shareholder value maximising management teams. In essence, the market for corporate 
control enforces managerial discipline. Prior research evidence on the issue is inconsistent. 
Some US studies such as Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) have shown that this hypothesis is not 
supported by the data, despite the widely held assertion that the takeover market disciplines 
poorly performing managers (see, for example, Palepu (1986)). In the opening chapter, I 
argue that a US sample is, perhaps, not the optimal context to investigate the role of the 
market for corporate control given confounding effects of state-level antitakeover 
amendments and the ability of some (entrenched) managers to fend off potential bidders. 
By employing a UK sample, a broader approach (taking into consideration different 
dimensions of the management inefficiency concept and controlling for several moderating 
variables) and an improved methodology, it is shown here that although targets are firms 
generally experiencing a decline in growth, they are not loss-making firms, on average.  
 
Target firms are, perhaps, inefficiently managed in the sense that they lack future growth 
opportunities as exhibited by a decline in stock returns as well as a decline in sales growth 
prior to takeovers. Consistent with this argument, I find that targets experience a monthly 
decline in share returns between month 11 and month 3 prior to the month of the bid. 
Further, I find that a firm’s takeover probability declines when its Taffler Z score falls 
below the 0 threshold, suggesting that financial distress (and hence poor management 
performance) does not increase a firm’s chances of receiving a bid. I find evidence in 
support of Powell’s (1997) free cash flow hypothesis – takeover probability increases with 
firm free cash flow – which is also consistent with the argument that the average takeover 
target is not financially starved. Contrary to the assertions of Palepu (1986), Morck et al. 
(1989), Powell (2001), Powell and Yawson (2007) and Brar et al. (2009) but consistent 
with De and Jindra (2012), I conclude that takeover targets are not loss-making (in an 
accounting sense) or financially constrained firms as suggested by prior researchers. In this 
context management inefficiency is, perhaps, limited to management’s inability to grow 
future firm cash flows. 
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The results from the broad tests of the management inefficiency hypothesis suggest the 
existence of an active but ‘cautious’ market for corporate control. Bidders appear willing to 
bid for firms with limited growth opportunities (as proxied by their market returns) only 
when such firms have potential for profitability (as evidenced by their past performance). 
A key question that arises at this point is what happens to firms that consistently perform 
poorly in an accounting sense (i.e., loss-making firms). The findings of this study suggest 
that the market for corporate control does not particularly discipline such managers, on 
average. Perhaps, these managers are disciplined by other forms of reorganisation such as 
bankruptcy, buyouts, demergers and debt restructuring, amongst others.  
 
The firm undervaluation hypothesis suggests that firms that are perceived to be 
undervalued will have a higher takeover likelihood. Consistent with prior UK studies (such 
as Powell (1997, 2004) and Powell and Yawson (2007)), I do not find any support for the 
undervaluation hypothesis when firm undervaluation is proxied by the book to market 
ratio. The results show that takeover likelihood rather decreases with the book to market 
ratio. 
 
The tangible assets hypothesis (Ambrose and Megginson (1992)) contends that takeover 
probability will increase with the proportion of tangible assets in a firm’s portfolio. 
Consistent with this hypothesis (but contrary to Powell (2004)), I find empirical evidence 
that UK targets have significantly higher levels of tangible assets when compared to non-
targets. These results are robust to industry differences thus indicating that bidders 
generally show preference for firms with a high proportion of property, plant and 
equipment within their total asset portfolio. As discussed in section 5.2.7, this tendency 
could be explained by the fact that the presence of tangible assets signals high debt 
capacity and reduces information asymmetry. These results lend further support to the 
existence of a rather ‘cautious’ market for corporate control with a general scepticism for 
intangible – perhaps, difficult-to-value –assets.  
 
The old firm age hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between firm age and 
takeover likelihood. Building on the lifecycle theory, I propose a U-shape relationship 
between firm age and takeover probability, with young and old firms having the greatest 
takeover likelihood. The evidence lends support to the contention that younger firms are 
more susceptible to takeovers but there is no evidence that old firms equally have a high 
takeover likelihood. These results do not support some of the literature that suggest that 
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obsolescence increases with firm age forcing old firms to solicit or be more susceptible to 
takeovers (e.g., Davis and Stout (1992), Agarwal and Gort (2002) and Loderer and 
Waelchli (2010)). Therefore, the question of what happens to firms as they grow old is still 
very much open for research. While prior literature suggests that takeovers serve as a 
medium through which these firms are revitalised (and their assets absorbed by newer, 
more agile forms of organisations), it is probable that these firms are mainly ‘recycled’ 
through other forms of reorganisations such as spin-offs and buyouts. It is also, perhaps, 
rational to posit that firms continuously develop, revitalise themselves (possibly through 
the acquisition of younger firms and investment in up-to-date technologies) such that their 
assets cannot be considered ‘obsolete’, as suggested by prior research.  
 
Consistent with prior studies, the evidence here neither supports the growth-resource 
mismatch nor the industry disturbance hypotheses. I find no empirical relationship between 
a firm’s takeover likelihood and its growth-resource dummy or industry disturbance 
dummy. One plausible reason for this is that the proxies proposed by Palepu (1986) poorly 
capture the underlying concepts. The industry disturbance dummy variable, for example, 
takes a value of one when a merger is announced in a firm’s industry in any given year and 
a value of zero otherwise. Due to the high-frequency of merger activity, most firms have 
an industry disturbance dummy of 1 in most years.  
 
The firm size hypothesis (Palepu (1986)) suggests that small firms will have a higher 
takeover probability. This hypothesis has been used across several prior studies with 
inconsistent results. This thesis provides evidence to reconcile apparent discrepancies in 
earlier research on how firm size affects the probability of receiving a bid. For the first 
time, it is empirically shown here that when the entire population of listed firms is 
considered (i.e., a panel data set), and no size restrictions are employed in sample 
selection, takeover probability first increases with firm size then declines when a threshold 
is reached. That is, the relationship between firm size and takeover probability is 
curvilinear or inverse U-shaped. On average, targets are neither the smallest nor the largest 
firms in the population. The results are consistent with an array of theories including 
economies of scale, managerial hubris, managerial utility maximisation, empire-building, 
information asymmetry, and transaction costs (further discussed in section 3.3.2).  
 
This finding explains some of the inconsistencies in prior research as prior research has 
reported a positive relationship (e.g., Hughes (1989), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and 
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Harford (2005)) negative relationship (e.g., Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), Bartley and 
Boardman (1990), Walter (1994) and Brar et al. (2009)) and insignificant relationship (e.g., 
Powell (1997)) between takeover probability and firm size. These studies construct their 
samples differently, sometimes focusing on firms in certain industries and above a 
threshold size. Palepu (1986) focuses on firms in the asset-intensive manufacturing and 
mining industry. Palepu’s sample is likely to be predominantly made up of large firms 
(natural log of total assets). As shown in section 5.3.2, consistent with Palepu’s finding, 
takeover is negatively related to firm size in the segment of large firms. Similarly Brar et 
al. (2009) restrict their sample to firms with market capitalisation of at least $100 million. 
This restriction also skews the sample towards large firms and hence, the results. The 
results here (test of old firm size hypothesis) are consistent with Powell (1997) who finds 
no clear linear relationship between firm size and takeover likelihood. 
 
Prior research has reported discrepancies in the relationship between a firm’s leverage and 
its probability of being acquired. The existence of a strictly positive or a strictly negative 
relationship between leverage and takeover probably is, perhaps, inconsistent with one or 
more theories of capital structure. This is discussed in section 3.3.3. The evidence in this 
study suggests that the relationship between leverage and takeover probability is best 
modelled as an inverse U-shaped relationship. That is, takeover probability initially 
increases with leverage and then declines as leverage increases above a threshold, all else 
equal. Firms are likely to take on extra debt when they have growth opportunities that 
require resources greater than those generated from profit retention. This potential for 
growth but lack of resources is attractive to resource-rich bidders. Firms with high levels of 
debt are usually bound by restrictive debt covenants which bidders might find unattractive 
irrespective of the firm’s growth potential. This is consistent with empirical evidence 
asserting that firms increase leverage to make them less attractive as takeover targets (see, 
for example, Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988), Garvey and Hanka (1999)). These 
results are consistent with a possibility that some UK firms take on extra debt to make 
them unattractive takeover targets.  
 
The employment effects of proposed M&As is a major concern for regulators as well as 
employees. It is not uncommon for bidders to make pledges on how the proposed 
acquisition will affect target employees. In fact, the UK Takeover Code requires bidders to 
disclose their intensions for target employees (see Takeover Code (2011)). Nonetheless, 
prior empirical research reveals that mergers, on average, result in loss of employment for 
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target employees, in particular (see, for example, Shleifer and Summers (1988), Haynes 
and Thomson (1999) Conyon et al. (2002), Kubo and Saito (2012) and Lehto and 
Bockerman (2008)). In this research, I investigate whether bidders are drawn to certain 
targets due to potential benefits of restructuring either theirs (the bidder’s) or the target’s 
payroll. I find evidence that the probability of receiving a bid initially increases with 
payroll burden then declines after a threshold is attained. That is, take over probability has 
an inverse U-shaped relationship with payroll burden. This finding is robust to different 
model specifications.  
 
As suggested by Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004), corporate 
reorganisation through M&A is an effective way of restructuring corporate human 
resources as a new management team is less likely to uphold existing employee contracts. 
Their evidence (Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004)) suggests 
that firms can deliberately engage (as a target) in M&A to create shareholder value by 
shedding their excess human resources. This argument is consistent with empirical findings 
that a reduction in payroll costs is one of the main ways of generating synergies in mergers 
(Devos et al. (2009), Haynes and Thomson (1999) and, Shleifer and Summers (1988)).  
 
Nonetheless, it is shown that the relationship between takeover likelihood and payroll 
burden does not persist in a linear fashion. High payroll burden, potentially, also acts as a 
deterrent to takeovers. While the redeployment and divestment (layoffs) of human 
resources can be a way to create synergies, the associated costs (e.g., compensation and 
reputational effects), perhaps, result in the creation of negative synergies at very high 
levels (see, for example, Krishnan et al. 2007). Besides increasing the complexity of the 
restructuring process, very large layoffs are likely to lead to significant or costly 
compensation schemes. Such layoffs are also likely to be met with stiff resistance from 
managers and employees with further effects on retained employee motivation and 
performance. Further, protracted litigations and court battles with damaging effects on 
corporate reputation cannot be ruled out. 
 
Mergers within highly concentrated industries are generally subject to more regulatory 
scrutiny. This is particularly the case in the UK banking and utilities industry
194
. I 
empirically investigate the relationship between a firm’s industry concentration (proxied 
                                                 
194 As discussed in section 4.2, firms within the banking industry are excluded from the sample 
used in this study given the unique interpretation of the financial statements. 
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by its Herfindahl index) and its takeover likelihood. The results reveal that, as expected, a 
firm’s industry concentration is negatively related to its takeover likelihood. This can 
partly be explained by the legal protection (antitrust laws) that concentrated industries 
enjoy. Further, firms within low concentration industries (hence highly competitive 
industries) might see mergers as a way of developing a competitive potential by increasing 
market size or market power. 
 
The literature holds two contrasting views on the role of share repurchases: (1) as signal of 
undervaluation and available free cash flow and hence a tendency to increase takeover 
likelihood or (2) as mechanism to defend against takeovers by consolidating the firm’s 
shareholding (see, for example, Harris and Raviv (1988), Persons (1994), Jagannathan et 
al. (2000), Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2002), Grullon and Michaely (2004), 
Brav et al. (2005) and Billett and Xue (2007)). The empirical evidence in this study lends 
partial support to the undervaluation and free cash flow signalling perspective of the share 
repurchase hypothesis. This implies that UK managers are more likely to repurchase shares 
when they believe that the firm’s stock is undervalued or when they need to distribute free 
cash flows. This acts as a signal to potential bidders thus increasing the incidence of 
takeover bids. In summary, I find that share repurchase activity does not act as a deterrent 
to takeovers as it marginally increases a firm’s likelihood of receiving a takeover bid. The 
relationship is, however, not robust when other determinants of takeover likelihood are 
controlled for.  
 
Additionally, it is shown that two key market variables (market liquidity and stock market 
performance) have a significant effect on the propensity for firms to engage in M&A over 
time. The evidence suggests that that the propensity to engage in M&A increases as market 
liquidity (or capital availability) increases. In line with the hypotheses, I also find that the 
likelihood of acquisition increases with the emergence of merger rumours, decreases with 
the level of potential asymmetry in valuation, and decreases with financial distress. 
Nonetheless the results obtained for the merger rumours and financial distress hypotheses 
are not statistically significant when other determinants of takeover likelihood are 
controlled for.  
 
Overall, the thesis builds on the assertion that our knowledge of factors that drive the 
takeover decision can be substantially improved. I demonstrate this by identifying several 
new hypotheses for predicting takeover targets which are tested in this study for the first 
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time. The new model (developed from a combination of the new and old hypotheses) is 
tested for classification and predictive ability using ROC curve and out-of-sample analysis 
in chapter 6. The results in chapter 6 show that a model with the new hypotheses (new 
model) outperforms a benchmark model without the new hypotheses (old model). Also, the 
results show that, while some of the new variables are found to be statistically insignificant 
in the regression model, their inclusion in the model significantly improves its 
performance.  
 
While the new hypotheses substantially improve the performance of prior prediction 
models, there is no suggestion that this set of hypotheses is exhaustive. Such an argument 
will be misleading given the, arguably, low pseudo R squares and area under the ROC 
curve achieved by the model. While the new model improves upon the old model, it does 
not provide a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon. An interesting finding is the 
fact that curvilinear relationship forms can, sometimes, better capture the relationship 
between certain variables (e.g., firm size, payroll burden and leverage) and takeover 
likelihood. This suggests the need to also explore the usefulness of nonlinear models in 
takeover prediction in future research. 
 
8.2.3 Takeover prediction modelling methodology 
Besides the use of a limited set of hypotheses, there are several gaps, inconsistencies and 
biases in the methodologies employed in prior studies – some of which this research 
addresses. Some of these biases are discussed in section 2.6 and explored in chapters 5, 6 
and 7. Prior studies (including Palepu (1986), Barnes (1990, 1998, 1999, 2000), Ambrose 
and Megginson (1992), Walter (1994) and Brar et al. (2009), amongst others) have mainly 
employed matched-samples (i.e., equal number of targets and non-targets) in the 
development of the parameters of prediction models. This leads to significant survivorship 
bias as firms that are delisted, liquidated or go bankrupt are typically excluded from these 
samples. Perhaps, the main adverse effect of this strategy is that these models (developed 
from matched-samples) are not trained to distinguish between targets and bankrupt (or 
liquidated) firms out-of-sample. Moreover, the matched sample methodology masks the 
rare event problem by increasing the ratio of targets to non-targets in training samples. 
While such a strategy might be valid for understanding the characteristics of targets (as 
discussed in Palepu (1986)), it is unlikely to be effective for out-of-sample prediction. The 
alternative (adopted in this study) is to employ a panel data set in which each firm 
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contributes an observation in every year over the study period. This sampling methodology 
is standard in other areas of finance and accounting research.  
 
Further, prior studies employ arbitrarily selected test and holdout periods, with several 
studies employing a very short (usually one-year) holdout period. I empirically show that 
the use of a limited holdout period (such as one year), leads to substantial bias and non-
generalisable results. I show that takeover prediction models (old and new models) tend to 
perform better in bull periods than in bear periods. This is, perhaps, because takeovers are 
more likely to be initiated in bull periods than in bear periods. Additionally, the evidence 
here also suggests that the length (in years) of the estimation sample plays a role in 
moderating the performance of the model. I find that the models, generally, perform better 
when a longer estimation sample (more years of data) is used in developing model 
parameters. This suggests that the use of more (rather than less) years of data in the 
development of model parameters is an optimal modelling strategy. 
 
Again, some takeover likelihood modelling studies evaluate model performance by 
computing returns to predicted target portfolios but do not test whether the model predicts 
actual targets (e.g., Powell (2001), Cremers et al. (2009) and Brar et al. (2009)). The latter 
is, perhaps, a more adequate test of a prediction model’s performance195. Studies 
employing firm takeover likelihood as an independent variable in research (e.g., Cremers 
et al. (2009), Bhanot et al. (2010) and Cornett et al. (2011)) do not evaluate whether the 
prediction models developed can predict actual takeover targets. Such a test is vital to 
ascertain whether the model is effective in ascribing takeover likelihood to firms. The 
evidence from this thesis suggests that the models used in these studies are suboptimal in 
ascribing takeover probability. These models can be substantially improved by including 
relevant explanatory variables or prediction hypotheses. Moreover, studies that evaluate 
the model’s ability to predict actual targets (e.g., Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) 
and Powell (2004)) evaluate model performance against poor benchmarks (such as a 
random selection prediction approach). These comparisons are biased as a model with any 
predictive power is likely to outperform a random selection approach. Perhaps, a better 
benchmark for comparison is the performance of a suitable control model. For example, 
                                                 
195 Cremers et al. (2009), for example, find that their predicted target portfolios generate positive 
abnormal returns but these returns are not explained by the targets in the portfolio. That is, the 
returns to the portfolios do not change in magnitude when targets are excluded from the portfolio. 
This finding suggests that model predictive ability does not explain the returns (if any) to target 
portfolios 
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the research design in his study employs the old model as a control model for evaluating 
the contribution of the new variables. 
 
Several prior studies incorporate substantial look-ahead bias in their analysis by not 
recognising the time lapse between financial year-ends and the publication of financial 
results. Several prior takeover prediction studies assume that firm financial data is made 
public on the balance sheet date.  Again, studies employing a matched-sample 
methodology do not incorporate ‘timing’ – the dynamics between data availability and bid 
announcement – in the development of model parameters. The June approach is used in 
this study to incorporate these dynamics while substantially reducing any possibility of 
look-ahead bias in the analyses.  
 
Last, prior studies typically use an arbitrarily-selected method for identifying the optimal 
target portfolio from the holdout sample (e.g., the use of cut-off probabilities or deciles). In 
critique of these prior studies, I show that the results achieved by prediction models are a 
function of the method (or cut-off) for extracting the target portfolio from the holdout 
sample. For example, I find that the use of portfolio identification techniques that lead to 
larger portfolios (e.g., Port5%, quintiles and deciles) generate better results on average.  
 
Given the above sources of bias inherent in methodological choices, the true predictive 
ability of takeover prediction models can, perhaps, be observed only by averaging out the 
effect of choice. I therefore employ a more robust framework for predicting takeover 
targets and testing prediction models by taking into consideration the issues raised above. I 
employ a continuously-updated (recursive) model and evaluate its performance over a 
period of 15 years from 1995 to 2009, across different external market conditions. I 
explore different portfolio identification techniques including deciles, quintiles, 
percentiles, cut-off probabilities (developed ex-ante) and fixed portfolios (of 100 firms, 50 
firms, 30 firms and 10 firms). I compare the performance of the new models against 
control models (described as ‘the old model’) equivalent to the model used in prior studies. 
The control models are identical to the new models but employ fewer variables – the old 
prediction hypotheses. The design of the control model allows any difference in 
performance to be directly attributed to the eleven new hypotheses. 
  
As part of this study I develop a new prediction model, whose parameters (shown in table 
6.2.1a) can be used in future UK studies (or practice) to ascribe takeover probabilities to 
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firms. This new model has a superior classification and predictive ability when compared 
with previous models. The model is able to correctly predict more firms that subsequently 
receive takeover bids when compared to earlier models. The results on model performance 
are robust to several model specifications and modelling choices (discussed above). The 
model’s coefficients are also reasonably stable allowing for the same model coefficients 
(e.g., those developed in this study) to be used recurrently for up to ten years without 
substantially reducing the model’s predictive power. The importance of such a model is the 
finding that several contemporary studies use takeover probability as an independent 
variable in empirical research but the models used in these studies are, arguably, naïve. 
The model and its parameters can, perhaps, be useful to future researchers
196
.  
8.2.4 Investing in predicted targets 
As one potential application of the new model, I evaluate whether the model can be used as 
an investment tool to consistently generate positive abnormal returns for investors. The 
motivation for this test is the consensus that targets gain substantially from takeover 
announcements (see Jensen and Ruback (1983), Frank and Harris (1989), and Georgen and 
Renneboog (2003)) and the mixed findings on the subject
197
. I find that despite the model’s 
ability to correctly predict a higher number of targets than prior models, this superior 
predictive ability does not translate into consistent abnormal returns for investors. The 
portfolios of predicted targets earn significant (positive) Carhart alphas in certain periods 
(which broadly coincide with bull periods) but also earn negative alphas in other periods 
(which broadly coincide with bear periods). When the portfolios are rebalanced annually, 
the long run Carhart alphas earned from the strategy are not statistically different from 
zero. This finding is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis given that the model 
relies on publicly available information to ascribe takeover probabilities. It is also 
consistent with prior studies (such as Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell 
(2001, 2004)) but is based on a more robust methodological framework.  
 
Prior studies, generally, attribute the inability to generate positive abnormal returns to 
market efficiency. Nonetheless, to date, there has been no explanation of how market 
efficiency unfolds in this case. That is, no study (to my knowledge) has investigated why 
                                                 
196 Studies utilising default or bankruptcy risk readily adopt established models such as Taffler Z 
score and Altman’s Z score (together with model coefficients), but no such models are currently 
available for takeover risk modelling. Although stale model parameters are useful in ascribing 
takeover likelihood, fresh parameters are shown to yield more optimal results (see section 6.7.4). 
197 Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (2001, 2004) find that abnormal returns 
cannot be earned from the strategy while Walter (1994), Brar et al. (2009) and Cremers et al. (2009) 
suggest that abnormal returns can be earned by investing in a portfolio of predicted targets. 
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predicted target portfolios do not generate excess returns on average, despite the 
substantial returns to targets. Several prior studies (such as Palepu (1986), Barnes (1998, 
1999, 2000) and Powell (1997, 2001, 2004)) achieve very low model predictive abilities. 
Hence, the finding that such portfolios do not generate excess return is generally attributed 
to the failure to predict a sufficient number of actual targets.  
 
In chapter 7, I extend the literature by empirically investigating why predicted target 
portfolios are likely to earn lower-than-expected returns for investors. I investigate whether 
the mediocre performance of predicted target portfolios can partly be explained by (1) the 
presence of small poorly performing firms in the portfolios, (2) the tendency for predicted 
target portfolios to hold a high number of bankrupt firms which earn –100% returns upon 
bankruptcy declaration, (3) the poor performance of the large number of non-targets within 
the predicted target portfolios and its diluting effect on portfolio returns, (4) market 
anticipation of impending bids and its erosion of announcement period gains, and (5) the 
portfolio management strategy.  
 
Prior studies using a matched-sampling methodology (e.g., when matching by size) tend to 
bias their samples towards larger and more established firms (see Palepu (1986), Powell 
(1997, 2001), Brar et al. (2009))
198
. These studies (e.g., Palepu (1986)), however, test their 
models on a holdout sample of all firms in the population. The results from chapter 7 
suggest that the presence of small firms in the predicted target portfolio adversely impacts 
on the portfolio returns. The (positive) abnormal returns to equal weighted becomes 
statistically significant when small firms (with market capitalisation below £100 million) 
are excluded from the portfolios.  
 
Consistent with Powell and Yawson (2007), I find that predicted target portfolios tend to 
hold a high number of bankrupt firms. Presumably, these stocks earn –100% returns upon 
failure, hence, eroding any positive returns to actual targets within the portfolio. Excluding 
bankrupt firms from the predicted target portfolios leads to an improvement in the 
abnormal returns earned by these portfolios. Nonetheless, this cannot be easily achieved in 
practice. To my knowledge, no prior study in takeover prediction modelling has considered 
the effects of bankrupt firms (i.e., the –100% returns to the stock) when computing the 
returns to predicted target portfolios.  
 
                                                 
198 For example, Brar et al. (2009) exclude all firms with market capitalisation below $100million. 
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Prior studies (e.g., Powell (2001) and Cahan et al. (2011)) suggest that the poor 
performance of predicted target portfolios is due to the underperformance of type II errors 
(or non-targets) within target portfolios. Cahan et al. (2011) assert that these type II errors, 
possibly, underperform other non-targets in the population
199
. The evidence in this study 
shows that type II errors earn positive abnormal returns, on average. Contrary to Cahan et 
al. (2011), type II errors perform better than non-targets in the lowest takeover probability 
quintile (Q1). The returns to predicted target portfolios increase when non-targets are 
excluded. The long run returns to target-only portfolios are positive but not statistically 
significant. 
 
Further, prior literature has not considered the potential impact of market wide anticipation 
of impending bids on the announcement period returns to takeover targets. I find evidence 
that the market anticipates impending bids and incorporates the bid probability into the 
share prices of future targets prior to the bid announcement period. The effect is that these 
highly anticipated targets earn lower-than-expected returns in the announcement period. 
This is attributable to a ‘limited market surprise’ when the takeover bids are eventually 
announced. This can, potentially, partly explain the lower-than-expected overall return to 
predicted target portfolios.  
 
The analysis also reveals that the use of a fixed portfolio holding period (July X1 to June 
X2) together with the annual portfolio rebalancing technique further erodes the gains to 
predicted target portfolios. I confirm prior empirical evidence that targets earn negative 
returns up to three months prior to the bid announcement. Hence, the returns to fixed 
holding period portfolios are, on average, higher when the bid announcement date is closer 
to July X1 than to June X2. This is because the target underperformance prior to the bid 
announcement is captured in the portfolio if the bid announcement date is closer to the end 
of the holding period (June X2). One way of mitigating some of this negative fixed 
portfolio holding period effect is by employing a monthly portfolio rebalancing strategy. 
Such a strategy entails active portfolio management which may involve high transaction 
costs.  
 
                                                 
199 The argument advance in the study is that these type II errors (non-targets with a high takeover 
likelihood) are better-off acquired. Hence, these firms perform poorly if no takeover bids are 
received. 
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In summary, this study demonstrates that target prediction models can be improved 
through the introduction of relevant prediction hypotheses and improved empirical 
methods for prediction. The thesis highlights weaknesses in the methodologies used in 
prior studies and empirically shows how some of the choices of prior researchers lead to 
bias and non-generalisable results. I develop and adopt a more robust modelling and testing 
framework which allows for the development of a model which can better predict future 
takeover targets. This model is, perhaps, useful for key stakeholders such as regulators and 
management who may want to more fully understand the motivations underlying target 
selection or the likelihood that some firms will be subject to takeover bids in the future. 
Nonetheless, I find that if all known sources of bias are eliminated, there is no evidence 
that even an improved target prediction model can help investors to consistently ‘beat the 
market’ in the long run. Indeed, an improved prediction model appears to underperform a 
simple (old) prediction model. Overall, this thesis contributes to the literature in four main 
dimensions: (1) by extending the literature on the characteristics of takeover targets, (2) by 
introducing a more robust prediction modelling and testing framework, (3) by providing a 
simple model which can be used to ascribe takeover probabilities to UK targets in future 
research and practice, and (4) by providing some suggestions  – beyond the generic market 
efficiency argument – of why takeover prediction as an investment strategy is unlikely to 
generate high abnormal returns for investors. 
 
8.3 Implications for future research 
 
As part of this research, the impact of methodological choices (such as the length of the 
estimation period, the methodology for identifying predicted target portfolios and the size 
of target portfolios) on research results is evaluated. There are generally no strong 
theoretical arguments for selecting one method over another. I find that these choices – 
which are arbitrarily adopted by researchers – tend to substantially impact on the reported 
performance of prediction models. Based on these results, I posit that a more robust and 
unbiased approach to testing needs to recognise this influences and control for them by 
evaluating performance across the different modelling choices. This finding extends 
beyond the takeover prediction literature with implications for research in corporate event 
(such as bankruptcy) forecasting. 
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In addition, the results suggest that the use of a short holdout sample period (such as a 
year) leads to biased and non-generalisable conclusions about the out-of-sample 
performance of predictive models (see, for example, Palepu (1986), Walter (1994) and 
Powell (2001, 2004)).  This is supported by the evidence that predictive models are more 
likely to perform better in bull periods than in bear periods. This suggests that true model 
performance can, perhaps, be ascertained by testing for predictive ability across different 
market cycles and holdout periods. The emphasis should be on whether the model’s 
performance is consistent over a long out-of-sample test period. 
 
The ‘rare event’ problem (discussed in sections 2.5.3 and 2.6.2) has motivated the adoption 
of a matched-sampling approach (as opposed to a pooled-sampling approach) by prior 
researchers (e.g., Palepu (1986), Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Walter (1994), Barnes 
(1998, 1999, 2000) and Powell (1997, 2001)). The findings in this study suggest that 
contrary to previous suggestions, the use of a pooled-sampling approach is, perhaps, a 
more optimal modelling strategy. This is especially the case when the goal is to allow for 
model out-of-sample predictive power. This sampling approach allows for model 
parameters to be trained to identify potential target from a sample of firms. 
 
The evidence in this study also suggests that reliance on the old hypotheses for the 
development of prediction models by prior studies results in sub optimal models. The use 
of the new variables substantially improves the model’s explanatory and predictive ability. 
The new takeover target prediction model provides an improved method for ascribing 
takeover probabilities. I find that stale model parameters (such as those shown in table 
5.4.1) can be useful for future researchers if the goal is simply to model takeover 
likelihood. Nonetheless, fresh parameters are likely to yield more optimal results. 
 
8.4 Limitations of the study  
 
To a large extent, the methods used in the study and the results reported are robust to the 
choice of techniques applied. Nonetheless, there are a number of areas in which 
improvements can be made or the current findings extended. These are discussed below. 
 
The data for share repurchases and merger rumours is obtained from Thomson OneBanker. 
Upon analyses of this data, I find that the data is patchy and can be considered incomplete. 
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I anticipate that a database such as the Financial Times (used in Holland and Hodgkinson 
(1994) and Siganos and Papa (2012)) can provide a more comprehensive method for 
gathering information on merger rumours. This database will require manual data matching 
which was not an option in the current study given resource limitations. Some studies 
(such as Siganos (2013) have also shown that Google search volume can even provide a 
good indication of market anticipation and the existence of rumours of impending takeover 
bids. Nonetheless, this data is not available for the full period of my study. Future studies 
can therefore assess the extent to which this new data can improve our ability to accurately 
predict future takeover targets. 
 
As in several studies in accounting and finance, there is a possibility that the proxies used 
in operationalising some of the hypotheses do not fully capture the underlying concepts. I 
employ proxies which reflect the choices of prior researchers but do not fully investigate 
whether alternative proxies can better operationalise the underlying concepts. For example, 
I use GRDummy and IDummy as employed by prior studies (including Palepu (1986)) to 
proxy for growth-resource mismatch and industry disturbance, respectively. I do not find 
empirical support for either hypotheses but cannot confidently conclude that the 
hypotheses are not valid. Another example is the measurement of industry concentration 
using the Herfindahl index. While the index justifiably measures the concept of industry 
concentration, its construction in this study ignores the significant role played by private 
(non-listed) companies in industries. Due to data unavailability and insufficiency, only data 
for public companies is used to compute the index. Clearly, this might introduce bias into 
the analysis. Future studies should, perhaps, consider private companies in the construction 
of the index. 
 
Further, in line with prior studies, the book to market ratio is used as a proxy for 
undervaluation. Improved measures of undervaluation such the decomposed MTB ratio 
(Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)) and price to value measure (Dong et al. (2006)) have been 
advanced in the literature. Again, residual volatility has been used as a proxy for 
information asymmetry in this study. It is worth noting that other measures of information 
asymmetry (such as analyst forecast errors) have also been used in the literature (see 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)). While modelling bankruptcy risk using the 
Taffler Z score model is in line with prior research (see, for example, Agarwal and Taffler 
(2007)), there is a real possibility that the model inadequately operationalises the concept. 
In fact, several studies (including Shumway (2001) and Christidis and Gregory (2010)) 
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have suggested several potential improvements to this model. Future research can, 
therefore, consider extending the results of this study by exploring other more efficient 
bankruptcy prediction models. 
 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Cremers et al. (2009)), an annual rebalancing 
methodology has been applied in this study. In essence, portfolios are formed at the start of 
July each year and held to the end of June in the next year. The results from section 7.3.6, 
indicates that the use of this fixed holding period erodes some of the potential gains to the 
portfolios. Future research can consider the use of a more dynamic approach to portfolio 
rebalancing such as a monthly rebalancing methodology. This strategy might be more 
complex to execute and more expensive (in terms of transaction costs) but might generate 
better returns for investors. 
 
The industry classification system used in this study is arguably broad and, perhaps, poorly 
captures the competitive structure of some industries. For example, firms engaged in 
manufacturing are grouped under the manufacturing industry even though these firms can 
be manufacturing unrelated products. This classification system is, however, narrower than 
that employed in some prior UK studies such as Renneboog and Trojanowski (2007). It 
also extends prior studies in the takeover prediction literature (e.g., Palepu (1986), 
Ambrose and Megginson (1992), Powell (1997, 2001, 2004), Brar et al. (2009) and 
Cremers et al. (200)) which do not control for industry variations. 
 
Finally, the analysis of portfolio returns in this study (as well as prior studies) ignores the 
transaction costs involved in investing in portfolios of predicted targets. Given that an 
annual rebalancing strategy is employed, the inclusion of transaction costs is unlikely to 
significantly alter the conclusions. Given that the old model generated small positive 
returns, future studies might consider investigating how these returns are affected when 
transaction costs are considered  
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